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DISCUSSIONS
IN HISTORY AND THEOLOGY

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TO
MY MOTHER

THIS VOLUME IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED.

G. P. F.



PREFACE.

THE Essays which are collected in this volume, with a few exceptions, may be classified under three heads.

The first group, beginning with the second Essay, comprises Papers which relate to the history, polity and dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church. The Church of Rome has lately undergone two changes of great moment. The principality which the Pontiffs had ruled for a thousand years, has fallen from their grasp and been absorbed in the new kingdom of Italy; and the infallibility and supreme "power of jurisdiction" of the Pope have been defined by conciliar decree. These new aspects of the Roman Catholic system, in their historical relations, and in their bearings on religion and civil society, are among the topics here considered. How the genius and religion of ancient Rome reappear in characteristic features of Latin Christianity, is the subject of one of the Discussions in this series.

The second group of Essays relates to New England theology. Jonathan Edwards was the pioneer in a movement which was carried forward by a succession of theological leaders after him, and involved important modifications in the philosophy of Calvinism. The character of this movement—the most original in the history of Ameri-

can theology—and the peculiarities of the principal coryphæi of the New England school, I have attempted impartially to describe. While Calvinism took this turn, out of the old Arminianism—which withstood the revivalism of Edwards and Whitefield—in conjunction with other influences, Unitarianism sprang up, in its various types and with its different offshoots. This branch of the religious history of New England is the subject of the Paper on Channing.

The third division pertains to Theism and Christian Evidences. In the Essay on Rationalism, the defining characteristic of the rationalistic theory, and its radical assumption, are pointed out, and a place is vindicated for the principle of authority in religion. The discourse on Atheism indicates, without elaborately developing, points of argument which appear to me to constitute valid grounds of faith in the personality of God. In the Essay on the Apostle Paul, the threads, intellectual and spiritual, which connect the two portions of his career—separated from one another by the crisis of his conversion—are brought to light, and comments are made on observations of Renan and of Matthew Arnold. The Review of *Supernatural Religion* examines the most noteworthy reproduction, in English literature, of the modern attack by the Tübingen criticism upon the genuineness of the canonical Gospels.

Among the Essays not included in this classification, one has for its object to trace to its origin the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve, and to sketch the rise and progress of the civil wars in France, down to that epoch; a second aims to set forth the history of the doctrine of future punishment in the church—in particular, the opinions and

arguments of modern theologians on that subject; a third describes the position taken by the Church of England in reference to other Protestant Churches, in the age of the Reformation and subsequently. In the dissertation last mentioned, the relations of the Protestant leaders to one another in the different European countries, in the sixteenth century, are incidentally exhibited.

G. P. F.

NEW HAVEN, *March* 30, 1880.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW.*

FRANCE, in the age when Protestantism was spreading in Europe, found herself in a place where two seas met. If the ship of state did not go to pieces, like the vessel which threw St. Paul upon the coast of Malta, it had to struggle through a long and frightful tempest from which it barely escaped. In the other European countries the situation was different. There was intestine discord, but not to the same extent ; or with consequences less ruinous.

In Germany, the central authority was too weak to coerce the Lutheran states. The war undertaken by Charles V. for that purpose was brief, and comparatively bloodless. The final issue was the freedom of the Protestants for a long period, until imperial fanaticism, in the early part of the seventeenth century, brought on the terrible Thirty Years' War, which exhausted what was left of the vitality of the German Empire, and ended in the establishment of Protestant liberties at the Peace of Westphalia (1648). In England, as late as Elizabeth's reign, not less than one-half the population preferred the old Church ; but in the wars of the Roses, the nobles had been decimated, and regal authority strengthened ; and the iron will of the Tudor sovereigns, Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, coupled with an inbred hatred of foreign rule, ecclesiastical and secular, and supported by

* An Article in *The New Englander* for January, 1880.

the fervent love of a great party to the Protestant faith, kept the nation on one path, and stifled various attempts at insurrection, which might otherwise have blazed up in civil war. In Scotland, the league of the nobles with the reformers, aided by the follies of Mary Stuart, proved strong enough to uphold against the opposing faction the revolution which had made Calvinism the legal religion of the country. In Sweden, Protestantism speedily triumphed under the popular dynasty erected by Gustavus Vasa. In the Netherlands, there was a fierce battle continued for the greater part of a century; but the contest of Holland was against Spain, to throw off the yoke that she was determined to fasten upon that persecuted and unconquerable race. In Italy and in the Spanish peninsula, Protestantism did not gain strength enough to stand against the revived fanaticism of its adversary, and was swept away, root and branch.

In general, it may be said that in the north, among the peoples of the Teutonic stock, the preponderance was so greatly on the side of the Protestants, that the shock occasioned by the collision of opposing parties was weakened and unity was preserved; while in the south, among the Romanic peoples below the Alps and the Pyrenees, the Catholic cause had a like predominance in a much greater degree, and overwhelmed all opposition. But, as for France, she stood midway between the two mighty currents of opinion. Her people belonged, in their lineage and tongue, to the Latin race; but they had somewhat more of German blood in their veins than their brethren in the south, and—what is much more important—by their geographical situation, previous history, and culture, they were made much more sensitive to the influences of what was then modern thought.

Yet, France was a powerful and compact monarchy, and seemed better able than any other country to breast the storm. On the 1st of July, 987, Hugh Capet, Count of Paris, elected king by an assembly of nobles, superseded the

foreign Carolingian line, and was crowned at Rheims. From him all the later kings of France—the Bonaparte usurpers alone excepted—the direct Capetian line, the Valois, Bourbon, and Orléans monarchs, down to the abdication of Louis Philippe, are sprung.* Out of the dominion of Hugh Capet, the small district known as the Isle of France, of which Paris was the centre, there was built up in the course of centuries, by the accretion of feudal territories, by lucky marriages, by treaties or conquest, the modern kingdom of France. The wars with England which went on, with many intervals, for 250 years—from the end of the twelfth century to the middle of the fifteenth—resulted at the end of this period, largely through the heroic deeds of Joan of Arc, in the expulsion of the English from every place except the single town of Calais. Normandy, Guienne, and all the other territories which had been held by the victors of Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt, who were more than once the almost undisputed masters of France, fell back to their native and rightful owners. Toward the close of the fifteenth century, the crafty policy of Louis XI. effected the downfall of Charles the Bold, and secured to France the Duchy of Burgundy. From the King of Aragon he acquired, on the south, the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne, the last of which was permanently incorporated in France. Anjou, Maine, and Provence reverted to him from the house of Anjou, together with the claims of that family upon Naples. Charles VIII., son of Louis XI., married Anne, the heiress of Brittany, and so this fine province was added to the jewels of the French Crown.

Francis I., who ascended the throne in 1515, two years before the posting of Luther's theses, had a consolidated kingdom powerful enough to enable him, a few years later, to cope on equal terms with his rival, Charles V. At home,

* The Valois line begins with Philip VI. (1328); the Bourbon with Henry IV. (1589); the Orléans with Louis Philippe (1830).

he could set at defiance the will of his parliaments, and augment his authority through the Concordat with Pope Leo X., which secured to the king the power of filling by nomination the great ecclesiastical benefices in his realm. During the thirty-two years of his reign, and the twelve years' reign of his son and successor, Henry II., the Protestants could offer only a passive resistance to the persecution which was instigated and managed by the Sorbonne—the Faculty of Theology at Paris—and which found myriads of brutal agents throughout the land. Francis, and Henry after him, with one arm aided the German Lutherans in their contest with Charles V., and with the other crushed their French brethren of the same faith. "One king, one law, one faith," was the motto. There must be one and only one religion tolerated in the realm. Yet Protestantism, notwithstanding its long roll of martyrs, and partly by means of them, had gained a firm foothold before the death of Henry II.

The revival of learning, which in other countries paved the way for the reform in religion, was not without its natural fruit in France. Francis himself was proud of being called the Father of Letters ; cherished the ideas of Erasmus ; founded the college of the three languages at Paris, in spite of the disgust and hostility of the doctors of theology, the champions of mediævalism ; drew to his side from beyond the Alps men like Leonardo da Vinci, scholars and artists ; protected his sister Margaret in her Protestant predilections ; and contributed not a little, indirectly, notwithstanding his occasional cruelties, to the diffusion of the new doctrine. Henry II. was more of a bigot ; but he followed his father's policy of joining hands with the Protestant communities of Germany, in opposition to Charles.

The first converts to the Reformation in France were Lutherans ; but Lutheranism was supplanted by the other principal type of Protestantism. Calvinism was more congenial to the French mind. Calvin was himself one of the most acute and cultivated of the Frenchmen of that age.

Driven from his country, he continued to act upon it from Geneva with incalculable power. Geneva became to France what Wittenberg was to Germany. The lucid, logical, consistent character of the system of Calvin commended it to the French mind. The intense moral earnestness and strict ethical standard of that system attracted a multitude who were shocked by the almost unexampled profligacy of the age. Among the higher classes, and still more among the industrious and intelligent middle classes, the Calvinistic faith had numerous devoted adherents. In 1559 the Calvinists held their first national synod at Paris. Their places of worship, scattered over France, numbered at that time two thousand; and in their congregations were four hundred thousand worshippers, all of whom met at the risk of their lives. That same year, Henry II., who had just agreed with Philip II., in the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, to exterminate heresy, and to give his daughter in marriage to the Spanish monarch, was accidentally killed by a splinter from the lance of Montgomery, the captain of his guards, with whom he was tilting at the festival in honor of the wedding.

The whole posture of affairs was now changed. His oldest son, Francis II., was a boy of sixteen, feeble in mind and body. He was not young enough to be made subject to a regency; and too young, had he been possessed of talents and character, to rule. Who should govern France? Catherine de' Medici, the widow of Henry; she to whom, more than any other individual, as we shall see, the massacre of St. Bartholomew was due, thought that the power for which she had long waited was now within her grasp. The granddaughter of the great Lorenzo de Medici, and the daughter of Lorenzo II., she was left an orphan in her infancy, and was placed in a convent. Her childhood was encompassed with perils. When her uncle, Pope Clement VII., was laying siege to Florence, in 1530, she being only twelve years old, the council of the city proposed to hang her in a basket over the wall, as a mark for the besiegers' cannon. About

ten years after, she was married to Henry, the second son of Francis I., in pursuance of an arrangement between the Pope and the king, which grew mainly out of the king's want of money. The death of the Dauphin placed her husband within one step of the throne. She was obliged to pay obsequious court to the mistresses of the king and of her husband, the Duchess D'Etampes and Diana of Poitiers. Henry regarded her with a feeling little short of repugnance. Under this feeling, and disappointed that she bore him no children, he entertained, at one time, the thought of sending her back to Italy. This was prevented by her own submissive demeanor, and by the favor of Francis I. Later, after the birth of her children, her situation became more tolerable. She professed to be utterly devoted to her husband, mourned his death with real or affected grief, and would never ride or drive near the spot where he received the fatal wound.

Catherine de Medici is generally considered an execrable character, an impersonation of the principle of wickedness such as rarely appears on earth, especially in a female form. History has put her in the pillory among monsters of iniquity, like Domitian, Nero, Cæsar Borgia, enemies and destroyers of their kind. It is hardly possible to dispute the justice of this verdict. Yet she was not destitute of attractive qualities. On the ceiling of a room in the old Burgundian chateau at Tanlay, Catherine is painted as Juno, with two faces, one of which is described as "masculine and sinister," while the other is full of "sweetness and dignity." She might seem to have a dual nature. Her complexion was olive, bespeaking her Italian birth. She had the large eyes peculiar to the Medici family. Her hand and arm are said to have been "the despair of the sculptor," so faultless was their model. She was of medium height, large, but compactly made. Her figure was admired even in middle life. She required and was capable of the most vigorous out-of-door exercise. In the chase she dashed on through stream and

thicket, keeping up with the boldest riders. Then she would give herself up with a hearty appetite to the pleasures of the table; but she arose from it to apply herself with untiring energy to business. Her manners were lively and gracious; her conversation full of spirit and intelligence. She has left behind numerous monuments of her taste in architecture—the palace of the Tuileries owed its beginning to her. Her versatility and tact were equal to any emergency. Her letters to her children are those of a sympathetic mother. She was personally chaste, little as she valued chastity in others. But at the core, as Milton says of Belial, all was false and hollow. It was the grace of the leopard, serving as a veil for its ferocity. Beneath exterior accomplishments, and charms even, was a nature devoid of moral sense. She was swift to shed blood, when a selfish end required it. But falsehood, and the treachery that springs from it, was her most loathsome trait.

To comprehend the possibility of such a character, we must remember the spirit of the age, and the atmosphere in which she grew up. In the famous church of Santa Croce, at Florence, where are the sepulchres of Michael Angelo, Galileo, Alfieri, and the cenotaph of Dante, the attention of the visitor is arrested by an impressive epitaph. High up on the smooth face of a marble monument stands the name NICOLAUS MACHIAVELLI. Below, where the inscription would naturally come, there is a broad space left untouched by the chisel; beneath which are carved the words: "*Tanto nomini nullum par elogium*"—"To so a great a name no eulogy is adequate;" as if the pen had been dropped in despair, for want of words commensurate with the genius and merits of the statesman, scholar, and historian, whose name had been recorded. Yet the word "Machiavellian" has become a current term to denote knavish intrigue, double-dealing, and fraud. It would be unjust to Machiavelli to brand him as the inventor of the ethical code which he has set forth in "The Prince." This work, which was written for Lorenzo,

the father of Catherine, deliberately advises rulers to break their word, whenever they find it convenient to do so. It presents a fair picture of that base public morality of the fifteenth century, which had grown up in the conflicts of the Italian States, and under the eye of the Popes, some of whom were its notorious exemplars. The Machiavellian spirit tainted the public men of the sixteenth century; in some degree, the best of them, as William the Silent, and the Regent Murray of Scotland. As for assassination—that in Italy had been almost reduced to a fine art. The grandfather of Catherine, Lorenzo I., barely escaped from a murderous attempt, which proved fatal to his brother Julian, who fell under the dagger of an assassin before the high altar of the cathedral of Florence, during the celebration of mass—Pope Sixtus IV. being, probably, the chief contriver of the plot. Catherine de Medici was an Italian woman, born and nurtured under the influences that then prevailed, constrained from childhood to cloak her thoughts and impulses, and developing, under the unhappy circumstances in which she was placed prior to the death of her husband, the cleverness and cunning that belonged to her nature. She was destined to be the mother of three kings of France, and to play a conspicuous and baleful part in a most eventful period of French history.

At the accession of Francis II., the Queen Mother naturally felt that the hour for the gratification of her ambition had arrived. But she was disappointed. She found that the king and his government were completely under the sway of the family of Guise, in the person of Duke Francis, and of his brother Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine—the knight and the priest, the lion and the fox united. Claude of Lorraine, their father, was an opulent and influential noble, who had distinguished himself in the wars against Charles V. His son Francis, who was now forty years of age, had acquired brilliant fame by his defence of Metz against the Emperor, whom he forced to raise the siege after a loss of 30,000

men, and also by the recent capture of Calais from the English. The Cardinal had been the confessor and trusted counsellor of Henry II. The power of the family had been increased by matrimonial connections. Their brother had married a daughter of Diana of Poitiers. Their niece, Mary Stuart, the daughter of James V. of Scotland, had, in the preceding year, when she was sixteen years old, married Francis II., who was about a year younger than herself. Her beauty, her tact, accomplishments, and energy, were cast on the side of the Guise influence. With her aid, her uncles found no difficulty in managing the boy-king. Catherine was obliged to stand back, and yield up the station that she had long coveted. The Constable Montmorenci, who, with his numerous relatives, had shared power with the Guises in the last reign, was civilly dismissed from his post.

The Guises, in whose hands everything was practically left, set themselves up as the champions of the Roman Catholic cause, and the enemies of the Protestant heresy. But their path was not to be a smooth one. The princes of the house of Bourbon—descendants of a younger son of Louis IX., St. Louis of France—considered that they were robbed of their legitimate post at the side of the throne. Anthony of Vendôme, the eldest, was the husband of that noble Protestant woman, Jeanne D'Albret, the daughter of Margaret, the sister of Francis I., and through his marriage wore the title of King of Navarre. He proved a vacillating and selfish adherent of the Protestant party, which he at length was bribed to desert. His younger brother, Louis of Condé, who had married a niece of the Constable, and a devoted Protestant, was a gallant soldier, but rash in counsel. With the Bourbons stood the Chatillons, the sons of Louisa of Montmorenci, the Constable's sister; of whom the most eminent was the Admiral, Gaspard de Coligny, one of the greatest men of that or of any age. He was of middle height, with his head slightly bent forward as if in deep

thought. His spacious forehead reminds one of the portraits of William the Silent, to whom in character he had many points of resemblance. He spoke little, and slowly. In battle, his grave countenance lighted up, and he was observed to chew the toothpick, which, to the disgust of a class of courtiers, he habitually carried in his mouth. Frequently defeated, he reaped hardly less renown from defeats than from victories. He rose from them with unabated vigor. His constancy never wavered in the darkest hour. He embraced the Calvinistic faith; and whether in the court, the camp, or among his dependents on his own estate, his conduct was strictly governed by the principles of religion. His reserve and gravity, in contrast with the vivacious temper of his countrymen, commanded that respect which these qualities, even when not united with remarkable powers of intellect, usually inspire in them, as we see in the case of Napoleon III.

Here, then, in the middle of the sixteenth century, in France, were all the materials of civil war. It was inevitable that the Calvinists, harassed beyond endurance, should league themselves with the disaffected nobles who offered them the only chance of salvation from their persecutors, and whose religious sympathies were on their side. Thus the Huguenots became a political party. The nation was divided into two bodies, with their passions inflamed. A tempest was at hand, and there was only a boy at the helm.

The conspiracy of Amboise, which occurred in 1560, was an abortive scheme, of which a Protestant gentleman named La Renaudie was the chief author, for driving the Guises from power. Condé was privy to it; Calvin disapproved of it; Coligny took no part in it. The next year the Estates assembled at Orleans, and a trap was laid by the Catholic leaders for the destruction of all Protestants who should refuse to abjure their religion. Condé had been arrested and put under guard, when, just as the fatal blow was ready to fall, the young king died. Charles IX., his

brother, was only ten years old, and it was no longer practicable to shut out his mother from the office of guardian over him, and from a virtual regency. From this time she comes to the front, and becomes a power in the State. Mary Stuart returned to Scotland, and on another theatre entered upon that tragic career which ended on the scaffold at Fotheringay. The Queen Mother was now free from her dangerous rival. Through her whole career, tortuous and inconsistent as it often seemed, Catherine de Medici was actuated by a single motive—the purpose to maintain the authority of her sons and her own ascendancy over them. To check and cast down whichever party threatened to acquire a dangerous predominance and to supplant her, was her incessant aim. Caring little or nothing for religious doctrines, she hated the restraints of religion, and hence could regard Calvinism only with aversion. But how indifferent she was to the controversy between the rival churches is indicated by her jocose remark, when the mistaken report reached her that the Protestants had gained the victory at Dreux: “Then we shall say our prayers in French.” She believed in astrology, and that was about the limit of her faith. To rule her children, and to rule France through them, was the one end which she always kept in view.

The civil wars began in 1562 with the massacre of Vassy, where the troopers of Guise provoked a conflict with an unarmed congregation of Protestant worshippers, many of whom they slaughtered. Ten years intervened between this event and the massacre of St. Bartholomew; years of intestine conflict, when France bled at every pore. Neither party was strong enough to subjugate the other. The patience of the Protestants had been worn out by forty years of sanguinary persecution. The battle on both sides was waged with bitter animosity. The country was ravaged from side to side. The Catholics found it impossible to crush their antagonists, who revived from every disaster, and extorted, in successive treaties, a measure of liberty for

their worship. Among the events which it is necessary for our purpose to mention is the assassination of the Duke of Guise by a Huguenot nobleman in 1563, while the Duke was laying siege to Orleans, then in the hands of the Protestants. This act met with no countenance from the Protestant leaders. It was condemned by Calvin. It was said that the assassin, when stretched on the rack, avowed that the deed was done with the connivance of Coligny. But he was subjected to no fair examination, and there was no reason to doubt the assertion of the Admiral that he had no agency in it. He admitted that for six months, since he had learned that Guise was plotting his own destruction and that of his brothers, he had made no exertions to save that nobleman's life. Innocent though Coligny was of all participation in this deed, it planted seeds of implacable hostility in the minds of Guise's family, the fruits of which eventually appeared. Another event, which it specially concerns us to notice, was the insurrection of the Huguenots which they set on foot several years later, in anticipation of a projected attack upon them, and which resulted in their extorting from Charles IX., in 1568, the Peace of Longjumeau. The king was exasperated at being obliged to treat with his subjects in arms. This humiliating event was skilfully used afterward to goad him on to a measure to which he was not spontaneously inclined.

At this time the foundations of the Catholic League were laid. The extreme Catholics began to band themselves together, instigated by the spirit of the Catholic reaction which, through its mouthpiece, the Pope, and its secular head, Philip II., breathed out fire and slaughter against all heretics. Between this bigoted faction, which became more and more furious as time went on, and the Huguenots, were the Moderates—the Politiques, as they were called—Catholics who deplored the continuance of civil war, deprecated the undue ascendancy of Spain, and were in favor of an accommodation with the Protestants. The treachery of Cath-

erine de Medici broke the treaty of Longjumeau ; but her plan to entrap and destroy the Huguenot leaders failed. Their defeat at Jarnac, where Condé perished, and at Montcontour, with the military triumph of her favorite son, the Duke of Anjou, did not bring to her content. The defeated forces of the Protestants, under the masterly lead of Coligny, found a refuge within the walls of Rochelle, where the Queen of Navarre established her court, and whence Coligny, with his cavalry, and with the young princes, Henry of Navarre and Henry of Condé at his side, was soon able to sally forth and take the offensive. The Queen Mother was now eager for peace. The atmosphere of intrigue and diplomacy was always more pleasing to her than the clash of arms. The king's treasury was exhausted. He did not relish the military successes of Anjou. The Huguenots sprang up from their defeats with indomitable courage. Moreover, Catherine, the king, the whole party of Moderates, saw that the continuance of the strife could only redound to the profit of Philip, who lent aid or withheld it, with sole reference to his own ambitious projects. If the war was to go on between the king and his Protestant subjects, the latter would get help from England and Germany, and the government, forced to fall back upon the support of Spain, would come into practical subservience to Philip. To this the Queen Mother was not at all inclined. At the Conference of Bayonne in 1565, both she and Charles IX. had disappointed Alva by refusing to enter into his plan for a common crusade against the heretical subjects of France and Spain. Thus, in 1570, the Peace of St. Germain was concluded. The Huguenots, who could not longer be expected to trust the king's word, were put in possession of four fortified towns for the space of two years: They were, to be given up to Henry of Navarre, Henry of Condé, and twenty Huguenot gentlemen. The Lorraine faction, the Guises and their followers, acquiesced in the treaty.

Observe, now, the political situation. The policy of the

court was turned in the anti-Spanish direction. The power of Philip was becoming too formidable. The Duke of Alba had begun his bloody career in the Netherlands in 1567 with the execution of Egmont and Horn, and numerous other judicial murders. Now, his tyranny was at its height. Philip had planned a marriage between his half-brother, Don John of Austria, and Mary Stuart, which would give him, as he hoped, control over Scotland and England both. He was already supreme in Italy. His wish was to marry his sister to Charles IX., and to unite with him in an anti-Protestant coalition. Then all Europe would lie at his feet, and France be practically a Spanish province. On the 25th of February, 1570, Pius V., an untiring and un pitying instigator of persecution, issued his bull of excommunication against Elizabeth. A year after, the brilliant victory of Spain over the Turks at Lepanto still further raised the *prestige* of Philip, and left him more free to pursue his ambitious schemes in Western Europe. The Queen Mother loved power too well for herself and her children, to fall into the snare which Philip was setting. She entered warmly into the project of a marriage between her second son, the Duke of Anjou, and Elizabeth, which was first suggested by the brother of Coligny. When Anjou, seduced by the Spanish court, and by the offer of 100,000 crowns from the Pope's Nuncio, drew back from a match with a heretic so much older than himself, Catherine was eager to substitute for him his younger brother Alençon; and indulged also the chimerical hope that Anjou might secure the hand of Mary Queen of Scots. This policy of the court could not be otherwise than satisfactory to the Huguenots. War with Spain, to be fought out in the Netherlands, in alliance with England and Germany, but with due care for French interests, appealed at once to their patriotic feeling and their religious enthusiasm. The government and the Huguenot party were thus drawn toward each other. A marriage between Henry of Navarre and Margaret of Valois, the daughter of Cath-



erine, had been spoken of long before, prior to the death of Henry II., when both Navarre and Margaret were children. The idea was now revived from the side of the Moderates, by a son of Montmorenci. It was heartily favored by Catherine, warmly supported by the king, who was personally fond of Henry, and was struck with the expediency of a marriage which would thus unite the contending parties; and it obtained at length the consent of the high-toned Queen of Navarre, with whom worldly distinction for her son was of far less account than honor and religious conviction. Coligny and the other Huguenot leaders lent their cordial approval to the plan.

Coligny was now urgently invited to come to the court. The king and the Queen Mother were anxious to have the benefit of his counsel. Despite the opposition of his friends, including the Queen of Navarre, who were unwilling to see him commit himself to the hands of those who had been, in the past, his perfidious enemies, Coligny determined to comply with the invitation. He confided in Charles, he said; he would rather die at once, than live a hundred years, subject to cowardly apprehensions. He earnestly desired to bring the civil conflict to an end. He was full of ardor for the enterprise against Philip, in the Netherlands, into which he hoped to carry the king. It would give employment to the numerous mercenaries and marauders whom the cessation of the war at home had left idle. It would strike a blow, alike honorable and useful to France, and damaging to Spain. Coligny left Rochelle, escorted by fifty gentlemen, and arrived at Blois, where the court was, on the 12th of September, 1571. He was welcomed by Catherine, and by the king, who greeted him with the title of "father," and declared that day to be the happiest of his life.

Charles was twenty-one years of age. His natural talents were above the ordinary level. He was fond of music, and his poetical compositions were not without merit. But the education which he had received was the worst possible.

His nature was unhealthy, and utterly unregulated. Though not a debauchee, like his brother Anjou, his morbid impulses raged without control: his anger, when excited, bordered on frenzy. Yet there was in him a latent vein of generous feeling. He met in Coligny, almost for the first time in his life, a man whom he could revere. Coligny was fifty-four years of age. He had been a man of war from his youth up; but he had drawn the sword from a stern sense of duty; and his lofty character could not fail to impress all who were thrown in his company. He, in turn, seemed to be charmed with his young sovereign. The jealousy of Catherine was soon aroused. "He sees too much of the Admiral," she said, "and too little of me." As the veteran soldier painted the advantages that would result from going to the rescue of William of Orange, and striking a blow at Spain in the Low Countries, the sympathy of Charles was awakened, and he expressed an eager desire to enter personally into the contest.

Meantime, the project of the marriage of Henry and Margaret continued to be pushed. The Queen of Navarre was persuaded herself to come to Blois, in March, 1572. While there, in a letter to her son, she described the indecency of the court, where even the women had cast off the show of modesty, and did not blush to play the part of seducers. The marriage of Henry and Margaret, the plan of a matrimonial connection with Elizabeth, the scheme of an offensive alliance with England, and of a war with Spain, to be waged in Flanders, were all parts of a line of policy which the Huguenots urged, and which Catherine for a while favored. But she became more and more alarmed at the influence acquired by Coligny. Elizabeth was cautious, and the negotiations looking to a change of the defensive into an offensive alliance, lagged. A war with Spain, Catherine felt, would establish Coligny's ascendancy over the mind of Charles. Such a war she more and more dreaded on its own account; and when the force secretly sent by Charles, under Genlis,

to the support of Orange, was defeated and cut up by Alva's son, the Queen Mother declared herself vehemently against the measure on which Coligny rested all his hopes for France, and towards which the king, in his better moods, was strongly inclined. In the council, the party opposed to the war was led by Anjou. He, with Catherine, Retz, Tavannes, and others to support him, was able to keep back the king from an absolute decision; and thus, through the spring and early summer of 1572, the question was warmly, and sometimes angrily, debated. The death of the Queen of Navarre at Paris, on the 9th of June, was one cause for the postponement of the wedding of her son to the 18th of August. The refusal of the Pope to grant a dispensation was another hinderance. The king was resolved to effect the marriage, with or without the Pope's consent. A forged letter, purporting to come from Rome, announcing the consent of Gregory XIII., the new Pope, to the nuptials, was exhibited by Charles to the Cardinal of Bourbon, who had refused to solemnize the marriage without the papal authorization.

In subsequent years Henry IV., the Conqueror of Ivry and the Restorer of Peace to France, looked back on the 8th of July, 1572, as one of the brightest days in all his tempestuous career. On that day he made his entry into Paris, riding between the king's two brothers, and accompanied by Condé, the Cardinal of Bourbon, the Admiral Coligny, and eight hundred mounted gentlemen. The procession, however, was greeted with little enthusiasm by the crowd that filled the streets. Paris was the hot-bed of Catholic fanaticism. In all the treaties which had given liberty to the reformed worship, the capital had been excepted. Here the enmity of the populace to the Huguenots was rancorous in the extreme. All the pulpits in those days rang with fierce invectives against the heretics. Guise, with his mother, the Duchess of Nemours, and with a great military following, came to Paris also. The Huguenots had no protection but

their own vigilance, their swords, and, above all, the good faith of the king, against the host of enemies by whom they were surrounded.

On the 18th of August the long-expected marriage took place. The splendid procession, composed of the royal family and the nobility of France, moved along a covered platform from the Bishop's palace to the pavilion erected in front of Notre Dame, where the ceremony took place. The bride, whose beauty and grace of person unhappily were not associated with moral qualities equally winning—for she was untruthful and vain, if not something worse—describes her own costume—her crown, her vest of ermine spotted with black (*couët d'hermine mouchetée*), all brilliant with pearls, and the great blue mantle, whose train of four ells in length was carried by three princesses.* Charles, Navarre and Condé, in token of their mutual affection, were dressed alike, in garments of light yellow satin, embroidered with silver, and glittering with pearls and precious stones. Micheli, one of the Venetian ambassadors—accurate reporters—states that the cost of the king's bonnet, charger, and garments, was half a million crowns; while Anjou wore in his hat thirty-two well-known pearls, purchased at a cost of 23,000 gold crowns. All this, when the royal treasury was exhausted! Navarre led his bride from the pavilion into the church; and then, during the celebration of mass, with the Huguenot chiefs withdrew to the adjacent cloister. De Thou, the French historian, who was then a youth of nineteen, after the mass was over, climbed over the barriers erected to keep off the people, went into the choir, and heard Coligny, pointing to the flags taken at Jarnac and Moncontour, say to Damville that "soon these would be replaced by others more agreeable to see;" alluding to the war in Flanders, on which his thoughts were bent. The next few days were given up to festivities—"balls, banquets, masques and

* *Mémoires de Marguerite de Valois*, in *Petitot's Collection*, tom. xxxvii., p. 48.

tourneys," into which Navarre entered with zest, but which were equally offensive and tedious to the grave Coligny, who longed to be away, and who vainly tried to draw the king's attention to the business which lay nearest his heart. Charles put him off. He must have a few days for pleasure; then the admiral should be gratified.

Five days after the wedding, on Friday, the 22d of August, at a little past ten in the morning, as Coligny was walking between two friends from the Louvre to his own lodgings, an arquebus was discharged at him from a latticed window of a house standing near the cloister of St. Germain l'Auxerrois. At the moment he was in the act of reading a petition. He was hit by a bullet on the first finger of the right hand; another bullet entered his left arm. With his wounded hand he pointed out the window whence the shot had come, and directed an attendant to inform the king. He was then conducted to his lodgings. The king, vexed and enraged, threatened vengeance upon the guilty parties. His surgeon, Ambrose Paré, was sent, who amputated the finger, and extracted the ball from the arm. Navarre, attended by hundreds of Huguenot gentlemen, soon visited the admiral. Condé and other Huguenot leaders waited on the king, and demanded leave to retire from the court, where their lives were not safe. Charles begged them to remain, and swore vengeance upon the perpetrators of the deed.

The authors of the attempt to assassinate Coligny were Catherine de Medici, and her son, the Duke of Anjou, in conjunction with the Duke of Guise and his mother. The house belonged to a dependant of Guise; the weapon, which was found in it, to one of Anjou's guards. The instrument who was employed to do the work was Maurevel, who, a few years before, had been hired to kill Coligny, at a time when a price was set on his head, but had murdered one of his lieutenants, Mouy, in his stead.

In the year following the massacre of St. Bartholomew,

Anjou—afterward Henry III.—was elected king of Poland. In the narrative which he is said to have given verbally to Miron, his physician, we are furnished with an account of the motives and causes of the transaction in which he bore so guilty a part. The reporter, Miron, states that when Henry III. was on his way to Poland, in the cities of the Low Countries, wherever a crowd was assembled, he was saluted with bitter execrations in German, French, and Latin, for his agency in the massacre; and that in apartments where he was entertained and lodged, he found paintings depicting scenes in that fearful tragedy, which had been arranged beforehand to meet his eye. Hence, two days after his arrival in Cracow, he was kept awake in the night by the recollection of the terrible occurrences which had thus been brought to his mind. Restless and agitated, about three hours after midnight, he summoned Miron from an adjacent room to his bedside, and related to him there the story of the origin of the massacre. According to this statement of Henry III., Charles, in the period just before the Navarre marriage, was in frequent conference with Coligny; and after those long conferences, the king treated Anjou and his mother in a very frigid and even rough manner. On one occasion, as Anjou was entering the king's apartment, after one of these interviews, Charles looked at him askance in a fierce way, and laid his hand upon the hilt of his dagger, so that he was glad to escape precipitately from the king's presence. Convinced that Coligny was undermining the king's regard for them, the Queen Mother and Anjou resolved to destroy him; and for this end called in the aid of the Duchess of Nemours—the widow of Guise, and an Italian by birth—whose vindictive hatred of the Huguenot leader made her a willing coadjutor. Maurevel, who had abundant cause to fear the Chatillons, was pitched upon to do the deed. When the attempt had failed, the king after dinner—he dined at eleven—went to visit the wounded admiral. Catherine and Anjou took care to go with him. While they were

in the Admiral's chamber, he signified his wish to speak with the king privately. Anjou and his mother retired to another part of the room. Alarmed at the way in which this private conference was prolonged, and at the menacing demeanor of the throng of Huguenot gentlemen, who treated them with less than usual respect, Catherine stepped to the bedside, and, to the obvious disgust of the king, broke off the conversation—saying that Coligny must not be wearied, that there was danger of fever, and that a future time must be chosen for finishing their talk. Whatever may be false in this narrative of Henry III., or may be omitted from it, the main circumstances of the interview are correctly given. Coligny thought that the bullets might have been poisoned, and he wished to give his dying counsel to the sovereign. On the way back to the Louvre, Anjou proceeds to say, Catherine by her importunity wrung from the king the avowal that the admiral had warned him of the fatal consequences that would follow from allowing the management of public affairs to remain in her hands, and had advised him to hold her in suspicion, and to guard against her. This the king uttered with extreme passion, implying that he approved of Coligny's advice.

There was good ground for the consternation of the Queen Mother and of Anjou. A crisis had come for which they were not prepared. The wrath of the Huguenots was ready to burst forth in an armed attack upon the opposite faction. They were restrained only by the king; and even he was resolved to punish to the full the assailants of Coligny. If the Guises fell, the ascendancy of the Huguenot chief, who would recover from his wounds, was assured. But the punishment which the king threatened might fall on Anjou, also, if not on Catherine herself. Nothing was left to her but to make another desperate effort, with the aid of counsellors as unprincipled as herself, to win back the king, resume the control over him which she had exercised from his childhood, and to enlist him in the work of destroying the

Admiral and of breaking down the Huguenots' power of resistance. After noon on Saturday, she collected about her, in anxious conclave in the Tuileries, besides Anjou, the Count de Retz, the Chancellor Birogne, the Marshal de Tavannes, and the Duke de Nevers; three of whom were Italians like herself, with no scruples about assassinating an enemy, and with whom deceit and mystery lent an added fascination to crime. With these men, the Queen Mother repaired to the Louvre, to the cabinet of her son. There she made, with all her energy and skill, her last and successful onset upon him. She avowed her own agency, and that of Anjou, in the attempt upon Coligny. But first she declared to him that the Huguenots were everywhere arming to make themselves masters of the government; that the Admiral was to furnish 6,000 cavalry and 10,000 Swiss; that the Catholics in turn had lost all patience, and would instantly combine in a league to supplant him and seize on power; that there was no deliverance but in the death of Coligny, without whom the Huguenots would be left destitute of a leader. She reminded Charles of the insurrection when, at Meaux, they had nearly got possession of his person—a recollection that always excited his anger. When she saw that he did not yield; that he could not bring himself to give up Coligny and his friends—La Rochefoucauld, Teligni, and others—she begged—almost breathless, in her feigned despair—that she and Anjou might have leave to withdraw from the approaching ruin—to retire from the court. To retire, as he well understood, meant to join themselves to the Catholic faction, soon to be in arms against him. At last she taunted him with fear of the Huguenots. Then he gave up; and in the fury of his vexation, wild with excitement, bade them kill not the Admiral alone, but all the Huguenots in France, that none might be left to reproach him. Such is the statement of Henry, who thus attributes the general massacre to the suggestion of the king. But Tavannes—or the son in the memoirs of his father—relates that the recommendation

of the council was to slay all the Huguenot leaders: he asserts that Navarre and Condé were spared by his own intercession. Catherine must have foreseen that the murder of Coligny, which could only be effected by open violence, would lead to a general slaughter, or to a bloody encounter between the forces of the two parties, resulting in a great loss of life. If she did not first recommend the general massacre, she consented to the plot, and joined in the execution of it.

The plan being formed, the requisite orders were promptly given. Guise took it in hand to destroy the admiral. Chanon, the Provost of Merchants, and with him Marcel his predecessor, on whose influence and cruel disposition more reliance was placed, were summoned, and commissioned to shut the gates of the city so that none could go out or come in, to arm the people, and have them in readiness in their proper wards. The organized soldiery were conveniently disposed under their commanders. A conspiracy and threatened rising of the Huguenots were the pretext for these arrangements; but the soldiers and the leaders of the mob needed no such inducement to reconcile them to the task of putting to death the heretics. As the dawn approached, Guise, with the bastard Angoulême, a son of Henry II., moved with a strong force silently through the streets to the lodgings of the admiral, where the king's guards, who had been stationed there for his protection, were ready to side with the assassins. Coligny heard the tumult; divined its nature; calmly commended his soul to Christ; told his friends that he was ready to die; bade them escape, and was pierced with the swords of the hired murderers who flung his body from the window upon the pavement, that Guise might be satisfied that the work was completely done, and trample on the lifeless hero whom he had hated. Guise had ordered that every true Catholic should tie a white band upon his arm, and fasten a white cross to his hat. A distinguished painter, Millais, has depicted, in

"The Huguenot Lover," a scene that might naturally have occurred. A maiden, in whose countenance tenderness is mingled with terror, is gazing up into the face of her lover, about whose arm she is trying to bind a white scarf—which he gently but firmly resists. The houses of the Huguenots were registered; there was no difficulty in finding the victims.

At early dawn the great bell of Saint Germain l'Auxerois tolled out the signal, and the slaughter began. Even the hard-hearted Marshal Tavannes, who superintended the soldiery, says: "Blood and death fill the streets with such horror that even their majesties, who were the authors of it, within the Louvre cannot avoid fear; all the Huguenots are indiscriminately slain, making no defence; many women and children are slain by the furious populace; two thousand are massacred." Catherine de Medici and her two sons had come to the front of the Louvre "to see the execution commence." This same Tavannes, with savage ferocity, cried to his men: "Kill, kill! bleeding is as good in August as in May!" The Protestant noblemen who were near Coligny, placed there for his defence, were murdered. La Rochefoucauld, who had spent the previous evening with the king until 11 o'clock, and whom Charles had tried to detain for the night in order to save him, was stabbed to the heart. Teligni, Coligny's son-in-law, a man beloved by all, was butchered by a valet of Anjou. Brion, the white-haired preceptor of the Marquis of Conti, the young brother of Condé, was massacred in the arms of the child, who begged in vain that the life of his teacher might be spared. Among the killed was Peter Ramus, a renowned scholar and philosopher, who was detested as a Protestant and as an opponent of Aristotle, and fell a victim to the jealousy of his rival, Charpentier. Private revenge and avarice seized on the occasion to strike down those who were hated, or whose property was coveted.

Among the most revolting features of the massacre were

the part taken by women and children in the work of death, and the brutality with which the corpses of the dead were mutilated, and dragged through the streets. The tumult, as a writer has said, was like that "of hell. The clanging bells, the crashing doors, the musket shots, the rush of armed men, the shrieks of their victims, and high over all the yells of the mob, fiercer and more pitiless than hungry wolves, made such an uproar that the stoutest hearts shrank appalled, and the sanest appear to have lost their reason." * On the evening before, Margaret of Valois had been bidden by her mother to retire to her own room. Her sister Claude caught her by the arm and begged her not to go, an interference which Catherine sharply rebuked. "I departed," says Margaret, "alarmed and amazed, not knowing what I had to dread." She found the King of Navarre's apartments filled with Huguenot gentlemen, talking of the demand which they would make of the king, the next day, for the punishment of the Duke of Guise. At dawn, her husband went out with them to the tennis-court, to wait for Charles to rise. She fell asleep, but an hour later was awakened by a man calling out, "*Navarre*," "*Navarre*." The nurse opened the door, when a wounded gentleman, pursued by four soldiers, rushed in and flung himself upon her bed. She sprang up, followed by the man, who still clung to her—as it soon appeared, for protection. The captain of the guards was fortunately at hand. He drove out the soldiers, and the life of the wounded man was saved. The friends, guards and servants of Navarre and Condé were slain. Two hundred bodies lay under the windows of the palace. They were inspected, at a later hour, by the ladies of the court, who commented on them with a shameless indecency, that would be incredible were it not attested by good evidence. The princes themselves had been summoned to the king's chamber. Charles, excited to fury, de-

* Henry White: "Massacre of St. Bartholomew," p. 413.

manded of them to abjure their heresy. "The mass, or death!" he cried. Navarre, politic though brave, reminded him of his promises, and required time to consider. Condé firmly refused. Three days were given them in which to make their decision. They finally conformed, to save their lives; and these converts made in this way were graciously accepted by the Pope. In the course of the massacre, there were many who narrowly escaped death. A little boy, the son of La Force, saw his brother and father killed, and lay, pretending to be dead, all the day under their bodies, until he heard from a bystander an expression of pity for the slain, to whom he revealed himself, and was saved. Sully, afterward prime minister of Henry IV., then in his twelfth year, escaped almost by miracle.

The slaughter once begun, could not easily be stopped. Several days passed before the scenes of robbery and murder came to an end. Capilupi, who wrote his account immediately after the massacre, under the direction of the Cardinal of Lorraine, referring to Sunday, the principal day, says: "It was a holiday, and therefore the people could more conveniently find leisure to kill and plunder." Orders were sent to the other principal towns of France, where the massacre of the Huguenots was carried forward with like circumstances of cruelty. Not less than twenty thousand persons of both sexes, and of every age, were killed in obedience to the command of the court.

On the first evening after the massacre, the king had sent out messages, ascribing the whole to a conflict of the hostile houses of Guise and Châtillon. Soon it was found necessary, as well as expedient, to assume the responsibility for the dreadful transaction, and to declare that the massacre was made necessary by a dangerous conspiracy of the Huguenots against the king and government. To carry out this false pretension, several of the Huguenot leaders, who had escaped with their lives, were put through the forms of a judicial process, convicted, and executed. Henry of Na-

varre was compelled to be one of the spectators of the death of these innocent men.

In all Protestant countries, the report of the great massacre called out a feeling of unmixed reprobation and horror. Burghley told La Mothe-Fénelon, the French ambassador, that "the Paris massacre was the most horrible crime which had been committed since the crucifixion of Christ." John Knox said to Du Croc, the French Minister in Scotland; "Go, tell your king, that God's vengeance shall never depart from him nor from his house; that his name shall remain an execration to posterity; and that none proceeding from his loins shall enjoy the kingdom in peace unless he repent." The Emperor Maximilian II., Catholic though he was, expressed the strong condemnation which was felt by all whose hearts were not hardened by sectarian animosity. On the contrary, in Rome and in Madrid, the seats of the Catholic Reaction, there was joy and thanksgiving. Philip II., who, it is said, laughed aloud for the first time in his life, was profuse in his congratulations. The event was celebrated at Rome by the ringing of bells, bonfires, and solemn processions. An inscription over the church of St. Louis, where a *Te Deum* was chanted, described Charles IX. as an avenging angel, despatched from heaven to sweep his kingdom of heretics. A medal was struck by Gregory XIII. to commemorate the massacre—bearing on one face the inscription "*Hugonotorum Strages*"—Slaughter of the Huguenots—together with the figure of an avenging angel engaged in destroying them. Three frescoes were painted by Vasari in the Vatican, according to the Pope's order, describing the attack upon the Admiral, the king in his council plotting the massacre, and the massacre itself. This painting bears the inscription: *Pontifex Colignii necem probat*—the Pope approves the killing of Coligny. It is pretended by some that the authorities at Rome were deceived by the story of a Huguenot conspiracy against the

king's life, which the massacre prevented from being carried out. But Charles did not bring forward this story until the 26th of August. On the 24th, he wrote to his ambassador at Rome—Ferraz—that the slaughter resulted from a conflict of the two families of Guise and Châtillon. Salviati himself, the Nuncio of the Pope, said that no person of sense believed the tale of a conspiracy. The Nuncio's despatches put the Court of Rome in immediate possession of the real facts. The Cardinal of Lorraine claimed at Rome that the massacre was the product of long deceit and premeditation. The circumstance that Muretus, in his inhuman panegyric of the murderers, delivered in Rome four months after the event, charges a conspiracy upon the slain Huguenots, does not prove that anybody believed it. It is probable that few, if any, were deceived by the fiction of a Huguenot plot—an afterthought of Catherine and the king. The exultation at Rome and Madrid was over the destruction of heretics, and the downfall of the anti-Spanish party in France. The rejoicings of the Vatican were kept up, after the massacre at Paris, as the reports of the continuation of the tragedy reached Rome from other parts of the kingdom. It was simply a fanatical joy over the murder of apostates from the Roman Catholic religion.

The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, like the whole course of events in the sixteenth century, was due to a mingling of political and religious motives. It was not political ambition and rivalry alone, nor was it religious fanaticism alone, that gave rise to this terrible event, but both united. But personal motives were, also, closely interwoven with these agencies. The principal, most responsible author of the crime, was Catherine de Medici. It sprang out of her jealousy of Coligny's influence, and her fear of being supplanted. Anjou, her companion in guilt, was moved by the same inducements. Their confederates, Henry of Guise and his mother, were instigated by revenge, mingled with the

ambition and resentment of political aspirants who saw themselves on the verge of a downfall. But the instrument by which these individuals accomplished their design was the fanaticism which the reactionary Catholic movement had kindled in the populace and soldiery of Paris. It was religious malignity that sharpened their daggers, and found vent in the fiendish yells that resounded through Paris on that fearful night. The slaying of heretics had never been rebuked by their religious teachers, but only encouraged and applauded. The thanksgivings at Rome were the proper sequel of the exhortations which had been sent forth from the same seat of authority.

Was the Massacre of St. Bartholomew contrived long beforehand? So it was once thought. Davila, and other Italian writers, declared this to be the fact. To them, the event would have been shorn of a great part of its interest, if it did not occur as the result of a long and intricate plot. Even the authors of the crime, to account for the sudden reversal of their attitude toward Spain and for their previous acts of hostility against Philip, were willing to countenance this interpretation of their conduct. The Huguenots, on whom the blow fell like a thunderbolt, and who had a right to consider those murderers of St. Bartholomew capable of infinite falsehood, naturally took this view. The treaty of St. Germain, the marriage of Navarre, the collecting of the Huguenot leaders in Paris, the offensive demonstrations in the Low Countries, were elements in a diabolical scheme for their destruction. Yet this theory was undoubtedly erroneous. Philip and Alva had been right in expecting a war with France. Not only the Navarre marriage, but the negotiations with Elizabeth respecting marriages and an alliance, were undertaken with a sincere intent on the part of Charles IX. and Catherine. The theory of a long premeditation of the great crime, and that all these transactions, stretching over two years, were steps in a deep-laid plot, is confuted by an irresistible amount of circumstantial evidence,

and by the authentic testimony of Tavannes and Anjou, chief actors in the tragedy. The spell which Coligny had cast upon the mind of the king, whom he had impressed so far as to persuade him to enter into war, was what determined Catherine de Medici to bring about the death of the Admiral by the agency of the Guises. She probably anticipated that vengeance would be taken by the Huguenots upon these leaders of the Catholic faction; but for that she did not care. The fall of the leaders on both sides would strengthen her power. When the Admiral was wounded, instead of being killed; when she saw that he survived with undiminished and even increased influence, and that her and Anjou's complicity in the attempt could not be concealed, she struck out another programme.

All this appears to be established by conclusive proofs. And yet, on the other hand, there are facts going to show that the thought of cutting off the Huguenot leaders had long haunted Catherine's mind; and that she even shaped the course of events in such a way as to enable her, if she found it expedient, to convert this thought into a definite purpose, and to carry it out in the deed.

The destruction of the Huguenot chiefs, as a means of paralyzing and crushing their party, had been recommended to her by Philip as early as 1560. At Bayonne, Alva had given her the same counsel. He had himself acted on his theory in the treacherous seizure and execution of Egmont and Horn. These things must have made the idea familiar to Catherine. In 1570, the Venetian Ambassador says that it was generally thought that it would be enough to strike off five or six heads. It is, at least, a curious coincidence, that Catherine declared, after the massacre, that she took on herself the guilt of the murder of only six. It was Catherine who insisted that the wedding of Navarre should be at Paris. Other points she was willing to waive; but not this. What was her motive, unless it was to collect the Huguenots in a place where they would be in her power?

In January, 1572, the Papal Legate wrote to Rome, that he had failed in all his efforts; yet there were some things, which he could only verbally report, which were not wholly unfavorable. Cardinal Salviati, a Florentine, a relative of the Medici, and intimate with Catherine, had informed Pius V. that there was a secret plan favorable to the Catholics. After the massacre, Catherine reminded the Nuncio of the word that she had sent to the Pope, that he would see how she and her son would avenge themselves on the Huguenots.

Facts of this nature appear to contradict the conclusion to which the general current of evidence leads us. They justify the inference, not that Catherine had resolved upon the deed, but that she was glad, even while pursuing an opposite policy, to provide herself with the means of doing it. Other princes of that day—Queen Elizabeth, for example—were fond of having two strings to their bow. While pursuing one policy, Elizabeth was fond of holding in her hand the threads of another and opposite line of conduct. In this double intent of Catherine de Medici, we are presented, as Ranke has said, with a psychological problem, such as one occasionally meets with in historical study. It is like the question of Mary Stuart's participation in the murder of Darnley. These are problems which the philosopher and the poet are most competent to solve. They require, as the same great historian has said, an insight into the deep and complicated springs of action in the soul—the profound “abysses where the storms of passion rage,” and where strange and appalling crimes have their birth. It would seem as if, in the brain of this devilish woman, whose depth of deceit she herself could hardly fathom, there were weaving at once two plots. While she was moving on one path, she was secretly making ready, should the occasion arise, to spring to another. If all should go well in amity with the Huguenots, she would be content; but if not, they would be helpless in her hands. Not only was she double-tongued, but she was double-minded; there was duplicity in her in-

most thoughts and designs. But this occult thought, which finally developed into purpose and act, was confined to herself. The king had no share in it. Like Pilate, he gave consent. His crime was that he yielded to the pressure brought upon him by his inhuman mother and her confederates, and authorized a crime a parallel to which can be found only by going back of all Christian ages, to the bloody proscriptions of heathen Rome.*

It is interesting to glance at the fate of the authors of the massacre. Less than two years after, on the 30th of May, 1574, Charles IX. died. On his death-bed, his brief intervals of sleep were disturbed by horrible visions. He suffered from violent hemorrhages, and sometimes awoke bathed in blood, which recalled to his mind the torrents of blood shed by his orders on that dreadful night. In his dreams he beheld the bodies of the dead floating upon the Seine, and heard their agonizing cries. Anjou—Henry III.—more guilty than he, mounted the throne. But Guise, his rival, the idol of the League, stole away the hearts of the people. He enjoyed the reality of power, and there was danger that he might get the crown too. On the 23d of September, 1588, in the chateau of Blois, where the Estates were assembled, Henry of Guise was invited to the cabinet of the king. As he crossed the threshold, by the order of Henry III. he was stabbed and thrown down by men belonging to the king's body-guard, and after a short but desperate resistance, was killed at the foot of the king's bed. The Cardinal of

* On the question whether the massacre had been planned long before, there are three opinions. That it was so planned is maintained, among others, in an elaborate argument by Sir James Mackintosh, in his *History of England*, vol. iii. That there was no such premeditation is, at present, the more general opinion. It is clearly set forth by Professor Baird, in his recent *History of the Rise of the Huguenots*. The middle view which attributes to the Queen Mother a dual plot, is that maintained by Ranke, and appears to me to match best the evidence, collectively taken. Extracts from Salvati's despatches, as copied by Chateaubriand, are in the Appendix of Mackintosh, vol. iii.

Lorraine, the brother of Guise, was seized and executed. The Cardinal of Bourbon was placed under arrest. Catherine de Medici was at this time laboring under a mortal illness. Her son had renounced her counsels, power had slipped from her hands, and she had become an object of general aversion and contempt. Her apartment was directly under that in which Guise had been struck down, and the sounds of the deadly struggle reached her ears. When she learned what had occurred, she saw that the murder boded no good to the king. She rallied her strength and visited the Cardinal of Bourbon. He charged everything upon her; she could not rest, he told her, until she had brought all to the slaughter. In this scene, pale and haggard—like the wife of Macbeth, “troubled with thick-coming fancies that keep her from her rest”—she appears on the stage for the last time. In full view of the danger that impended over her son, and of the ruin of her house, she expired. Soon Henry III. was obliged to fly from the anathemas of the Sorbonne, and the wrath of the League, to the camp of Henry IV. There, on the 1st of August, 1589, a fanatical Dominican priest, Clément, by name, came to him, pretending to have secrets of importance to communicate. The king bent his ear to listen, but was immediately heard to cry out: “Ah! the villainous monk—he has killed me!” Clément had drawn a knife from his sleeve and buried it in his body. Henry lingered for eighteen hours; and then the last of the four principal conspirators who planned the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the last king of the line of Valois, died.

THE OLD ROMAN SPIRIT AND RELIGION IN
LATIN CHRISTIANITY.*

ANCIENT Christianity passed through three consecutive stages : it was first Jewish, then Greek, then Latin. Greek Christianity and Latin Christianity each became permanent, but diverged from one another, and grew at length to be distinct. Each of these types of Christianity planted itself among new nations, and underwent a development of its own—in the case of Latin Christianity, a development full of vitality, and entering as a prime element into the growth of European civilization.

Christianity was at first of necessity Jewish. Its founders were of that nation. It had an organic connection with the religion and life of the Hebrew people. Jerusalem was the metropolis of the church in the apostolic age. It still remained "the Holy City." Thither the apostles resorted as to a common hearth-stone, and there one or more of them almost constantly resided. To the church at Jerusalem perplexed and disputed questions, like that of the requirements to be made of gentile converts, were naturally brought. There was the mother-church, to which the Christians scattered abroad turned with somewhat of the same feeling with which the Jewish diaspora had looked to their Judean brethren. To that church the apostle to the gentiles, tenacious as he was of his independence, chose to carry reports of his missionary labors, and to manifest his loyal regard by bringing to it from afar contributions of money for the relief of the poor.

* An Article in *The Princeton Review* for January, 1880.

But Christianity rapidly passed beyond the Jewish period. An Asiatic religion in its origin, it was destined to find the most hospital welcome and most secure abode in Europe. The gentile converts rapidly preponderated in number over the Jewish. The obsolescent character of the Old Testament rites was more and more clearly discerned. Circumcision and sacrifice were seen to be things of the past, and national privileges and distinctions melted away in proportion as the spiritual and universal character of the Gospel—a religion not for the Jew only, but for man—was distinctly perceived. The crushing of the Jewish nationality by the overwhelming power of the Romans precipitated the completion of the great change. The soldier of Titus who, on the 15th of July in the year 70, flung a blazing brand into the Temple, was an unconscious instrument of Providence for breaking up the Judaic centre of Christianity. That act was a signal of a new order of things, marking the dissolution of the bond which held the church in a certain dependent relation to Jewish Christianity.

For the century that followed the capture of Jerusalem by Titus and the death of Paul and of Peter, Christianity was everywhere predominantly Greek. The canonical gospels, with the possible exception of the first, were written in that language, and the Hebrew original of Matthew was early superseded by a Greek edition of that gospel. The apostles wrote their epistles in that cosmopolitan language, the common vehicle of communication wherever they went. Religious services, even among the Christians at Rome, were in the Greek tongue. Theological discussion was carried forward almost exclusively by Greeks. It was long before any important writer of Latin extraction, or employing the Latin in his works, appeared. Not only Clement of Alexandria, and Origen after him, but Justin Martyr, the most conspicuous of the Apologists of the second century, and Irenæus, who was born in Asia Minor, but was a bishop at Lyons and the most eminent literary adversary of Gnostic



heresies in that period, were Greek writers. The first theological author of note who wrote in Latin was the North African father, Tertullian, early in the third century. His style, though its peculiar roughness springs in part from his impetuous fervor and the *brusquerie* of his temper, shows how ill-adapted the Latin was to serve as a medium for Christian thought and for theological debate, compared with that flexible and subtle language in which the truths of the Gospel had before been incorporated. Theological activity in the early centuries continued predominantly on the Greek side. The discussions of the Trinity and of the person of Christ, which gave rise to the great councils of Nicea, Constantinople, and Chalcedon, were carried forward in the East. When Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, and the other cities of the East resounded with the din of theological strife, the West was, for the most part, little more than a passive spectator of the conflict. All the while, however, Latin Christianity was growing up into distinct life, and the Roman See was gathering to itself power. Whilst the East was spending its energies in warfare upon the profound and intricate themes of speculative theology, the West was cementing its polity, and quietly accepted every opportunity to augment the authority of its chief bishop. One means of the advancement of his power was the consideration with which he was regarded by the discordant parties, who not unfrequently, from motives of policy, vied with one another in efforts to win his countenance and support.

During this whole formative period, and down to the extinction of paganism, the church was exposed to heathen influences. Christianity, to be sure, was from the first aggressive. There was a perpetual conflict between the new faith and the devotees of the old religion. The Gospel was to act as a leaven in the midst of pagan society, rejecting what was evil, and permeating and preserving what was right and innocent. But what security was there that the discrimination would always be correctly made? If there was asceticism

on the one hand, might there not arise a lax liberalism, an unwarrantable accommodation and indulgence, on the other ? The disciples were not taken out of the world ; would they be wholly kept from the evil that is in it ? Would not heathenism, which was entwined with every institution of society, which in a thousand forms confronted the Christian from his infancy to old age, which had inwoven itself, so to speak, in the whole texture of life, succeed in silently infusing something of its spirit, its beliefs, and its customs into the Christian community ? Would the Christian creed be maintained incorrupt ? Would Christian worship keep up its pure, spiritual character ? Would Christian conduct be kept free from the demoralizing effect of heathen education and example ? If we find traces of paganism in ancient Christianity, there is no occasion for wonder, and it is no just ground of reproach against Christianity itself. Rather does the Gospel show its intrinsic vitality in not being stifled by doctrines and ceremonies heaped upon it, though alien to its nature, and in eventually proving itself sufficient to purify itself of these foreign, corrupt elements, thus regaining its native purity.

The church was far more exposed to the infection of heathen opinions and practices after it grew in numbers, and especially after the conversion of Constantine, when it became dominant, and remained, save during the brief period of Julian's reign, the religion of the empire. In the first three centuries, the martyr-age of the church, it stood forth as a persecuted sect, and was far less likely to catch the spirit or imitate the ways of the worshippers by whom it was subjected to imprisonment, torture, and death, either by the instrumentality of magistrates, or because left by them a victim to the violence of fanatical mobs. In the field of theology the church had early roused itself against the swarm of heresiarchs and heretical sects which sought to amalgamate Christianity with Greek speculation and the fantastic dreams of Oriental philosophy. The battle with Gnosticism was

fought and won. Judaizing Christianity had likewise received its death-blow, and its pertinacious votaries, pushed outside the pale of orthodoxy, had been left to prolong their existence as isolated, heterodox parties. It must not be forgotten that heathenism was virtually overcome, the complete triumph of Christianity was insured, before the faith and worship of Christians had undergone essential depravation through the retroactive influence of paganism. Comparatively speaking the first three centuries were pure. The victory of the Gospel was practically achieved by legitimate means. It was a victory fairly won. It was not by incautious compromise, it was not by timid surrender, that the Christian religion gained that firm footing in the Roman world from which it could not have been dislodged. The old religion was put on the road to extinction in the better and purer era which followed the first introduction and dissemination of the Gospel. The fourth and fifth centuries are the period when the baleful influence of heathenism was chiefly felt; and it was during this period that tendencies in the wrong direction, which, so far as they had existed previously, were kept within bounds, attained to a rank development. Constantine himself, in the mingling of Christian and heathen opinions, tempers, and practices—the admixture of gospel faith and pagan superstition—which belonged to his character, was no unfit type of the mixed system which both his personal example and public policy tended to foster. It was in the fourth and fifth centuries that the rage for ecclesiastical miracles manifested itself. Then these supposed miracles were multiplied far beyond anything of the kind in the preceding period. This single feature of these later centuries may be taken as one sign of the altered temper of the church. After the emperors professed Christianity, it became popular with the indifferent and self-seeking, who found their profit in adopting the religion of the cross. The inducements held out to produce conversion, in the shape of court patronage, offices, and

other mercenary appeals, brought into the church a multitude of insincere or selfish proselytes. The ambition to swell the ranks of the baptized, stimulated many to make concessions to heathen tastes and preferences, and to purchase a superficial adhesion by a toleration of pagan customs, or by the introduction of usages not dissimilar to them. To not a few an immediate, seeming success was more attractive than a slower but more thorough advance. As the dread of heathen opposition passed away, the teachers of Christianity grew less vigilant, and concessions were insensibly made, such as threats and violence had not been able to extort. It was far more easy to withstand a direct attack than an infection.

In treating of the influence of heathenism upon the church, several cautions are requisite :

1. It is to be observed that similitude in the case of religious phenomena does not always imply identity of origin. Beliefs, ceremonies, may exhibit a striking resemblance where there is no genetic connection. It is often rash to infer that an opinion or rite is derived from a particular quarter simply on the ground of likeness. The common source may be in impulses of human nature itself. The generic qualities of man being the same in all times and in every latitude, it would be surprising if in the religious sphere, as elsewhere, there should not frequently be a marked likeness in the actions of the human mind, whether the spring of them be sound or corrupt. The historical student perpetually meets with similar religious phenomena, with opinions, sects, and rites, in places and times remote from one another, and under circumstances where no communication can possibly be assumed. In the same community such phenomena may arise independently. There may be an epidemic where there is no contagion. No one familiar with the history of religion can inspect a village of Shakers, in Massachusetts, without being reminded of other societies, such as the Jewish Essenes, the Egyptian Thera-

peutæ, and numerous widely-scattered monastic communities which have existed under the shield of the church or in the ancient ethnic religions of the East. Yet there is no genetic bond between these modern sects in New England and the various communities referred to. The same impulses of human nature which generated any one of these communistic societies might give birth to any other. The Oxford Tractarian movement of the present century—to take another illustration—was Judaizing in its spirit. Dr. Arnold saw in it the very thing which the Apostle Paul denounced in the Epistles to the Galatians and Colossians. There was the same misconception of the Gospel, the same attempt to amalgamate with it heterogeneous principles. Yet the leaders of Puseyism stood in no direct line of connection with the Judaizing party which gave Paul so much trouble. Those leaders did not learn their lesson, they did not borrow their distinguishing tenets, from their ancient prototypes. Tendencies of the mind which were rife in the early days of Christianity revived and bore their natural fruit independently, and under circumstances quite different. Whately wrote a book in which he traced, with his usual sagacity, the corruptions of Romanism to their origin in certain appetencies of human nature.

2. The points in which the church in the patristic age departed from the spirit of primitive Christianity result not wholly from the influence of heathenism, but in an important degree from the adoption of characteristic principles of the ancient Jewish Church. Roman Catholicism is, in some essential features, a return to the old dispensation. It is a restoration of parts of the Old Testament religion which the Gospel abolished. These discarded elements, outgrown in the later stage of Revelation, and giving way in the Gospel to something better, insensibly came back and incorporated themselves in the conceptions of Christian people and in the institutions of the church. This is eminently true of the prime corruption of Christianity, the doctrine of a special

mediatorial priesthood—a class of heaven-appointed intercessors, and almoners of divine grace. Peter, in whom hierarchical supremacy is supposed to have first inhered, and by whom it is thought to have been transmitted to the successive bishops of Rome, himself styled his fellow-disciples generally “a chosen generation, *a royal priesthood*, a peculiar people,” whose office and privilege it was to celebrate the praises of God (1 Peter, ii. 9). This distinction of an immediate access to God which of old had belonged exclusively to the priests who ministered in the Temple, was made by Christ the prerogative of all believers. But more and more, as the church receded from the apostolic age, and the absolutely gratuitous character of forgiveness became obscured, the instinctive craving for priestly mediation led to a perversion of the Gospel, to the surrender of the exalted distinction conferred on all Christians, and to the imputation to the clergy of an office analogous to that of the Aaronic order. The ramifications of this erroneous idea, securing thus a lodgement in the Christian mind, were far-reaching. Its effects on the constitution of the church, on the prerogatives of the ministry, and on Christian worship and life, were grave and enduring. Now this revolution, silently accomplished in the first centuries, was, as I have said, Judaic in its character. Not that it was due to the conscious efforts of a Judaizing party, existing by itself and deliberately pursuing this end. The Judaizers, whose explicit effort it was to assimilate Christianity to the Old Testament system, had been foiled. They had been vanquished. Pauline Christianity gained the ascendancy over its adversaries. The authority of the Apostle Paul, in the second century as well as in the third, was held in due respect by the churches, and was disparaged only by sectaries and factions. But the Judaic transformation of which we are speaking crept in after this first great contest had been decided and the right side had triumphed. It arose in connection with a gradual transformation of theology in a legal direction, and as a

consequence of the quiet but powerful operation of general causes. The Old Testament Scriptures were in the hands of the early Christians. They were read in the churches. They were quoted—at first with more verbal accuracy than the writings of the apostles. The relation of Christ to Moses, of the new dispensation to the old, was not accurately defined. Even now Christian theologians do not always agree in formulating this relation. The Gnostics had assaulted the Old Testament, and disparaged the ancient church and religion with which the Gospel was known and felt to be somehow organically connected. These circumstances, however, would have been quite insufficient to produce the revolution to which we have adverted, had not the natural, spontaneous desire of human, visible mediation rendered the notion of a special priesthood congenial to the minds of men. The elevation of the ministry to the rank of a priesthood did not arise, then, from a formal usurpation on their own part. It was due mainly to a willing descent of the people to a lower plane of religion, which was guided and accelerated by the example of the system that was present to their eyes on the pages of the ancient Scriptures. The classical heathenism, therefore, is only in a very limited degree responsible for the intrusion of this idea, so portentous in its bearing on the history of the Christian church.

3. It is not to be inferred forthwith that everything which the church took up from the environment in which it was placed was of the nature of corruption. The theory of development, as it is expounded by Dr. Newman, although it requires much correction and qualification, contains in it a kernel of valuable truth. Christianity and the church were not something absolutely fixed and immovable within limits set about them at the start. Christianity was to unfold its contents in contact with humanity, and to stamp with its approval whatever was true and good in the thinking and life of the communities into which it was to enter, and which it was to leaven with its spirit. The church was not rigidly

shut up to an inflexible method of polity or to an established round of worship. It might lawfully adapt itself to national peculiarities; it might conform itself to all the varying circumstances in the midst of which it was to do its work. That work was to regenerate, not to extinguish, humanity. The truth on this subject seems to be that development must take place, if it take place aright, on the lines sanctioned in the New Testament, and also that on these lines nothing must be pushed to excess. Mozley, in his acute review of Newman's Essay, has shown that the natural tendency to exaggeration and excess is sufficient of itself to engender corruption if this tendency is not held in check. It is not sufficient that a particular sentiment is in itself innocent; it becomes evil and dangerous the moment it is pushed into undue prominence or allowed to expand itself beyond measure. There is a source of corruption which is distinct from the mingling of false ideas—germs intrinsically pernicious. For example, the worship of the Virgin, which we find in the church of the fourth and fifth centuries, may be called, and is called by Dr. Newman, the development of the sentiments entertained towards Mary by the early Christians, by whom she was regarded as the most blessed of women. But was it not an excessive, an unhealthy, a pernicious expansion of a feeling which was right and wholesome only when kept within a definite limit? Rashness may be called a development of courage, foolhardiness and audacity the offshoot of boldness, timidity the product of prudence, stinginess of frugality, etc. There are many plants which need to be trimmed, and whose growth must be kept down; otherwise their fruit is bad. The conclusion is that whatever in the theology, the polity, the ethics, or the ritual of the church is at variance with the injunctions, or with the more intangible genius and spirit of the New Testament, is worthy of condemnation. Whatever is not thus antagonistic to the standard, even though it may not be explicitly set forth there, is amenable to criticism, to be sure, but is not

of necessity to be discarded. Between things enjoined and things forbidden there is a middle district, where, in the absence of written law, there is no guide but a wise Christian judgment.

It was the whole church, the church in the East as well as the West, that was modified by the influence of heathenism in the early ages. We have to notice both the effects which were due to the antique spirit in general, to which Christians were everywhere exposed, and which left its mark upon Greek as well as Latin Christianity, and also, more particularly, the effects upon Latin Christianity, owing to the peculiar conditions in which it was placed. There was a general heathen influence, and a peculiar Latin influence superadded. The world in which the Gospel was disseminated was Græco-Roman. Notwithstanding all that tended to render "the monarchy of the Mediterranean" homogeneous, there was always an East and a West, separated, to be sure, by a fluctuating line, but characterized distinctly by the prevalence in the one of the Greek and in the other of the Latin influence. The division of the empire into the Eastern and Western, and later the corresponding division of the church, was not merely geographical, but was based on an essential diversity of character. Accordingly, the bent of theology was different in the East from that which was prevalent in the Western mind. Ecclesiastical organization and life shaped themselves differently in the countries where the Latin tongue and the spirit of Rome had sway; so that the Latin Church is a fit designation of the church of the West. So Latin Christianity is obviously diverse in character from the German or Teutonic Christianity, which finally broke loose from the tutelage of Rome, and at the Reformation separated itself, by a line nearly coincident with the race-division, from the Latin communion. To this last contrast we shall soon advert again. There are several points in which the distinctively Latin spirit transmitted itself to the Latin Church.

1. We see plainly in the Latin Church the Roman genius for rule—the capacity and disposition to exercise authority. This quality, which Virgil attributes to his countrymen as a native trait,* and which the growth of Roman power and its long duration illustrate, appears to have passed over to the Roman Church and its bishops. A recently-recovered passage of the earliest extant Christian writing after the apostles—the Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians—contains an admonition, almost authoritative in its tone, addressed to them by the Roman Church, in whose name Clement wrote. To be sure, had not circumstances all conspired to favor the upbuilding of the Roman ecclesiastical supremacy, no such domination could have arisen. But with the same truth it may be said that the talent and spirit of rule were an equally indispensable condition. The love of order, the will to check insubordination wherever deference and obedience are conceived of as obligatory, were tendencies of the Roman mind which appeared in full vigor in the incumbents of the chair of St. Peter.

For the papacy remained an Italian institution. It was built up, and its policy was moulded, by men in whom the old Latin spirit never died out. Leo I., at the crisis when the empire was falling in ruins about him, wielding the sceptre of spiritual supremacy over distant provinces; interposing to protect society from anarchy; going forth to the camp of Attila to save Rome from his destroying host, and endeavoring, even though with but partial success, to shield the Romans from Genseric and his Vandal army; Gregory I., exercising his pontifical rule in the midst of political tumult and disorder, and sending forth missionaries for the conquest of new nations to the faith; Hildebrand, insisting on the right of the church to govern itself independently of lay authority; demanding of king as well as priest absolute submission; sitting for days in the castle of Canossa, while

* *Æn.* vi. 847-853.

an emperor stood without in the court-yard praying for admission; Innocent III., giving away crowns, and despatching his legates to lay kingdoms under the Interdict—in these great ecclesiastics, the leaders and rulers of men, the old Roman dictators and proconsuls seem once more to have clothed themselves in flesh. There can be no doubt that from an early day the bishops of Rome found it more natural and easy to assume authority for the reason that Rome was their abode. It had been a place of authority with which no other seat of power, ancient or modern, can be compared. It seemed to be only right and natural that Rome should rule. It was an association that affected the minds of the incumbents of the Roman See, as well as of the peoples whose allegiance they claimed.

2. Closely allied to the quality just mentioned is what we may call the idea of imperialism. How easy it was for the Latin mind to associate this idea with the church! To unify the church by combining all its parts in a common subjection to Rome was a thought natural to Roman Christianity. The empire and the church were conceived to be each the counterpart of the other. In making Rome the capital of the empire, God had intended that it should be the metropolis of the church. Peter and his successors were to be to the ecclesiastical commonwealth what the Cæsars had been to the civil. The emperors of the West in the fifth century lent their aid to the propagation and practical realization of this idea. When everything tended to disintegration, the rulers of the state welcomed the unifying influence of the Roman ecclesiastical supremacy. "Peace"—so runs a law of Valentinian III., in 445—"Peace can be universally preserved only when the whole church acknowledges its ruler." This was a policy directly contrary to that of the Byzantine princes in relation to the Eastern church, whose independence they destroyed. When the Western empire was broken up, and while it was so curtailed in its boundaries as to embrace only Germany and Italy, the outlying

countries, long accustomed to the idea of imperial unity, saw no substitute for it except the spiritual rule of the popes. Roman, imperialism contributed, in a variety of ways, to engender and sustain imperialism in the church.

3. The most conspicuous among the features of the Latin Church which it inherited from old Rome was the legal spirit. The comparative indifference with which the ancient Latin Church looked on the controversies in speculative divinity which convulsed the East, and the ardor with which the same Latin Church, in the fourth and fifth centuries, plunged into the discussions pertaining to the doctrines of sin, of free-will, and of the operation of divine grace, have often been pointed out. Mr. Maine thinks that the historians of the church have come near but have not quite hit the solution, in referring this phenomenon to the "practical" character of the Roman mind. The reason he declares to be that, "in passing from the East to the West, theological speculation had passed from a climate of Greek metaphysics to a climate of Roman law." Yes; but what created this diversity of climates? Was it not an ingrained philosophical turn in the Greek mind—"the Greeks seek after wisdom"—and an opposite bent of the Roman mind, which is properly described by the epithet "practical"? Roman politics, Roman jurisprudence, were the fruit of that peculiar temper of the people which created the atmosphere of which Mr. Maine speaks, and which the historians of theology have by no means overlooked. That the familiar principles and problems of the Roman law affected Latin theology there is no question. "Almost everybody who has knowledge enough of Roman law to appreciate the Roman penal system, the Roman theory of the obligations established by contract or delict, the Roman view of debts and of the modes of incurring, extinguishing, and transmitting them, the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by universal succession, may be trusted to say whence arose the frame of mind to which the problems of Western theology proved so

congenial, whence came the phraseology in which these problems were stated, and whence the description of reasoning employed in their solution." * The Roman law which "worked itself into Western thought" was not the modern civil law, but the philosophy of jurisprudence which "may be partially reproduced from the Pandects of Justinian," As to legal phraseology, it is interesting to notice the recurrence of terms from this source in the first Latin theological writer of prominence, Tertullian, who had been a student of Roman law and forensic eloquence before he embraced the ecclesiastical profession. He entitles one of his books "De præscriptione hæreticorum." The term *præscriptio* was a legal word signifying a demurrer, or something which shut a litigant out of court and closed his mouth. The fact which constitutes the *præscriptio*, levelled by Tertullian at the perverters of the Gospel, is the tradition of the apostles' teaching which is preserved in the churches. That the churches, so recently founded by the apostles, knew nothing of these heretical opinions was a bar to controversy, and determined the case at once. Tertullian in two other treatises introduces the legal word *satisfactio* (or the cognate verb), not to denote the atonement of Christ, to which it was afterwards applied, but rather as a description of penance, or of the self-imposed manifestations of penitence. In fasting a man "satisfies God" by denying himself food, in the immoderate partaking of which he has offended him. † It is seemly for a woman to clothe herself in humble attire, that by every garb of satisfaction (*satisfactionis*) she may expiate the ignominy which she derives from Eve. ‡ In following down the stream of Latin theology, from Augustine to the latest of the schoolmen, we might trace, in the handling of such topics as sin, the atonement, penance, indulgences, absolution, the silent influence of the conceptions which Roman jurisprudence had made current. Augustine, it may

* *Ancient Law*, p. 347.

† *De Jejun.*, c. 3.

‡ *De Cult. Femm.*, I., i.

be added, was, in his whole genius and training, a Latin theologian. It is true that he was fascinated with Platonism. But he knew little Greek. He received his training in the schools of rhetoric. His reading was mainly in the Roman classics. The themes on which his mind was exercised were those which we have pointed out as chiefly interesting to the Latin mind. The word "Augustinism" denotes certain tenets respecting the bondage of the will under sin, and the operation of grace in delivering it. And Augustine's influence was dominant for a thousand years in the Western church. Apart from favorite inquiries in theology, the Roman Catholic Church is broadly contrasted with the Greek, in that the one has aimed more at the regulation of the life, at the management of the individual and of society, while the other has been mainly absorbed in maintaining orthodoxy of dogma. The epithet "orthodox," which the Greeks proudly assume, is significant of the spirit of their communion. To order the conduct of men as individuals, to sway the action of political societies, has been ever a leading end of the Church of Rome. Herein it shows itself to be Roman.

The contrast between Latin and Teutonic Christianity is hardly less striking. The ideal of ancient life, Greek as well as Roman, recognized everywhere restraint. Everything must be within measure. "Nothing too much"—*nihil nimis*—was the maxim which governed the creations of classical literature and art. Character and manners were subject to the same precept. There must be metes and bounds to all products of the imagination. Conduct must be shaped by rules. Especially did the Roman mind insist upon rigidly defining what is to be done. The old Roman religion was punctilious, formal, ritualistic. Salvation was by works. Worship must be carried forward in a prescribed manner. Each god must have his due, and was to be decorously honored. The Teutonic mind is spiritual, full of aspiration, chafing under the yoke of rules and forms. We

see the Teutonic genius in the Gothic architecture, and in Shakespeare. The principle of personal independence—that element in European civilization—is ascribed by Guizot and other historians to the Germanic influence. The ideal, spiritual tendency of the German mind appeared in the mysticism of the latter part of the middle ages, which was the soil from which the Reformation sprang up. Hegel ascribes the Reformation to the “*alte und durch und durch bewahrte Innigkeit des deutschen Volkes*,” * which was not satisfied to approach God by proxy, or put religion outside of the soul, in sacraments and ceremonies, or make the vote of a council of priests the criterion of truth. The Teutonic mind revolted against the legalism which entered into the warp and woof of the Latin theology, and it craved an immediate access to the heavenly good offered in the Gospel. Personal communion with God, founded on the free forgiveness of sin—the intimate communion of a child with a father—could alone meet the deep want of the spirit. Hence, when the banner of Protestantism was unfurled, the Germanic peoples, one after another, with alacrity ranged themselves under it.

From these general characteristics of the Latin Church, in which the old Roman leaven discovers itself, let us turn to consider certain more definite traces of assimilation to that ancient paganism which Christianity supplanted.

1. The sort of polytheism introduced through the cultus of angels and of saints. Angelic beings, good and evil, were a prominent element in the current Jewish theology when the Gospel was first preached. Their existence and agency are recognized in the New Testament. But in the early church they came to hold a much more conspicuous place in the thoughts of Christians. Individuals, as well as nations, had each his tutelary angel, who watched over him. Sometimes it was held that each person is attended by two spirits,

* Phil. der Gesch., *Werke*, b. ix. 499 seq.

one bad and the other good. The strict monotheism with which Christians were so thoroughly imbued at first, and the express prohibitions of the New Testament, long prevented them from addressing supplications to those invisible guardians. Ambrose, in the fourth century, is the first author quoted as countenancing this practice. "*Obsecrandi sunt angeli, qui nobis ad præsidium dati sunt,*" are his words. The meaning is simply that angels are to be invoked to intercede for us. It was held that they carry the prayers of the disciple up to God. Hence it was natural that they, being within hearing, should be asked to intercede. But this perilous sort of intercourse with supernatural companions not divine did not stop at this point. Gradually angels came to be themselves the objects of homage and of a species of worship which, however, was theoretically distinguished from that due to God and to Christ. The custom spread of appealing to them for other benefits than mere intercession. To this host of secondary, inferior divinities, close at hand to hear prayer and to bestow blessings, there were added a throng of martyrs and saints. The sanctity of martyrs caused their intercessory prayers, while they were alive, to be highly prized. The practice of appealing to them after their death, especially in the vicinity of their mortal remains, where it was imagined that their spirits lingered, easily gained a foothold. It was natural to look to these departed worthies for other good offices; and so martyr-worship grew up by the side of angel-worship. Then there were eminent saints who had died a natural death—holy monks, for example—and to these supplications might with, equal reason, be directed. The indefinite fraternal remembrance of departed saints in the prayers connected with the Eucharist gradually transformed itself into a species of worship of them. Prayers were offered *to* them instead of *for* them.

These beliefs and practices approximated Christianity to the contemporaneous heathenism, which tended to the doctrine of the divine unity, and reduced the gods of the Pan-

theon to the rank of subordinates and instruments of the Supreme Power. Plutarch had ascribed much that was offensive in the old mythology to demons—inferior beings. The gods of the heathen were admitted even by Christians really to exist, but were considered to be evil, to be demons in the bad sense of the term. The worship of heroes and the deification of the emperors furnished human objects of heathen devotion. A heathen of the fourth or the fifth century had only to substitute angels for the old subordinate divinities, the worship of martyrs and saints for the adoration of heroes, and of emperors whom, after they had abjured the old paganism, it was awkward to deify. He had before believed in his protecting genius, who was honored on birthdays and might be invoked in any emergency. The attendant spirit he had only to christen as a guardian angel. Not that Christian worship sank down to the level of the former idolatry. The Christian doctrine respecting God, his exalted nature, and his holy attributes, might be obscured, and in a degree imperilled; yet that doctrine continued to be taught. Nevertheless the heathen mind could find in the Christian system the counterpart of what it had cherished. This facilitated the transition from one system to another. And this resemblance was due, to a considerable extent, to the silent influence of paganism on the church.

2. The localizing of worship. The feeling that God dwelleth not in temples made with hands, that neither to Mt. Gerizim nor to the Sanctuary of Jerusalem is the worshipper obliged to resort, but that the real temple is the human soul, was very much qualified after the church emerged from the age of persecution, came forth from the catacombs, found it safe to erect costly edifices, and began to vie with the heathen in seeking for pomp and impressiveness in the services of religion. Under the Christian emperors heathen temples in many instances were handed over to Christians. In the interval between Valerian and Diocletian, while there was rest from persecution, splendid edifices

were built for Christian worship. The last great persecution, that under Diocletian, was signalized in its beginning by the destruction of one of them, the church at Nicomedia. A mysterious sanctity gradually attached itself to these places of worship. In the fourth century the names of saints came to be connected with them; not at first under the idea that the churches were consecrated to them, but the saint whose name was affixed to the edifice was looked upon as a special patron and protector. It was not very long, however, before the church became a shrine for the cultus of the saint whose name it bore, and before churches came to be dedicated to these human objects of religious veneration. The graves of martyrs collected about them assemblies for religious worship, especially on the anniversaries of their death. Churches and altars were reared over their remains. The bodies of departed saints were deposited in churches. Special efficacy was attributed to the devotions practised in the neighborhood of these relics. It was an old pagan tenet that cities and countries were blessed and protected by the relics of fallen heroes. Cities in Greece had been built over the graves of their founders, and worship had been rendered to them. The superstitious belief in the continuance of miracles served to surround the hallowed centres of worship with a constantly increasing sacredness.

3. In hardly any particular was the deviation of the Latin from the primitive church more signal than in the introduction of images and pictures as instruments and objects of devotion. An intense antipathy to everything of this sort had been derived by the gentile converts to Christianity from their Jewish brethren. As late as the close of the second century, Clement of Alexandria speaks in condemnation of the art of painting altogether. Tertullian reproaches Hermogenes with being a painter. Whether Tertullian objected to the art as being in itself deceptive, as the same zealous father denounces the masks worn by actors for the reason that they partake of fraud, or whether his objection is

grounded on the circumstance that the heretical artist made pictures for heathen worship, is not clear. The dates when pictorial representations of a religious sort were first introduced among Christians it is not easy precisely to determine. A very important source of knowledge on this whole subject is the catacombs. But here the dates are quite uncertain. De Rossi and Mr. J. H. Parker differ very widely from one another in their judgments on this point. Paintings which De Rossi considers to be early Mr. Parker would place at a much later date. The main difficulty grows out of the fact that the pictures in these subterranean burial-places were subjected to a process of restoration in the sixth century and afterwards, by which the characteristics indicative of the time of their origin were very much obliterated.

The first pictures were symbols—as the dove, the anchor, the shepherd with a lamb on his shoulder—which were substituted on goblets and seal-rings, and on sepulchral inscriptions, for mythological representations in vogue among the heathen. At first the cross, though a common token among Christians, by which both the Saviour's death and the humility of the Christian profession were called to mind, was seldom depicted. Following upon this class of paintings were historical pictures of Scriptural events, such as the sacrifice of Isaac, under which, beyond the interest in the subject itself, was discerned a type of the suffering of Jesus. Then followed the portraiture of apostles and saints. It was long before any representation even of the man Christ Jesus was permitted, and longer still before his picture was allowed in churches. Constantia, the sister of Constantine, sent to Eusebius a request that she might have an image of Jesus. In denying this request, Eusebius says: "Hast thou ever seen such a thing in a church thyself, or heard of it from another? Have not such things been banished throughout the whole world, and driven far off out of the churches?" Constantia died in 354. Images of Jesus, whether pictorial or in sculpture, were first used by hereti-

cal sects like the Carpocratians. Under Leo I. (440-461) the image of Christ is first heard of in a Roman church. For several centuries church teachers forbade homage of whatever kind to be offered to pictures. Augustine discountenances the practice of worshipping an image, and of praying with one's eyes fixed upon it. The Synod of Elvira in 305 or 306, in the 36th canon, expressly forbids the introduction of pictures into churches, and the paying of homage to them. The language of the council excludes that qualified sort of worship which the Latin Church afterwards sanctioned. "*Ne quod colitur et adoratur*" is the phrase.* But after the fourth century the custom spread of depicting apostles, martyrs, and other individuals of high repute for their sanctity, or renowned for their beneficence, upon the walls of churches. Augustine allows that they were often worshipped by the illiterate. When paganism ceased to be feared as a dangerous foe, the spirit of resistance to practices of this kind lost its force. Roman Catholic scholars apologize for this innovation on the very ground that when the power of heathenism was broken, it was no longer needful to exclude the visible auxiliaries of Christian worship. It seems to be forgotten that these auxiliaries involved a revival of paganism in another form. It should be added that, in the fifth century, images of Christ and of the Madonna became common. It was in the mediæval era of the Latin Church, however, that the devotional use of images and pictures reached its height and engendered the worst abuses.

It is a curious fact that the heathen were in the habit of kissing the images of their objects of worship, as is now the custom in the Roman Catholic Church, especially in Southern Europe. Cicero states that the mouth and chin of the image of Hercules at Agrigentum were in this way worn smooth by the lips of devotees. Lucretius adverts to the

* See Hefele's *History of Councils*, vol. i. Hefele evidently adopts the interpretation given above.

fact that the hands of pagan statues were worn down and polished by the kisses of those who passed by. The same effect was produced that we see now on the toe of the statue of St. Peter.

4. The multiplying of festivals, including the substitution of heathen for Christian celebrations. Under the old heathenism, there were numerous festal days in honor of the various deities whose gifts were to be acknowledged and whose disfavor was to be deprecated. These, as we learn from the Roman writers, were a serious draught upon the time of working people, and harmfully interrupted the labors of agriculture. Among Christians, in the first three centuries, there were but few festivals. Origen, in his book against Celsus, written in the latter part of his life—he died in 254—makes mention of only three: the Parascene (or Preparation), the Passover, and the feast of Pentecost. Clement of Alexandria, near the end of the second century, speaks of Epiphany as a festival of the heretical Basilidians; and he clearly implies that there existed no commemoration of the nativity of Jesus. Toward the end of the third century, the feast of the Epiphany established itself in the Eastern church, but not until the second half of the fourth century did it spread in the West, where its significance was changed. It is first heard of in the West in 360. Christmas, on the contrary, a festival of Western origin, was not celebrated as a festival separate from Epiphany, in Antioch, until the year 376. Chrysostom, in a sermon delivered on the 25th of December, 386, states that it had existed there for ten years. We find it fully established in Rome in the middle of the fourth century, and its origin as a distinct festival was probably not very long before. In connection with the close of the year there had existed a series of heathen festivals into which the Romans entered with extreme delight. First were the Saturnalia, the jubilee of Saturn or Kronos, which marked the close of farm-work for the year, when the reins were given to merriment, when

slaves could put on the clothes of gentlemen, and wear the badge of freemen, and sit at a banquet, being waited on by their masters. Then came the Sigillaria (on the 21st and 22d of December), when the streets were thronged, gifts interchanged among friends, wax-tapers being given by the humble to superiors, and when many sports were allowed which resembled those of Christmas in our times or of a Roman carnival. Miniature images of the gods and all sorts of presents were given to the young. Then followed the Brumalia—from Bruma, the shortest day—in honor of the sun, and connected with the Persian sun-god, Mithras, whose cultus had been brought to Rome under Domitian and Trajan. This festival—*dies natalis invicti solis*—after the synchronous festival of Christmas was established, continued, as Augustine informs us, to tempt away Christians to a participation in its heathen observances. Leo I. complains that the custom of paying religious homage to the sun still lingered among many Christians. Even among the Greeks, as late as 691, a council—the second Trullan—found it necessary to prohibit Christians from taking part in the celebration of the Brumalia. It is not improbable that one motive for fixing the Christmas festival just at that time was to shield weak Christians from the seductive influence of the pagan and often unseemly festivities to which they had been accustomed. In justice to the church, it should be said, however, that, generally speaking, where there were heathen festivals which led to riotous excess, the season of their occurrence would be set apart for prayer and penitence. This was the case with the New Year's Festival of the heathen, the *Calendæ Januariae*, which was a scene of revelry. The festival of Christ's circumcision was transferred to the New Year—a festival utterly diverse in its origin and spirit from the boisterous heathen celebration occurring at the same time. The principal abuses in the church arose from the habit of commemorating martyrs and saints, the list of whom grew into an extensive catalogue. The Romans re-

garded the manes of their ancestors as in some sense divine. They presented to them not only sacrifices but other gifts, such as wine, milk, and garlands of flowers. They carried food to their sepulchres for the use of the dead. These banquets the Christians imitated by preparing feasts at the graves of the saints, of which these invisible beings were invited to partake. The little burial-chapels in the catacombs were places for the friends of the departed to meet in. There was sometimes a close parody of heathen myths and of the superstitions that grew out of them. On the 15th of July the Roman Catholic Church pays honor to Phocas, the patron-saint of sailors, who took the place of Castor and Pollux in the Christian mythology. He was said to have been a gardener at Sinope, and to have been put to death, under Diocletian, in 303. He was made the guardian saint of all who prosecuted voyages. Seamen sang songs in his praise. A place was set for him as an invisible guest at the table on shipboard, and on the safe arrival of the vessel in port his portion of its earnings was given to the poor. In this last act the benevolent spirit of the Gospel was manifest, connected though it was with superstitious fancies. Let the amount of direct heathen influence in giving rise to the commemorations of the church be estimated as it may be, there can be no doubt that the pagans found in the multiplied Christian festivals a welcome surrogate for those which they were called upon to give up.

5. A great variety of customs and ceremonies, resembling those familiar to the heathen, but not included under the foregoing topics, were early adopted by the church. Votive offerings are deserving of special mention. Heathen temples, especially the temples of Æsculapius, were hung with gifts, left as tokens of gratitude for deliverance from sickness, accident, or some other kind of trouble. The Virgin and the saints were honored in a similar way; and Christian churches exhibited, like the heathen sanctuaries, images of fingers, legs, and other parts of the body, made of silver or

some other substance, in connection with other offerings betokening thankfulness for rescue from suffering or danger. There were shrines where each particular disorder was supposed to be miraculously healed by some special saint who made the victims of it the objects of his benevolent care. This was one of the occasions of the pilgrimages which, having been a heathen, now became a Christian usage. The pagans had been in the habit of resorting to the temples of Æsculapius, or Isis, or Serapis, in order that the god might teach them in their dreams in the night-time how to rid themselves of their diseases. So Christians betook themselves to their churches, to the end that the saint whose image was enshrined within them might, in like manner, inform them in their slumber how to regain their health. The introduction of incense among the ceremonies of worship is a curious illustration of the incoming of heathen innovations. The fathers of the second century, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, contrast the worship of Christians in this particular with that of the heathen. "The Creator," says Athenagoras, "does not require blood, nor *smoke*, nor the sweet smell of flowers, nor *incense*." Tertullian says: "We buy no frankincense;" we offer "not one pennyworth of the grains of frankincense." Clement says that the perfume from the altar is "holy prayer." The fathers of the third and fourth centuries give the same testimony. Arnobius (A.D. 298) speaks of the use of incense even among the heathen as a modern thing, and infers from this circumstance alone that it is offered vainly and to no purpose. In the same spirit write Lactantius (A.D. 303) and even Augustine (A.D. 396). The great Latin father approves of the statement which he quotes, that "frankincense and other perfumes ought not to be offered at the sacrifice of God." It was not until the sixth, or late in the fifth century, that incense was used in the ritual. It was brought into the church first merely as a disinfectant, to sweeten, and, as was thought, to purify the air. Tertullian refers to this use of

it. Pseudo-Dionysius, early in the sixth century, is the first writer who adverts to incense as a part of Christian worship. He speaks of the priest censuring the altar, and then going over "the whole circuit of the sacred place." * Of course the precedent of the ancient Jewish worship could be pleaded in support of the new practice. Thus it was the accident of the use of perfume for the homely practical end of expelling bad odors, that brought it into Christian sanctuaries as an instrument of worship. One is reminded of the fact that, several centuries later, it was the frequent accidental spilling of drops of wine at the Eucharist that first led to the withholding of the cup from the laity. Circumstances in themselves trifling have led to grave transformations in the ritual, and indirectly in the doctrine, of the church. After the censer was adopted as a utensil of devotion, the Christian priest pacing before the altar, attended by the thurifer with the swinging thurible in his hand, presented an almost exact image of what had been familiar to the eyes of visitors to heathen temples. The spectacle was one which the early Christians, had they been present to witness it, would have beheld with astonishment and reprobation, and one which the heathen, on the other hand, of an earlier day would have recognized as closely resembling a rite of their own. A heathen in the fifth century who should cross the threshold of a Christian church would observe much in the exterior arrangements of the building and of the service that would tend to make him feel at home. He would find much to remind him of the religion in which he had been bred. The very edifice might have once been a temple of pagan worship. Now it wore the name of that one of the host of invisible beings to whom it was specially sacred, and to whom supplications might be addressed with marked efficacy within its walls. All around there might not im-

* The passages on this subject are collected by Bingham (b. viii., c. vi. § 21) and in Smith's *Dict. of Christ. Antiquities*.

probably be seen votive gifts—*donaria*—like those which the heathen had been wont to see in his own sanctuaries. There was an altar with lamps burning near it, and with priests, in their official garb, standing before it; there were genuflexions and processions, all stamped with a likeness to familiar parts of the heathen ritual. It is true that there were no bloody offerings, and that transubstantiation had not come to be an article of Christian belief; but the Eucharist was called a sacrifice, and was invested with an atmosphere of awe and mystery.

It would be a rash, unauthorized inference that the church in the last half of the patristic period, or that the mediæval church in which excrescences, like those referred to, increased in number and volume, was nothing better than heathen. In the constitution, creed, ceremonial, of the church after Constantine, truth and error, good and evil, were strangely, almost indissolubly, mixed. To call it a mere baptized paganism is to ignore the principle of life that ever inhered in it. The truth of redemption through Christ, with the facts presupposed and included in it, however that truth may have been mingled with erroneous fancies and overlaid with cumbrous ceremonies, still constituted the life-blood of Christianity.

A question that may occur to the reader of the foregoing pages is this: If Latin Christianity has thus proved itself congenial to the Latin nations, are they likely to be satisfied with Protestantism in its present shape? Is it to be expected that the nations of Southern Europe will reconcile themselves to the system of worship which has proved acceptable to the peoples of German extraction? This opens up the question of symbolism in religion. No one can escape from symbolism altogether. The strictest Puritan kneels in prayer, and the act of kneeling not only expresses, but also facilitates, the inward prostration of the spirit. It is the form, the visible embodiment, the material investiture, of the spiritual act. Even the Quaker at his meeting, in his sober mien, his quiet,

expectant attitude, expresses that waiting for the silent coming of the Spirit which is the posture of his mind. Whoever bows or shakes hands with a friend, or embraces him, indulges in symbolism. A gesture is a symbol. It expresses an emotion, or a volition, or an intellectual act. It is the living counterpart of the mental movement. Body and soul are so intimately connected that a sympathetic physical action spontaneously accompanies the action of the soul, and all the more when the soul is deeply moved. There is a ritual of etiquette, of friendship, of social intercourse, as well as of religion. The manners of a gentleman or of a lady are symbolical of refined feelings, of self-respect, and of regard for others, even in little things. Manners are a language. The feeling bodies itself forth instinctively in outward acts; and cultivation here, as elsewhere, is not artifice, but the perfecting of nature. Symbolism is more natural and more grateful, more of a necessity of the spirit, as one may say, to one individual than to another. One person would feel himself cramped if this mode of expressing thought and emotion were confined within the limits which another has no impulse to overpass. In different stages of culture there is a difference in the degree of satisfaction yielded by symbols. The pageants of the middle ages no longer interest the European mind as they once did. Mediaeval ceremonies, which are still observed in connection with courts and royalty, strike one as curious relics of a by-gone time. They may seem puerile, and they may be in reality puerile—that is, they may have been the offshoot of a time when there was a disproportionate liveliness of emotion and fancy, such as belongs to children. It is true evidently of certain branches of the human race that gesture, pantomime, all that falls under the head of symbolical expression, form, and ceremony, are far more congenial—we might say indispensable—than is true of peoples of a more reserved temperament. The vivacious manners of the Frenchman, and the more stiff and stolid ways of the Englishman, have always been to both the

source of mutual diversion. The southern European nations are by nature more ritualistic than the northern. The brighter skies, the sunny landscape, the peculiar fruits and flowers, are not more characteristic of the south than is the love of music and song, of painting and sculpture, of brilliant dress and ceremony, and of expressive tones and gestures. Worship is naturally affected by this diversity of temperament. A New England Puritan thinks it natural to clothe himself in black in token of grief for a lost friend, and to march in a procession on the fourth of July. But he finds it more difficult to see how any one should be inclined to carry an analogous symbolism into the services of religion. Now the exact limits of that symbolism in worship which is allowable under the Gospel do not admit of mathematical definition. There is no prescribed, unbending code in the New Testament on this subject. The Saviour and the apostles preached often in the open air. They wore no official garments. Probably no one at present thinks that the cloak which Paul left at Troas was a surplice; or that, if it had been, he would have suspended his work as a minister to wait for its arrival. Everything in the services of the primitive church was plain and simple. At the same time there was no law laid down in reference to these matters. There are certain principles, however, to which the church is bound to adhere in all the arrangements of worship. First, the symbol must be significant of a truth, and not of an error. The rite speaks to the observer, and the language which it utters must be true. An erroneous doctrine which has clothed itself in symbol can be subverted only by abolishing the forms in which it is invested. Secondly, the symbol must be immediately intelligible. It must conform to the rules of allegorical art. If it fail to do this, it is obnoxious from an æsthetic point of view. Still more obnoxious is it from a religious point of view; for it becomes then an opaque glass. It is a mirror in which nothing is reflected. It is a fossil from which the life is gone. It is a word in an un-

known tongue. The observance of unmeaning rites is a mechanical sort of devotion, equally dishonorable to God, who will be worshipped in spirit and in truth, and to the soul, which is degraded by the exercise of a blind, stupid homage, that is kept up in deference to authority or from mere force of habit. The symbolical act or object must tell its own tale at once, and must continue to do so, or it is worse than useless; for a rational being is harmed by the performance of irrational acts. Such acts are doubly mischievous when they come to be regarded as meritorious, and to be made a substitute, as to some extent they are very likely to be, for faith, love, and charity, and for good deeds springing from them. Formalism is the enthronement of rites in the place that belongs to the feelings and purposes of the heart. External observances are made by the formalist an end and not a means. They are valued for their own sake. If they do not supplant the dedication of the heart, which is the "reasonable"—that is, the rational or spiritual—service to be rendered to God by a Christian, they are placed on a level with it, and thus deprive it of the supreme place that of right belongs to it. "Obedience is better than sacrifice." Rites that are devoid of meaning are an offence. Formalism in religion is like artificial, affected manners in social life. They tend to stifle true, cordial feeling. Honest minds break through such barriers, and may be led by the energy of their protest to fall into rude and blunt ways, which are preferable to a hollow and unmeaning courtesy. Thirdly, all visible representations of the invisible God are irreverent in their nature. The law of the Old Testament on this subject was given to prevent idolatry. It was one great object, moreover, to educate the souls of men to the exercise of faith in realities which belong to an order higher than that of the visible world. This design is defeated when the Deity is depicted in human form, and the august mystery of his being brought down to the level of his creatures. In the ancient church, representations of God the

Father, and any other than symbolical representations of the Holy Ghost, were rigidly excluded. The inveterate tendency, especially of the uneducated mind, to identify the image with the being whom it is intended to represent is a sufficient reason why images of Jesus should not be used as auxiliaries in worship. It is legitimate for the arts of painting and sculpture to give form to the ideals of Christ which the study of his human life inspires. An elevating influence may go forth from these creations of art. The Christ of Leonardo da Vinci, the study for the painting of the Last Supper, with the deep but patient sorrow that is stamped upon the countenance, gives new vividness to our conception of the "Man of sorrows." He must be an iconoclast indeed who would blot out of existence the descent from the cross as depicted in all its terrible reality by the pencil of Rubens. But such creations of art are not to be made the objects of worship, and worshippers cannot look to them in prayer without the risk of confounding the unseen exalted One with the imaginary portrait of him that is spread upon the canvas. Fourthly, the multiplying of symbols beyond a limit, which, of course, cannot be precisely defined, is evil in its influence. Crutches are good to support the weak, but are of no benefit if they supersede the natural use of the muscles. Pictures are useful in teaching, but, if employed beyond a certain limit, they keep the mind in a passive state that interferes with the due development of its powers. An elaborate ritual becomes a spectacle, in which, at the best, the soul is acted upon, with little exertion on its own part. There is a golden mean between a dazzling and distracting symbolism, complex and wearisome to a thoughtful mind, and a bald, frigid service, where no help is derived from the senses, and where the didactic element, in the form of abstract discussion, excludes every other. We may reject the idea of Archbishop Laud and the ritualists as to what is meant by worshipping God in "the beauty of holiness," but in flying from Scylla we should not wreck ourselves on Charybdis.

Starting with these principles respecting the nature and use of symbolism, we are prepared to allow to Protestantism the liberty of conforming its ritual to the temperament, taste, and national peculiarities of the several peoples among whom it may be planted. There are many customs which belong under the category of things indifferent, and which it may be a duty to discard under one set of circumstances, while they may be admitted without harm when the situation is altered. The great conflict of the Puritans against sacerdotal usurpation led them to push their protest in certain directions further than is necessary at present, now that the battle has been fought and won, and when in many communities the danger which they dreaded has passed by. A rigid adhesion to a particular method of worship, when there are reasons for varying from it, is itself formalism, one of the principal evils against which Puritanism contended. A certain elasticity must be allowed in things external. The criterion is to ascertain what conduces to the edification of the flock, not in some foreign latitude, but in the place with respect to which the question is raised. Should the Protestant doctrines spread extensively in Latin countries, it is not impossible that forms of worship may arise specially consonant with the native characteristics of the inhabitants of those lands. There may arise a Latin Protestantism different in its external features from Germanic Protestantism. There is no hurtful rupture of unity in such diversity. At the Reformation, Protestantism in the southern countries tended to a particular type not strictly accordant with the German. The acceptance of the doctrine of justification by faith alone was often accompanied by a less degree of disaffection towards important parts of the Romish ritual, and with a less degree of repugnance to the sacraments as formerly administered. In France, many who were inclined to Protestant opinions, like Margaret, the sister of Francis I., and the class in sympathy with her, occupied this position. The phenomena of the Reformation in that age in



Italy and Spain indicate the natural bent of the Latin mind. The Old Catholic movement in our day seemed at first to hold out the promise of issuing in a new type of Protestantism which should be more satisfactory to such adherents of the Church of Rome as were evangelical in their tendencies. Père Hyacinthe, disposed though he was to head a revolt against the Pope and the popular type of Romanism, did not find himself at home in the midst of Protestantism, with its absence of form and its churches locked up except on Sunday. He was evidently feeling after a system which, while it should be free from Romish abuses of doctrine and practice, should make a warmer appeal to the sensibility and æsthetic feeling than any of the Protestant denominations presented. He wanted a system that should bring religion, more visibly and constantly, before the minds and close to the hearts of men. It must be confessed, however, that his main difficulty was that he did not see his way clear to lay the axe at the root of the tree by distinctly renouncing the sacerdotal theory of the ministry. No effectual issue can be made with Romanism by those who cling to the theory of a mediatorial priesthood. The greatness of Luther is strikingly manifest in the boldness with which he assaulted the central dogmas of the opposing system, instead of expending his strength on the outworks. In one of his early publications, the *Address to the Nobles of the German Nation*, he struck a vigorous blow at the doctrine that the clergy are a close corporation of priests on whom the laity are dependent for the sacraments. It was because he laid a strong foundation in principles, that his war against the papacy was something more than an irregular, guerilla contest, and resulted in a great and permanent conquest. The abortive character of the Old Catholic movement is due very much to its failure to lay hold of the principles on which alone an insurrection against the Church of Rome can maintain itself.

THE TEMPORAL KINGDOM OF THE POPES.*

THE great Popes in the middle ages endeavored to realize the splendid, but impracticable, conception of a theocratic empire, which should embrace all Christian nations, and of which the Pope was to be the head. The attempt was made to establish an administration such as would require wisdom, justice, and benevolence, as well as power, in a superhuman measure. The Popes renounce no pretension that has once been made; but the extravagant claims of Hildebrand, Innocent III., and Boniface VIII., are silently dropped—the claim to set up and pull down princes, and to settle international disputes—and the revival of such claims at the present day would only excite ridicule. For several centuries, national interests have been strong enough, in the politics of Europe, to override ecclesiastical and religious bonds of association. The design of this Article is not to discuss the obsolete claim of the papacy to a temporal supremacy over Christendom, but to touch on the salient points in the history of their own peculiar kingdom in Italy.

I.

On Christmas Day, in the year 800, in the old Basilica of St. Peter at Rome, Pope Leo III. placed the imperial crown on the head of Charlemagne. It was one of those particular

* A Review, in *The New Englander*, for January, 1867, of *Geschichte der Entstehung und Ausbildung des Kirchenstaates*. Von Samuel Sugenheim. Leipzig, 1854; *L'Église et la Société Chrétienne en 1861*. Par M. Guizot. Quatrième édition. Paris, 1866.

events or scenes in which a great epoch is signalized and pictured, as it were, to the eye. It is a landmark terminating the first period in the annals of the Popes' temporal sovereignty.

During the first three centuries, while the church was a persecuted, but rapidly growing, sect, the Bishop of Rome was steadily acquiring moral influence and hierarchical authority. After Constantine began to take the church under his patronage—his edict of toleration was issued in 312—and after he and his successors not only granted to the church the right to receive legacies and hold property, but also enriched it by their own offerings, the Roman bishops were in a position to profit greatly by these new privileges. Gradually they became possessed of extensive estates, not only in Italy, but also in Sicily and Gaul, and even in Africa and Asia. In the time of Gregory the Great (590–604), their annual income from the estates near Marseilles alone amounted to four thousand pieces of gold. It is true that this “patrimony of Peter,” as even then it was called, was held by the Pope as a private proprietor or trustee, and not as a sovereign. For example, the Papal lands in Gaul were subject to the king of the country, like the lands of any other proprietor. Yet the control of the Pope over extensive estates would border, in some particulars, upon that of a sovereign, and the rudiments of a secular dominion are properly discerned in this early relation. The downfall of the empire left the Roman Pontiff the most important personage in all the West. But during the score of years (from 551 to 568) that followed the conquest of Italy by the generals of Justinian, and preceded the partial overthrow of the Byzantine rule in that country by the Lombards, the coercion exercised upon the Popes by the tyrants of Constantinople serves to show how much the papacy was to be indebted for its growth to the absence of an overshadowing power in its neighborhood.

To the Lombard conquest the Popes owed their secular

dominion. That which infused into them the greatest terror turned out providentially to be the greatest benefit. This barbarian people, partly Arian and partly pagan in their religion, overran the larger portion of Italy. They left to the Byzantine emperor, in middle and northern Italy, besides Rome, and a few other fortified places, a strip of territory along the sea-coast, in which were included Ravenna, the seat of the so-called Exarch, or Governor-General, under the Eastern empire, and the five cities (Pentapolis), Ancona, Sinigaglia, Fano, Pesaro, and Rimini. The various cities outside of the Exarchate, of which Rome was one, had been placed under subordinate governors, called dukes. After the Lombard invasion, the Byzantine rule over the places which had not yielded to the conquerors was little more than a nominal sovereignty. In this time of anarchy and distress, the Pope was the natural leader and defender, as well as the benefactor, of the people whom the emperor was unable to protect. When the quarrel broke out between the Pope and Leo the Isaurian, in regard to the worship of images, the Romans warmly sided with their bishop against the iconoclastic emperor. They even drove out the Byzantine duke, who had long possessed only the shadow of power, and they would have proclaimed their independence and a republic, had not the Pope withstood them, his motive being an intense anxiety lest imperial power should fall into the hands of the Lombard king. He naturally chose to keep up a nominal connection with the Eastern empire, which brought no real inconvenience, in preference to falling under the sway of his aggressive, powerful, and heretical neighbor.* It was evident that the Lombard kings were determined to extend their dominion over Italy. Yet Pope Zacharias, in return for favors rendered to them, obtained from them the gift, first of Sutri, and then of four other towns, which had been

* See, on this point, Sugenheim's work (the title of which is given above), p. 68 seq. This very thorough monograph throws light on many difficult questions connected with our subject.

wrested by them from the Greek empire. The Pope, though still the subject of that empire, set up the principle that these places, being the property of the Lombards by right of conquest, might be withheld from the emperor and granted to him. In truth, this gift from the heretical enemy was the beginning of the Papal kingdom. But when the haughty Aistulph, in 749, mounted the throne of the Lombards, and when, having seized upon Ravenna, the Exarchate, Pentapolis, and the Greek territory on the Adriatic as far as Istria, he turned his arms against Rome, the Pope saw no way of escape from the imminent peril into which he was thrown, except by imploring the intervention of Pepin, king of the Franks. Fortunately Pepin was obliged to the Pope for lending a religious sanction to the usurpation by which he had dethroned the Merovingian family, the founder of the new dynasty having been anointed, in 752, at Soissons, by Boniface, according to the direction of Zacharias, and having been absolved afterwards from his violated oath of fealty to Childeric III., the last representative of the old line. In two campaigns (754-5), the Lombards were defeated, and expelled from their new conquests; and Pepin now gave to the Pope the Exarchate and the Pentapolis. He had won these territories, he said, not for the Greek emperor, but for St. Peter.

What was now the position and what were the rights of the Pope, as a secular prince? This is a nice and difficult question to determine. The Pope received the name and title of Patricius over the Exarchate, while Pepin became Patricius of Rome. In regard to the donation of Pepin, it is a controverted question whether it made over to the Pope the rights of sovereignty, or only the property and incomes which had formerly belonged to the Byzantine emperor. The great German lawyer, Savigny, is decidedly of opinion that the rights of sovereignty were included.* Sugenheim

* Savigny, *Das Römische Recht*, vol. i., p. 358.

holds that this was probably not the original idea, but rather the interpretation successfully affixed to the donation by the Popes.* The gift of Pepin was made to the Pope and the Roman Republic: and it is further declared by Savigny that "the Roman Republic," as the representative of which the Pope appears, "was not the city of Rome, still less the Greek empire;" "it was rather the old Western empire, which in this small compass, though as yet without a visible head, was again restored, the idea of its formal restoration, which was soon to follow, being, perhaps, already present."† It seems clear that *Patricius* was an honorary title which carried with it no very definite prerogatives. It involved the right and duty of affording protection. We may conclude, then, that by this transaction the Pope acquired, in reference to the greater part of what was afterwards called Romagna, a station similar to that held by the former Exarchs, with the difference that the superior to whom he would be subordinate was an ideal personage, the future head of the Western empire, which had not then been reconstituted. In respect to Rome, it is remarkable that the Pope still kept up the show of allegiance to the Eastern empire, his motive being a jealous desire to prevent the Patriciate of Pepin over the eternal city from passing into an imperial function.

Such was the position of the Pope, as a temporal ruler, up to the time of Charlemagne. The overthrow of the Lombard kingdom by this monarch, in 773, was followed by a confirmation of the gift of Pepin to the Pope, increased by the addition of a few places in Tuscany. Charlemagne had acquired a supremacy and a conceded authority which his coronation by the Pope recognized rather than created. The patriciate, by the course of events, had grown into the imperial office; and the treaty of Charlemagne with the Eastern emperor, Nicephorus, in 803, formerly designated the

* Sugenheim, p. 27.

† Savigny, p. 361.

portions of Italy with which we are concerned, among the territories of the Western emperor.

II.

I Toward Charlemagne and his immediate successors the Popes stood in the relation of feudal dependence, analogous to that held by other ecclesiastical nobles who were subjects of the empire, although the Roman bishop, in point of ecclesiastical and spiritual dignity, had, of course, the highest rank. The Popes were obliged to take an oath of fidelity to the emperor, acknowledging him to be their lord and judge. Not only was their election incomplete without the imperial sanction, but they were held to account when charges were preferred against them. Thus an inquiry was instituted against Leo III. for executing certain Romans; and at the time when Lothaire I. was crowned at Rome, in 823, Pope Paschal I., on the complaint of the abbot of the monastery Farfa, was obliged to restore to the latter all the property which had been unjustly taken from his monastery.

The Popes were constantly striving to release themselves from their subjection to the princes of the family of Charlemagne. The end they had in view was to free themselves from the need of procuring a ratification of their election from the emperor; and they even sought to give currency to the idea that the imperial office was bestowed by them. Occasionally, an able man like Nicholas I. (858-867), favored by circumstances and strengthened by popular support, realized in a measure the Papal aspirations after independence and control. But, as a general rule, through nearly the whole of the ninth century, the Roman bishops were foiled in these attempts. They profited, however, by the conflicts in which the Frank princes were engaged with one another, and in which they were frequently induced by the interest of the hour to appeal to ecclesiastical arbitration and to ad-

vance their pretensions by obtaining episcopal unction. The disorders and divisions in the Frank empire were rather fomented than hindered by the ambitious Popes, who, in the turmoil that followed the downfall of that empire, gained for a time their long-coveted independence.*

Their success proved their worst misfortune. The next century and a half is the most disgraceful era in the whole history of the papacy. The dangers to which the Popes were exposed in the midst of the wild factions of contending Italian nobles led them to parcel out a great part of their territory outside of Rome among feudatories, as a reward for services rendered and expected. The same weakening of the central authority, the same struggles for independence on the part of the vassals, and for ascendancy on the side of their liege, ensued here as among the nations north of the Alps. The easy subjection of the Popes to the Frank princes was exchanged for a galling servitude under violent and rapacious nobles. For a long series of years the Counts of Tuscany, and after them the Counts of Tusculum—two branches of the same house—disposed of Rome and the Papal office at their will. Three prostitutes, Theodora, and her daughters, Marozia and Theodora, made and deposed Popes, even placing their paramours and bastard sons in the chair of St. Peter. At length, in 933, Pope John XI., who was perhaps a son of the vile Pope Sergius III. by Marozia, was

* It was in the ninth century that the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals appeared—that collection of forged papers by which the prerogatives conceded to the Pope in that age, and even higher prerogatives than were generally conceded to him then, were ascribed to his predecessors in the first three centuries. Among these spurious documents was the pretended deed of Constantine, giving to Pope Sylvester his Western dominions. The forgery is a clumsy one. For example, the author of it conceives of the Western empire as it was in the eighth century—as comprising only some provinces of Italy. The spurious character of this *document* is generally acknowledged. Yet Baronius, and some other Catholic writers, seek, against all evidence, to maintain the fact of such a *gift*. See Gieseler, *Church History*, vol. ii., p. 118, n.

imprisoned by his own brother Alberich in the castle of St. Angelo, and was forced to act, even in spiritual things, as his passive instrument. Until the year 954, this Alberich, under the title of Prince and First Senator of the Romans, ruled with despotic authority over the city and the adjacent territory; and, after the death of John XI., set up in succession four Popes, whom he restricted to the exercise of their spiritual functions. At his death all power fell into the hands of his son Octavian, a vicious youth of less than eighteen years of age, who, on assuming the tiara, set the fashion, which has since been copied, of adopting a new name, and called himself John XII. To protect himself against Berengar II., King of Italy, this profligate wretch invoked the aid of Otho I., the German emperor; but the interposition of Otho brought but a momentary relief from the frightful disorder and degradation in the affairs of the papacy. Finally, the German emperor, Henry III., appeared to reëstablish, with a strong hand, the imperial power in Italy; and at the Synod of Sutri, in 1046, he caused the Papal chair to be declared vacant, and, the three rival claimants having been summarily set aside, one of Henry's own bishops was elected to the vacant place, under the name of Clement II. From this time the influence of Hildebrand becomes predominant. The Synod of Sutri marks an epoch in the record of the Papal dominion. The imperial power and influence are seen at their culminating point.)

III.

A notable event in the progress of the Papal dominion in Italy was the famous bequest of Matilda, Countess of Tuscany, to the Papal See. This enterprising and gifted woman, the fast friend and supporter of Hildebrand, bequeathed her territories, comprising a fourth part of the Peninsula, to the Roman Church. Whether this gift was intended to include

anything more than her allodial property, and what portion of her possessions was allodial and what held in fief, it is impossible to say. To dispose of territory held in fief would be utterly contrary to law, and to all the ideas of the time. But the ambiguous character of the bequest in these respects opened the way for the assertion of a claim on the part of the Popes to the whole, and contributed eventually to the long and bitter strife with the emperors. Gieseler observes that "because the feudal relations of these lands to the emperor were at that time much relaxed, the Pope was inclined to regard them as allodial, while the emperor, by virtue of his ancient right, laid claim to all landed possessions at least, as fiefs of the empire." * Certain it is that the Popes were determined to incorporate the fiefs in their own kingdom, especially the most valuable of them, Tuscany, Spoleto, and Camerino.

In the early part of the twelfth century there appeared a fresh element of disturbance in the Papal kingdom, of a portentous character. This was the newly-awakened spirit of the Roman people. Heretofore, the populace of Rome had been of little account. Emperor, Pope, and nobles, in all their conflicts with one another, had united in keeping down the people, and reducing them to political insignificance. But now a new era had arisen. The aspirations of the Lombard towns after municipal independence and free government had spread southward. The popular feeling in Rome found an organ and a leader in the disciple of Abelard, Arnold of Brescia. He demanded that the clerical order, from the Pope downwards, should give up their claim to secular rule, and should possess no secular property. He was heard with enthusiasm, and his doctrine spread like a contagion. After he had been driven out of Italy by the anathema of the second Lateran Council, the Roman people renounced their allegiance to Innocent II., and, in 1143, set

* Gieseler, *Church History* (Prof. Smith's ed.), vol. i., p. 272.

up a government of their own, placing supreme power in the hands of a senate. They were strengthened by the arrival of Arnold with several thousand Swiss soldiers. In an unsuccessful attack upon the new government in the capitol, Pope Lucius II. was hit with a stone, and received a mortal wound. The people wished to restore the old imperial constitution, and accordingly invited Conrad III., and afterwards Frederic I., to assume this imperial character and make their abode in Rome. Pope Hadrian IV. persuaded the Romans to banish Arnold, whose unpractical and imaginative spirit had hindered him from succeeding in his plans. By the Emperor Frederic, who was bitterly hostile to republicanism, and was bent on humbling the Lombard towns, as well as desirous to receive the imperial crown, Arnold was delivered up to the Pope, who made such haste to destroy him, that the Romans, who rushed to the Piazza del Popolo to effect a rescue, found only his ashes.

We pass to the Pontifical reign of the ablest of the Popes, a man of great virtues, shaded by serious faults, Innocent III. All the circumstances, especially the minority of Frederic II., and the disordered state of the empire, facilitated the accomplishment of the ends which Innocent set before him. He drove the vassals of the empire out of the territory of Matilda, taking possession of the March of Ancona, the Dakedom of Spoleto, the Earldom of Agnisi, the Marquisates of Tuscany, Radicofani, Aquapendente, Montefiascone, and the rest; so that his admiring biographer, Hurter, claims for him the honor of being the founder of the States of the Church. More important was the concession which he extorted from Otho IV., one of the three competitors for the imperial crown, as the condition of supporting his cause, and of declaring in his favor. On the eighth of June, 1201, Otho bound himself by a solemn engagement to protect, to the best of his ability, all the possessions, rights, and honors of the Apostolic See; to leave the Pope in undisturbed possession of the territories which he had won

back, and to help the Holy See both in defending them, and reconquering those not yet gained. Under these possessions were embraced all the territory from Radicofani to Ceperano, also the Exarchate of Ravenna, the former Pentapolis, the March of Ancona, the Dukedom of Spoleto, the allodial property of Matilda, the Earldom of Bertinaro, together with the bordering territories which the Roman bishops had acquired from the Western emperors since the days of Louis the Pious. The provinces here enumerated comprise the principal territories of the modern Papal States. The violation of his agreement by Otho turned Innocent's friendship into bitter hostility, and ultimately led him to bring forward the young Frederic of Sicily (Frederic II.), and powerfully to support his pretensions to the empire. This support was not given, however, until Frederic had renewed and ratified the concessions previously made by Otho. The equally perfidious violation of this treaty by Frederic was a leading cause of that long and dreadful conflict with the Popes, which ended in the complete overthrow of the house of Hohenstaufen.

In the progress of this conflict, the cities in the Papal kingdom wrested concessions from the Popes, by which they acquired for the time a large measure of municipal freedom and independence. It is remarkable that while the Lombard towns followed the Popes in their contest against the Ghibelline or imperial interest, the immediate subjects of the Holy See were often found on the other side. This was owing to the fact that, although the Popes, out of hostility to the emperors, and the desire to gain the victory over them, allied themselves to the freedom-loving cities, they were still at heart inimical to republicanism, and were impolitic enough to betray their real temper and policy towards their own cities, in case no pressing emergency compelled an opposite course. By the aid of Charles of Anjou, to whom they had given the crown of Sicily, they succeeded in recovering Rome from the imperial party, and destroy-

ing Conradin, the last of the Hohenstaufens. In 1275, they had the satisfaction of receiving from Rudolph of Hapsburg a full and most explicit ratification of the deed of surrender, which Otho IV. and Frederic II. had given and disregarded.

This deed has been properly considered the *MAGNA CHARTA* of the Pope's temporal dominion.

IV.

It was one thing to acquire a title to these rich possessions, and quite another thing to get and to retain them. The turbulent cities, accustomed now to a good measure of self-government and strengthened by privileges granted by the Popes in times of distress, could not easily be brought into subjection. The factions of Guelfs and Ghibellines, raged in them, and the result, as in other Italian towns, was the elevation to power of certain noble and distinguished families. Such were the houses of Polenta in Ravenna, of Malatesta in Rimini, of Varano in Camerino and in other places in the March of Ancona, and of Montefeltro in Urbino.

It was the repugnance of Boniface VIII. to the family of Colonna, whose overshadowing influence at Rome became intolerable to him, that finally led to "the Babylonian captivity," or the residence of the Popes for about seventy years at Avignon. Determined to get possession of their fortified places, Boniface sought means of capturing the apparently impregnable stronghold, Palestrina.* At length he applied

* The truth of the story relative to the transaction with Guido di Montefeltro is denied by Cardinal Wiseman in his Article on Boniface VIII. (*Essays on Various Subjects*, vol. iii.). The story is given by many authors, including Sismondi (*Republiques Italiennes*, tome iii., p. 91). Sismondi's authorities are Dante, his commentator, Benvenuto da Imola, and two contemporary chroniclers, Ferretto Vincentino and Pipino, in Muratori (*Script. Ital.*, tom. ix., pp. 731, 970). Dante (*Inf.*, xxvii., 81) styles Boniface "Lo principe di nuovi farisei." It is represented that Boniface had absolved Guido for his wicked counsel before it was given. This did not save him from hell, since

"No power can the impenitent absolve."

for aid to a famous old soldier, Guido de Montefeltro, a former enemy of the Popes, but now reconciled and passing

Dante makes Guido, in the midst of the flames, relate circumstantially the fatal seduction by which "the chief of the new Pharisees" misled him, having given him the promise of impunity. Another not at all flattering allusion to Boniface is in *Parad.*, xxvii., 22; and elsewhere (*Inf.*, xix. 52). Dante condemns him to hell. In the last passage, the spirit in hell mistakes Dante for Boniface, who, at the date of the poet's vision, was not dead. It is the same canto in which Pope Nicholas V. is doomed to a like fate, and in which, in allusion to the pretended gift of Constantine to Pope Sylvester, the poet exclaims:—

"Ah, Constantine! to how much ill gave birth,
Not thy conversion, but that plenteous dower
Which the first wealthy father gain'd from thee."

In regard to Ferreto, Muratori, as Wiseman truly states, adds a note to Ferreto's account of Guido, in which the critic questions the truth of the story. He observes:—"Probosi hujus facinoris narrationis fidem adjungere nemo probus velit quod facile confinxerint Bonifacii æmuli," etc. In the *Annali d'Italia*, vol. xi., p. 648, the same critic expresses his doubt of the truth of the anecdote respecting Guido, though he quotes G. Villani (*Istor. Fiorent.*, lib. viii., c. 6) to the effect that Boniface was troubled by no scruples when there was something to be gained. Muratori also suggests that the story of the advice of Guido may have arisen from the subsequent events—namely, the breach of faith with the Colonnas. This last fact he appears not to reject. Although it is called in question by Wiseman, it rests upon strong evidence. In the proceeding before Clement VII., after the death of Boniface, the Colonnas averred that they had been cheated in the manner described. The proofs are given in Sugenheim, p. 208. The circumstances are stated by G. Villani, lib. viii., c. 64. Villani wrote soon after the event. See also, Fleury, *Hist. Ecclesiast.*, tom. xviii., p. 240. Considering the manner in which the anecdote, as to the advice of Guido, is given by Dante, even though his Ghibelline hostility to Boniface, as Muratori observes, impairs the value of his testimony,—and considering, also, the other authorities in its favor, we are hardly justified in rejecting it as false. It is believed by Sugenheim, by Milman (*Latin Christianity*, vol. vi., p. 228) by Schröckh (*Kirchengeschichte*, vol. xxvi., p. 531)—who supports his opinion by an argument—and by others. Schwab, in the Roman Catholic *Theologische Quartalschrift* (No. 1, 1866), admits that Wiseman, as well as Toste, the Catholic biographer of Boniface, in their attempted vindication of him, are biased by excited feelings consequent on the injustice which they suppose him to have suffered.

the evening of his days in a cloister. The veteran declined to take the field, told Boniface that the place could not be captured by force of arms, but advised him, as a means of obtaining it, to promise much and perform little. The Pope but too faithfully obeyed the iniquitous counsel. This perfidy still further exasperated the great family which he was seeking to extirpate. It was Sciarra Colonna who, in connection with William of Nogaret, the emissary of Philip the Fair, made an attack upon the person of the old Pope, then staying in Anagni, and inflicted such injuries that he died on the 11th of October, 1133. The papacy, brought under French influence, was now transferred to Avignon.* Contrary to a common idea, the residence of the Popes in France did not result in the weakening, but rather in the temporary restoration of their power as secular princes. This unexpected result was due to several causes. The local dynasties which had risen to power in Italy in the course of the last half of the thirteenth century, were divided amongst themselves; and the Pope could skilfully avail himself of their mutual jealousies and conflicts to turn one against another. Moreover, the close connection of the Papal feudatories, the kings of Naples of the house of Anjou, with their liege, gave him a strong ally. And finally, the Pontiffs in Avignon played anew the part of their predecessors who, in the contest with the Hohenstaufen emperors, had taken the attitude of friends and protectors of the Italian municipalities in their pursuit of freedom. By means of Cardinal Albornozy, an able Spaniard, the Popes succeeded, while personally absent from Italy, in recovering and reuniting nearly the whole of their former cities and territories. They even succeeded in using for their own ends the eloquence and popularity of Cola di Rienzi. At a

* Avignon was afterwards, in 1348, bought by the Papal See of Joanna, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence. Venaissin was presented to the Pope in 1273, by King Philip III.

time when Rome was filled with anarchy and violence, through the agency of the nobles who sallied from the strongholds which they had built in the city, to engage in bloody fights in the streets, this political and religious enthusiast became the author of a successful revolution, in which he installed himself as tribune, compelling the nobles to surrender their fortresses, and restoring order. Unhappily he quickly betrayed an unbalanced character, and by his costly pomps and shows disgusted the people, caused the Pope to declare against him, and was at length driven from Rome. Arrested a few years later by the Emperor Charles IV., he was sent to Avignon, and having been detained for a while in custody by the Pope, he returned to Rome in company with Albornoz, and materially aided the latter in conciliating the popular favor. But his vanity and self-indulgence excited renewed hostility against him, and in 1354 he was assassinated.

Hardly were the Popes back again in Rome, before they threw away the great prize which the energy and sagacity of Albornoz had won for them. They set about the business of depriving the cities in their domain of the privileges which had been wisely conceded to them by Albornoz; and, in order to crush republicanism more effectually, they even attempted to rob the Tuscan towns of their independence. The result was that the Papal subjects anew broke off their allegiance, which Albornoz had regained with so much painstaking. If the Popes retained, and even recovered, their temporal power during their residence in Avignon, the effect of the great schism, lasting from 1378 to the Council of Constance in 1417, a period in which two and sometimes three rival Popes were struggling to supplant each other, was quite the opposite. In the cities of the Papal kingdom the old dynasties revived and new ones sprang up; towns and territories were ceded to nobles in fief, so that the exhausted Papal treasury might have a new source of income; to the old republics within their domain,

as Rome, Perugia, and Bologna, the Popes found it necessary to concede a degree of republican freedom, that almost amounted to independence, and like privileges were even granted to cities that had never before enjoyed them. In short, the Papal kingdom was dissolved and broken up in this eventful period which was equally detrimental to the temporal and spiritual dominion of the Roman bishops. The steps by which subsequent Pontiffs, beginning with Nicholas V., who became Pope in 1447, regained by degrees, through patient and prudent efforts, the inheritance which the folly of their predecessors had lost, we cannot attempt, in this brief sketch, to relate.

V.

As we approach the beginning of the sixteenth century, we come to a period of moral degradation in the papacy, having no parallel save in the tenth century, when harlots disposed of the sacred office. "The governments of Europe," says Ranke, "were stripping the Pope of a portion of his privileges, while at the same time the latter began to occupy himself exclusively with worldly concerns."* To found an Italian kingdom for his own family, to carve out principalities for his own relations, was the darling object of his ambition. This shameful era may be said to begin with Sixtus IV., Pope from 1471 to 1484. He conceived the plan of founding a State in Romagna for his nephew, or, if we may believe Macchiavelli's assertion, his natural son, Jerome Riario. Opposed in his schemes by Florence, he entered into the foul conspiracy for assassinating Lorenzo and Julian de Medici, which was concocted by the Pazzi. In the midst of the solemn service of the Mass, at the signal given by the elevation of the host, a fierce attack was

* Ranke, *History of the Popes of Rome during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, vol. i., p. 45.

made upon them; but while Julian fell, Lorenzo escaped. The speedy execution, without the forms of a trial before an ecclesiastical tribunal, of the priests who had been engaged in this murderous assault, afforded the Pope a pretext for venting his chagrin at its failure by launching his spiritual thunders against Florence and its ruler. He joined Ferdinand of Naples in making war upon Lorenzo, whose consummate boldness and skill in drawing off Ferdinand from the alliance saved him from ruin. Next, Jerome coveted Ferrara, held in fief by the house of Este; and the Pope, in alliance with Venice, turned his arms in that direction; but the same Pope, seeing that they were to gain nothing, deserted Venice and excommunicated her. Vexation at his inability to subdue this republic hastened his death. Innocent VIII. "sought with a still more profligate vileness to exalt and enrich his seven illegitimate children:" and for this end carried on two wars against Ferdinand, King of Naples. But the crimes of Sixtus and of Innocent, shocking as they were, were less than the crimes committed by the most flagitious of all the Pontiffs, Alexander VI. To give riches and crowns to his five illegitimate children, and especially to his favorite son, Cæsar Borgia, he exerted all his energies. His court afforded a spectacle of luxury and unbounded sensuality. Alexander sided with Naples against the invader, Charles VIII. of France, and then, for a price, deserted his ally. In 1495, he joined the emperor and the King of Spain, in order to drive the French out of Italy. Not getting enough from Naples to satisfy him, he went over to Louis XII. of France, granting to Louis a divorce from his wife, and receiving, among other benefits, armed assistance for Cæsar Borgia, who made war upon the principal vassals of the church and carved for himself a dominion out of their territories. To advance the interests of this monster of cruelty and perfidy, Alexander was ready to throw away even the show of truth and decency. At length the poison which the Pope had mixed for a rich cardinal

whom he wanted to rob, he drank himself by mistake, and died on the 18th of August, 1503.

Julius II. differed from his immediate predecessors in being free from their personal vices and in not aiming to aggrandize his own relations. His aim was to build up and extend the States of the Church. In this he attained to great success. He satisfied his family by obtaining for them, by peaceful means, the patrimony of Urbino. He expelled Cæsar Borgia from his dominion and seized upon it. He brought Perugia and Bologna under the direct rule of the Papal See. Unable to induce the Venetians to retire from the territories of the Holy See on the coast, he organized the league of Cambray, and compelled them to surrender this portion of the dominions of the church. He gained possession of Parma, Piacenza, and Reggio, and of all the region lying between Piacenza and Terracina. He had established his sway over all the territories of the church and consolidated them into a kingdom. He only failed in a second great end which he had set before him—that of expelling the foreigners, or, as he expressed it, of “driving out the barbarians” from Italy. In truth, in reaching the object of his ambition, he had been obliged to bring in foreign intervention, and had done his part in paving the way for the train of evils which were destined to flow from it.

In their efforts to preserve the fair inheritance which Julius II. had left to them, his successors were obliged to involve themselves in the intrigues and conflicts of European politics, and especially in the long contest between France and Austria for power and predominance in Italy. In particular did the acquisitions made by Julius II. help forward the Protestant Reformation. The Papal control over Parma, Piacenza, and other Lombard towns, Charles V. regarded as a usurpation; and, at the critical time of the Reformation, he was not disposed to strengthen his antagonist by stifling the Lutheran movement. In like manner, the Popes were willing to use that movement as an element

of discord and weakness in the empire of Charles. At the moment when Charles was gaining his great success against the Reformers, in the Smalcaldic war, about the time of the battle of Mühlberg, Pope Paul. III. sent a message to the King of France "to support those who were not yet beaten," that is, to aid the Protestants. Francis, the Pope, and the Protestants were found, on occasions of vital importance, in virtual alliance with each other. The Protestant cause was saved by the mutual jealousies and the selfish rivalry of its enemies. The separation of England from the Catholic Church was occasioned by the refusal of Clement VII. to grant the application of Henry VIII. for a divorce—a refusal that was due to the political relations then subsisting between the Pope and the emperor.

To Julius II. belongs the distinction of founding the Papal kingdom as it has continued down to a recent day. It was not, however, until 1598 that Ferrara was brought under the immediate sovereignty of the Holy See, and not until 1649 that the Dukedom of Urbino was in like manner absorbed into the Papal kingdom. By the treaties of 1815, Austria gained a small strip of Papal territory situated on the left bank of the Po.

VI.

The Papal dominion in Italy felt the shock of the French Revolution, which caused all thrones to tremble. In 1790 the French National Assembly incorporated with the French kingdom the Papal counties of Avignon and Venaissin. As the Pope joined in the war against France, Napoleon, in 1797, conquered his states and obliged him, in the peace of Tolentino, to renounce Avignon and Venaissin forever, to give up the Legations of Ferrara, Bologna, and Romagna to the new Cisalpine Republic, to surrender the finest works of art to be transported to Paris, and to pay the costs of the war. The republican feeling spread as far as Rome, and in

1798, a Roman Republic was proclaimed by the insurgent people. Pius VI. was carried from Rome as a prisoner and died in Valence, in France, in 1799. During the absence of Bonaparte in Egypt, Italy was overrun by Suwarrow at the head of the allied army. It is needless to recount here the particulars of the prolonged conflict of Pius VII. with Napoleon. In 1809, a decree of the French emperor united the Papal States with his empire. In 1814, after the allies had entered France, the Pope returned to Rome. The reactionary policy at once began to prevail, and the French system of law and administration, which had proved so beneficial to the Papal States, was overthrown. At the Congress of Vienna, the Pope entered a protest against the cession of the little tract of territory on the Po to Austria, as well as against the retention by France of Avignon and Venaissin, which, as we have said, had been formally given up. The maladministration of the Papal government, especially the restoration of the confiscated ecclesiastical property, brought the finances of the kingdom into irretrievable ruin. Up to the accession of Pius IX., there was no sign of any disposition to vary from a blind, stubborn, and liberty-hating conservatism. Efforts at rebellion—as those at Bologna in 1831—had been suppressed by Austrian soldiery. The government of Gregory XVI. obstinately set itself against every enterprise looking towards political and social improvement, and evinced its hatred of freedom by incarcerating thousands of political offenders.

The accession of Pius IX., in 1846, to the Papal chair, inspired the warmest hopes. He set free six thousand political prisoners. He earnestly set about the work of improving and liberalizing the system of government. He was hailed as the chief of the liberal party in Italy. The Revolution in France, in 1848, was followed by the grant, from the Pope, of a Constitution embracing liberal provisions. The insurrection in Lombardy, against the Austrian rule, led to the breach between the Pope, who refused to

engage in a war with the Austrians, and the radical party; and this party gaining the ascendancy, after the assassination of Rossi, in 1848, the Pope was obliged to fly from Rome. The Roman Republic was overthrown by French troops, and the Pope, under their protection, returned to Rome, in 1850.

Of late, the progress of the new kingdom of Italy has given promise that the yearning for Italian unity will be realized, and that the temporal rule of the Pope must give way to the demand of a nation. Upon the evacuation of the States of the Church by the Austrian garrisons, immediately after the victories of the French and Sardinians at Magenta and Melagnano, in the summer of 1859, several of those states at once revolted from the Pope and proclaimed Victor Immanuel king. The Papal government succeeded in reconquering them, with the exception of Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna, and Forli. After the peace of Villafranca, the French emperor denied the application of the Pope for aid in recovering these legations; and their formal annexation to the Sardinian kingdom took place in 1860. The attempt of Lamoricière, the French general in the service of the Pope, to recover them, not only failed, but led to the further annexation of Umbria and the Marches of Ancona to the Italian kingdom. Thus there was left to the Pope only the comarca of Rome, Civita Vecchia, Velletri, and Frosinone, having an aggregate population of about half a million of inhabitants. The Italian statesmen probably expect that the retirement of the French garrison from Rome will be attended with the same result that followed the evacuation of the legations by the Austrians in 1859. The people will rise, overturn the government, and invite Victor Immanuel to incorporate them among his subjects and establish his court at Rome.

After this historical survey we are prepared to consider what have been the character and effect of the Pope's secular rule. And first, in respect to the States of the Church

themselves, there can be no doubt that the government of the Popes has been, on the whole, an exceedingly bad government. On this point there can be no serious question among enlightened men. The exceptional periods, when there has been an improved administration, have been short and far between. Since the French Revolution, the great powers, including such as are most loyal to the Catholic Church and to the Supreme Bishop, have repeatedly used their endeavors to procure reforms. But they have been met by a stiff refusal to depart from the old system. It is supposed that the election of Pius IX. was owing to the conviction that the gross misgovernment at Rome could not long continue; and that his liberal measures at the outset of his reign were due to this feeling. Now the vices of the Papal rule are not accidental; but they appear to belong inseparably to a government of priests like that which the Pope has been so long endeavoring to prop up by foreign bayonets. The settled disaffection and hostility of his subjects are well justified by the inherent and ineradicable vices of a priestly administration.

The effect of the Popes' temporal sovereignty on Italy has likewise been in the highest degree disastrous. The maintenance of their temporal power has led them to bring in foreign domination, the great curse of the peninsula, and to keep Italy divided. Macchiavelli, who inscribed his *History of Florence* to Clement VII., says that "all the wars which were brought upon Italy by the barbarians"—that is, foreigners—"were caused for the most part by the Popes, and all the barbarians who overrun Italy were invited in by them. This has kept Italy in a state of disunion and weakness." At this moment, the Pope's temporal dominion is the one great hindrance to the realization of Italian unity.

When we inquire as to the influence of his temporal rule upon his character and influence as a spiritual ruler, it is an open question whether his position as secular prince did not, in the middle ages, protect and strengthen the papacy in

general. If it did, and if the papacy in these times is acknowledged to have been, on the whole, a beneficial institution, being a counterpoise to the spirit of irreligion and lawless barbarism, then we must admit that the temporal power was relatively a good thing. However this question may be answered, it is clear that the secular power of the Pope has had a corrupting and pernicious influence upon the character of his spiritual administration. Bellarmine, and other eminent Catholic theologians and casuists, have explained the consistency between the spiritual office of the Pope, and his position as a secular prince; and have held that, in entire consistency with religion, a foreign prince or state may wage war with him in his character as an earthly sovereign. But as a matter of fact, as is well known, the Pontiffs have never refrained from using the spiritual weapons in their hands, as the excommunication and the interdict, for the furtherance of the temporal interest. They have turned the awful powers of discipline, which are attributed to them, for the furtherance of their political schemes. The inevitable effect must be, and has been, to degrade the spiritual function, and rob it of no small portion of the reverence which it might otherwise excite and maintain. Of the influence of the secular dominion exercised by the Popes, and of the court which it creates, on their own personal character, history is an outspoken witness. The covetousness, the ambition, the luxury, the open and shameless licentiousness, the atrocious crimes, which are chargeable on too many of the Popes—offenses which have moved the indignation of Catholic historians like Baronius, and poets like Petrarch and Dante—have commonly grown out of the temptations incident to the temporal sovereignty. By the occupations and pleasures which cluster about it, Pontiffs who are by no means to be counted among the worst, have been drawn aside from the proper work and character of Christian bishops. Father Paul, after praising Leo X. for his erudition, his humanity, his liberality, his love of letters and arts, adds, with fine sa-

tire, that "he would have been a perfect Pope, if with these qualities, he had united some knowledge of the affairs of religion, and a somewhat greater inclination to piety, for neither of which he manifested much concern."* Dante's indignant protest against the temporal power of the Roman bishops, is familiar † :—

"Laws indeed there are
But who is he observes them? None; not he,
Who goes before, the shepherd of the flock,
Who chews the cud, but does not cleave the hoof,‡
Therefore the multitude, who see their guide
Strike at the very good they covet most,
Feed there, and look no further. Thus the cause
Is not corrupted nature in yourselves,
But ill-conducting, that hath turn'd the world
To evil. Rome, that turn'd it unto good,
Was wont to boast two suns, § whose several beams
Cast light on either way, the world's and God's.
Once since hath quench'd the other; and sword
Is grafted on the crook; and so conjoin'd,
Each must perforce decline to worse, unawed
By fear of other."

But can the temporal power be given up, and the spiritual power be left intact? The affirmative is declared by some Catholic writers and statesmen. It is proposed that the Pope should surrender his temporal authority, but continue at Rome the exercise of his spiritual functions, receiving an abundant revenue, together with an ample income for each of the cardinals. On the other hand, the Pope and his party stoutly contend that the temporal sovereignty is essential to the full exertion of his spiritual functions, and therefore cannot be given up. It must be allowed that cogent

* *Istoria del Concil. Trident*, lib. i., p. 5.

† *Purgatorio*, xvi., l. 100—115 (Cary's translation).

‡ The allusion is to an unclean beast in the Levitical Law. (See Levit. xi. 4.)

§ The emperor and the Bishop of Rome.

arguments may be brought forward on this side of the question. In the first place, as the Pope declares in his recent "Allocution," if he is not to be a ruler, he must be a subject of one of the Catholic powers; and, if a subject, he is constantly exposed to the suspicion of being warped or managed, in his spiritual government, by the power to which he is thus, in a civil relation, subordinate. The experience of the papacy at Avignon, and the immense loss of prestige and influence consequent on the relation of the Popes, at that time, to the French kings, is one of the facts which lend a strong support to this plea put forth by Pius IX. On the contrary, the force of his argument seems to be neutralized by the consideration that, in the present state of the world, the Pope, as a temporal ruler, is incapable of sustaining himself, and is obliged to lean for support on a foreign power. If it be said that the surrender of his States is to compromise his independence, the reply is that his independence is lost already. There is still more weight in an additional argument, which is also touched upon by the Pope in the late "Allocution," that on becoming a subject he would at once be involved in a conflict of duties, or would be fettered in the promulgation of doctrine and the administration of discipline. The great question of marriage, which is now a prominent subject of contention between the Pope and the Italian king, affords a fair illustration. In the kingdom of Italy, and wherever the French law is in vogue, marriage by the civil contract alone is valid. To this law and practice the Pope is, of course, vehemently hostile. Marriage is a sacrament of the church, and the sanction of the priest is held to be indispensable. The control which this doctrine gives to the priesthood is one of their greatest prerogatives, and no wonder that it is prized and defended to the last. Now, suppose the Pope to become a subject of Victor Immanuel. It is easy to see that his freedom to fulminate anathemas against the authors of the statute which abolishes this high prerogative, and against

such as venture to take shelter under the law of the land, might be inconveniently restricted; and that conflict between the secular and ecclesiastical rulers would almost inevitably spring up. And this is only one of the subjects on which variance and strife might easily arise. On a review of the whole question, we are inclined to agree with the Pope and his party in the opinion that the loss of the temporal power carries with it a partial loss of the spiritual. If the spiritual power could survive the surrender of the temporal, in undiminished vigor, the former might be enhanced, and the Catholic Church strengthened by the purifying influence flowing from the change. The Pope would stand forth in the simple character of Supreme Bishop, free from the entanglements of secular rule. But, as we have just intimated, it is doubtful whether his freedom, as a spiritual prince, would not be seriously impaired by the loss of his earthly kingdom.

Will the Pope be dethroned? If we looked solely at the past, we should give a negative answer to this question. We should say that if he be driven from his kingdom, he will regain it. Many times have the Popes been expelled from Rome. They have seen their dominions pass into other hands, and have wandered forth as fugitives and exiles. Often have they witnessed emergencies which, in outward appearance, were more threatening than the peril in which they are just now involved. The bark of St. Peter, to borrow their own favorite simile, has frequently been tossed by the tempest, but has never been submerged. It has floated in safety in the midst of the rude blast, and at length the billows have been composed to rest. But times have changed. There is, even in the Roman Catholic part of Christendom, a decline of faith in the Papal pretensions. The main point is that the papacy no longer enjoys in Europe the popular sympathy which was once its firm support. In the middle ages, the papacy was popular, sometimes even demagogical. In modern times, it has attached itself with blind, unyield-

ing tenacity to the despotic principles and organs of the reactionary anti-republican party in Europe. It vainly struggles to stem the tide of political sentiment which, notwithstanding occasional fluctuations, has been steadily rising since the commencement of the present century. The prospect, therefore, is that the Pope will be forced to yield up what remains to him of his Italian kingdom. If he could permanently change his residence, the problem would admit of another solution. He might become the master of some other province, or establish himself on some island of the Mediterranean. But it is only as bishop of the Roman Church that he can pretend to episcopal supremacy. Forsaking that church by his own voluntary act, could he longer claim the prerogatives of Peter? If a theory could be devised for escaping from this difficulty, still the abandonment of Rome for a long period would bring upon him a great loss of consideration.* The peculiar glory that lingers over the eternal city, and over the papacy as identified with it, would be lost.

The separation of Italy or of France, or of both, from the Papal See, would be an event which would be hailed by Protestants with joy. Such an event would open to the seceding kingdoms the possibility of religious reforms which are now precluded. The policy of toleration is now too firmly established, to render it possible, in either of the countries just mentioned, for Protestantism to be suppressed by the tyranny of an establishment, in case they were to break off their connection with the Roman Church. Unhappily, in

* The Catholic theologians hold that the Bishop of Rome may reside away from that city, if he chooses. As long as he is Bishop of Rome, he is Supreme Pontiff. Says Perrone :— “ Fieri potest, ut summus pontifex resideat Viennæ, Mediolani, Berolini, aut Petropoli, nunquam vero potest fieri, ut simplex episcopus Viennensis aut Petropolitani sit summus Pontifex; ubicunque idcirco resideat, semper erit pontifex maximus, ut possit dici ac vere sit in primatu Petri successor.” Perrone, t. ii., § 604. (Quoted in Hase, *Handbuch der Protestantischen Polemik*, etc., p. 242, n.)

France, the ultramontane party is now in the ascendant. The old principles of Gallican freedom, for which Bossuet, and a body of great men before and after him, have contended, have lost ground and find but few advocates. In Italy, the prospect is more hopeful. It is not impossible that the prolonged and irritating conflict there between Pope and king will ultimately lead to an open renunciation of the ecclesiastical, as well as civil, pretensions of the Pope. Since the modern nations of Europe emerged into a distinct existence, the feeling of national rights and of national independence, as opposed to foreign ecclesiastical control, has been steadily growing. A regard for the interest of the nation has outweighed the influence of religious affinities. Since Philip the Fair summoned together the estates of his realm to aid him in his opposition to the tyrannical measures of Boniface VIII., the nation has generally been the uppermost thought, as compared with the church, in the policy of European rulers. The hostility of France to the Austrian house of Hapsburg brought the former to the assistance of the Protestant cause in the thirty years' war. Now we find Prussia and Italy in alliance against the same Catholic empire. The papacy is not so strong that it can afford to set itself against the national feeling and real welfare of any Catholic people.

At the same time we have little confidence in the permanence of any triumph that is achieved over the Papal system, unless that triumph results from the power of enlightened religious convictions. In the last century, in Europe, the papacy—we speak of it as a system of spiritual rule—was at a low ebb. It seemed as if there were none so poor as to do it reverence. The Emperor Joseph II. of Austria introduced into his dominions reforms that fell little short of an utter renunciation of Papal control. Everywhere the bonds of hierarchical rule were loosened. But the motive underlying these changes was, to a large extent, religious indifferencism. When religion revived, religious feeling flowed

in the old channel. In France, the Catholic Church is stronger than it was fifty years ago. It is on a believing, and not on a free-thinking, Protestantism that we must depend for a success that is to be enduring. It is requisite that deep and enlightened convictions of Christian truth, and a true love of the Gospel as understood by Protestants, should spread among the people of Catholic countries. The church is founded not on Peter as an individual, but on Peter as a warm and sincere confessor of the faith that Jesus is the Son of God and Saviour of the world. With the progress of this faith, unencumbered by the traditions of men, the decline and fall of the Papal system are linked. Political changes may be valuable auxiliaries, but it is easy to overestimate their importance.

Most Protestant Christians sympathize with the progress of the Italian kingdom, and hope to see the Pope lose his temporal power. This is not true of all, however; and among the dissenters from the popular view is the illustrious scholar and statesman, Guizot. The publication, during the present year, of the fourth edition of his remarks on *The Christian Church and Christian Society* in 1861, indicates that his opinions on this question since that time have not changed. At the foundation of his interesting discussion is the proposition that every blow struck at one of the great churches is a blow struck at all and at Christianity itself. The Roman Catholic and the Protestant have adversaries in common, who are far more distant from both than the Catholic and Protestant are from one another. The Catholic and Protestant profess the same Christian faith, important as the points of disagreement are between them. The adversaries attack this faith, and their attacks at the present day are mischievous and formidable. It is, therefore, suicidal, as well as wrong, for Protestants to join hands with indifferentism and irreligion, for the sake of weakening their ancient theological antagonist. Guizot proceeds to argue that the temporal kingdom of the Pope cannot be wrested from him

without a violation of international law and public morality. He sees in the authority which it has become fashionable in France to concede to "universal suffrage" the rising of a new despotism which is held to be stronger than the obligations of treaties and the settled principles of international right. Moreover, the attack on the Pope's temporal kingdom he considers an infringement of religious liberty. The temporal power is a condition of the exercise of the spiritual. It is the guaranty of the independence of the Papal office. The great body of Catholics so regard it. The temporal power grew up in connection with the spiritual, as a part and a fruit of the latter. Besides, he thinks that the policy of the Italian kingdom is principally dictated by political ambition. If the Pope be driven from Rome, Guizot thinks that this event will not give more than a momentary success to the Italian movement. The Roman Catholic population, the world over, will be roused to a sense of the injury done to their chief and thus indirectly to themselves. The consequence will be that widespread and increasing agitation will lead to positive measures for the restoration of the Pope to his rightful throne.

Guizot does not confine himself to an expression of his reasons for not approving the Sardinian movement. He indicates what he believes to be the real need of Italy, and the way in which it should be met. Italy needs independence and liberty—independence of foreign control and liberty within. Both of these ends he holds it possible to secure by peaceful means, apart from all revolutionary measures. The abridgment of liberty in the Italian States he attributes, to a considerable extent, to the revolutionary ferment. But Italian unity, in the sense in which the phrase is taken generally, he believes to be at once unnecessary and impracticable. His plan would be to establish a confederation, embracing all the States of the Peninsula as they existed prior to the revolutions which have so enlarged the borders of the Sardinian kingdom. In a confederacy of this kind, he con-

ceives that all the unity that is desirable or attainable could be realized. To give strength to the various parts composing such a body, he would wish that they should be nearly equal to one another, no one State being much beyond any of the rest in power and resources. It is evident that Guizot has little faith in political changes which are due to revolutionary agencies. He uses strong language when condemning the action of the Italian Government in confiscating ecclesiastical property, and in reference generally to their treatment of the Catholic Church. Yet he does not omit to express satisfaction that he is a Protestant, and regret that the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church do not see the advantage, as well as duty, of coming out in favor of full religious toleration.

We must confess ourselves not convinced by this reasoning. The fact is obvious that the Papal civil administration is not only distasteful to the subjects of it, but is extremely bad—inherently bad. It is a fact equally obvious that the condition of Italy, partly in consequence of the Papal kingdom, has been deplorable. The discontent of the people is owing to misgovernment. So we cannot but think that their desire to become a nation is legitimate and laudable. Nor does Guizot's scheme of a confederation, even were it within reach, seem to promise good. If it is to be united by no bond stronger than the bands which held the Greek states together, or which lately connected the members of the Germanic body, it would prove to be a rope of sand. If, on the contrary, it were a bond like that of the American Union, Italy would be, to all intents and purposes, a single nation, and that member of the nation over which the Pope presides would inevitably prove to be refractory and unmanageable. The Pope, if he were to belong to such a confederacy, would be bound to abide by its policy in respect to foreign nations, not to speak of domestic affairs, and would be as far from a situation of independence as it is claimed he would be were he a subject of the Italian king.

Our conclusion is that the "logic of events" is hurrying the Pope to the coerced surrender of his temporal power, and that a portion of his spiritual power must eventually go with it. Whether this great change will take place speedily, and in consequence of the progress of the new Italian kingdom, it is impossible to say. The effect of an exile of the Pope from Rome, growing out of a refusal on his part to acquiesce in the absorption of his territory in the new kingdom, may be such as Guizot describes. Disturbances may arise which will lead, as when the late Roman Republic was overthrown, to the regaining of his throne. Even when Victor Immanuel establishes himself at Rome, it will be too early to say that the Pope's temporal power is gone forever. So unsettled is the political condition of all Europe, that a confident judgment on this point would be premature.

[At the beginning of the Franco-German war, Napoleon III. withdrew the French troops from Italy. Shortly after, on the 20th of September, 1870, Victor Emanuel took possession of Rome. The relations of the Pope to the Italian government were defined in the law of the Papal guarantees, which was enacted on the 13th of May, 1871. By this law it was provided that the person of the Pope should be sacred and inviolable; that attacks upon his person should be punished in the same manner as like offences against the king; that he should have the honors of a sovereign, and all the distinctions which Catholic monarchs had heretofore accorded to him; that 3,225,000 lire should be annually granted him; that the Vatican and Lateran palaces, and the Castel Gandolfo, with their appurtenances, should be given up to him to use, and that they should be inalienable, and with all their contents—libraries, museums, and the like—should be exempt from taxation; likewise that no government officials should enter these places, on official business, without the Pope's permission; that this rule should also hold good of places where conclaves and councils are

assembled ; that the Pope's correspondence should be free, and that he should have his own postal department and telegraph ; that all ecclesiastical institutions in Rome, and in the suburban dioceses should be under his exclusive authority ; but that no aid should be rendered by the secular power in the execution of ecclesiastical sentences. If these should be at variance with the law of the state, they would be null and void.

These liberal concessions went as far as it was practicable to go without constituting the papacy an *imperium in imperio*. Pius IX., in repeated protests, repudiated this law, and he refused to receive the grant of money which it offered him, or to yield to the enactment anything but a passive submission. Thus, in an encyclical to all patriarchs, archbishops, etc., on the 15th of May, 1871, he declared that he could not surrender his rights, "which are the rights of God and of the Apostolic See," with which the Popes had been invested, in the providence of God, for eleven hundred years. He asserted the impossibility that a Pope of Rome could be independent in his office, as long as he is subject to a temporal sovereign who might be an infidel or a heretic, or might be at war with other princes. The act of guarantees of 1870 had left the ecclesiastical establishments in Rome and its dioceses under the exclusive control of the Pope. By a law passed on the 19th of July, 1873, the laws in virtue of which such institutions in all the other parts of the Italian kingdom had been obliged to give up their immovable property to the government, and to submit to the regulations imposed by the civil authority, were made applicable to the province of Rome. Among the qualifications, however, which were attached to the new enactment was the important provision appropriating to the Pope 400,000 francs annually for the support of the generals of the religious orders.*]

* The various documents referred to above may be found in Von Kremer-Auenrode u. Hirsch, *Das Staatsarchiv*, I. Supplementband zu b. xxiii., xxiv., Leipzig, 1877.

THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND THE COUNCIL OF THE VATICAN.*

THE Council of Constance, which was in session during the interval between the years 1414 and 1418, was the most brilliant and imposing of the ecclesiastical assemblies of the middle ages. If the number of bishops present was not so large as at some of the other great synods of the church, this difference was more than made up by the multitude of inferior clergy, of doctors and of jurists, and by the unexampled array of sovereigns and nobles. Pope and emperor were both present, each with a numerous and dazzling retinue of officers and attendants. It has been pronounced the first example of a congress of princes in modern times, since there was hardly a kingdom or principality of the catholic world, however small or remote, that was not represented by princes or other deputies. A throng of not less than fifty thousand people, drawn by official obligation, curiosity, the love of gain or of pleasure, flowed into the city of Constance, to witness the doings of the council. It has been truly said that a detailed description of the scenes that took place within and without the assembly, would afford a complete as well as vivid picture of the life and manners of the time. The occasion that called the council together was of the

* An article from *The New Englander* for April, 1870, in review of *Conciliengeschichte*. Nach den Quellen bearbeitet von Dr. Carl Joseph Hefele, o. ö Professor an der Universität Tübingen. Siebenter Band. I. Abth. *Geschichte des Concils von Constanx*. Freiburg im Breisgau 1869: *The Centenary of St. Peter and the General Council: A Pastoral Letter to the Clergy, &c.* By Henry Edward, Archbishop of Westminster. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1867.

gravest character. The abuses in the administration of the church had grown to be unbearable. In Bohemia there was a formidable religious movement that threatened to result in the establishment of a new and powerful sect. Above all, the long schism which the Council of Pisa had unsuccessfully tried to terminate, demanded an instant and effectual remedy, if Christendom and the Catholic Church were to be saved from permanent division. It is to the proceedings of this synod, that the new instalment of Hefele's copious work on the *History of Councils* is devoted.

Hefele is one of the most learned and justly esteemed of the Catholic theologians north of the Alps. His work is one to which a Protestant, to be sure, must often take exception; yet, generally speaking, it is characterized by a spirit of fairness, and it is not probable that it contains any intentional perversion of facts or sophistry in argument. Hefele is frequently called a liberal Catholic; and so he is, in comparison with the curialists or extreme ultramontanist party. On the particular question whether the Pope is, by himself and independently of the concurrence of a council, infallible in matters of faith and morals, we do not find that, in the work before us, he distinctly avows his opinion. But he is far from being a Gallican, in the sense of the old Paris theologians, who exerted a commanding influence in the reforming councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle, or in the sense of Bossuet, who followed in their track. In fact, he describes his own position as being a middle one, between the Gallicans on the one hand and the curialists on the other. The Pope is neither *above* nor *under* the council, but is the head of the church; his relation being analogous to that of the head to the members of the human body. A council without the Pope is incomplete. It is not an oecumenical council. His assent to the dogmatic decrees of such an assembly is requisite, to give them infallible authority. Yet Hefele holds, as indeed does Bellarmine, that a council might depose a Pope for heresy, inasmuch as

a heretic is *ipso facto* disqualified from holding an ecclesiastical office, high or low.* But in such a proceeding the council does not act as an œcumenical assembly. Being cut off from the Pope, it cannot act in this capacity. We have the singular doctrine, then, that an assembly of bishops, which is incompetent, without the Pope's assent, to issue infallible definitions of doctrine, is still competent to put the Pope on trial for heresy, convict him, and degrade him from his office. Hefele shows his conservatism, also, in maintaining that a Pope cannot be deposed by a council for personal misconduct. He may be a very bad man, but he cannot for this reason be deprived of his office. John XXIII., Hefele expressly says, could not have been lawfully deposed for his crimes. It was only heresy on his part that could authorize such a proceeding. The doubtful validity of his election is brought in, as another sufficient cause for removing him from his station. How far this theory is from that of the Constance theologians and of hosts of able and good Catholics in past ages, we need not stop to point out.

In his History, Hefele is evidently biased by the theory as to the relation of the Pope to the council, to which we have just adverted. He supports, by feeble arguments, the often refuted assertion that the Bishops of Rome convoked and presided over the early œcumenical councils, including that of Nicea. The proposition that the Roman bishop convoked the Council of Nicea, rests on no proof that has any weight, and is contrary to all the evidence and probabilities in the case. It was Constantine who endeavored to quell the disturbance raised by Arius at Alexandria. It was through his friend Hosius, the Spanish bishop whom he held in so high esteem, that he sent his letter which was designed to pacify the contending parties. Not a syllable do

* Bellarmine, as will be explained hereafter, does not admit, for himself, that a Pope will ever be left to fall from the faith.

we hear from the contemporary historians and witnesses, of any connection of the Roman bishop with these preliminary events. Constantine, in all his letters and missives that relate to the council, says nothing about the Pope. The assertion that Hosius acted for the Pope and presided in his name, is not only a pure conjecture, but is virtually contradicted by Eusebius, who speaks of the Roman presbyters as acting for the Roman prelate, and although Hosius is named in the same sentence, no such representative character is ascribed to him. That Hosius signs the decrees of the synod first, is owing to the circumstance that he was a "world-renowned" man, as Eusebius says of him; to his personal relations to the emperor; and to the probable fact that he was one of the presidents, not as standing in the Pope's place, but through his own merits. It was he and Eusebius of Cæsarea, as Stanley justly thinks, who sat, one on each side of the emperor, when that august personage took his place in the midst of the council. The two Roman presbyters signed after Hosius—we assume that the authorities which report the signatures in this order are correct—out of respect to the Roman bishop, to whom a primacy of dignity would probably have been conceded, had he been present; although, even in this case, it is not certain that the name of Hosius would not have been first inscribed. Now that the pseudo-Isidorian misconceptions and misrepresentations respecting the powers conceded to the Roman bishops in the first centuries, have been so long exploded, is it too much to hope that Roman Catholic writers will cease to strain historical evidence for the sake of establishing an indefensible position? The sole authority which Hefele cites for the pretended presidency of the Roman prelate at Nicea, is Gelasius of Cyzicus, who wrote towards the end of the fifth century—an utterly worthless witness, a *marvais compilateur*, as Dupin calls him. Gelasius interpolates, in a quotation from Eusebius, the statement that the Pope presided by representatives. But his whole narrative of the

council swarms with errors. He even gives an account of discussions on the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, although, as is well known, the subject was not touched at the council. One may see how desperate the case is, when a scholar, like Hefele, finding nothing in Eusebius or Socrates or Athanasius, to afford any aid to his position, falls back on Gelasius!

The two topics of most interest which are brought forward in Hefele's recent volume on the proceedings at Constance, are the decrees of the 4th and 5th Sessions, affirming the subordination of Pope to council, and the trial and execution of Huss. Hefele dissents, of course, from the view of the extreme curialists, who deny the œcumenicity of the Constance council altogether. It requires, indeed, some hardihood even in them to take such ground, in the face of the distinct declaration of Martin V., in the bull against the Hussites. But Hefele allows an œcumenical character only to those acts of the council which were done after the election of the Pope and with his approval (the 41st to 45th Sessions, inclusive), together with such other previous acts and decrees as were ratified by him. All the ingenuity of the Papal theologians has been exerted in the effort to show that the famous doctrines of the 4th and 5th Sessions never had Papal sanction. The decrees which had been agreed upon in the meetings of the nations, were to be read in the general session (the 4th) by Zabarella, Cardinal of Florence, the anti-Gallican spokesman. But it was found that in his hands they had undergone an alteration. One of the changes was that in the 1st Article which declared the obligation of all, the Pope included, to obey the council, the words, "Reformation in head and members"—one of the points in regard to which the obligation to submit to the council was affirmed—were left out. This, Hefele states, was by an arrangement between Sigismund and the cardinals. Then the intelligence came that the Pope had fled again,

leaving Schaffhausen. The council now insisted upon the passage of the Articles as originally conceived, and as approved by the nations, and this took place at the 5th General Session, at which Zabarella and seven other cardinals were present. They made no protest, and the Articles were passed in due form. We cannot admit, therefore, the plea of Hefele, that on account of their secret objections or private declarations, supposing these to have been in opposition to the decrees, they were rendered invalid. In two discourses of Gerson, they were quoted before the council as authoritative acts, and no voice was lifted up to dispute the statement. They are to be regarded as the decrees of the council, not less than the declarations of the preceding session. But we do not see that Hefele materially helps his case, were he to succeed in showing that the proceedings of the 5th Session were without the assent of the cardinals. For the 1st Article, as read by Zabarella and passed in the 4th Session, is all that a Gallican can ask. It read thus: "The Synod of Constance, regularly assembled in the Holy Ghost, forming a universal council and representing the militant church, has its authority immediately from God, and every one, the Pope included, is bound to obey it in what pertains to the faith and to the extirpation of schism." * This is enough. The superiority of the council to the Pope is unambiguously declared. And as to the omitted clause—"the reformation of the church in head and members"—the council practically vindicated its right

* "Et primo declarat, quod ipsa in Spiritu Sancto, legitime congregata, generale Concilium faciens, et Ecclesiam Catholicam militantem repræsentans, potestatem a Christo immediate habet, cui quilibet, cujuscunque status, vel dignitatis, etiamsi papalis, existat, obedire tenetur in his, qua pertinent ad fidem et extirpationem dicti schismatis, ac *generalem reformationem ecclesiæ Dei in capite et in membris*," etc. The council proceeds to assert that disobedience to its behests and ordinances, come from whatever quarter it may, even from a Pope, will subject the offender to condign penance, and to punishment. Van d. Hardt, iv. p. 72. Gieseler, III., v. 1, § 131, n. 8.

on this point by deposing John XXIII., and by other measures equally significant. But how about the approval of the Popes? In the first place, John XXIII., before his deposition, declared, over and over again, that the council was "holy and could not err." Hefele himself quotes these declarations. To be sure, Balthasar Cossa was one of the most flagitious of men, although Hefele would mitigate somewhat the verdict of execration that was pronounced upon him by his contemporaries. But he was Pope, nevertheless, up to the time of his deposition. In the second place, Martin V. sanctioned the proceedings of the council, in terms that cover the 4th and 5th Sessions. No matter what reluctance he may have felt in doing this. No matter what counter expressions he may have uttered. In the matter of Falkenberg, who had so grievously incensed the Poles by his book, and whom the French, on account of the affinity of his doctrines with those of Jean Petit, wished also to condemn, the Pope declared that he maintained the decrees of the council as to everything which had been adopted in *materiis fidei et conciliariter*. The verdict against Falkenberg had been passed in the nations, but not in the general session. This is the sense of the term *conciliariter*. It is not opposed to *tumultuariter*, as Hefele seemed to think, in his first volume; but to *nationaliter*. Now the decrees of the 4th and 5th Sessions *were* adopted *conciliariter*. Hefele objects, again, that they are not *de fide*. That is, they are not of a dogmatic character. They were obviously so meant; and this Hefele himself concedes.* If the supremacy of Pope over council can be made into a dogma, why not the reverse proposition? If the infallibility of the Pope can be turned into an article of the creed, why not the infallibility of the council? But look at Martin's bull against the Hussites. In this bull, it was provided that every person suspected of holding the condemned heresies

* P. 104.

of Wickliffe and Huss, should be required by bishop or inquisitor to say, among other things, whether he believes that "what the Holy Council of Constance, representing the universal church, has sanctioned and sanctions *in favorem fidei et salutem animarum* is binding on all Christian believers, and also that what the synod has condemned as contrary to the faith, must be held by all to deserve reprobation." Hefele can do nothing with this passage except to construe the terms, *in favorem fidei et salutem animarum*, as restrictive! As if Martin, in a bull for the suppression of heresy, which aimed to accomplish its end by bringing the authority of the council to bear heavily upon offenders, would couple with the assertion of the œcumenical character of the synod, a partial denial of the same! As if he would suggest to persons heretically inclined, that decrees not judged to be *in favorem fidei* and for the health of souls, need not be respected! But Hefele is compelled to resort to the hypothesis that Martin V. purposely used ambiguous language, such as might be understood by each party as favoring its cause against the other. That is, he intended that the supporters of the council should understand him to approve of their doctrine, at the same time that he left a loop-hole out of which he could escape! We think more charitably, in this instance, of Martin V., and we interpret him as giving a full and unqualified assent to the decrees and declarations, passed in general session, of the Council of Constance. In the third place, when the Council of Basle had reaffirmed the Constance decrees on the point in question, Eugene IV. gave them his express and unqualified sanction. The pretence of the curialists, that this was done under stress, will not answer. There was the force of public opinion and the pressure of circumstances, so that he did what he would have preferred not to do; but he acted freely, without coercion. Moreover, his legates solemnly swore to observe the decrees of the Council of Basle, before they were permitted to preside. We might bring other evidence

to prove that Popes have sanctioned the Constance doctrine, upon the relative authority of councils. But the great French historians and theologians have established the fact long ago. It is only the fresh assertion of the contrary proposition by Hefele, and his particular mode of defending it, that has induced us to enter into the question at all.

The subject of the trial and execution of Huss is treated by Hefele, on the whole, with commendable fairness. There are occasional criticisms on the character and on the statements of Huss, to which we do not assent, but which are to be expected from a Roman Catholic, even though his proclivities are humane and liberal. Huss, though strongly influenced by the writings of Wickliffe, was quite a different man in his intellectual cast. Huss did not carry out his principles, as Wickliffe did, to their logical consequences; although, had he lived longer, he might have worked out a more complete system. The council found it difficult to fasten on propositions which, in the sense in which they were intended by him, could justly be declared heretical; and the impatience and passion of the assembly prevented him from having a fair and attentive hearing. His occasional paradoxes, which were in themselves innocent, were perversely construed into an assault upon the foundations of civil as well as ecclesiastical authority. But the council were sagacious enough to discern that he disowned the authority of the church, and placed himself on the Scriptures as he understood them. He was, in truth, a Protestant in this essential principle. He was ready to renounce errors, if he could be convinced that his opinions were errors; but he would not abjure his opinions at the mere command of the council. He presented thus, in the attitude which he assumed before that body, a practical demonstration to their eyes that he was a heretic. D'Ailly, Gerson, and the rest of the eminent men who led in the council, and who were

ready to pull the offending Pope down from his throne, were attached as firmly as possible to the doctrine of hierarchical authority. They simply held the episcopal, aristocratic theory that this authority inheres not in the Pope personally, but is diffused through the hierarchical body; that the centre of gravity is in the whole assembly of bishops, and not in the primate.* They felt it the more necessary, since they were effecting changes with a high hand, to mark the limits of the reform which they aspired to achieve; and this limit, as one has said, they did mark with blood. Every enlightened Protestant Christian who believes that the Scriptures are the guide in doctrine and life, and that the disciple has the right to interpret the Scriptures for himself, looks up to Huss as a noble witness for the truth and an illustrious martyr. It is evident that his uprightness, his sincerity, his unfaltering courage, his spirit of forgiveness, so like that of the Master, make a deep impression even upon men like Hefele, who yet deem his doctrinal position an erroneous one. Luther said, in view of the words and conduct of Huss, that if he was not a good Christian, there never was one.

Respecting the execution of Huss, Hefele has interesting remarks, which are designed to soften the condemnation which

* The Gallicans distinguished between the *ecclesia universalis*, on the one hand, whose only head is Christ, and in which are included Pope, cardinals and prelates, kings and princes, and people (plebeii), and in which there is salvation, even if there were no Pope to be found in the world, and, on the other hand, the more restricted *ecclesia apostolica*, composed of Pope, bishops, and other ecclesiastics, which is commonly called the Church of Rome, and of which the Pope is considered the head. The Church Universal can never err; the Church of Rome can err and fall into heresy. "Et haec longe minoris auctoritatis videtur esse universali ecclesiâ." (See the passages from Gerson, in Niedner's *Kirchengesch.*, p. 560, n.) Some of the Gallican leaders held that even a general council could err. This was affirmed by Peter d'Ailly at Constance. (For the passages, see Gieseler, III., v. 1, § 131, n. 4.) But Gallicanism finally settled down upon the opinion that a general council is infallible.

is visited on the council for this act; for it is the council, and not Huss, which, in modern days, is on trial. He urges the fact that all civil punishments in those days were severe and barbarous, even when judged by our standards and by existing codes. He also shows that, according to the universal opinion of that age, a heretic, convicted by the proper ecclesiastical authority, should and must be put to death by the civil magistrate. Huss was adjudged a heretic by the highest judicial body; and his opinions were, in fact, if compared with the creed, heretical. The legislation, however, which inflicted such penalties upon heresy, Hefele styles "Draconian," and he deplores the execution of Huss the more, since great disadvantages have resulted to the church from this iron legislation, and countless misunderstandings and misconceptions have been occasioned by it.

Hefele brings up the burning of Servetus, as an illustration of the sentiments prevalent even a hundred years later and among Protestants, respecting the right mode of dealing with heretics. The feeble attempts which have been made in times past to relieve Calvin from the responsibility connected with the death of Servetus, are now, for the most part, abandoned, as they ought to be. Calvin, seven years before the arrest of Servetus, said that if he came to Geneva, he should not, with his (Calvin's) consent, go away alive. He approved and justified the execution. The "mild Melancthon," as Hefele truly says, joined in this approval. Protestants generally, at that time, held that civil magistrates should use the sword, which is entrusted to them, for the extirpation of heresy. The theory of religious persecution is now given up, for two reasons. First, there is undoubtedly a different estimate of the criminality involved in holding erroneous opinions in religion, and a disposition to more charitable judgment. Along with this feeling, there is a stronger sense of the difficulty of measuring the guilt of false belief. Yet this is not the only, nor is it the chief, influence which renders Protestants averse to the use of

force against what they consider dangerous and mischievous errors. Nor is the experience of the futility of forcible and violent means for the defence of truth, the sole or the principal cause of this change. We may hold that men are morally responsible for their beliefs, inasmuch as they are responsible for using those means of ascertaining the truth which God has placed within their reach, and because character cannot be dissevered from belief; and, at the same time, we may hold that it is utterly wrong to use force for the propagation of truth or the extirpation of error. The real ground of this view is, that it is not the function of the church to use, directly or indirectly, any but moral influences against religious error, and that it is not the function of the state to punish men for their opinions. This radical alteration in the view that is taken of the proper function of the state, and of the church as well, is the ground of toleration; although the other motives to the exercise of this spirit, which have been adverted to, are cogent auxiliary reasons. There are two important differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics, in regard to this subject. The first is, that the amount of persecution of which Protestants have been guilty is far less than that for which Catholics, in the same period of time, are accountable. Thus, Protestants have never perpetrated such cruelties as were perpetrated in the Netherlands by the Roman Catholics under Philip of Spain and through the Inquisition. This difference is not an unimportant one; since it shows that the misgivings which spring from humane Christian feeling have had far more practical influence in neutralizing the power of wrong principles among Protestants than among Roman Catholics. It took some time for Protestants to emancipate themselves from the theory of persecution, which was an heir-loom from the middle ages and the Catholic hierarchy; but even before this happy result was consummated, it was manifest that the old principle of suppressing error by force had relaxed its hold upon

the Protestant mind. The main difference between Protestants and Catholics on this subject, however, is that while we disown the theory of persecution, and lament that Protestants should have been so mistaken as to be guilty of it; while, in short, we heartily repent, so far as one generation can repent of the errors of another, of all the instances of religious persecution in which Protestants bore a part, the Catholic Church makes no such confession and exercises no such compunction. Hefele may deplore the *severity* of the sentence against Huss, but even he does not commit himself to an absolute rejection of the theory on which that sentence was pronounced. To the attitude of the Catholic Church generally on this point, we shall soon have occasion again to refer.

The true force and intent of the safe-conduct which Sigismund had given to Huss, is a topic of much interest to the historical student. Did the safe-conduct, properly interpreted, protect the bearer of it against the council, as well as from attacks which might emanate from all *other* persons and bodies; or was it merely a passport ensuring his safety on the journey to Constance, a hearing before the council, and a safe return in case of acquittal? This last interpretation is strenuously advocated by Hefele. With him agrees Palacky, the learned and usually accurate historian of Bohemia.* The same view is adopted by Leo, the German historian, although his very lukewarm Protestantism should prevent him from being quoted, as he sometimes is, as a Protestant authority. On the other side are Hallam and most of the other Protestant historians. Neander speaks of the restricted interpretation of the safe-conduct as a device of modern sophistical historians, and considers that Sigismund was guilty of a perfidious violation of his promise.

How stands the evidence? If we look at the terms of the

* *Geschichte der Böhmen*, III., ii., p. 357, n.

safe-conduct, we find that Huss is taken under the protection of Sigismund and of the empire, and that all lords and magistrates are enjoined to permit him, without hindrance or molestation, to go and return—"transire, stare, morari, et *redire libere*." Hefeles concedes that his safe return was guaranteed, provided he should be acquitted; but no exception or proviso is found in the document itself. This exception Hefeles considers to be implied in the nature of the case. Huss was going before a judicial body to be tried, and it is not to be supposed that the emperor would undertake to protect him against the very tribunal before which, as an accused person, he was to make answer. The reply to this is, that Huss did not so regard the council. He often said that he desired to bring his cause before the council; but in his expressions of this nature, there is always the avowed or implied qualification, that unless he can be convinced of the error of his opinions, he shall not abandon them. To give up his alleged errors, provided they can be shown to be such, he ever professes his readiness, but only on this condition. In reality, he wished to vindicate himself before so great an assembly, and in this public and conspicuous manner, against aspersions that had been thrown out by his enemies, and he wished to show what sort of a man he was by a free and open declaration of his opinions and feelings. It was always far from his design, as his whole conduct as well as words prove, to surrender the convictions of his own mind, in consequence of a mandate from any man or body of men. No weight, therefore, is to be attached to this argument of Hefeles, especially as there is no evidence that Sigismund, prior to the council, had a materially different idea respecting the design of Huss's visit to Constance, from that of Huss himself. But what was the interpretation which Huss himself gave to the safe-conduct? He considered that Sigismund had bound himself to bring him back in safety to Bohemia. In one of his last letters, he accuses Sigismund of breaking his engagement, and says, that he ought to have told the council: "If

he (Huss) does not choose to abide the decision of the council, I will send him to the king of Bohemia, together with your sentence and the documents in support of it, to the end that he [the king] with his clergy may judge him." * Huss adds that Sigismund had allowed Henry Leff and others to say to him, that he should be brought back unhurt, in case he chose not to submit to the judgment of the council. Peter von Mladenowicz, the friend of Huss, declares the same thing. Hefele and Palacky say that nothing should have been built by Huss and his friends on such declarations, since they manifestly transcended the bounds of Sigismund's lawful power. But this answer appears to us insufficient. The veracity of Huss cannot be called in question; and if the official agents of Sigismund gave him this assurance, it is probable that Sigismund expected to be able to verify it. That Sigismund blushed when Huss fixed his eyes upon him, at the moment when the sentence of the council was pronounced, rests upon the testimony of a credible eye-witness. That it was a fact widely reported, may be inferred from the remark of Charles V. at Worms, when, in reference to a suggestion that he should avail himself of the opportunity to lay hold of Luther, he said that he would not blush like his predecessor Sigismund. Whether more or less importance is attached to this famous blush of Sigismund, the fact seems to rest on pretty good authority. The only argument of much weight on Hefele's side of the question, is derived from a passage in one of the remonstrances addressed by the Bohemian nobles to Sigismund, after Huss had been taken into custody, and before he had been brought before the council. The arrest of Huss, as is well known, was effected by the cardinals on their own authority, with the consent of John XXIII.—involuntary consent, as he declared to the Bohemians. It is acknowledged on all hands that *this* imprisonment was considered, by the Bohemian friends of Huss,

* The language of Huss is given by Hefele, p. 226.

and by Sigismund himself, a flagrant violation of the terms of the safe-conduct. Sigismund, having threatened to liberate him by force, actually went so far as to quit Constance—so indignant was he that the council did not adopt efficient means to relieve him from this disgrace. It was only when it was strongly represented to him that if the council was to be controlled in its action, all the hopes of reform and of terminating the schism would be nipped in the bud, that he consented to come back. When by the flight of his custodians, Huss was released from the hands of the cardinals, the Bohemians were confident in the expectation that Sigismund would deliver him from his cruel confinement and procure for him a hearing before the council. When this did not follow, but Huss was still kept in prison, the Bohemians were yet more aggrieved and exasperated. Among the petitions and remonstrances with which they endeavored to move the council and Sigismund to fulfill the obligations under which he had placed himself, there is one in which they say, that provided Huss is found guilty before the council, and his false doctrine is shown to him, they do not expect that he is to go away unpunished, but that the emperor may then do with him what he chooses. The phrase is:—“*Nec vero cupimus, ut convictus, falsaue doctrina ipsi ostensâ, impunitus abeat. Sed tum prout potest, cum ipso agat, deque ipso quod vult faciat.*” * Possibly they mean no more than Huss meant himself in his professions of a willingness to bow to the council, if they will show him—that is, make him see—that he is in error. We must allow that this is not the most natural interpretation of the phrase. It is more naturally interpreted as implying a strong desire that he should be delivered from his gaolers and be heard before the council, with the judgment of which, even if unfavorable to Huss, his friends would be content. If this be the true meaning of the passage in the Bohemians’ petition

* Van der Hardt, iii., 33.

to Sigismund, we must conclude that the exact sense of the safe-conduct was not definitely understood by all of the parties concerned, and that a discussion and difference of opinion as to its intent and scope sprung up, when the true meaning of it became a matter of vital moment.*

In this place, we may notice an unjust criticism of Hefele upon Gieseler. Says the former: "Finally, in reference to the letter of safe-conduct, another still heavier offence has been laid to the charge of the Council of Constance, which Gieseler thus formulizes: 'in order to justify the emperor on account of his violated safe-conduct, the council put forth the shameless decree, that no faith is to be kept with a heretic!' For the sake of giving at least the semblance of a proof, Gieseler cites two decrees of the Constance Synod, which Van der Hardt (t. iv., p. 521) and Mansi (t. xxvii., pp. 791 and 799) have communicated. The first of them says: 'if a prince, also, has given out a letter of safe-conduct, the Ecclesiastical Court is still authorized to bring the person charged with heresy to an examination, and, if he shows himself guilty and contumacious, to punishment; nevertheless, he who has given the safe-conduct is bound, as far as stands in his power, to labor to fulfil it.' I know not what solid objection any one, from the stand-point of those times, could bring to this. But against Gieseler it can be said with the best reason, that he has grossly sinned against the synod and against the truth, in just leaving out the conclusion of the reprobated decree, viz.: 'that the giver of the safe-conduct must do his utmost to fulfil it.'" Gieseler combines with an unsurpassed thoroughness of investigation an unequalled accuracy of statement. His frigid impartiality is one of his leading characteristics. He is totally incapable

* The safe-conduct obtained for Jerome was differently drawn up; but this proceeded from the council.

Ferdinand, King of Aragon, exerted himself to persuade Sigismund that he ought not, on account of the safe-conduct, to protect the heretic from the penalty of death.

of a wilful *suppressio veri*. Looking into Van der Hardt, we find that the decree referred to is abbreviated and imperfectly paraphrased by Hefeles, in the passage just cited. The decree declares that a safe-conduct issued to heretics or persons charged with heresy, by kings or other princes, with whatever bond they may have bound themselves—*quocunque vinculo se astrinxerint*—can work no prejudice to the Catholic faith and interpose no hindrance in the way of the arraignment and punishment of such persons by the proper ecclesiastical tribunal, even though they may have come to the place of trial, trusting in the safe-conduct, and would not have come without it. Then follows the concluding sentence, omitted by Gieseler: “Nor is the promiser, when he has otherwise done what in him lies, any further obliged, in consequence of his engagement.”* Now, it is obvious that this sentence does not affect materially the import of the decree. But in the text of Van der Hardt, it is given in brackets (with a reference to two manuscripts in which it is found); and it was probably a doubt as to its genuineness that led Gieseler to leave it out. The second decree, asserting that in the matter of a safe-conduct, faith need not be kept by princes with heretics, Hefeles declares not to have been passed by the council, and to be found only in one codex. But it is given as authentic by Van der Hardt, and although Hefeles’s view may, perhaps, be correct, that it was a programme or original proposition for which the first quoted decree was substituted—this decree being the one that actually passed in the general session—there is not the smallest ground for impugning the honesty and impartiality of Gieseler. The decree, in the most offensive form of it, asserts that the king had done what he lawfully could and what it behoved him to do, in the matter of the safe-conduct.† The obnoxious clause affirms that Huss, by persist-

* *Nec sic promittentem, cum aliàs fecerit quod in ipso est, ex hoc in aliquo remansisse obligatum.*

† “*Ex debito fecisse quod licuit, et quod decuit Regiam Majestatem.*”

ently attacking the orthodox faith, has put himself beyond the pale—reddiderit alienum—of every safe-conduct and privilege; “nor is any faith or promise to be kept with him, by natural right, divine or human, to the prejudice of the Catholic Church.” The doctrine which both decrees were framed to embody, was the same, namely, that a safe-conduct from a secular prince gives to a heretic no protection against the lawful ecclesiastical tribunal. The decree which, according to Hefele, was passed, simply formulizes this doctrine. The other decree adds the reason that promises of protection to one who turns out to be an obstinate heretic are *ipso facto* void. The theologians, from the first, endeavored to indoctrinate Sigismund with the idea that his safe-conduct was limited and qualified by the absolute rights of the ecclesiastical tribunal to try and convict heretics; and there were not wanting those who put the doctrine in the repulsive form in which it appears in the draft of the second decree referred to by Gieseler. It is evident that there was complaint and loud complaint that Sigismund had broken his engagement; otherwise, there would have been no occasion for such a decree, in either form. The decree which Hefele allows to have been passed, proves not less clearly than the other, that an accusation of bad faith had been brought against the emperor, which was founded on his failure to protect Huss from the penalty imposed by the council.

Huss was condemned. The old quarrel in the university of Prague, which resulted in the desertion of the university by the whole body of German teachers and students, had some influence in increasing that spirit of hostility towards the Bohemian innovators, which inflamed the council; but the influence of this circumstance was comparatively small. The philosophical quarrel between nominalism, which was now once more in the ascendancy at Paris and elsewhere, and realism, to which in common with Anselm and the most orthodox of the schoolmen, Huss, like Wickliffe, ad-

hered, sharpened the antagonism of Gerson. But the violent and mob-like deportment of the council, which contrasts so unfavorably with the noble serenity and self-possession of their victim, was due to the vindictive hatred which was felt towards what they called heresy. This sentiment was sufficient to paralyze all wiser and more humane feelings, even in the hearts of good men—for such, we doubt not, were many of those who killed Huss, and for whose forgiveness he, remembering the words of his dying Master, prayed. Say what one will of minor, incidental questions, like this of the intent of the safe-conduct, and bring forward what other examples one may of ecclesiastical tyranny and cruelty, it remains true that a frightful tragedy was enacted at Constance, when a sincere, earnest preacher of the Gospel, inspired with heroic courage and Christian gentleness, and so elevated by faith and love that death had for him no terrors, was killed for his opinions by men who claimed to be acting in the name of Jesus and by his authority. Luther published four of the impressive letters which Huss wrote while he was in prison and shortly before his death,* and in the preface Luther gives an interesting reminiscence concerning himself. He says that when he was a young theologian at Erfurt, he took down from the convent library a volume of Huss's sermons. He was curious to see for what heresies it was that Huss had been killed; but, as he read, he was struck with astonishment that a man who wrote in so excellent and Christian a way should have been burned to death for heresy. As he put back the volume, he thought to himself—not knowing then the particulars of the history—that Huss must have become a heretic after writing these sermons.

Bossuet wrote a book on the variations of Protestantism. Quite as copious and telling a book might be written on the

* These letters are included in the edition of Huss's letters in prison, published by Micowek.

variations of Roman Catholicism; and, we may add, in such a work the name of Bossuet himself would figure largely. Bellarmine, an eminent exponent of the Papal, anti-Gallican theology, and a great name in the estimation of all parties, resorts to different subterfuges in order to escape from the difficulty occasioned by the Constance decrees relative to the power of a council.* He brings forward the utterly false position of Turrecremata, Campegius, and others, that the Constance propositions were meant to apply only to times of schism, when opinion is divided as to who is the lawful Pope. He denies, of course, that Martin V. opposed the decrees in question, and makes the term *conciliariter*, or *concilialiter*, mean "after the manner of other councils, the matter having been diligently examined;" a totally different definition from either of those given by Hefele, and one altogether unfounded. Equally unfounded is the assertion that when Martin approved of the decrees which had been adopted *de fide* and *concilialiter*, he referred solely to those against the Wickliffites and Hussites. Bellarmine denies that John XXIII. and Gregory IX. were deposed against their will, and affirms that, admitting that they were, the power to depose them does not involve the power to frame new dogmas. His whole treatment of this question is according to his usual method, which is to bring forward everything that can be said, with any degree of plausibility, against the antagonist, whether the considerations advanced are consistent with one another or not. He is master of the art of fencing; a typical polemic. Bellarmine maintains the opinion that the Pope is absolutely superior to a council, and that he cannot be deposed.† In an earlier section of his work,‡ he takes up the question whether a heretical Pope can be deposed, and discusses it at length. He begins by stating the opinion of Pighius that a Pope cannot be a here-

* C. III., lib. ii., c. xix., p. 1222 seq.

† C. IV., l. ii., c. xxii. seq.

‡ C. III., ii., c. xxx.

tic, and with this opinion he expresses his concurrence. "Yet," he adds, "because it is not certain, *and the common opinion is the opposite*"—"communis opinio est in contrarium"—"it will be worth while to see what answer can be given, provided it be allowed that the Pope *can* be a heretic." It seems, by Bellarmine's own concession, that it was the common opinion that a Pope could fall into heresy. Bellarmine, with the rest of the advocates of the indefectibility of the Pope, is involved in extreme embarrassment by examples like those of Liberius, who cast off Athanasius, signed the confession of the semi-Arians, and received them to his fellowship, and of Honorius, who espoused the cause of the Monothelites, and was anathematized as a heretic by the 6th General Council, as well as by several of his own successors. The various evasions that have been sought out for the purpose of avoiding these unwelcome facts, form a curious chapter in polemical theology. Hefele, while he contends that Liberius was not a heretic in his real opinion on the Trinity, allows that his constancy so far broke down, that he purchased his return from exile by deserting the orthodox Athanasians, abjuring the term *homoöusion* (and with it, of course, giving up the Nicene creed), and by joining hands with heretics. Newman, in his edition of Athanasius, styles Liberius "a renegade."* He speaks of that time as one when "the Latins" were "committed to an anti-Catholic creed, the Pope a renegade, Hosius fallen and dead, Athanasius wandering in the deserts, Arians in the sees of Christendom," etc. That Liberius gave up the Nicene formulary and allied himself with the semi-Arians, is an unquestionable fact. Athanasius, Jerome, and Hilary are strong witnesses to his unfaithfulness. The instance of Honorius is still more perplexing to the curialists. He expressed his concurrence with the Monothelite, Sergius. All that Hefele can claim in behalf of him is, that he was a Dyothelite *at*

* P. 127, N. c.

heart, but not competent to handle the question, and was therefore led to the avowal of opposite principles. That he took the Monothelite position in his letters to Sergius, will be clear to every unprejudiced person who is familiar with the points that were under discussion.* But whether he did or not, it is a fact that he was anathematized as a heretic by the 6th General Council, in repeated declarations. It is a fact that this condemnation was approved by the Pope, as well as by the emperor. It is a fact, moreover, that Pope Leo II., who had succeeded Agatho, reiterated the anathema of the council. “Pariter anathemitizamus novi erroris inventores, id est, Theodorum Pharinitanum episcopum, Cyrum Alexandrinum, Sergium, Pyrrhum, Paulum, Petrum, Constantinopolitanæ ecclesiæ subseorsores magis quam præsules, NECNON ET HONORIUM, qui hanc apostolicam sedem non apostolicæ traditionis doctrina lustravit, sed profana proditiõne immaculatam fidem subvertere conatus est [or, according to the Greek, subverti permisit] et omnes, qui in suo errore defuncti sunt.” In a letter to the Spanish bishops, and in another letter to King Erwig, Leo charged Honorius with nourishing the flames of heretical doctrine and defiling the spotless rule of apostolic tradition which he had received from his predecessors. The Trullan Synod (Concilium Quinisextum) repeated the condemnation of Honorius, which the 6th Council had passed. The 7th General Council did the same, and so did the 8th. Pope Hadrian II. (867-872) wrote: “although the anathema was pronounced upon Honorius after his death, yet it is to be understood that it was because he was charged with heresy, for which cause alone it is allowed to inferiors to resist the movements of their superiors.” This declaration of Hadrian was read and approved in the 7th session of the 8th General Council. Hefele shows fully and conclusively that Honorius was condemned by the 6th General Council for

* See, on this point, Neander, III., 179, n. 3.

heresy. He holds that the council was right in doing this, since they could not look into his heart, but must judge his declarations and avowals, which are really heretical. The foolish, because desperately futile, endeavor of Baronius to make out that the name of Honorius had been falsely inserted in the proceedings of the 6th General Council, is completely demolished in the third volume of Hefele, where proofs of the foregoing statements may be found. Popes and councils, then, have united in anathematizing Honorius as a patron and supporter of heresy. Did they believe that a Pope is indefectible? When Popes acknowledged the 6th General Council and anathematized Honorius, did they hold the doctrine that a Pope cannot err from the faith? When all other subterfuges fail, the defenders of Papal infallibility set up the plea that Honorius was uttering private opinions, not public definitions of doctrine! Letters, then, from the Bishop of Rome to the Bishop of Constantinople on a doctrinal question that is agitating the whole church, are destitute of authority!

Since writing the foregoing remarks upon the case of Honorius, we have received the pamphlet of M. Gratry,* priest of the Oratoire and member of the French Academy, which relates to just this topic. M. Gratry is a distinguished writer upon philosophy and theology. We recollect that his able work on *The Knowledge of God*† is preceded by a commendatory letter from Pius IX. In the little pamphlet before us, M. Gratry expresses his strong sense of the wrong that is done to history by the attempts to falsify the testimonies to the condemnation of Honorius for heresy. He shows that Honorius was condemned for heresy "by three œcumenical councils which were approved by the Popes, by two Roman councils, which were presided over

* Mgr. L'Evêque D'Orléans et Mgr. L'Archevêque de Malines. *Pre-mière lettre a Mgr. Dechamps.* Par A. Gratry, Prêtre de l'oratoire, membre de l'académie Française. Paris : 1870.

† *La Connaissance de Dieu.*

by Popes, and by the pontifical profession of faith in use for ages (plusieurs siècles). He exposes, with strong displeasure, the absurd pretense that the 6th Council meant anything by *heresy* except that which the word imports. He shows that Leo II. anathematized Honorius for something besides mere negligence. It was the neglect to extinguish an error which grew out of sympathy with it, and a willingness that it should prevail. He reminds Archbishop Manning that he exposes himself to the penalty of excommunication threatened against all defenders of heretics, when, in the face of the verdict of three general councils, he assumes, in the exercise of his individual judgment, to pronounce the offending letters of Honorius to be free from heresy. But M. Gratry is especially earnest in his protest against the changes that have been introduced into the Roman breviary and the *Liber Diurnus*. In all the copies of the former, up to the commencement of the sixteenth century, the condemnation of Honorius is mentioned. The name of Honorius has now been stricken out. The *Liber Diurnus* contains the ancient confession of faith of the Popes. This included the condemnation of Honorius, but the *Liber Diurnus*, containing the disagreeable passage, is now suppressed. These things, together with the evasions of the Papal apologists for Honorius, appear to M. Gratry to be examples of intolerable duplicity and mendacity. He inquires if the church and the Pope are to be helped by lies! In the last number of the quarterly journal of Hefele,* there is a brief Article by the learned editor on the *Liber Diurnus*. He affirms that it is perfectly clear that at the beginning of the eighth century it was held at Rome that a Pope might be subjected to trial and condemnation, at the hands of a general council, for heresy, and also for negligence in his office. Hefele does not explicitly say, either in this Article or in his *History of Councils*, whether or not

* *Quartal-schrift*. 1869, 4.

Leo II. anathematized Honorius for heresy as well as for criminal negligence. He does not conceal, however, the fact that Leo II. approved of the proceedings of the 6th Council, and the fact that by the council Honorius was condemned for being himself a heretic. That Leo II. and the other Popes meant, in their reiterated anathemas, to charge upon Honorius more than mere remissness, even real participation in heresy, is made evident by M. Gratry. The further plea that Honorius was not speaking *ex cathedrâ*, when responding to interrogatories of the Eastern primates on a debated question of doctrine, is effectively disposed of in this little pamphlet.

The Synod of the Vatican, which Pius IX. has convoked to rebuke the errors of the times, is a much less imposing assemblage than that which was gathered within the ancient walls of Constance. The realistic or practical spirit of the nineteenth century neither provides nor craves a pageant such as gratified the taste of the fifteenth. The mediæval passion for symbols and shows has now, to a great extent, passed away. Everything in the present council betokens the altered condition of church and society. That the Pope should gather a council at Rome, summon it into his own court and camp, as it were; also, that he should be suffered to mark out and manage its proceedings, with little, if any, audible remonstrance, indicates a great change, even since the days of the Tridentine Synod, in the temper of the bishops. The absence of the sovereigns and princes is another notable feature, indicating that the policy of the church is not coincident with that of the European states, and that church and state move in different orbits. The cabinets stand aloof, prepared, if it is thought expedient, to withstand and thwart the determinations of the council. The church, in turn, asks no advice from the civil rulers, and is conscious how little practical authority she exercises over their conduct and over the course of political affairs.

On one of the two great points which absorbed the at-

tention of the fathers at Constance, there is a remarkable contrast between that body and the one now in session. The prerogatives of the Pope are again a topic of discussion; but we find a powerful party in favor of declaring the personal infallibility of the Pope. If a general council could be brought to renounce the very prerogative which liberal Catholics have claimed for it, that would be a triumph for the papacy indeed. The monster which has so long lifted its head against the chair of Peter would strangle itself. The principles and aims of the ultramontanist party are well set forth in the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Manning, one of their most prominent leaders. He writes in vigorous English. It is almost a pleasure to read invectives against one's self, when they are uttered in the terse and polished style of this noted prelate. We find in his pamphlet a distinct expression of the ultramontanist theology, the very principles which Innocent III. proclaimed when the papacy was at the summit of its power. The Lord made Peter, and the successors of Peter, the fountain both of doctrine and of jurisdiction. Episcopal authority, therefore, is derived from the Pope and through him. He is the bishop of bishops, and the doctor of the universal church. We cannot praise Bossuet, "when his illustrious name is under a cloud." "Ultramontanism is Catholic Christianity." The object of greatest dislike to this representative of the Papal party is "nationalism." It is a Judaic notion that began to rise when the idea of Catholic unity began to decline. It was the rise of modern nationalities, we are told, that caused the great Western schism and Protestantism after it. This is the Archbishop's protest against modern civilization, for modern civilization, as distinguished from mediæval, is inseparable from the rise of nationalities to distinct and separate existence, and to a consciousness of separate rights and obligations. What is Manning's theory? Does he think that the resistance to Boniface VIII. by France was all wrong? Does he approve of

the bulls of Boniface—*clericis laicos* and all? Does he think that the European nations and their governments should have yielded humble submission to the lofty claims of the Papal See to a dominion over them? Does he think that the Council of Constance committed a capital error in seeking to curtail the Papal office? Should that council, instead of voting by nations, have allowed John XXIII., with his host of Italian ecclesiastics, to govern the Assembly by their numerical force? What would have been the condition of the Roman Catholic Church if this had happened? It would seem that the Archbishop is prepared to sanction the doctrine which the most ambitious of the Popes formulized and acted upon, that the state is to be subject to the church, and that civil governments are to receive law from the Pope. When one reads, in the light of history, the Archbishop's fine phrases about the union of the two jurisdictions, the church and state, and "the supreme direction of the supernatural over the natural law," coupled as these phrases are with denunciations of the system that subordinates the church to the state, or makes the latter independent of the former, and with a general disapproval of the "nationalism" which is the prevailing characteristic of the free civilization of the modern age, one is led to conclude that it is the realization of the old and fallen assumptions of Hildebrand, Innocent III., and Boniface, that this enthusiastic prelate hopes to behold.

It is not strange that French ecclesiastics are affronted at the supercilious and slighting tone in which Manning speaks of Gallicanism. He affects to consider this a transient episode in the course of the history of the Church of France; a divergence from the orthodox faith, which never counted in its favor more than a fraction of the French clergy. And he identifies Gallicanism with the movement of Louis XIV. and the Declaration of 1682. The Archbishop misreads history. If we take Gallicanism, as Bossuet defines it, as consisting of the three principles of the independence of

kings, as to temporalities, of ecclesiastical control, the derivation of episcopal authority immediately from Christ, and the authority of councils, we shall find the roots of this type of Catholicism far back in French history. The peculiarities of the French Church, as a national church, claiming rights and privileges of its own, appear in full vigor in the days of Charlemagne. They were maintained by Louis IX. with persevering energy, against Papal encroachments. In the eventful period before the Protestant movement, when great but ineffectual efforts at reform were attempted, it was French doctors and statesmen who were forward and influential in the effort to restrict Papal prerogatives, as well as to remedy Papal abuses. Gallicanism is not at all the transient and erratic phenomenon which Manning represents it to be.

In view of such declarations as are made in this pamphlet of Manning; and in other publications of the ultramontanist party, the question arises whether the council of the Vatican is to reaffirm the principles on which John Huss and Jerome of Prague were led to the stake. We should be glad to have explicit information on this subject. The question is not whether the form and degree of penalty to be inflicted for opinions which are judged heretical, may not be changed to suit modern ideas of the criminal code. It is to be presumed that neither Pope nor bishops would wish to have Protestants or other heretics burned at the stake. But the question is, whether the principle that church and state may rightfully combine, the one to adjudge the degree of their guilt, and the other to inflict the penalty upon persevering opposers of the Roman Catholic dogmas, is still held? Ought men to be punished criminally by the church, or by the state executing the church's verdict, for heretical opinions? If we seek for an answer to this question in the Pope's Encyclical, we find that the old doctrine of persecution appears to be approved and asserted, and the modern doctrine of toleration appears to be condemned and de-

nounced. The liberty of conscience, which is conceded by modern states, is set down among the damnable errors of the times. What does the Pope mean? If he does not mean that civil governments ought to use force to punish persons who teach doctrines which are pronounced by him or by the Catholic Church heretical, what do these statements of the Encyclical signify? The "bloody tenet of persecution" is not yet abandoned, but, it would seem, is again to be asserted in audacious opposition to the humane and Christian spirit of the age, and in obstinate derogation of the precepts of the founder of Christianity.

The other point of the Pope's infallibility, in which, if the new dogma is carried, the Council of Constance will be flatly contradicted by the Vatican Synod, is one which an enemy of the Catholic Church might wish to see adopted. For ourselves, if the Roman Catholic Church is to act practically upon this dogma, as it has done in regard to the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, we should prefer to have it defined and declared; for then it would be more likely to awaken opposition. But we should prefer that the doctrine should be neither practically nor theoretically received. We may desire that evil should be manifested, but not that evil should be done, in order that good may come. And we have no hostility to the Roman Catholic Church except so far as we deem its doctrines erroneous.

One of Manning's arguments in favor of an authoritative proclamation of the infallibility of the Pope is derived from the *need* of such a doctrine. Protestants are told that the church is infallible, but they taunt Catholics with the fact of a division among themselves as to the place where infallibility resides. Persons in quest of a safe harbor into which they can retreat from the agitations of doubt, are exhorted to cast themselves upon the authority of the church; but when they comply with the counsel, they hear it said by some that the Pope's definitions of doctrine are not irreformable. We fear, however, that if the ultramontanists were to se-

cure their end, difficulties and perplexities would still remain. What are the bounds and limits of this Papal infallibility? We are told by Perrone and the other Catholic theologians of this school, that his infallibility relates only to matters pertaining to faith and morals, and that on these matters he is unerring only when he speaks to the whole church in his character of universal bishop. The fine distinctions which are made by these theologians remind us of a passage in the *Republic* of Plato, where Socrates, in one of his paradoxical speeches, argues that no physician can err, since when he mistakes he is not *in* that mistake, or so far as he makes it, a physician; and that no pilot can err, since, if he misleads a vessel, he is not in this act a pilot, and so of the various trades and professions. A thousand questions would immediately arise respecting the metes and bounds of this supernatural prerogative of the Pope, if it were to be authoritatively ascribed to him. Moreover, the historical perplexities in which the champions of the Roman Catholic system would be involved, already great enough to task them to the utmost, would be much enhanced through such a decree.

The Roman Catholic hierarchy assumes to stand, with priestly prerogatives, between the soul and God. This doctrine of a priesthood in the Christian church, all consistent Protestants unite in rejecting. It is the first great corruption of Christianity. It is grateful to notice occasional symptoms of a more true and spiritual conception of the Gospel and the church. Father Hyacinthe, in one of his sermons or addresses, remarks that he cannot look on these great Protestant communities, with all the fruits of religion which they exhibit, as disinherited of the Holy Ghost. The expression is a very striking one. It shows how the very warmth and honesty of Christian feeling may carry one beyond the narrow bounds of sect. It was just this recognition of the fruits or effects of the Spirit, that opened the eyes of the Apostle Peter, and broke down his traditional

prejudice. "Forasmuch," he said, "as God gave them the like gift as he did unto us, who believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, what was I that I could withstand God?" (Acts xi. 17.) A like argument brought all of the apostles to give the right hand of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas. They learned that the Spirit was not confined in the channel to which they had limited His operations. A new dispensation had come, which was of a different character from the old. The revival of Judaism in the Roman Catholic Church obscured for ages an essential peculiarity of the Gospel and the Gospel dispensation. Such words as these of Father Hyacinthe, to which we have referred, indicate, in our judgment, the way in which the Roman Catholic error and all sectarian narrowness will ultimately disappear. Good men will be compelled to acknowledge that a Christianity as genuine and as valuable, it may be, as their own, is found outside of the borders in which they had supposed it to be confined.

NOTE.* MR. GLADSTONE'S DISCUSSION OF THE VATICAN DECREES.—The Vatican Council defined the infallibility of the Pope, as follows: "That the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedrâ*, that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that his church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals; and that, therefore, such definitions are irreformable of themselves, and not from consent of the church." (C. iv.) That is to say, when the Pope puts forth

* This note is from contributions to the *N. Y. Daily Times*, of March 18, 1875, and *The Christian Union*, of April 7, 1875.

a doctrinal or ethical proposition, which he intends that the whole church shall receive, he is infallible. As to the limit of the province within which he cannot err, it is a just inference that he is the sole authoritative judge; since the point whether any proposition is fairly included in the department of faith and morals, is itself a theological or ethical question. But the Vatican Council also accorded to the Pope an equally unlimited jurisdiction as regards government and discipline. The definitions on the topic conclude thus: "If, then, any shall say that the Roman Pontiff has the office merely of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power over the universal church, not only in things which belong to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the jurisdiction and government of the church spread throughout the world; or assert that he possesses merely the principal part, and not all the fulness of this supreme power; or that this power which he enjoys is not ordinary and immediate, but over each and all the churches, and over each and all the pastors and the faithful—let him be anathema." (C. iii.)

Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet on the *Vatican Decrees in their Relation to Civil Allegiance*, is written in a grave and elevated tone, and, from the character of its arguments, as well as from the position of the author, could not fail to make a profound impression. It is a powerful, and at the same time, a temperate arraignment of the Vatican definitions quoted above, as being subversive of the rights of the state and the obligations of the subject. The most noteworthy replies from the Roman Catholic side are those of Archbishop Manning, Dr. Newman, and Monsignor Capel. Dr. Newman's tract is marked by his wonted felicity in composition and ingenuity in argument. All his controversial writings have the note of urbanity—a charm which cannot be said to belong in the same degree to the productions of Manning. Mr. Gladstone's able and spirited rejoinder to his critics bears the title of *Vaticanism*. The fol-

lowing is a brief statement of the main points in this interesting debate.

The chief allegation in Mr. Gladstone's first pamphlet was that the Vatican decrees are incompatible with the duty of obedience to the civil authority. Incidentally his discussion involved an examination of the powers accorded to the papacy at present, as compared with the past, and of the bearing of the new ecclesiastical measures upon the liberty and personal responsibility of the individual who submits to them.

1. Mr. Gladstone is at issue with his opponents on the authority and meaning of the Syllabus. This document was issued from Rome in 1864. It purports to be a brief statement of the errors which the present Pope had condemned in his various allocutions, and other letters and speeches. Attached to each error in the list is a reference to the particular paper in which the more full and specific condemnation may be found. The Syllabus was sent, at the direction of the Pope, by Antonelli, to all bishops, and the reason given for this proceeding in the accompanying letter was that these might not have seen all of the documents of which the Syllabus is an abridgment. Mr. Gladstone considered the Syllabus an *ex cathedrâ* manifesto, and as such claiming to be infallible. This was a natural view, and one taken heretofore by many Catholic theologians. But this construction of the Syllabus Dr. Newman denies. He ventures to attribute to it no more authority than pertained to the several papers that gave rise to it. Dr. Fessler, the late Secretary-General of the Vatican Council, cautiously takes a similar ground. Is this judgment an afterthought, occasioned by the unpopularity of the Syllabus, and the inconveniences arising from the position that all of its propositions are infallible and of divine authority? So Mr. Gladstone evidently thinks. Certainly it is a great advantage to be able to say of Papal utterances, ancient or recent, that they are not *ex cathedrâ*; especially when the Pope himself is the fi-

nal judge on the question. It is surely strange to find him who claims to be the Vicar of Christ sending a series of doctrinal propositions to every bishop in every quarter of the globe—propositions which he may himself hereafter recall and deny. That is to be considered *ex cathedrâ* teaching, according to the Vatican Council, when, “in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he (the Pontiff) defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal church.” What belongs “to faith and morals” it is for the Pope to judge. Under the circumstances, it was certainly pardonable for Mr. Gladstone to regard the Syllabus as the utterance of the infallible Oracle.

2. There is a difference between Mr. Gladstone and his antagonists concerning the sense of the Syllabus. Both Dr. Newman and Archbishop Manning labor to pare away the offensive parts of the Syllabus, and to reduce its denunciations to a series of harmless commonplaces. For example, the rejection of the liberty of speech and of the press is converted into a condemnation of blasphemous, seditious, and obscene publications, which, it is asserted, all governments proscribe. Mr. Gladstone’s answer to this interpretation is quite destructive. It is hardly probable that the Pope would take pains to put among the errors of the times a doctrine which nobody holds. Moreover, it happens that Pius IX., as governor of his own kingdom, illustrated his idea of the error in question, and that he denounced the Austrian laws on this subject, which no Protestant would consider to be over-liberal. Mr. Gladstone’s indignation at this and other like attempts to rob the propositions of the Syllabus of their real intent and plain import is not misplaced.

3. Another point in the contest is the scope of the Vatican definition which gives to the Roman Pontiff a “power of jurisdiction” such as imposes upon his subjects “subordination and true obedience” not only in matters belonging to

faith and morals, but also "in those that appertain to the discipline and government of the church throughout the world." This vast prerogative of "regimen and discipline" makes the Pontiff, according to Mr. Gladstone, an absolute monarch. Disobedience to his mandates, whatever they may be, carries with it the perdition of the soul. In reply, Dr. Newman affirms that "regimen and discipline" refer to the rites of worship and the internal affairs of the church. The supremacy of the Pope under this head is not absolute, or exercised with infallible authority, as Mr. Gladstone imagines. On the contrary, it is conceivable that the Pope should misjudge, or otherwise err, in his prescriptions to individuals, and with respect to concrete cases. Moreover, it is a mistake of Mr. Gladstone—so Dr. Newman asserts—to hold that every act of disobedience to the Pope is accounted a mortal sin. The phraseology of the Decree is as follows: "This is the teaching of Catholic truth (*Catholicæ veritatis doctrina*), from which no one can deviate without loss of faith and of salvation." It is the rejection of the doctrine that the Pope is the supreme governor, not the single act of disobedience, against which the penalty is set. Dr. Newman is here technically right. But Mr. Gladstone pertinently suggests that the Vatican creed says nothing about any exceptions to the duty of obedience. That such exceptions may arise we can believe only on Dr. Newman's authority; and this admission of so moderate and liberal a disputant is liable at any time to be condemned at Rome; in which case, Dr. Newman, on his own principles, would have to renounce his concession.

4. The deposing power. Mr. Gladstone urges that the assumed right of the Pope to excommunicate and depose princes has never been given up. To this his opponents answer that the moral conditions of the exercise of this prerogative are absent, and that to exert it would, therefore, be wrong. Among these moral conditions, Dr. Newman, explicitly, and Dr. Manning, more cautiously, include the con-

sent of nations. They try to make it out that the European nations in former ages constituted the Pope an arbiter in their affairs, domestic and international. From this view of history Mr. Gladstone dissents. He considers it a very exaggerated statement. The Papal government, in this particular, always encountered sharp resistance as a usurpation. Besides, Queen Elizabeth was deposed, she being a Protestant. The lame defence of Archbishop Manning is that she was baptized a Catholic, which is not even true in fact. Moreover, this lofty prerogative is not renounced by the Pontiff, or by his disciples for him. It is only, to use Mons. Capel's phrase, "in abeyance." It may be revived at any time. Who can say that in the event of a war between ultramontaniam and Germany, the Pope might not resort to the measure of absolving the Roman Catholic subjects of the emperor from their allegiance to him? The Pope has claimed a *de jure* right to govern Protestants—Lutherans—as being baptized persons. There is nothing in the creed to forbid him to take the course in relation to William which his predecessor, Pius V., took towards Queen Elizabeth.

As to the question whether the power of the Pope over kings and princes is direct or indirect, Mr. Gladstone justly pronounces the distinction unimportant. Archbishop Manning holds that the Pope has not literally a temporal power in this relation, but that he can only reach sovereigns and governments indirectly, by his spiritual authority. But so long as he is competent to forbid rulers to make or execute laws which he does not approve; so long as he claims the right to annul all such legislation, and to excommunicate its authors, as well as to prohibit their subjects from obeying them, what boots it whether this tremendous authority is called direct or indirect, spiritual or temporal?

5. The use of force for the suppression of heresy. Even Dr. Manning—we must style him "Cardinal Manning" now—resents the imputation to the Pope and the church of a disposition to make use of physical coercion, as in the days

of rack and fagot. Yet he does not disavow the right to do so. He does not condemn the employment of these fierce weapons in past ages. He founds his disinclination on the altered circumstances of the times, and not on any deep principle of right.

We have no disposition to speak harshly of the Roman Catholic Church or of its prominent apologists. We must say, however, that it is impossible for an educated Protestant to read their defences, and note their fine distinctions and carefully-guarded concessions, and not feel that they are the champions of a flexible, evasive, slippery system, which is *this* to-day and *that* to-morrow, but which at all times pursues, with an unrelenting eye, an end which can be secured only by robbing men, just as Mr. Gladstone maintains, not only of their mental and moral liberty, but of their outward and political liberty as well. Dr. Newman compares the absolute control of the Pope to the authority exercised by a physician; as if the subjection of a patient to his medical adviser were analogous to that of a subject of the Pope to the ruler at Rome. The cases might be analogous if the patient did not select his physician, and were not at liberty to dismiss him and take another whenever he chooses to do so.

6. Mr. Gladstone alleges against the Papal Church of to-day "a breach with history," in two particulars. One of these has reference to the pledges of the Roman Catholic clergy of Great Britain, on the faith of which the Emancipation Act and other liberal measures were conceded by the Parliament of Great Britain. It was then declared by the representatives of the Catholic Church that they did not hold the Pope to be infallible, and admitted no right on his part to interfere, "directly or indirectly," with the independence, sovereignty, laws, constitution, or government of the United Kingdom. If the Vatican decrees are accepted, says Mr. Gladstone, there is a retreat from these solemn engagements, a breach with history which is closely akin to a breach of faith.

Again, whatever opinion may have been cherished by individuals or schools of opinion in the past in favor of pontifical infallibility, Gallicanism has been, from the days of the Council of Constance—not to speak of earlier times—a permitted and a powerful type of Catholicism. But Gallicanism is now put under the ban. Mr. Gladstone exposes the misrepresentation of Manning, who, strangely enough, makes Gallicanism have its origin in 1682, in the contest of Louis XIV. with the papacy.

7. In answer to one of the main propositions of Archbishop Manning, that Catholics do not differ from Protestants on this matter of civil loyalty, since both acknowledge the higher law of conscience, and the possible occurrence of cases where allegiance to the moral law clashes with obedience to the civil magistrate, Mr. Gladstone points out a marked and obvious distinction. The Protestant makes his own conscience supreme; he does not subject his conscience to the conscience and will of another, and that other a foreign potentate. The state is not brought into peril by the doctrine of the authority of conscience, provided the individual acts for himself, but the state is endangered when a body of citizens substitute for their own consciences the will of a foreign ecclesiastic; and this peril is not diminished by the circumstance that in making this surrender they suppose themselves to be impelled by the sense of right. The practical fact is that there is erected an *imperium in imperio* of a formidable kind.

What is the significance of this controversy? It indicates that the ecclesiastical conflict which disturbs the continent has crossed the channel and reached England. Ultramontanism, with its new dogma of Papal infallibility, with its rigid tenets respecting civil marriage and secular education, and its revived claim on behalf of the Pope to dehort the subjects of Christian states from their obedience to obnoxious laws, inevitably clashes with the enlightened sentiment and established policy of the European nations. Ultramontanism is a reac-

tionary movement, an endeavor to arrest the progress of society in the direction of freedom and laical independence, and to bring mankind once more under the dominion of the priesthood. This controversy has political bearings of much consequence. The ultramontanes do not give up the hope of breaking up the kingdom of Italy and of restoring his old principality to the Pope. In the event of an armed conflict on this point, they would hope to rally to their cause the sympathies of the whole Roman Catholic population of Europe. Mr. Gladstone has not only sounded a note of alarm in Protestant ears, but he has forewarned his Roman Catholic countrymen of the possible use to which the Jesuit leaders may eventually wish to put them.

THE OFFICE OF THE POPE AND HOW HE IS
CHOSEN. *

THE papacy has been stripped of the splendid prerogatives which inhered in it in the middle ages, when Western Europe constituted a great and undivided ecclesiastical commonwealth which acknowledged the Pope as its head; when such was the force of his authority that his Interdict could suspend all the public services of religion in a nation, silencing the bells upon the tower of every church and convent, and compelling the disconsolate to bury their dead without the soothing voice of prayer; when the injunctions of the Sovereign Pontiff were heard with awe to the farthest limit of Christendom; when monarchs were dethroned and kingdoms given away at his bidding. But, although the power of the Pope as regards political society is in abeyance, and notwithstanding the fact that he has endured the bitter humiliation of seeing his temporal principality wrested from him, and a secular ruler enthroned at his side in the Holy City itself, the spiritual authority of the Pope over many millions of devoted subjects still remains intact, and has even been augmented within the present generation. A vast multitude of Christians still look up to him as the guide of their consciences, and the highest earthly authority in the regulation of their conduct. His office is even now the most august on earth. Nor is there any prospect that it will soon pass out of being. As far as external perils are concerned, it is in less danger than it was fourteen hundred years ago,

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when Leo the Great went forth from Rome to the camp of Attila, and saved the city from pillage; or twelve hundred years ago, when Gregory III. and his successors besought the help of the Franks against the Lombard invaders, who had seized on the northern and central portions of Italy; or eight hundred years ago, when Hildebrand was driven out of Rome by the troops of the Emperor Henry IV., and died in exile; or three hundred and fifty years ago, when Clement VII. was shut up in the Castle of St. Angelo by a Lutheran army under Roman Catholic leaders; or even sixty-five years ago, when Pius VII. was the prisoner of Napoleon, and when the French Revolution had apparently well-nigh dispelled all reverence for the papacy in the ruling classes of the nations nominally Catholic. The bark of St. Peter, the Pontiffs have been accustomed to assert, may be tossed upon the waves, but it does not go under; and after a time the Master awakes, and the waves are stilled. The great change which the papacy has undergone in modern times is in the loss of its influence in the political sphere. The growth of religious skepticism in Italy and France has made, to be sure, a serious inroad upon the spiritual dominion of the Pontifical See. The separation of the Teutonic nations at the Reformation was a staggering blow, yet it did not prove a fatal blow, to the Roman hierarchical supremacy.

Pope is derived from *papa* (in the Greek Πάπας), signifying *father*. As late as the fifth century, in the Western churches, all bishops were styled *Papæ*. Sidonius, who was made bishop of Clermont in 472, calls the bishops of Rheims, Arles, Lyons and other places by this title. Jerome, in his Epistle to Pammachius, styles Epiphanius, Bishop of Constantia in Cyprus, *Pope*; and this is not a solitary example, in his writings, of the same usage. The designation came to be appropriated, in the Eastern church, to patriarchs and abbots, ecclesiastics of high rank. In the West, *Pope* gradually became the specific and exclusive ap-

pellation of the Bishops of Rome, by a change in language similar to that which had taken place in the use of the terms "patriarch" and "bishop;" for, as is well known, "bishop" and "presbyter," in the New Testament, are used indiscriminately for the same class of church officers.

The nature of the Papal office is of more consequence than the name. The Roman Catholics hold that the Bishop of Rome is *ex officio* the inheritor of the primacy of St. Peter; and as such, is the representative or vicar of Christ, the visible head of the visible church, the spiritual or invisible head of which is Christ himself. As primate, the Pope is the high priest, the regent, and the doctor, or teacher, of the church Catholic, and of all persons, lay and ecclesiastical, of whatever rank, who are embraced in it. First, it is maintained that Christ gave to Peter this supreme pastoral superintendence and control over all his brethren. The passages of Scripture relied upon to sustain this proposition are chiefly these: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church" (Matt. 16: 18); "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren" (Luke 22: 32); and "Feed my sheep"—the injunction thrice repeated (John 21: 15 seq.). Secondly, it is held that, Peter being the founder and first bishop of the Church of Rome—this being properly his See Apostolic—the primacy, by a divine ordinance, descends in the line of the incumbents of this bishopric. The prerogatives of Peter, which have been enumerated above, are transmitted to the persons duly elected to the episcopal office in the Roman Church. One of the gravest of the controverted questions in the past has been whether other bishops held the episcopal office directly from Christ or mediately through the Pope, as His vicar. It is the common view that none of them is the successor of any particular apostle. This distinction belongs exclusively to the Bishop of Rome, because the primacy devolves on him. But do they, or do they not receive the episcopate directly from

Christ? Those disposed to exalt the papacy have maintained that in the Pope is centred and included apostolic and episcopal authority, which is said to flow out from him to other bishops. But whatever diversity may have existed on this point, the doctrine has prevailed that the Pope is the centre of sacerdotal and ecclesiastical unity, so that without him the church is dissolved, and hence fellowship with him on the part of all Christian priests and people is indispensable. The most liberal Gallicans, as Gerson and D'Ailly, in the fifteenth century, the era of the Reforming Councils, dared not dispense with a Pope, or leave the office vacant. The church without a Pope was considered a body without a head.

Another of the great controverted questions of the past has been whether an œcumenical council is an authority paramount to the Pope, and whether its enunciations of doctrine are authoritative. That such is the fact was the theory of the Gallicans, and this general view is assumed and affirmed by the Councils of Basle and Constance. In former times, the middle and moderate theory has had most currency, which makes the concurrence of council and Pope necessary to the validity of a dogmatic definition. This was the doctrine of Hefele, and of most of the Catholic theologians of Germany down to a recent date. The ultramontane tendencies of the day have been potent enough, under the auspices of the present Pontiff, to crush this opinion, and the Vatican Council has pronounced for the infallibility of the Pope, in the sense that no conciliar ratification of his dogmatic decrees is requisite. The sense of the Vatican definition, however, is often misunderstood and misstated. Of course, it is not meant that the Popes are impeccable. The Pope himself has a confessor, like the humblest of his flock. Roman Catholic writers do not hesitate to admit that there have been wicked Popes; and Dante is far from being alone in remanding some of them to perdition. Judas betrayed his Master, they say, and Peter denied him; how

can we expect that the successors of the apostles should be better than the apostles themselves? Prophets in the Old Testament were sometimes cowardly and unfaithful. The Old Testament church passed through periods of darkness and corruption; why not the church of the New Covenant? If the Vatican definition does not mean that the Popes are *ex officio* delivered from the moral infirmities of human nature, no more does it signify that all of their doctrinal utterances are necessarily void of error. But this is the import of the dogma, that the Pope, speaking *ex cathedrâ*, or addressing the entire church upon any topic of religion or ethics, is preserved supernaturally from error. Speaking in this character, not to an individual or a class alone, but to the whole body of the faithful—not upon any subject, as politics, or philology, or medicine—but upon theological and ethical doctrine, he is infallible. This is, of course, a momentous dogma, and a very grave addition to the articles of belief which loyal Catholics, on pain of perdition, are obliged to accept. That the church cannot err was the old belief. The Holy Spirit, it was held, abides perpetually in the visible body, over which the Latin hierarchy presides; and, therefore, when the church collectively speaks, its utterances are free from error. The new dogma substitutes for the collected episcopate, with the Pope at their head, the Pope alone, who is thus declared to be the organ of the church and of the Spirit.

Besides the teaching function of the Pope, he is endued with supreme legislative and judicial powers in the church. No ecclesiastic can be appointed against his will, and he can depose every ecclesiastic, from the highest to the lowest, by his bare authority. The promise of obedience to him is solemnly made by all ecclesiastics when they enter upon their offices.

Protestants deny that the texts of Scripture to which we have referred are correctly interpreted by Roman Catholics. It is maintained by Protestants that the rock on which the

church was founded was not Peter personally, but Peter as confessing Christ, or the confession made by the fervent apostle. They point to the fact that the authority to remit sins was not conferred on Peter to the exclusion of the other disciples (Matt. 18: 18), and that Christ breathed on the whole company of apostles, imparting to one as much as to another the gift of the Holy Ghost (John 20: 22). They find no proof that, as a matter of fact, Peter governed the other apostles or the church, or that he exercised any more actual authority than the other apostles. They deny that he was bishop of the Roman Church. They deny that there is any evidence that his primacy, supposing that such a distinction belonged to him, was handed down to subsequent bishops of that church. His precedence, if he had any, died with him. They deny, likewise, that the bishops of Rome in the first three centuries claimed for themselves, or exerted, the prerogatives which are ascribed by the Roman Catholic theory to Peter and to his successors.

The historical difficulty here suggested has been met in two ways by Romish apologists. The more extreme school endeavor to achieve the very difficult task of proving that the early bishops of Rome were Popes in the later sense, and were acknowledged as such by the church. More plausible is the ground taken by theologians like De Mais-tre and Möhler, who bring to their aid the theory of development. The papacy, they say, was founded by Christ, but it existed at first, like so many other features of Christian polity, doctrine, and life, in the germ. The idea—the divine idea—was gradually realized. The papacy grew up, but its growth was legitimate. It is the natural, normal, intended outcome of the seed planted by the hand of Christ. The precedence of Peter among the apostles, and the precedence of Rome among cities and communities, were the divine preparations for an institution the foundations of which rest on the express ordinances of Christ, although the edifice arose only by degrees, and in the course of cen-

turies, to the full symmetry and splendor of its proportions. In answer to this hypothesis, Protestants have to say, first, that it allows that the papacy has no perfectly distinct warrant in the New Testament, and had no concrete existence in the primitive church; and secondly, that the papacy arose historically through the introduction of the doctrine of the mediatorial priesthood, a doctrine which has no rightful place in the Christian dispensation, but was a germ of development borrowed from Judaism.

In the first centuries, the Bishop of Rome was chosen, like bishops elsewhere, by the suffrages of the clergy and laity of the church at Rome, with the coöperation of the neighboring bishops; and the traces of this primitive arrangement are even now not wholly obliterated. It is sometimes made a subject of complaint that the primate of the whole church should be created mainly by Italians; but this objection, like various other objections, implies an ignorance or forgetfulness of the fact that it is as chief pastor of the Church of Rome that the Pope holds his dignity and prerogatives. It belongs to the Roman Church to create its own pastor. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, gives some particulars respecting the choice of Cornelius (A.D. 251) to the Roman bishopric. He says (Ep. 55) that Cornelius was made bishop "by the judgment of God and of his Christ"—that is, by a divine call—"by the testimony of almost all the clergy, by the suffrage of the people who were then present, and by the assembly of ancient priests and of good men." The importance of the episcopal office in the metropolis led the Roman emperors to intermeddle in the selection of the person to fill it. This was done, also, to some extent, by the Gothic king, Theodoric (A.D. 493-526). After the downfall of the East Gothic kingdom in Italy, the Greek emperors (A.D. 553-754) were still more disposed to put checks upon the unrestrained liberty of the Romans to make their own bishop. The ratification of the emperor at Constantinople,

either directly given, or through his viceroy, the Exarch at Ravenna, was necessary to the validity of an election. Justinian (A.D. 553-565) was as arbitrary in his treatment of the Roman See, as in dealing with the Eastern patriarchs and bishops who were under the shadow of his throne. After the rescue of the papacy from the threatened supremacy of the Lombards, by Charlemagne (A.D. 774), this monarch and his successors exercised the same sort of ascendancy over the Pope that they were accustomed to exercise over the Frank bishops. The consent of the Frank rulers was requisite before a Pope-elect could begin to exercise his functions. In the anarchy that followed the ruin of Charlemagne's empire, a period extending to the middle of the eleventh century, the papacy succeeded, to be sure, in liberating itself, for a long time, from this exterior control, but only to become a prey to violent domestic factions, which brought the papacy down to a lower depth of moral degradation than it has ever reached before or since. From this condition of helplessness and infamy, relieved only for brief intervals by the German Othos, it was delivered by the emperor, Henry III., who entered Italy at the head of an army, and at the Synod of Sutri, in 1046, deposed the rival incumbents of the sacred office, and himself elevated three German bishops in succession to the Papal dignity. The Hildebrandian or reforming party, as long as the Italian factions were raging, were glad to avail themselves of imperial help; but they lost no time in seizing the first opportunity that presented itself to shake off transalpine and secular interference and control in the great matter of filling the chair of St. Peter. After the death of Henry III., and when Henry IV. was a child, Pope Nicholas II. (in 1059), by a decree, devolved the prerogative of electing the Pope upon the cardinals.

In the first centuries the term *cardinal* (from *cardo*, a hinge) might be applied to civil officers holding permanent stations under the Roman government. It was applied,

also, to ecclesiastics having a permanent connection with a church. The clergy of the Roman churches, which all stand in close connection with the Lateran, the mother of churches, were termed *cardinals*. The presbyters having charge of the parishes—at first twenty-five, then twenty-eight in number—into which Rome was divided, and the deacons to whose care the poor in the ecclesiastical districts of the city—at first seven, then fourteen in number—were committed, were “cardinals” of the Lateran Church. In the eighth century, under Pope Stephen IV., the seven—now six—suburbicarian bishops, or bishops in the ancient diocese of Rome, were added to this body of priests and deacons. The number of the college of cardinals, however, has varied from time to time. At one time, in the thirteenth century, it sank to seven. Pope Sixtus V., in 1586, fixed the number at seventy, corresponding to the seventy elders of Israel. The college, however, is seldom full.

It will thus be seen that the College of Cardinals, whether they actually reside at Rome or not, by whom the Pope is elected, are clergy of the Roman Church. They comprise the suffragan bishops of the vicinity, with presbyters and deacons of the Church of Rome; and so are divided into three classes, cardinal bishops, cardinal priests, and cardinal deacons. The fifty cardinal priests are designated by the names of fifty churches in Rome; the fourteen cardinal deacons, by the fourteen deaconries. The cardinal bishops are of highest rank; the cardinal priests and deacons are on a level; but all are practically equal as regards the choice of a Pope.

The constant policy of the Popes has been to keep off outside interference, and especially to defend this electoral college from the undue influence or coercion of secular governments. They have sought to make its action independent and final. Nicholas II., in the decree to which we have referred, and which forms an epoch in the history of the electoral system, recognized in very indefinite terms the im-

perial pretensions. The cardinals—the cardinal bishops at that time taking precedence—were to take the initiative, and choose the Pope; the next step was some indefinite consultation with the emperor; while “applause” of a choice already concluded was the only prerogative left to the people of Rome. The Pope was to be selected from “the bosom of the Roman Church,” if it contained a fit person for the place. Gregory XV., in 1621, laid down the rules for the organization of the conclave, and for its proceedings, which, with some modifications, have continued in force until the present time.

The cardinals are appointed by the Pope. He is not obliged, however, to divulge the names of persons raised to this rank, at the time when they are appointed. When the names are temporarily withheld they are styled cardinals *in petto*, i. e., *in pectore*, or in the breast. That is to say, they are hidden in the Pope’s breast. Eligibleness to the cardinalate is attached to no definite age. In certain periods, as is well known, by an abuse of the power of appointment, persons in extreme youth have been raised to this office. Leo X. was made cardinal at the age of fourteen, and invested with the purple three years later. Leo X. made Prince Alfred, of Portugal, cardinal when he was seven years old, stipulating, however, that he should not assume the dignity until seven years later. The qualifications necessary in a cardinal are those requisite in a bishop. It is required that the candidate shall be a legitimate son. He must have been in orders for at least a year. He must have neither children nor grandchildren, and he must have no relative within the second degree of canonical kinship in the college before him. The cardinal-elect goes to the Vatican, and according to an elaborate form, receives the purple cap. This may be sent to a cardinal residing abroad. At a public session of the whole body, the new member is ceremoniously received, and clothed with the red hat. Other curious forms, as that of closing and opening the mouth of

the cardinal-elect by the Pope, attend his inauguration to his new dignity.

The cardinals are princes, as well as ecclesiastics, since the right of electing the Pontiff vests in them. They are a kind of council, the business of the Papal administration being mainly distributed among them. The various *congregations* at Rome are composed of them, or are under their presidency. But their principal distinction lies in the prerogative which belongs to them, of choosing the Pope, who, it is supposed, must be one of their own number.

What a departure is all this from the primitive method of electing a pastor! Clement of Rome, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, which was written in A.D. 96 or 97, says that the apostles put officers in the churches, and provided that their places, on becoming vacant, should be filled by approved men. The body of church members, in the case of a vacancy, decided who should be appointed, the remaining pastors giving their voice, but the power of acceptance and of veto being always exercised by the body of the congregation. This was the custom at Rome, as in other churches. In the room of this free action of the body of church-members, we have substituted a corporation of ecclesiastics, appointed by the chief pastor of the Roman Church, and filling his place with no action on the part of the Christian laymen of Rome, except what is involved in shouting for the individual whose election by the conclave of cardinals is announced to them.

The institution known as the conclave originated in a turbulent period of the middle ages, when it was thought expedient, in repeated instances, to catch the cardinals and shut them up, in order that they might be compelled to fill a vacancy in the Papal office. Clement IV. died in 1269, at Viterbo. The strife between the French and the Italian factions among the cardinals prevented the choice of a successor for two years and nine months, the longest interreg-

num that has existed in the whole history of the papacy. During this interval, the citizens of Viterbo, under the town captain, Ranieri Gatti, not only imprisoned the cardinals in a palace, but resorted to the bold expedient of unroofing the edifice and leaving their eminences to the mercy of the elements, besides diminishing their supplies of food. It was not, however, until a year after this irreverent proceeding that an election was made. Gregory X., who was chosen, was moved, in consequence of these disorders, at the General Council at Lyons, held in 1274, to establish fixed regulations for the proceedings in the case of the death of a Pope; and he may be considered the founder of the conclave. His rules have been in various particulars modified by his successors. They are subject to modification at the will of the Pontiffs. At the same time, they still form the basis of the ecclesiastical law on the subject.

When the Pope dies, the cardinals wait for ten days only for the absent members of their body to appear. No notifications are sent out to absentees. They must come, if they come at all, of their own motion. At the end of this time, the cardinals are to enter into conclave in the palace where the Pope died. Each cardinal may now have two attendants, who are lodged in two of the three small sleeping apartments which, together with another little room, constitute his "cell." The old restrictions as to the supply of food are very much mitigated; and communication with persons from outside is not absolutely prohibited, except during the time of actual voting, though such communication is not allowed to be private. No other business is permitted in the conclave except what pertains to the election of a Pope, unless measures have to be taken to defend his territory. Of course, this last proviso is now rendered obsolete. A vote of two-thirds is requisite for an election. Cardinals under ecclesiastical censure, or even under excommunication, cannot be excluded from taking part in the assembly. All bargains and prior agreements are solemnly prohibited; and

the electors are bound by stringent oaths to the observance of all the regulations which the church has prescribed for the performance of their function.

On the death of a Pope, the Cardinal Camerlingo (Chamberlain) is informed of it at once. He proceeds to the room where the dead Pope lies, and strikes his forehead thrice with a little hammer, addressing him, at the same time, by his original name. Receiving no reply, he takes from his finger "the ring of the fisherman," and breaks it. On the tenth day, the cardinals enter into conclave in the chambers which have been set apart for this purpose in the Vatican—if the Pope dies in Rome—and which, in the interval, have been walled in, the doors and the windows, with the exception of a narrow space at the top for the admission of light, being closed up with brick and mortar. Within the conclave everything takes place by rule, under official supervision. The Pope may be chosen in either of three ways. First, he may be elected by *acclamation*—also called "inspiration," or "adoration"—when all the cardinals, gathered at the appointed time and place, with one voice designate some individual for this office. Such a mode of election is of very rare occurrence. Secondly, he may be chosen by direct vote. In this case, as was said above, a candidate must have the suffrages of two-thirds of those who participate in the election. Each cardinal must swear that his ballot is cast for the one whom he deems most fit for the office. The greatest precautions are taken to prevent fraud. The ballot is secret; the number and motto of each cardinal, however, being recorded on the ballot, which is folded and sealed so that this part of it is not seen, unless it becomes necessary to ascertain by whom the vote was cast. In case no candidate receives two-thirds of the ballots cast, any one who has received a single vote may, nevertheless, be chosen, if a sufficient number who have voted for other persons "accede," to constitute the two-thirds. This is a choice by "accession," and is not unfrequent. Thirdly, a Pope may

be chosen by *compromise*. When it is found that the requisite number of votes cannot be obtained by any one—in other words, when there is a “dead-lock” in the conclave—the business of selection may be delegated to a committee of the cardinals, by whose decision the rest are bound to abide. In this way, the impossibility of an agreement among the electors, and the calamities of a long interregnum have, in noted instances, been avoided.

Formerly, each of the great Catholic powers have had the privilege of exercising the “veto” upon any obnoxious candidate for the papacy. But this could be used but once during the process of filling a vacancy by the conclave, and if used at all, was necessarily exerted before the decisive vote had been taken. In the present relation of the papacy to the Catholic powers, it is understood that the exercise of the veto, which is not considered by the Papal canonists as a right, will not be conceded.

When the choice has been made, a window is opened, and the announcement of the result of the election is made to the throng of people without. The coronation of the Pope, who usually receives the tiara from the oldest cardinal deacon, takes place on the next Sunday or next festal day after his election. If a deacon, he must first be elevated to the priesthood and the episcopate. During the procession in St. Peter's, as a part of the coronation ceremonies, a little tow is burned, to remind the Pontiff elect of the transitoriness of worldly glory. The enthronement follows the coronation. The Pope assumes another name on his induction into office. The first to do this was Octavianus, in A.D. 956, who adopted the name of John XII. It has been suggested by Roman Catholic writers even, that his motive was to cover up, as far as might be, the disgrace which his sins and crimes had brought on his former name.

Vast results have sometimes turned on the action of the conclave. A single illustration may be given. In the summer of 1197, Henry III., a powerful monarch, wore the im-

perial crown. His antagonist in the papacy was an old man ninety years of age, Celestine III. So unequally were the papacy and the empire matched. On the 28th of September of that year, the Emperor Henry died. A few months later, on the 8th of January, 1198, Celestine also died. On the same day the conclave assembled. A number of votes were cast for one candidate and another; but these candidates themselves united in proposing that Giovanni Lotario Conti should be the Pope, and he was forthwith chosen unanimously, taking the name of Innocent III. This greatest of the Pontiffs was then in the vigor of life, being only thirty-seven years old. Frederic II., who eventually succeeded to the empire, was at that time a child. In the Papal chair was a sagacious and energetic statesman, thoroughly in earnest, and determined to carry the Papal prerogatives to the greatest height. On the other side, there was division and confusion. Such was the change in the posture of affairs which a few months wrought.

Yet Innocent, like certain other great Pontiffs, was reluctant to take on him the burdens and responsibilities of the office. Gregory I.—Gregory the Great—when he learned of his election, hid himself. He held out in his refusal of the station allotted to him as long as he could. Gregory VII. consented, not without an inward struggle, to take the part of leader in the tremendous conflict with secular authority which the Papal office, in his judgment, imposed upon him. Like Calvin afterwards at Geneva, he knew what a struggle awaited him. If Hildebrand was ambitious, it was no vulgar ambition that inspired him. Innocent II., as long as he was able, withstood the cardinals who were resolved to make him Pope; and Eugene III. had to be dragged out of his cell, and forced to assume the purple. If there have been ambitious intriguers who have aspired to this lofty distinction, and have climbed to it by flagitious means, there have been others who have sincerely desired to shun so harassing and responsible a station. It is difficult to see how, in the

present circumstances, any one who values his own ease and comfort can wish to grasp the sceptre which the present Pontiff must soon lay down.

The pontificate of Pius IX., who was elected Pope as the successor of Gregory XVI., on the 16th of June, 1846, is drawing to a close. Victor Emanuel is no more, and at the death of the present Pontiff, when it shall occur, the two most prominent actors in the drama of recent Italian history, so fraught with momentous events, will have passed off the stage.

There are two principal eras in the long reign of Pius IX., and two principal sides to his activity. In the first place, he has played a conspicuous part in political affairs. The temporal principality which the Popes had held for a thousand years has been torn from his grasp. Italy has become a united kingdom under the house of Savoy, and Rome has become its capital. There are many who recall the startling impression made by the liberal measures of Pius IX., on his first accession to power, and the enthusiasm among the friends of Italian liberty which was kindled in those days of hope. The intolerable misgovernment in the Papal States imperatively required a radical change in the system of internal administration, and Pius IX. undertook to organize a constitutional monarchy in which laymen should have a large share of power. The reduction of taxes, the liberation of political prisoners, the charters given to railway and telegraph companies, the improvement of agriculture, the patronage of education, the reform of ecclesiastical institutions, the relaxation of restraints upon the press, and other measures consonant in spirit with these, seemed to usher in an utterly new period of liberty and prosperity in the Roman kingdom. But the Pope had still larger aims. Italy was groaning under the tyranny of Austria, and of the petty sovereigns who were under Austrian influence. That Italy should be emancipated from oppression, and combine into a

confederation of which the Pope should be the head—becoming thus once more a nation among the nations—was another design which Pius IX. cherished, and which he hoped to realize. All these fair dreams and bright beginnings were shattered in pieces. The revolutions of 1848 were attended with consequences which the Pope had not foreseen. A tempest arose which he could neither quell nor control. On the one hand, there was Austria, which had endeavored to prevent his election to the papacy, which had done what it could to baffle his projects of reform and his concessions to liberalism, and which stood in mortal hostility to everything that could be called Italian liberty. On the other hand, there were the Radicals, the republicans of the Mazzini type, who demanded a democratic system, and were determined to wrest all secular authority from ecclesiastics. The Pope found himself in a place where two currents met. The liberals were bent on driving him to a more advanced position than he was prepared to take up, and to involve him in an open war with Austria. The winds were let loose ;

*“Una Eurusque Notusque ruunt creberque procellis
Africus, et vastos volvunt ad litora fluctus.”*

How a man of greater talents and sagacity might have succeeded in preserving himself and his cause in such a storm, it is not for us to say. On the 24th of August he fled from Rome to Gaeta. The French occupation of Rome followed. Thenceforward, the idea of liberal and partly lay government for Rome was abandoned by the Pope. The success of France, in alliance with Sardinia, in the war with Austria, paved the way for the extension of the rule of Piedmont over all Italy. The Franco-German war disabled Napoleon III. from longer hindering the consummation of the movement which he had helped to initiate. The Papal States were absorbed in the Italian kingdom, and Victor Emanuel took possession of the Quirinal.

The restoration of the Italian nationality under the auspices

of a limited monarchy and a native dynasty, is one of the most gratifying events which have occurred in our time. The charm which Italy must always possess for the historical student is far from being the only source of the interest which we cannot but feel in the fortunes of this beautiful land. This charm is indeed great. What a part have Rome and Italy played for the last twenty-five centuries in the history of mankind! What a glory rests upon this birthplace and hearthstone of the civilization of Western Europe, whence law, and literature, and culture have flowed out in a quickening stream upon so many nations of Christendom! But this interest derived from memorable ages of history Italy shares with other lands—especially with Greece and with Palestine. Athens and Jerusalem are cities which, in some relations, awaken a deeper feeling than Rome itself. But the Italy of to-day is full of a vigorous life. The Italians are a highly intellectual people. No statesman of modern times has surpassed in ability, perhaps none has equalled in ability, Count Cavour. The public men of Italy are versed in political science and political economy. No-where else are there to be found persons more competent to deal with great political and social problems. The reinstatement of Italy as a power among the nations is adapted to give the deepest satisfaction to thoughtful and good men. If it has not taken place in the way which the Pope would have chosen, if the loss of his temporalities has called out from him bitter reproaches, still the unification of his country is really one of the most beneficent events which signalize the annals of his pontificate.

Not less momentous have been the events of this pontificate within the spiritual sphere. In 1854 Pius IX. invited the Roman Catholic bishops in all the countries to resort to Rome, and with their support and consent, though without the decree of a council, he promulgated the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. This act was contrary to the advice and judgment of many of the most discreet theo-

logians and ecclesiastics of the Roman Catholic Church. It decided authoritatively a point of divinity on which theological opinion from the days of Augustine had been divided. Great names in the past could be appealed to in opposition to the new definition. No doubt it was repugnant to the previous opinions and wishes of multitudes from whom no public expression in opposition to it was heard. Moreover, it was the making of a dogma by the Pope's bare authority, with no concurrent action by the episcopate gathered in an œcumenical body. In this light it was seen to be a stretch of pontifical prerogatives of a highly portentous character. The influence of the Jesuit Society over the Papal mind was supposed to be further disclosed when, on the 8th of December, 1864, the celebrated Syllabus appeared, in which were condemned a long list of alleged errors, which appeared to include the liberty of the press, secular education, freedom of religious belief and worship, and various other characteristic elements of popular liberty and modern civilization. Whether the propositions of the Syllabus were spoken *ex cathedrâ*, and addressed to the entire church, or not, is a question on which Roman Catholic authorities are not agreed. Dr. Newman, in his controversy with Mr. Gladstone, maintained that they are not. Certainly, the assumption that they are absolutely binding on the conscience of all Catholics seriously embarrasses the defence of the Roman Catholic system in all free countries. In 1869-70, there followed the great ecclesiastical event of this pontificate, the Vatican Council, by which the infallibility of the Pope was decreed. Another question of the highest moment was then taken from the category of disputed and disputable beliefs, and a decision of it was incorporated among the Articles of Faith. It is difficult to say how far these extraordinary measures, which have modified in important respects the Roman Catholic Church, and have set up new barriers in the way of compromise and union with opposing systems, emanated from the Pope's own

natural proclivities, and how far they were inspired by the peculiar influences by which he has been surrounded. At the very moment when the temporal monarchy fell, and the Papal influence in the civil affairs of nations was at the lowest ebb, the spiritual monarchy was carried to the highest pitch of exaltation. The Roman Catholic Church has generally acquiesced in this remarkable change. Men, like Bishop Hefele, who had just before demonstrated the fallibility of Pope Honorius, accept the new definition. The Old Catholic movement was not without a political importance; able and cultivated men were enlisted in it; but apparently it has no strength in the mass of the Catholic population even in Germany. It has no deep root among the people. Père Hyacinthe stands by himself, refusing to sanction the new dogma, and by an exercise of private judgment deciding that the action of the Vatican Council is destitute of œcumenical authority, at the same time that his dissatisfaction with the Protestant system of belief and worship keeps him from placing himself within the pale of any of the Protestant religious bodies.

THE RELATION OF PROTESTANTISM AND OF
ROMANISM TO MODERN CIVILIZATION.*

IN this discussion I shall take "civilization" in the broad sense, and include under the term all that enters into the improvement of the individual and of society—all the elements that unite to constitute an advanced stage of human progress. Whenever we contemplate the growth of civilization, we should not confine our attention to the organized institutions, political or ecclesiastical, which minister to the welfare of mankind, but should take into view, also, whatever influences spring from the individual and contribute to his well-being. In other words, the term "civilization" includes culture. The inventions and discoveries that lighten the burden of labor and conduce to material comfort, the safeguards of law, refined sentiments, literature, art, and science, the amenities of social intercourse—all that raises man above the rude and narrow life of the barbarian is embraced in this comprehensive term. In defining civilization, however, it has been justly said that no nation can be considered highly civilized in which a small class is possessed of the benefits of scholarship, the charm of polished manners, and the conveniences and luxuries derived from wealth, at the same time that the bulk of the population are sunk in poverty and ignorance, perhaps degraded to a condition of serfdom. Nor can that nation be deemed civilized, in the full idea of the word, where the fine arts flourish while agriculture and the mechanic arts are in a low state. Civilization

* A Paper read at the meeting of the Evangelical Alliance in New York, October, 1873.

should involve something like an impartial or proportionate development of the capacities of man and a fair distribution of social advantages. It should likewise carry within it the germ of further and indefinite progress.

We are absolved from inquiring, in this place, what sort of a civilization could exist, and how long it were possible for civilization to continue, without any aid from religion. Whoever believes in the teachings of Christ needs no argument to convince him that Christianity is essential to the enduring life of all that is excellent and noble in the products of human activity. "Ye are the salt of the earth." It is clear that Christianity, from the moment when it first gained a foothold in the Roman Empire down to the present time, has never ceased to exert a profound influence upon society. Of the several agencies which have chiefly conspired to determine the course and the character of modern history, Christianity and the church are first in importance. Attribute whatever weight we may to the legacy that was transmitted from the nations of antiquity, or to the peculiar genius of their barbarian conquerors, every discerning student must allow to Christianity the predominant part in moulding the history of the European communities now on the stage of action.

No enlightened Protestant, in our day, will be inclined to disparage the wholesome influence which the Roman Catholic Church may still exert in certain places and over certain classes of people. We are not disposed to undervalue the benefits which that church, in the middle ages, when it was the only organized form of Christianity in Western Europe, conferred on society. We are even quite willing to concede that the papacy itself, the centralized system of rule, which has been the fountain of incalculable evils, was providentially made productive of important advantages during the period when ignorance and brute force prevailed, and when anarchy and violence constituted the main peril to which civilization was exposed. Let us thankfully acknowledge the debt that

is due to the mediæval church for preserving from utter destruction the remains of ancient literature and art, for training the minds of undisciplined men, and imparting to them what knowledge had outlived the wreck of ancient power and culture, and for curbing the passions and softening the manners of rude peoples. Christianity in the mediæval church existed in a corrupt form, but its life was not extinct, and it operated as a leaven, according to the promise of its Author. Our attention is to be directed to more recent times. We have to compare the influence of Romanism with that of Protestantism, as that influence is seen in the course of the last three centuries, and as it is deducible from the nature of the respective systems.

There is one point of contrast between the two systems which deserves to be placed in the foreground of our inquiry. The Roman Catholic system is the rule of society by a sacerdotal class. This is a fundamental characteristic of that system. The guidance of the conscience of individuals, and of the policy of nations, so far as their policy may be thought to touch the province of morals and religion, is relegated to a body of priests, or, according to the recent Vatican Council, to their head. The authority to decide upon the questions of highest moment resides in this body of ecclesiastics. It is not, indeed, like those hereditary priesthoods which are separated by an impassible barrier from other orders of men, and which are found, as an established aristocracy, in certain oriental religions. Nevertheless, it is a limited class, admitting to its ranks none whom it chooses to exclude, and assuming the exalted prerogative of pronouncing infallibly upon questions of truth and duty, and of conveying or withholding the blessings of salvation. Protestantism denied this prerogative. It broke down the wall of separation between priest and layman. It accorded to the laity the full right to determine for themselves those questions over which the clergy had claimed an exclusive jurisdiction. It declared that the heavenly good offered in the Gospel is accessible to

the humblest soul, without the intervention of a mediatorial priesthood. The emancipation of the laity from clerical rule is one of the prime characteristics of the Reformation.

1. Protestantism, as compared with the opposite system, sets free and stimulates the energy, intellectual and moral, of the individual, and thus augments the forces of which civilization is the product. The progress of civilization, in the long course of history, is marked by the growing respect paid to the rights of the individual, and the ampler room afforded for the unfolding of his powers, and for the realizing of his aspirations. There was something imposing in those huge despotisms—Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia—in which a multitude of human beings were welded together under an absolute master. Such empires were an advance upon a primitive state of things, where every man's hand was against his neighbor. Yet they were a crude form of crystallization; and they were intrinsically weak. The little cities of Greece, with their freer political life, and the larger scope which they allowed for the activity and the culture of the individual—communities of citizens—proved more than a match for the colossal might of the East. Among the Greeks and Romans, however, although governments of law had supplanted naked force, the state was supreme, and to the state the individual must yield an exclusive allegiance. It was a great gain when the Christian church arose, and when the individual became conscious of an allegiance of the soul to a higher kingdom—an allegiance which did not supersede his loyalty to the civil authority, but limited while it sanctioned this obligation. But the church itself at length erected a supremacy over the individual, inconsistent with the free action of reason and conscience, and even stretched that supremacy so far as to dwarf and overshadow civil society. It reared a theocracy, and subjected everything to its unlimited sway. The Reformation gave back to the individual his proper autonomy. The result is a self-respect, an intellectual activity, a development of inventive capacity,

and of energy of character, which give rise to such achievements in science, in the field of political action, and in every work where self-reliance and personal force are called for, as would be impossible under the opposite system. In the period immediately following the Reformation, signal proofs were afforded of this truth. The little States of Holland, for example, proved their ability to cope with the Spanish Empire, to gain their independence, and to acquire an opulence and a culture which recalled the best days of the Grecian republics. They beat back their invaders from their soil, and sent forth their victorious navies upon every sea, while at home they were educating the common people, fostering science and learning, and building up universities famous throughout Europe. England, in the age of Elizabeth, proved that the native vigor of her people was re-enforced in a remarkable degree by the stimulus derived from the peculiar genius of the Protestant religion. It was the period when she was acquiring her naval ascendancy; the period, likewise, of Shakspeare, Bacon, and Raleigh. Who can doubt that the United States of America are—not indeed wholly, but in great part—indebted to their position, as contrasted with that of Mexico and the political communities of South America, to this expansion of the power of the individual, which is the uniform and legitimate fruit of Protestant principles?

2. The spirit of Protestantism favors universal education. The lay Christian, who is to read and interpret the Scriptures, and to take part in the administration of government in the church, must not be an illiterate person. Knowledge, mental enlightenment, under the Protestant system, are indispensable. The weight of personal responsibility for the culture of his intellectual and spiritual nature, which rests on every individual, makes education a matter of universal concern. Far more has been done in Protestant than in Roman Catholic countries for the instruction of the whole people. It is enough to refer to the common-school system

of Holland, and of New England, and to Protestant Germany, to show how natural it is for the disciples of the Reformation to provide for this great interest of society.

The free circulation of the Bible in Protestant lands has disseminated an instrument of intellectual, as well as of religious, improvement, the good effect of which is immeasurable. As a repository of history, biography, poetry, ethics, as well as a monitor to the conscience and a guide to heaven, the Bible has exerted an influence on the common mind, in all Protestant nations, which it would be difficult to exaggerate. The practice of interpreting the Bible and of exploring its pages for fresh truth affords a mental discipline of a very high order. How often have the Scriptures carried into the cottage of the peasant a breadth and refinement of intellect which otherwise would never have existed, and which no agency employed by the Roman Catholic system, in relation to the same social class, has ever been able to engender!

3. That Protestantism should be more friendly to civil and religious liberty than the Roman Catholic system would seem to follow unavoidably from the nature of the two forms of faith. Protestantism involves, as a vital element, an assertion of personal rights with respect to religion, the highest concern of man. Moreover, Protestantism casts off the yoke of priestly rule, and puts ecclesiastical government, in due measure, into the hands of the laity. As we have already said, it is a revolt of the laity against a usurped ecclesiastical authority.

The Church of Rome teaches men that their first and most binding duty is to bow with unquestioning docility and obedience to their Heaven-appointed superiors. How is it possible that Protestantism should not foster a habit of mind which is incompatible with a patient endurance of tyranny at the hands of the civil power? How can Protestantism, inspiring a lively sense of personal rights, fail to bring with it, eventually at least, a corresponding respect for the rights

of others, and a disposition to secure their rights in forms of government and in legislation? How can men who are accustomed to judge for themselves and act independently in church affairs manifest a slavish spirit in the political sphere? On the contrary, the habit of mind which the Roman Catholic nurture tends to beget leads to servility in the subject toward the ruler, as long as an alliance is kept up between sovereign and priest. It is true that the Church of Rome can accommodate itself to any of the various types of political society. Her doctors have at times preached an extreme theory of popular rights and of the sovereignty of the people. While the state is subordinate to the church, any form of government may be tolerated; and there may be an interest on the part of the priesthood in inculcating political theories which operate, in their judgment, to weaken the obligations of loyalty toward the civil magistrate, and to exalt, by contrast, the divine authority of the church. When the civil magistracy presumes to exercise prerogatives, or to ordain measures, which are deemed hurtful to the ecclesiastical interest, a radical doctrine of revolution, even a doctrine of tyrannicide, has been heard from the pulpits of the most conservative of religious bodies.

Generally speaking, however, the Church of Rome is the natural ally and supporter of arbitrary principles of government. The prevailing sentiment, the instinctive feeling, in that church, is that the body of the people are incapable of self-guidance, and that to give them the reins in civil affairs would imperil the stability of ecclesiastical control. To this reasoning it is often replied by advocates of the Roman Catholic system that Protestantism opens a door to boundless tyranny by leaving the temporal power without any check from the ecclesiastical. The state, it is said, proves omnipotent; the civil magistrate is delivered from the wholesome dread of ecclesiastical censure, and is left free to exercise all kinds of tyranny, without the powerful restraint to which he was subject under the mediæval system. He may

even violate the rights of conscience with impunity. The state, it is sometimes said, when released from its subordinate relation to the church, is a godless institution. It becomes, like the pagan states of antiquity, absolute in the province of religion as in secular affairs, and an irresistible engine of oppression. It must be admitted that Protestant rulers have been guilty of tyranny; that, in many instances, they cannot be cleared of the charge of unwarrantably interfering with the rights of conscience, and of attempting to govern the belief and regulate the forms of worship of their subjects, in a manner destructive of true liberty. The question is, whether these instances of misgovernment are the proper fruit of the Protestant spirit, or something at variance with it, and therefore an evil of a temporary and exceptional character.

The imputation that the state as constituted under Protestantism is heathen depends on the false assumption that the church, and the priesthood as established in the Roman Catholic system, are identical, or so nearly identical that one cannot subsist without the other. It is assumed that when the supervision and control which the Church of Rome aspires to exercise over the civil authority is shaken off, nothing is left but an unchristian or antichristian institution. The fact that a layman can be as good a Christian as a priest is overlooked. The Christian laity who make up a commonwealth, and the Christian magistrates who are set over them, are quite as able to discern, and quite as likely to respect personal rights, and to act for the common weal, as if they were subject to an organized priesthood.

Since the Reformation, a layman has been the head of the English Church and State, and civil magistrates in England have borne a part in ecclesiastical government. Without entering into the question of the righteousness or expediency of establishments, or broaching any of the controverted topics connected with this subject, we simply assert here that the civil government of England is not to be branded as unchristian or antichristian on account of this arrange-

ment. As far as the administration of public affairs in that country has been characterized by justice and by a regard for the well-being of all orders of people, the government has been Christian—as truly Christian, to say the least, as if the supremacy had been virtually lodged with the Pope, or with an aristocracy of priests.

History verifies the proposition that Protestantism is favorable to civil and religious freedom, and thus promotes the attainment of the multiplied advantages which freedom brings in its train. The long and successful struggle for independence in the Netherlands, the conflict which established English liberty against the despotic influence of the House of Stuart, the growth and establishment of the Republic of the United States, are events so intimately connected with Protestantism and so dependent upon it, that we may point to them as monuments of the true spirit and tendency of the reformed religion. That religious persecution has darkened the annals of the Protestant faith, and that the earliest leaders in the Reformation failed to recognize distinctly the principle of liberty of conscience, must be admitted. But Protestantism, as is claimed, at the present day, both by its friends and foes, was illogical, inconsistent with its own genius and principles, whenever it attempted to coerce conscience by punishing religious dissent with the sword and the fagot. Protestants illustrate the real character and tendency of their system by deploring whatever acts of religious persecution the predecessors who bore their name were guilty of, and by the open and sincere advocacy of religious liberty. Liberty of thought, and freedom of speech and of the press, however restricted they may have been by Protestants in times past, it is the tendency of Protestantism to uphold. It is more and more recognized that freedom in the investigation of truth, and in the publication of opinions, is required by the true principles of the Reformation.

On the other hand, the dogma of persecution has never

been authoritatively disavowed by the Church of Rome. Who has ever done penance for St. Bartholomew's day and the burning of Huss? Even at present this hateful dogma is boldly professed by the organs of the ultramontane party, which is now in the ascendant. It is difficult to see how these doctrines can be given up by a church which attributes to every one of the long line of Pontiffs infallibility on questions of morals. In recent times the doctrine of "liberty of conscience" and of worship has been branded by Pius IX., in an address to all bishops—branded, therefore, *ex cathedrâ*—as an error to be abhorred and to be shunned as the contagion of a pestilence. The recent dogma of the Council of the Vatican involves a formidable attack upon civil liberty. This new article of belief subjects all civil legislation to the moral criticism of the Pope of Rome, and binds every member of the Roman Catholic Church, whether ruler or subject, to submit to his decision. No limit is set to the power of the priest to intermeddle with the governments that acknowledge his jurisdiction.

4. Protestantism has bestowed a great boon upon civilization in supplanting the ascetic type of religion. Christianity came not to destroy, but to fulfill. It was not to supersede any one of the normal activities, or to proscribe any of the legitimate products of human exertion. It was to mingle in the earthly pursuits of mankind, a renovating and purifying influence. Family life, letters, art, science, amusement, trade, and commerce were to suffer no blight, but were rather to experience a quickening and, at the same time, an elevating power from contact with the Gospel. Christ bade his followers not to retreat from the world, but to stay in it and transform it. The kingdom of God on earth was to draw within it all that is pure and admirable in the infinitely diversified works and achievements of the natural man. It was not to be a ghostly realm of devotees, but a society of men and women, not indifferent to the labors and pleasures that pertain to this life, but infusing into all

things a spirit of religious consecration. The ascetic type of religion interposes a gulf between religion and the business of the world, between things natural and supernatural. The creation of a separate priesthood, who are cut off from family life and from the ordinary relations of society, exemplifies the ascetic tendency, which appears more or less distinctly throughout the Roman Catholic system. The effect of the compulsory rule of celibacy is to attach a stigma to the institution of marriage and to the domestic relations. These relations are held to involve an inferior condition of sanctity. Apart from all the other evils which are connected with the law of celibacy, it strikes a blow at the sacredness of an institution on which the interests of civilization essentially depend. But the ascetic spirit, the unauthorized divorce of things sacred and secular, penetrates much further.

It is a remarkable fact in history that the rise of commerce helped to undermine the authority of the clergy, and was one of the potent instruments in educating the European mind for the revolt of Protestantism. Commerce, it is true, produced a keenness and sagacity of intellect, and led to an activity of social movement and intercourse, which tended to break the yoke of superstition. Municipalities of busy merchants soon began to chafe under the sway of ecclesiastics. Independently, however, of these peculiar effects of trade, there was a secret but growing consciousness that great industrial enterprises and secular activity do not find any link of connection with the ascetic type of religion. They may get from it a bare toleration, but they must look elsewhere for a sanction and a baptism.

5. The Protestant religion keeps alive in the nations that adopt it the spirit of progress. There may exist a high degree of civilization in certain respects, but a civilization which has ceased to expand through forces inherent in itself. China is an example. There may be a richer and more complex development which yet culminates, and, thenceforward, either remains stationary, or, which is more likely

to occur, becomes degenerate and goes backward. The civilization of the ancient Roman empire is a signal case of such an arrest of progress and of such a decadence. The spirit of progress, the fresh and unexhausted energy and hopefulness, with the consequent rapid growth in material and intellectual achievements which distinguish the Protestant nations, are due, not to characteristics of race alone, nor to incidental advantages of any kind, but, in a great degree, to their religion. There is a disposition to look forward as well as backward, to expect a future greater than the past, and to believe in the practicableness of carrying improvement to heights heretofore unattained. France is a prosperous and highly civilized nation; but of all countries nominally Roman Catholic, France is the one in which the Church of Rome has had the feeblest sway, and the one most alive to the influences which Protestantism and the Protestant civilization of other European nations have set in motion. The effect of the reactionary Catholicism that followed the Reformation upon the nations of Southern Europe was deadening. In the decay of the Renaissance, music, painting, and poetry revived, in the ferment of religious enthusiasm excited by the Catholic reaction; but the intellectual vigor of Italy and Spain beneath the iron tread of the Inquisition was soon crushed. The history of these naturally gifted peoples, subjected to the stifling atmosphere of ecclesiastical tyranny, is a convincing illustration of the fatal effect of such a system. The present aspect of South America and Mexico, when compared with the American communities which have been reared on Protestant foundations, impressively exhibits the same thing.

Roman Catholic polemics maintain that Protestantism is responsible for the skepticism and unbelief that prevail so extensively among Christian nations. They assert that there has arisen in the wake of Protestantism a spirit of irreligion which threatens to subvert the social fabric. The causes

of this evil, however, do not lie at the door of Protestantism. The free inquiry that had developed in Europe in connection with the revival of learning could not be smothered by mere authority. The earnest religious feeling which the Reformation at the outset brought with it counteracted the tendencies to unbelief, for a time, at least; and it was only when Protestantism departed from its own principles, and acted upon the maxims of its adversary, at the same time losing the warmth of religious life so conspicuous at the beginning, that infidelity had a free course. The ideas which Plutarch long ago embodied in his treatise on superstition and unbelief are well founded. They are two extremes, each of which begets the other. Not only may the artificial faith which leads to superstitious practices, and drives its devotees to fanaticism, at length spend its force, and move the same devotees to cast off the restraints of religion; but the spectacle of superstition, also, repels more sober and courageous minds from all faith and worship. Such has been the notorious effect of the superstitious ceremonies and austerities of the Roman Catholic system, both in the age of the Renaissance and in our own day. Religion comes to be identified, in the opinions of men, with tenets and observances which are repugnant to reason and common sense; and hence truth and error are thrown overboard at once.

Disgusted with the follies which pass under the name of religion, and attract the reverence of the ignorant, men make shipwreck of faith altogether. The same baleful influence ensues upon the attempt to stretch the principle of authority beyond the due limit. It is like the effect of excessive restraint in the family. A revolt is the consequence wherever there is a failure to repress mental activity and to enslave the will. The subjugation of the intelligence which the Roman Catholic system carries with it as an essential ingredient compels a mutiny which is very likely not to stop with the rejection of usurped authority. There is a general source of unbelief which is independent of the influence of

any particular form of religion. Rationalism has been correctly described as the fruit of the understanding stepping beyond its sphere, and supplanting the normal action of the moral and religious nature. It is due to a one-sided, exclusive, and narrow activity of a single function of the intellect, at the expense of conscience and the intuitive power.

Such, for example, was the character of that skepticism which the Sophists encouraged, and which Socrates, appealing directly to the immediate, ineradicable convictions of the soul, did so much to overthrow. When the free and accountable nature of the soul, and the aspirations and presentiments, as profound as they are natural, of the spirit of man, are flippantly set aside to make room for something called "science," which is converted by its votaries into a fetich, infidelity is the inevitable consequence. There is nothing in Protestant principles, rightly understood, to warrant or to induce such a procedure. Looking at the matter historically, we find that, in the age prior to the Reformation, unbelief was most rife in Italy, the ancient centre of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. In recent times, skepticism is nowhere more prevalent than among the higher, cultivated classes in Roman Catholic countries, where the doctrines of that religion have been perpetually taught, and where its ritual has been celebrated with most pomp.

To the relation of Protestantism and Romanism to special evils that afflict our modern civilization, it is hardly possible within the space given to this Paper to allude. War is still a terrible scourge of nations. It is obvious that the power of the Church of Rome, as an organized body, to avert war, even between countries owning its authority, amounts to nothing. It has been reserved for two English-speaking nations, professing the Protestant faith, to furnish, as they have lately done, an impressive proof of what may be accomplished by the peaceful method of arbitration. The church of old favored the emancipation of slaves; but

slavery was abolished in the United States with little or no help from the ecclesiastics of the Roman Church.

In the disposition to minister to poverty and to the various forms of physical distress, Roman Catholics, be it said to their honor, vie with Protestant Christians. But this may be claimed for Protestantism, that its disciples are more zealous to devise the means of prevention, to explore these great evils to their sources, and then to apply radical and permanent remedies. Political economy and social science, although still immature, flourish chiefly under the auspices of Protestant Christianity. There are questions, of which the "labor question," as it is called, is one of the most prominent, with which neither church can be said to have fully grappled. But Protestantism has a better promise of contributing to the solution of these grave and portentous problems than the opposite system; for the laborer has no real quarrel with the Protestant religion. The hostility of the laboring class to a priestly system may take the form of a hatred to religion itself; but better teaching and a true spirit of philanthropy may give them the needed light.

The Roman Catholic Church is at present engaged in the hopeless struggle to uphold in the midst of modern society the religious ideas and customs of the middle ages. A dictatorial attitude toward the civil authority, the management of education by ecclesiastics, an appeal to the senses by a gorgeous ritual, an exorbitant demand upon the credulity of mankind by unverified miracles and prodigies, an attempt to revive pilgrimages and other obsolete or obsolescent superstitions, an increased devotion to the Virgin Mary, which borders on idolatry—such are some of the characteristics of this movement. It is the endeavor to reinstate or maintain a type of civilization on which history has pronounced a final verdict.

THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
TO THE OTHER PROTESTANT CHURCHES.*

CERTAIN events connected with the recent conference of the Evangelical Alliance in this country have brought up anew for discussion the attitude of the Church of England, at present and in the past, towards the other Protestant churches. It is well known that there is now, and long has been, a party in the Episcopal Church, who have refused to hold communion with other Protestant bodies, for the reason that these discard the episcopal polity, and that their ministers are not ordained by bishops. This party, which goes by the name of the High Church, is composed of two subdivisions. The one class is made up of those who carry their views of doctrine and their notions of worship to the verge of Romanism, and look with more or less yearning towards the Greek and Latin churches, whose doctrine of transubstantiation is regarded with less aversion than is felt towards the prevailing opinions of Protestants respecting the sacrament. The other class are hostile to Rome, and to the ritualism that copies her ceremonies, but maintain the exclusive sanctity of episcopal ordination, and, therefore, stand aloof from the other churches of the Reformation. The Church of England, with its offshoots and branches, is, in their system, the one true church, with which alone it is lawful to have ecclesiastical communion. All other churches are shut out of ecclesiastical fellowship, either as being non-episcopal, or, like Rome, as being corrupt.

Now there is a class of writers of the High Church party

* An Article in *The New-Englander* for January, 1874.

who seek to convey the impression, sometimes by direct assertion, and sometimes by more indirect means, that the Church of England, in the first century after the Reformation, or in the period prior to Laud and to the act of uniformity under Charles II., professed the theories which they now profess, and stood in the isolated and exclusive position in which their party, since the middle of the seventeenth century have striven to hold her. We do not mean to impute this flagrant perversion of historical truth to all writers of the High Church school. There are candid scholars among them, like Keble, who discern and acknowledge facts, even when they militate against a party interest. Much less do we charge this kind of misrepresentation upon the writers of the Episcopal Church generally. Historical students who pursue these investigations without being warped by theological prejudice, are generally well agreed on the facts of the English Reformation. Hallam, Macaulay, and the other standard historians, state with substantial correctness the transformations which took place between the time of Cranmer and the eras of Laud and Sheldon. Authors who are strongly averse to Puritanism, and warmly attached to the episcopal side in the controversy between Churchman and Puritan, but who are too honest to be misled, or to mislead their readers, through partisan feeling, are equally commendable. The following passage from Lathbury's *History of English Episcopacy*, the work of a writer of this stamp, will illustrate our remark, and, at the same time, present some of the facts, which we shall establish in the course of this Article:—

“The English Reformers did not contend for any system of government or discipline in the church, as being *jure divino*; things indifferent, as ceremonies and clerical habits, were left to the civil magistrates. Nor did they refuse to recognize the validity of ordination in those foreign churches that had renounced episcopacy.” “The question of church government was vehemently agitated at this period [the reign of Elizabeth]. The Reformers were agreed that no precise form was laid down in the New Testament; but when the Puritans became divided into two

parties, the Presbyterian party advocated the divine right of their system. Cranmer and all the Reformers asserted that the form of government was left to the civil magistrate to determine, according to times and circumstances. The prelates of this reign maintained the same views; but like the earlier Reformers, they considered episcopacy, as retained in the English Church, to have been the apostolic practice. They did not, however, consider any mode of government essential to the constitution of the church; hence the validity of ordination as exercised in those reformed churches where episcopacy was not retained, was admitted. By an act passed in the thirteenth year of this reign, the ordinations of foreign reformed churches were declared valid, and their ministers were capable of enjoying preferment on receiving a license from the bishop.* Many who had received ordination abroad were allowed to exercise their ministry in the Church of England, provided they conformed. Travers, Whittingham, Cartwright, and many others had received no other, and their ordination was never questioned.† At a subsequent period this practice was denounced; and in 1662, it was ordered that no minister should exercise his office in the Church of England who had not received episcopal ordination. It appears that the Reformers did not contend for the superiority of the office of bishop as a distinct order from the priesthood, but as different only in degree. Nor did any member of the Church of England claim this distinction, till the year 1588, when Bancroft, in his celebrated sermon at Paul's Cross, asserted it." "Laud's notions on the subject of church government were at variance with those adopted by many of his predecessors, who, until the time of Bancroft, never claimed a divine right for the government of the English Church; and even Bancroft admitted the validity of Presbyterian ordination; for when it was suggested in 1610, that the Scotch bishops elect should be ordained presbyters, he opposed on the ground that ordination by presbyters was valid."‡

We quote the passages, not because we approve every sentence, but as, on the whole, a just exhibition of the facts, and as showing how a fair-minded churchman, who is, also, a thorough student, is capable of writing.

The following extract is from a writer of another type of theology and of churchmanship, but an accomplished historical scholar, Dean Stanley:—

"Whether from policy or necessity, the whole settlement of modern Scottish Episcopacy was far more Presbyterian, far less Episcopal and

* Strype's *Annals*, 524.

† [That is, until the new spirit, described in the next sentence, arose.]

‡ Lathbury, *History of the English Episcopacy*, pp. 19, 63, 170.

Catholic, than in any country in Europe. Doubtless this was partly occasioned by the fact, that in England itself the sentiment toward Presbyterian churches was far more generous and comprehensive in the century that followed the Reformation than it was in that which followed the Restoration. The English Articles are so expressed as to include the recognition of Presbyterian ministers. The first English Act of Uniformity was passed with the expressed view of securing their services to the English Church. The first English Reformers, and the statesmen of Elizabeth, would have been astonished at any claim of exclusive sanctity for the Episcopal order." * "It was not Knox, but Andrew Melville, who introduced into Scotland the divine right of Presbytery, the sister-dogma of the divine right of Episcopacy, which Bancroft and Laud introduced into England." "It is this [the Church of Scotland] for which every English churchman is asked to pray, by the canons of the English Convocation, which enjoins that prayers are to be offered up 'for Christ's Holy Catholic Church, that is, for the whole congregation of Christians dispersed throughout the whole world, especially for the Churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland.' 'There can be no doubt,' says the candid and accurate annalist of Scottish Episcopacy, 'that the framers of this have meant to acknowledge the northern ecclesiastical establishment at that time Presbyterian, as a Christian Church.'" † "The very first declaration which the sovereign makes—taking precedence even of the recognition of the rights and liberties of the English Church and nation, which are postponed till the day of the coronation—is that in which, on the day of the accession, the sovereign declares that he or she will maintain inviolate and intact the Church of Scotland." "In the Act of Union itself, which prescribes this declaration, the same securities are throughout exacted for the Church of Scotland as were exacted for the Church of England; and it is on record that, when that act was passed, and some questions arose amongst the peers as to the propriety of so complete a recognition of the Presbyterian Church, the then primate of all England, the 'old rock,' as he was called, Archbishop Tenison, rose, and said with a weight which carried all objections before it, 'the narrow notions of all churches have been their ruin. I believe that the Church of Scotland though not so perfect as ours, is as true a Protestant church as the Church of England.'" ‡

* See this well drawn out in Lord Macaulay's correspondence with the Bishop of Exeter; and in Principal Tulloch's Article on the English and Scottish Churches, in the *Contemporary Review*, December, 1871.

† See the discussions of the canons of 1603, in Grub [*Eccl. Hist. of Scotland*], ii., 282.

‡ Carstairs' *State Papers*, 739, 760. [Stanley's *Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland*, pp. 47, 66, 67. (Am. ed.)]

The drift of the representations of secular historians of the highest credit, may be learned from the following passage from Hallam, himself a churchman, and an authority of the first rank upon questions of legal and constitutional history:—

“The system pursued by Bancroft and his imitators, Bishops Neyle and Laud, with the approbation of the king, far opposed to the healing counsels of Burleigh and Bacon, was just such as low-born and little-minded men, raised to power by fortune's caprice, are ever found to pursue.” “They began by preaching the divine right, as it is called, or absolute indispensability, of episcopacy; a doctrine of which the first traces, as I apprehend, are found about the end of Elizabeth's reign. They insisted on the necessity of episcopal succession regularly derived from the apostles. They drew an inference from this tenet, that ordinations by presbyters were in all cases null; and as this affected all the Reformed churches in Europe except their own, the Lutherans not having preserved the succession of their bishops, while the Calvinists had altogether abolished that order, they began to speak of them, not as brethren of the same faith, united in the same cause, and distinguished only by differences little more material than those of political commonwealths (which had been the language of the Church of England ever since the Reformation), but as aliens to whom they were not at all related, and schismatics with whom they held no communion; nay, as wanting the very essence of a Christian society.” In the foot-note, Hallam adds that “it is evident, by some passages in Strype, attentively considered, that natives regularly ordained abroad, in the Presbyterian churches, were admitted to hold preferment in England; the first bishop who objected to them seems to have been Aylmer. Instances, however, of foreigners holding preferment without any reordination may be found down to the civil wars.”—*Annals of the Reformation*, ii., 522, and Appendix, 116; *Life of Grindal*, 271; Collier, ii., 594; Neal, i., 258.*

Since the late meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, Bishop Cummins, in a letter to the *New York Tribune*, referred to the fact that Presbyterian ministers, in the period following the Reformation, had been admitted to parishes in England without reordination; and he referred, among his authorities, to Prof. Fisher's work on the Reformation. The statement was denied by the Rev. Dr. Drumm, in communi-

* *Const. History* (Harpers' Am. ed.), p. 226.

cations to the same journal. Prof. Fisher published two letters in the *Tribune* in proof of the assertion ; and these letters we propose to transfer to our pages, partly for the purpose of giving them a more permanent form, and partly in order to illustrate their contents by further proofs and observations, such as could not well find place in the columns of a daily newspaper. As several topics belonging to the same general subject are handled in these letters, and will be considered in the pages which follow, we set forth distinctly the main propositions, which we conceive to be as capable of being established as any facts in the ecclesiastical history of England :

1. The first and second generation of English Reformers, Cranmer and his associates, Jewel and his contemporaries, did not hold the *jure divino*, or exclusive, theory of episcopacy.

2. The Church of England, in the sixteenth century, was in full communion with the other Protestant churches of Europe.

3. The greatest divines in the Church of England in the seventeenth century agreed with Hooker in acknowledging the validity of Presbyterian ordination, and in the recognition of the foreign Protestant churches. This was true of Ussher, Hall, and Stillingfleet, and of others of hardly less distinction.

4. The fellowship with the foreign churches on the part of the English Reformers was not owing to forbearance in them, but to the common opinion that each nation, or church, could shape its own polity, and that episcopacy might be adopted or rejected as each church or nation should see fit to determine.

5. Notwithstanding the changes in the Prayer-Book and in the law of England, at the Restoration, the Church of England has never, by law or synodal action, discredited the validity of the ordination practiced in other Protestant bodies.

We print below the first letter, in the form in which it was published in the *Tribune*, but with the addition of a few marginal notes.

SIR: In two communications which have lately appeared in your journal, I am mentioned among writers who have stated that, for a considerable period after the Reformation, persons who had only received non-episcopal ordination were admitted to parishes in the English Church, no objection being made to the validity of their orders. As the correctness of this assertion is directly impugned by the Rev. Dr. Drumm, and as the question is a historical one of some interest, and a question, too, that need not provoke sectarian asperity, I beg leave to offer a vindication of the truth of the statement which your correspondent has called in question.

The statement is usually made as one illustration of the fact that the founders of the Anglican Church in the reigns of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth—Cranmer and his associates, Jewel and the Elizabethan bishops and divines of his time—did not hold to the *jure divino* theory of episcopacy. That is to say, they did not consider bishops, meaning a class elevated above presbyters, essential to the existence of a church, and they did not regard Episcopal ordination as indispensable to the exercise of the functions and prerogatives of the Christian ministry. On the contrary, they looked upon the Protestant ministers on the Continent in the Lutheran Church, and in the Reformed Churches in Switzerland, France, and Holland, as on a perfect equality with themselves with regard to clerical rights and qualifications. Differences arose among the Protestant churches on the subject of the Eucharist, but as to controversy about episcopacy, in that age there was none. When Cranmer called eminent divines from the churches on the Continent to help him compose the formularies of the Anglican Church, and to train the ministers of England at Oxford and Cambridge, this was not an exceptional act, but in keeping with his avowed principles and constant practice. No one who is acquainted with Cranmer's opinions, can suppose that the circumstance that Martyr and Bucer had once taken orders in the Roman Church had a feather's weight in determining him to invite them to England, any more than a like fact influenced him in the case of John Knox, who was made Chaplain-in-ordinary to Edward VI., was commissioned for several years as a preacher in the north of England, was offered the parish of All-Hallows in London, and finally a bishopric. Fagius, who was the companion of Bucer and Martyr, had been a minister in Germany, made such, of course, without Episcopal consecration; and it is not true that he was called merely to teach the Hebrew language at Cambridge, as a Jew might teach. He was to expound the Old Testament, beginning with the prophet Isaiah, and he was welcomed from the beginning by

Cranmer as an intimate counsellor and friend. That Fagius, a minister of high standing in Germany, would have accepted such an appointment from those who denied his right to exercise the ministry, is something quite incredible. Cranmer went so far as to declare, in a written document, in 1540, that no consecration of bishops or priests is necessary, "for election or appointment thereto is sufficient." (Burnet, I., ii., *Collection of Records*, iii., 21.) That Cranmer referred to ordination, and not to institution merely, is made perfectly clear by the same document. The voluminous correspondence of the eminent English divines and reformers, which has been published principally from the archives of Zurich, must convince every candid person who examines it, that no suspicion of a want of validity in the orders of the Helvetic ministers, whose advice they so frequently sought, and whose hospitality they enjoyed, ever entered their minds. No man who has read, for example, the numerous letters of Bishop Cox, a warm defender of the English liturgy against the Puritans, to Gualter, the son-in-law of Zwingle—his "beloved Rodolph," as Cox styles him—will have the effrontery to affirm that the English bishop looked on his Swiss friend and adviser as one who had no right to exercise the functions of the ministry. In the last days of Edward VI., Cranmer was corresponding with Calvin, Bullinger, and Melancthon, in order to bring together a general synod of the Protestants, where a platform of doctrine might be made, in which their disagreement respecting the Lord's Supper—the only serious point of difference—might be adjusted. There is no trace of the exclusive, or *jure divino*, theory of episcopacy, in the writings of Cranmer, Parker, Grindal, and Whitgift, the first four Protestant archbishops of Canterbury. Whether Bancroft broached it in his sermon at Paul's Cross, is still a controverted point. Hallam maintains that he did not. That this theory, which, in its logical consequences, would "unchurch" the other Protestant religious bodies, and discredit the orders of their ministry, does not appear until about the time of Hooker, is granted by Keble in the elaborate essay prefixed to his edition of Hooker's writings. It certainly sounds strange to hear Keble, all whose prepossessions were on the side of the High Church doctrine, charged with error for conceding what, if the evidence in the case had not required, he would surely have been very loth to admit. But Keble had carefully and thoroughly explored the historical question, as his essay abundantly shows.

The opinion of Protestants of the English Church in the sixteenth century on this subject was closely connected with two other facts which deserve special attention. The first was the prevailing doctrine at that time that bishops do not constitute a distinct order in the ministry, but that bishops and presbyters are different grades of the same office. This was a common view in the Roman Catholic Church in the middle ages, since an ecclesiastical arrangement was thought to have the force of an *institutio divina*. The miracle of the Eucharist being the highest act which the

clergyman could perform, and this being open to the priest, it was plausibly argued that there can be no order of ministers above him. This ground was taken, even by a Pope, Urban II., and is sanctioned by the most orthodox of the schoolmen. Those who are curious to see the proofs of this statement may be referred to Gieseler's *Church History* (Am. ed., i., p. 91, n.). The same fact respecting the mediæval opinion is proved in a work which has always been held in high honor by Episcopalians, Field's *Treatise on the Church* (b. iii., p. 39).^{*} Cranmer subscribes to this old opinion of the original and essential identity of the office of bishop and that of presbyter. He held that "in the New Testament there is no mention made of any degrees or distinctions in orders, but only of deacons or ministers, and of priests or bishops." Thirteen bishops, with a great number of other ecclesiastics, subscribed to this proposition. See Burnet's *Collection of Records*, II., i. iii., 21.) Bishop Jewel, one of the great lights of the English Reformation, in his celebrated "Defence" of the Church of England, and in his "Apology," took no other ground. He falls back on the doctrine that "bishops are greater than presbyters by order and custom of the church, and not by the truth of God's ordinance." (Jewel's *Writings*, Parker Soc. ed., I., p. 379.) † This is the

^{*} "These being the divers sorts and kinds of ecclesiastical power, it will easily appear unto all that enter into the due consideration thereof, that the power of ecclesiastical or sacred order, that is, the power and authority to intermeddle with things pertaining to the service of God, and to perform eminent acts of gracious efficiency, tending to the procuring of the eternal good of the sons of men, is equal and the same in all those whom we call presbyters, that is, fatherly guides of God's church and people: and that only for order's sake and the preservation of peace there is a limitation of the use and exercise of the same." Dean Field states that the Romanists themselves concede this, and adds: "Whereby it is most evident that that wherein a bishop excelleth a presbyter, is not a distinct power of order, but an eminency and dignity only, specially yielded to one above all the rest of the same rank, for order's sake, and to preserve the unity and peace of the church." That Dean Field is here stating his own opinion is made perfectly evident by the context. See, also, b. v., c. 27, where the same doctrine is laid down.

† "St. Hierome saith generally of all bishops: *noverint Episcopi se magis consuetudine, quam dispositionis dominicæ veritate, presbyteris esse majores*: 'let bishops understand that they be greater than the priests by order and custom (of the church), and not by the truth of God's ordinance.' If Christ, as St. Hierome saith, appointed not one priest above another, how then is it likely he appointed one priest to be, as M. Harding saith, prince and ruler over all priests throughout the whole world?" In another place, Jewel says: "Is it so horrible an heresy as he [Hard-

explicit doctrine of Dean Field, in the passage to which I have just referred.

The second circumstance which it is important to notice, is the prevalent belief in the system of national churches, and the adoption by many, of the Erastian theory of the supremacy of the civil magistrate in ecclesiastical affairs. The first Reformers in England were of this mind, and the English Reformation was effected under this theory. Calvin opposed it, and fought out the battle at Geneva in behalf of the right of the church, by its own organs, to excommunicate unworthy members. Calvinists generally resisted the Erastian doctrine in its extreme form; yet they conceded to the magistrates of each country a large measure of power in matters of religion. The bishops of Elizabeth found it very hard, however, to yield up to their imperious sovereign that extent of control which she demanded; as the suspension of Archbishop Grindal and many other events of like character illustrate. The main point here is that the Anglican divines paid a great respect to national churches and to the right of each country to frame its own church institutions, and to order its own church affairs.

ing] maketh it, to say that by the Scriptures of God a bishop and a priest are all one." Then Jewel proceeds to quote Chrysostom, Jerome, and other fathers in support of the doctrine that they are the same. P. iii., p. 439 (*Defence of the Apology*). Thomas Becon, chaplain to Cranmer, and Prebendary of Canterbury, writes, in his Catechism: "*Father*.—What difference is there between a bishop and a spiritual minister? *Son*.—None at all: their office is one, their authority and power is one. And, therefore, St. Paul calleth the spiritual ministers sometime bishops, sometime elders, sometime pastors, sometime teachers, etc." The same doctrine is in *The Institution of a Christian Man*, published by authority in 1537. Pilkington, the first Protestant bishop of Durham, writes in 1561: "The privileges and superiorities which bishops have above other ministers, are rather granted by man for maintaining of better order and quietness in commonwealths, than commanded by God in his Word. Ministers have better knowledge and utterance some than other, but their ministry is of equal dignity." (Pilkington's *Works*, Parker Soc. ed., p. 493.) The same doctrine is taught by Fulke, Master of Pembroke College. In Blunt's *Annotated Prayer-Book*, the notes to which are from the High Church point of view, it is said: "It was not until the close of the sixteenth century that the distinction between the orders of bishops and priests was asserted. On Feb. 9, 1589, Dr. Bancroft, in a sermon, maintained the superiority of bishops *jure divino*; the doctrine was completely acknowledged during the primacy of Laud, and enforced by Bishop Hall in a well-known treatise on the subject" (p. 566). Of Bishop Hall's qualified form of the *jure divino* doctrine, we shall speak hereafter.

The conflict with the Puritans, which began with the accession of Elizabeth, had become stern and bitter in the time of Whitgift. But this inflexible enemy of Puritanism never calls in question the validity of the method of ordination prevailing in the churches abroad. He conducts his whole controversy with Cartwright, the Presbyterian champion, without any assertion of the *jure divino* doctrine of episcopacy. Field, the celebrated Dean of Gloucester, the warm friend of Hooker, also, as we have said, defends the foreign churches, and maintains the sufficiency of their orders. Whether Hooker himself holds that the right to establish or abolish episcopacy is included in that broad legislative jurisdiction which he attributes to the church, is a question of interpretation on which opinion is divided. In settling this question much depends on our judgment respecting the integrity of the last three books of his treatise. This is certain, however, that he recognized the validity of the ordination of the ministers of the Reformed churches on the Continent. He finds in their circumstances an excuse for their practice. Hooker never questioned, or thought of questioning, the right of a Huguenot or a German minister to dispense the sacraments.

There was nothing, then, in the principles of the Church of England, in the period of which we are speaking, that was incompatible with the granting of a parish to a minister ordained through presbyters alone. That is, there was no difficulty from any supposed defect in his ordination. The statute of the thirteenth of Elizabeth was a part of her coercive measures for securing uniformity. It required all ministers who had been ordained by any other method than that prescribed under Edward VI., to present themselves before the bishop, and give their approval of the Articles of Religion. The terms of the act cover the case of Roman Catholic priests, and also the case of Protestant ministers who might have been ordained abroad, whether in Scotland, or on the Continent, during the period of exile in the preceding reign. That the law was designed to refer to this second class, as well as to the other, has been affirmed by English historians and theologians of every party. Strype says that they were "undoubtedly" meant. It is now denied by your correspondent that such cases ever existed. He sets aside the authority of Hallam, who deliberately affirms that "instances of foreigners holding preferment without any reordination may be found down to the civil wars." (*Const. Hist.*, Harper's Am. ed., p. 226.) To contradict Hallam on a matter of this sort one should be very sure of his ground. Your correspondent dismisses Macaulay in an equally summary manner, as one "full of party prejudice." Macaulay is a somewhat rhetorical writer: and in the multitude of details which crowd his history, a few errors have been detected. But no man was more familiar with the times of which he wrote, and he is not an inaccurate author. Your correspondent likewise dismisses Bishop Burnet with a disparagement which I believe to be scarcely less unjust. Even Strype, he thinks, is not to be

trusted. But here come Bishop Fleetwood and Bishop Cosin.* Both are witnesses of unimpeached veracity. Bishop Cosin has personally known of individuals who had taken English parishes with only Presbyterian orders, and knew of many other cases before his time. This would strike one as conclusive testimony. But as Bishop Cosin did not specify the cases, his declaration is not to be accepted! Fleetwood was born sixteen years after 1641, the latest date at which instances of this sort could have occurred, and therefore he is not to be believed! As if persons who took parishes before 1641 might not have lived long enough for Fleetwood to know them; and as if a man cannot get credible information respecting anything prior to his birth! It would be instructive to see what would become, on such principles of reasoning, of accepted arguments from what Irenæus and other fathers say of the constitution of the church before their time.

These witnesses, then, to whom your correspondent alludes, fully establish the fact which he seeks to disprove. But there are other proofs, equally if not more decisive. Lord Bacon probably wrote his *Advertisement concerning Controversies of the Church of England*, in 1589. In the course of this tract he adverts to the gradual sharpening of the antagonism between the two contestants, the Puritan and the Churchman. He says that stiff defenders of episcopacy were beginning to condemn their opponents as a "sect." "Yea," he adds, "and some indiscreet persons have been bold in open preaching to use dishonorable and derogative speech and censure of the churches abroad; and that so far as some of our men, as I have heard, ordained in foreign parts, have been pronounced to be no lawful ministers. Thus we see the beginnings were modest, but the extremes were violent, so as there is almost as great a dis-

* Fleetwood became a bishop in 1708. He says: "During the reigns of King James and King Charles I., and to the year 1661, we had *many ministers* from Scotland, from France, and the Low Countries, who were ordained by presbyters only, and not bishops, and they were instituted into benefices with cure . . . and yet were never reordained, but only subscribed the Articles." Bishop Cosin says of the ministers of the French Reformed Church, that in the event of "their receiving a public charge or cure of souls among us (as I have known some of them to have so done of late, and can instance in *many others* before my time) our bishops did not ordain them." "Nor," he adds, "did our laws require more of such ministers than to declare their public consent to the religion received amongst us, and to subscribe the Articles established." (Letter to Mr. Cordel.) Bishop Cosin, a leader of the High Church party, was born in 1594. He retired to France during the civil war, and at the restoration was made a bishop. Bishop Hall's perfectly decisive testimony we present on a later page.

tance of either side from itself as was at the first of one from the other." This he accounts for on the ground that the partisans of the High Church side had become "exasperate through contentions." I cannot imagine how this piece of evidence can be invalidated, unless, indeed, it should be said that Lord Bacon did not mention names! There were ministers—"our men," they are called—ministers in the English Church, who had not been episcopally consecrated, and, hence, were denounced as having no right to exercise the ministry.

The cases of Whittingham and Travers, to which your correspondent appeals, so far from tending, when they are fairly stated, to support his position, strongly tend to overthrow it. Whittingham had written a preface to Goodman's book against the government of women, which was a companion piece to Knox's famous *Blast of the Trumpet*, on the same theme.* He was opposed to the imposition of the vestments, and wrote against it. On the 19th of July, 1562, he had been made Dean of Durham. There was a kind of standing conflict between him and Sandys, Archbishop of York, his Metropolitan. The Archbishop at length attempted to depose him by denying that he had ever been ordained. A Commission of Inquiry was appointed, which came to no result. In 1578, a second commission was appointed. The Dean, who was powerfully supported, died before the affair was terminated or a decision reached. It is true, as your correspondent states, that he claimed to have been ordained at Geneva, according to the method of the Reformed Church there. But there is another most material fact which your correspondent leaves out. This statement of Whittingham was denied by Sandys, who claimed that he had not been thus ordained, but had been ordained by a few lay persons in a private house. The proceeding was looked upon by many as a reflection upon the Church of Geneva. This was the feeling of the Lord President, the Earl of Huntington, who wrote to Burleigh that "his lordship could judge what flame this spark was likely to breed, if it should kindle; for it could not but be ill taken by all the godly learned, both at home and in all the foreign churches abroad, that we should allow of the popish massing priests in our ministry, and disallow of the ministers made in a Reformed Church." On the other side, the Archbishop's Chancellor reported that Whittingham had not proved that he had been ordained "at Geneva according to the order of the Genevan [office or book], by public authority established there." (Strype, *Annals*, Oxford

* Whittingham was one of the leaders of the Anti-Liturgical party at Frankfort, during the reign of Mary. He retired to Geneva, and took part in the translation of the Geneva Bible. There is the best reason for believing that if Whittingham and Travers had not been obnoxious on account of their Puritanism, there would have been no proceedings against them.

ed., II., ii., 170.) The Archbishop asserted that "neither in Geneva nor in any Reformed church in Europe it could be proved that any such orders were ever used or allowed of." In short, the attempt to depose Whittingham was defended on the ground that he had *not* been ordained according to the Geneva method; and there is a pretty strong implication that, if he had been, there would be no ground for the proceeding against him. Is it not a case of *exceptio probat regulam*?

Travers was a candidate for the office of Master of the Temple, where he was a preacher at the time when Hooker was appointed to the place. Travers was a strict Calvinist and a strenuous Puritan. On this last ground he was peculiarly obnoxious to Whitgift. Whitgift resolved to silence him, and alleged as a reason that he had not been properly ordained. Travers replied that he had been ordained at Antwerp, after the method of the Dutch churches; and asserted that many others, who had been ordained in Scotland and elsewhere abroad, had held offices in the English Church—a statement which, as he was a man of acknowledged veracity, must be believed. He appealed to the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth. Whitgift is careful not to deny the validity of Presbyterian ordination, such as was practiced in the foreign churches. His ground was that Travers had gone abroad out of dislike to the "order of his own country"—the method of ordination in the English Church; that he had been ordained by such "as had not authority to ordain him." The charge was that Travers was a schismatic; that, being in the Church of England, he ran abroad—"gaddeth into other countries"—and there got himself ordained, as was said, by Cartwright, and Villers, a Frenchman. In this case, as in that of Whittingham, there is no impeachment of the ordination of foreign ministers generally, but rather an implied admission of its validity. Travers urged that Christ's Church being one, every person who has received ordination in one branch of it must be received as a minister in every other. Whitgift, in his annotations upon Travers' paper, refers to the fact that the French Church, when a minister comes to them from abroad, require something more than proof of his ordination, and subject him to an additional "calling." When the Archbishop, in his note, remarks that the churches which allowed of Presbytery "are an exception to the rule," he refers to the rule to which Travers appealed, viz.: that a minister in one place is a minister everywhere. The Presbyterian churches, Whitgift means to say, did not sanction this rule. Whitgift, as we have said, in all his conflicts with the Puritans, never denies the validity of Presbyterian ordination, as established in the foreign Protestant churches. Travers, notwithstanding his deposition, which was accomplished with difficulty, was called to Dublin by Archbishop Loftus, and made Master of Trinity College, where he had for one of his pupils Archbishop Ussher, then in his youth.

The act of the 13th of Elizabeth continued in force until the Restoration of Charles II., when, in 1662, the statute for uniformity was passed,

which forbade any person to hold any benefice, or to administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper "before he be ordained a priest by Episcopal ordination." This statute took away the last protection which the law afforded to clergymen who had not been ordained by a bishop.

The different attitude in relation to other Protestant bodies and to their ministry, which the English Church assumed under Laud, as compared with its position during the first three Protestant reigns, is a fact as well attested by the consent of historical scholars of various and conflicting schools as anything else in the ecclesiastical history of England. The reign of James I. formed the transition to this new position. The participation of dignitaries of the English Church in the Synod of Dort, was one of the last conspicuous acts of fellowship with the Reformed Churches of the Continent. The Puritan controversy naturally led to this result. The Puritans were at first treated as schismatics, mutineers against the National Church established by public authority. It was natural that the churches abroad, whose principles the Puritans espoused, should eventually be included in the same condemnation, and be pronounced destitute of a duly ordained ministry. Especially was this natural when a great part of the Puritans themselves claimed a *jure divino* sanction and an exclusive right for their own favorite system of polity.

To enter into the merits of this great controversy, which rent English Protestantism in twain, is no part of my present purpose. Even at this late day it may not be perfectly easy to hold the scales of judgment even; but there ought to be no dispute about the facts.

To the list of witnesses to the fact of the admission of ministers, not ordained by bishops, to spiritual preferment in England, is to be added the name of Bishop Hall, who was the most conspicuous defender of episcopacy just prior to the civil war. In his *Defence of the Humble Remonstrance*, which was written at that time, he says: "I know those, more than one, that by virtue only of that ordination which they have brought with them from other reformed churches, have enjoyed spiritual promotions and livings, without any exception against the lawfulness of their calling." Such testimony would seem to be sufficient to convince the most skeptical. The gravest objection which is urged against proofs of this character is that the witnesses do not give names! Then, when the Evangelists tell us that many people went to hear John the Baptist, we must discredit them because they do not mention names and

places of residence. As we have brought forward proofs derived from Episcopal sources, we may certainly be permitted, by way of corroboration, to add the statement of the learned Puritan historian, Neal, whom it is too much the fashion of the High Church school to disparage. Speaking of the state of things about the year 1580, he says: "The statute of the 13th Eliz., cap. xii., admits the ministration of those who had only been ordained according to the manner of the Scots, or other foreign churches: there were some scores, if not hundreds, of them now in the church." * The case of John Morrison, who was licensed by Archbishop Grindal, in 1582, to preach and administer the sacraments in the province of Canterbury, has often been referred to. The license was issued, with the assent of the Archbishop, by Dr. Aubrey, the vicar-general; and it describes Morrison as one who had been ordained according to the "laudable form and rite of the Reformed Church of Scotland," which at that time was essentially Presbyterian. There is no reason to doubt that his ordination was by the synod of the County of Lothian.

The following is Professor Fisher's second letter to the *Tribune*.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the courteous tone of the Rev. Dr. Drumm's communication, in which he makes another attempt to disprove the statement that Presbyterian ministers were once admitted to parishes in the Church of England without reordination. But, after having read his acute and learned argument, I must still decline to comply with his invitation to retract the assertion, for the reason that I am fully convinced of its truth. The testimony of Lord Bacon, which Dr. Drumm does not notice; of Bishop Cosin—I know of no reason for questioning the genuineness of his letter—of Bishop Fleetwood, of Bishop Burnet, and of Strype, not to speak of other proofs, appears to me quite sufficient to establish the fact.† The circumstance that the witnesses do not mention the names of persons and of parishes only shows the absence of all anticipation that at some remote day their statement would be called in question. I am confirmed in the opinion that they are correct,

* *History of the Puritans*, P. I., c. vi.

† For the conclusive testimony of Bishop Hall, see p. 190.

from the fact that the validity of Presbyterian ordination was not questioned in the Church of England at that time, and that the relations of England with Scotland, and with the Continent, especially after the defeat of the Protestants in Germany by Charles V., and during the Marian period, were such as would naturally bring into England ministers who had received ordination in the Protestant churches abroad. I am further strengthened in this opinion by the authority of such historians as Hallam and Macaulay, to say nothing of Lathbury and others of less note, and by the concurrence of Episcopal theologians who have studied the subject, like Keble.*

I have no occasion to engage in a debate with Dr. Drumm about the merits of English historical writers. I would only remind him that Hallam published his last revision of the *Constitutional History*, the best and most thorough of all his works, in 1846. Dr. Drumm is mistaken in saying that Hallam offers no evidence of his statement in regard to the admission of Presbyterian ministers to parishes. Dr. Drumm probably referred to the second passage in which Hallam makes this assertion, and overlooked the first, with which the marginal references are connected. Everybody knows that Macaulay paints in strong colors; but a few instances of error, as when he confounds George Penn the pardon-broker with William Penn the Quaker, only set in relief the miraculous retentiveness and almost unfailing accuracy of his memory. As to Burnet, I think Macaulay right, who says of the charge of inaccuracy brought against him: "I believe the charge to be altogether unjust. He appears to be singularly inaccurate only because his narrative has been subjected to scrutiny singularly severe and unfriendly." Burnet was born in Scotland about the beginning of the civil war in England; he was personally familiar with both countries, and with the churches abroad; and he was an honest man. When, therefore, in explaining the Act of Uniformity of 1661, he says (in the *History of his own Time*): "Another point was fixed by the Act of Uniformity, which was more at large formerly; those who came to England from the foreign churches had not been required to be ordained among us; but now all that had not Episcopal ordination were made incapable of holding any ecclesiastical benefice"—I believe that he tells the truth.

* Keble says: "Nearly up to the time when he [Hooker] wrote, numbers had been admitted to the ministry of the Church in England, with no better than Presbyterian ordination, and it appears by Travers's *Supplication to the Council* that such was the construction not uncommonly put upon the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth, permitting those who had received orders in any other form than that of the English Service Book, on giving certain securities, to exercise their calling in England."—*Preface to Hooker's Works*, vol. i., xxvi.

Dr. Drumm seems to differ from me in relation to the date when the *jure divino* doctrine of episcopacy began to be promulgated in the Church of England. He attributes this doctrine to Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the closing years of Elizabeth's reign. In this Dr. Drumm is surely wrong. If the passage which he quotes warranted the inference which he draws from it, it would stand in flagrant contradiction to the whole tenor of Whitgift's writings, and to his explicit affirmations. By the *jure divino* doctrine is meant not simply that episcopacy existed in the apostolic age, under the sanction of the apostles, but that it is a perpetual and indispensable form of polity. Whitgift believed in the apostolic origin of episcopacy, and that it ought to be continued; but he did not deny that churches, with a lawful ministry, could exist without it. In the letter to Beza, from which Dr. Drumm has quoted, which was written as late as 1593, he says: "There is no mortal man more studious of the peace of the church than myself; nor one who, from his soul, more truly wisheth that every particular church would mind its own business, and not prescribe the laws of rites and the manner of government to others." This practice it is, he adds, "which bringeth forth that unhappy estrangement of souls among brethren." He agrees with Beza that "liberty was to be left to every church, in rites and such externals, so that they be made to edification." "I pray," he says, "that you would go on, by your daily prayers poured forth to God, to help us and the whole Church of England, which we do diligently for you and your church settled there with you." In the same letter, Whitgift says that Sutcliff's book (published in 1591) was the first attack that had been made in England against the Presbyterian system as it existed abroad; and that this was provoked by the long-continued aspersions cast upon the English system by the Puritans and by their foreign abettors.* In the preface to the "Defense" against Cartwright, Whitgift says of "the order of things external, touching the government of the church and administration of the sacraments:" "We do not take upon us (as we are slandered) either to blame or to condemn other churches, for such orders as they have received most fit for their estates." Elsewhere he says: "That any one kind of government is so necessary that without it the church cannot be saved, or that it may not be altered into some other kind thought to be more expedient, I utterly deny." He cites with approval the declaration of Calvin that "in ceremonies and external discipline, He [God] hath not in Scripture particularly determined anything, but left the same to His church, to make or to abrogate, to alter or continue, to add or to take away, as shall be thought from time to time most convenient for the present state of the church." "Wherein," says Whitgift, "do we agree with the Papists? or wherein do we dissent from the Reformed Churches? With these we have all points of doctrine and

* Strype, *Life of Whitgift*, b. iv., c. x.

substance common ; from the other we dissent, in the most part both of doctrine and ceremonies." * The episcopacy which Whitgift advocates is a superiority of one minister over other ministers in office or degree, as an arrangement of government, for the sake of union and discipline. Rome to him is still "Antichrist," and the foreign churches of the Protestants are recognized and honored as they were by Cranmer and Parker.

The *jure divino* theory dates from the era of Laud. It is intimately connected with the sacerdotal idea of episcopacy which, prior to that date, however it may have been suggested, had not gained a foothold in the Church of England, and had been repudiated in the teaching of her greatest reformers and divines. It was one item in that accusation against Laud which cost him his head, that, as a part of a scheme for "Romanizing" the Church of England, he had broken off communion with the Protestant churches abroad, and had tried to lead Bishop Hall to lay down a theory of episcopacy that would exclude them from fellowship. Clarendon, describing the causes of the civil war, states how, a few years before its commencement, the foreign churches in England, which had before been cherished and protected, were broken up, on the ostensible ground that they lent aid and comfort, by their example and otherwise, to the Puritans. This harsh measure of the government he explains by the fact "that the power of churchmen grew more transcendent, and, indeed, the faculties of the lay-counsellors more dull, lazy, and inactive." Then he relates how a new policy was adopted by the English ambassadors abroad, which turned the foreign Protestants against the English king :—

"Whereas in all former times, the ambassadors, and all foreign ministers of state, employed from England into any parts where the reformed religion was exercised, frequented their churches, gave all possible countenance to their profession, and held correspondence with the most active and powerful persons of that relation, and especially the ambassador lieger at Paris, from the time of the Reformation, had diligently and constantly frequented the church at Charenton," "some advertisements, if not instructions, were given to the ambassadors there 'to forbear any extraordinary commerce with that tribe.'" Lord Scudamore, the English ambassador, Clarendon further states, fitted up a chapel, in ritualistic fashion, in his own house, and took pains to say "that the Church of England looked not on the Huguenots as a part of their communion," "which," adds Clarendon, "was too much and too industriously discoursed at home."

Dr. Drumm concedes that, in the age following the Reformation, there was an ecclesiastical fellowship between the Church of England and the Protestant churches abroad. However it may suit the convenience of certain writers to ignore or deny this fact, it is established by most con-

* These passages are from Whitgift's *Writings*, Parker Soc. ed.

vincing and multiplied proofs. One might as well deny that Edward VI. and Elizabeth ever reigned, or that Cranmer, Ridley, Jewel, Parker, and their cotemporaries ever lived, as to call in question the fact of an uninterrupted and cordial fellowship on their part with the Protestant, and especially the Zwinglian and Calvinistic, Churches of the Continent. It is high time that the attempt of a school of partisan writers to cover up this fact should cease; if, for no other reason, to save themselves from the contempt of all well-informed students of English history. The invitation given by Cranmer to foreign theologians, to take posts of high influence and honor in the English Church, is only one of a multitude of circumstances which illustrate the ecclesiastical communion, as well as the personal intimacy that subsisted between the Anglican and the Continental divines. If Bishop Potter now held in his diocese the station which Cranmer held in England, and if he were to invite the Rev. Dr. Schaff and the Rev. Dr. William Adams—or two Presbyterian ministers of equal distinction from Europe—to take chairs in the General Theological Seminary, where Episcopal clergymen are trained; if he were, also, to request them, as Cranmer requested Bucer and Fagius, to translate the Bible into Latin, with “explanations of the difficult passages in each chapter, and the addition of summaries and parallel places,” the whole to be subsequently rendered into English for the use of preachers and people; * if he were to ask them, further, to furnish criticisms of the Prayer-Book with a view to the revision of it and to aid him in drawing up a creed to which the clergy of his diocese should subscribe; if Bishop Potter were to do all this, he would surely be judged not to have any decided repugnance to Presbyterian ordination. But Cranmer and other leaders of the English Reformation have left on record direct and conclusive evidence of their opinions on this subject. Their opinions, it may be here remarked, are not ascertained by inference from a few old phrases left standing in the Prayer-Book, but from their personal declarations, supported and illustrated as these are by their uniform conduct.

Dr. Drumm concedes that the Church of England was in communion with the other Protestant churches; but he sets forth an hypothesis to account for it, which I cannot but consider historically groundless. His explanation is, in substance, that the Reformers generally believed in episcopacy as the true and right form of church government, and that, for this reason, the English kept up their connection with their Protestant brethren, and maintained communion with them until forbearance ceased to be a virtue. The real explanation is, that until the conflict with Puritanism had reached its height, the English accorded with the Continental Reformers in regarding episcopacy as among things indifferent, which a church might adopt or reject at its will. If there was tol-

eration or forbearance on either side, during the period to which I refer, it was exercised toward the English more than by them, and was so understood by both parties.

At the outset of the Protestant movement, Luther in his Address to the Nobles of the German Nation, struck at the root of the tree by denying the existence of a priestly class in the church, and by asserting the universal priesthood of disciples. A company of pious laymen, in a desert, could choose one of their number to be their minister, and "the man so chosen would be as truly a priest as if all the bishops in the world had consecrated him." This doctrine was the key-note to the Reformation. It was professed in its essential principle by the Reformers in all countries, and by none more emphatically than by Cranmer. With him it was mingled with a very strong infusion of Erastianism. "If all the bishops and priests in a region were dead," he says, it is not forbidden by the divine law that "the king of that region should make bishops and priests to supply the same." He declares that bishops and priests are originally and intrinsically the same class of ministers, and that ordination and consecration are "comely ceremonies," but are not necessary. It is true that the Lutheran Reformers had no objection to episcopacy as an ecclesiastical arrangement, existing *jure humano*. Bishops were retained in Sweden, and, in the form of superintendents, in Denmark. The Lutherans expressed their view in the Smalcaldic Articles, where they affirm the parity of the clergy, declare episcopacy, or the precedence of one over others, a human institution, and assert that when ordinary bishops become enemies of the church, or refuse to ordain, the church can dispense with them, since with the church rests the right to call, elect, and ordain her ministers. Melancthon wanted bishops, and Luther would not have objected to them, as a preventive of disorder and a counterpoise to the apprehended tyranny of the civil authority. In England, generally speaking, the same views prevailed; and in the reign of Edward VI., bishops frequently went by the name of superintendents.* The principles of Calvin on this subject were in harmony with those of Luther, Melancthon, and Cranmer. I am acquainted with the story of the intercepted letter, which Strype has taken up in his Life of Parker; but I know of no evidence to lead one to think that Calvin wished to have episcopacy introduced into the Reformed Churches, which had given it up. But he recommended the King of Poland to retain bishops, and he felt no repugnance to the exercise of a presidency, superintendence, or official superiority by one minister, who should be appointed to such a duty by the church. Such a station in reality, though not in name, he held himself at Geneva. When Swiss divines came to England they generally found many things which they wished to see reformed; but to bishops, as such, they had no repugnance. When English divines went to Strasburg,

* See Strype, *Annals of the Reformation*.

Zurich, or Geneva, they felt not the slightest scruples on account of the parity of the clergy which they found to be there established.

This was the state of things until the Puritan controversy grew warm. This controversy grew up partly out of the fondness which English divines acquired, during their exile, for the polity and worship of the Helvetic churches. For a long period the advocates of the Anglican polity acted on the defensive. This was not from any spirit of forbearance, much less of condescension, toward the foreign churches, but because they had no thought of claiming for their polity a *jure divino* sanction, and never dreamed that the foreign churches were under any obligation to adopt it. A *jure divino* theory of church polity was first broached on the Puritan side. The Anglicans opposed it by denying that forms of church government are prescribed by positive law. As the conflict waxed hot, in the latter part of Elizabeth's reign, a class of defenders of episcopacy arose, of whom Hooker is the chief, who held that this polity being, in their view, apostolic in its origin, having generally prevailed, and being conducive to order, should be everywhere retained, unless peculiar circumstances forbid its acceptance. These writers, however, do not assert the *jure divino* theory, in the proper sense of the terms, since they recognize the foreign Protestant churches as true churches, and their ministry as lawfully ordained. Substantially this position is taken by several of the foremost episcopal divines of the seventeenth century, as Archbishop Ussher and Bishops Hall and Stillingfleet. Ussher thought that the churches of Holland had less reason for dropping episcopacy than the churches of France; yet he says, "I do profess that with like affection I should receive the blessed sacrament at the hands of the Dutch ministers if I were in Holland, as I should do at the hands of the French ministers if I were at Charenton." Hall loves and reveres the Protestant churches abroad as the "dear sisters" of the English Church.

Another element was requisite to constitute the full-blown doctrine of *jure divino* episcopacy. This was the sacerdotal theory; the doctrine of a continued, particular priesthood, which the Reformers had unanimously rejected. It began to be claimed that the clergy are, by virtue of the exclusive right of the episcopal order to consecrate and ordain, a self-perpetuating body, transmitting through an unbroken channel the grace that qualifies the ministry for their office; so that the church—the body of the laity—have lost out of their hands the power to create and ordain their ministers. This theory logically carried with it the rupture of communion with the non-episcopal Protestant bodies, and as far as it was received, it effected this result.

As to the alleged forbearance of the Anglican Church and of its divines, nothing is more apparent in the history of the English Reformation than the deference felt and expressed by the Anglican leaders towards the Reformers on the Continent, who led in the great revolt against Rome, and were the guides of the Protestant religious communities abroad. The

circumstances of England, in the long and doubtful struggle with the Roman Catholic party, naturally led the English Reformers to seek the counsel and lean upon the sympathy of their continental brethren. Certain it is that the former perpetually turned to the foreign divines for advice. When the troubles arose among the English exiles at Frankfort between the adherents of the Liturgy, led by Cox, afterward Bishop of Ely, and their opponents, led by Knox—the first manifestation of the differences that led to the Puritan controversy—one minor point of dissension was on the question whether the ministers should be equal in power, or whether precedence should be given to one of them.* Both factions, by a common instinct, appealed to Calvin for advice. Afterward, when the Puritan controversy broke forth in England, both parties applied for encouragement and support to Zurich and Geneva. The personal influence of Calvin and Bullinger in England, especially after Ridley and Cranmer adopted the Swiss doctrine of the sacrament, was for a long time well-nigh authoritative. Their treatises were the text-books in theology, recommended to the clergy, and everywhere in their hands. Their names were spoken with reverence. We see in the writings of Hooker, at a time when the contest with the Puritans was beginning to break up this old habit of unqualified respect for Calvin, how much of this feeling still remains. Hooker not only says that Calvin did the best he could in his church arrangements at Geneva, but he pronounces an elaborate and glowing eulogy upon him and his writings—an encomium which I fear that many who are accustomed to praise Hooker without stint have never read. If it be said that in the Puritan conflict the Anglican divines long abstained from direct attacks on the Presbyterian system, and from expressions disparaging to the foreign churches, this is true. Whitgift asserts this fact, and perhaps may be said to exemplify it. But this reserve, due in great part though it was to fraternal feeling, was partly consequent on the old sentiment of respect for the Helvetic Reformers and their churches. This it is which leads Whitgift to quote Calvin, Zwingli, Bullinger, and the others, on almost every page, not simply because his Puritan adversaries rested on their authority, but because he himself regarded them with profound respect and esteem. In the first three Protestant reigns we do not find the Anglican Church, nor any party in the Anglican Church, taking airs in reference to other Protestant bodies. There was no temptation to this sort of arrogance; and if it had shown itself, it would have met with a swift rebuke from the great men who were guiding the fortunes of Protestantism on the Continent.

The sacerdotal theory of the ministry is responsible for the separation, as far as it exists, of the Church of England from the other Protestant churches. In England, however, the Puritan churches were shut out, on

* *A Brief Discourse of the Troubles begun at Frankfort, etc.*, pp. cxxv., cxlvi. et al.

an independent ground, as being schismatical. The sacerdotal theory is a contribution of the school of Laud. Germs of it may, perhaps, be found earlier. It may be implied in isolated expressions of former Anglican writers; but it takes more than one swallow to make a spring. Thomas Becon, the chaplain of Cranmer, earnestly contends, in his voluminous Catechism, that "priest," in the Eucharistic service, is the equivalent, not of "sacerdos" but of "presbyter," and that it means only "minister," with which term it is there used interchangeably. Passing on to Hooker, we find him saying that a minister may be called a priest, as Paul calls fish flesh; that sacrifice is "now no part of the church ministry," and that though the term "priest" is not inadmissible, yet the word "presbyter" "doth seem more fit, and, in propriety of speech, more agreeable than 'priest,' with the drift of the whole Gospel of Jesus Christ."* I do not concur with all of Keble's interpretations of Hooker, but I deem it a mark of candor in Keble to concede that there is a marked distinction between Hooker's conception of episcopacy and of the succession, and that of "Laud, Hammond, and Leslie in the two next generations." Hooker's episcopacy is predominantly one of jurisdiction and government; the latter theory is a full retrogression to sacerdotalism.

In concluding, I beg leave to say that I have written without any reference to any recent movements or controversies in the Episcopal Church. In the evening service of the Prayer-Book, after the supplication for the clergy and congregations of the Episcopal Church, there follows, in the simple but majestic style of the Liturgy, an impressive prayer for the "holy church universal," that "all who profess and call themselves Christians" may be led aright. In this prayer, with its catholic idea of the church, as well as in the supplication that precedes it, I can heartily join.

In the foregoing letter, reference is made to the opinions of Ussher, Hall, and Stillingfleet. The most learned defender of episcopacy in the seventeenth century was James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland. From early life he had an inextinguishable thirst for the study of history and antiquities. This taste was awakened and stimulated by a passage in Cicero, where he says: "*Nescire quid antea quam natus sis acciderit id est semper esse puerum*"—not to know what happened before you were born is to be always a boy. The struggle that was go-

* Hooker (Keble's ed.), ii., 469, 470.

ing on between Protestantism and Romanism in the field of argument, and especially Stapleton's *Fortress of the Faith*, a Roman Catholic polemical book, in which the antiquity of the Romish creed was maintained, in opposition to the alleged novelty of the Reformed Church, impelled Ussher to undertake the reading of the entire body of patristic literature—a task which he is said to have accomplished in eighteen years. By this means he armed himself for conflict with the advocates of the Church of Rome, for the most learned of whom he was more than a match. No one can examine any of Ussher's works—his *Antiquities of the British Churches*, for example—and not be struck with the vast extent of his erudition. Truly there were giants in those days.

Ussher first printed in 1641 two short essays on the Episcopal controversy. The first was entitled *The Original of Bishops and Metropolitans*; the second was *The Judgment of Dr. Rainoldes touching the Original of Episcopacy, more largely Confirmed out of Antiquity*.^{*} The sort of episcopacy which Ussher set out to uphold may be seen from this extract from *The Judgment of Rainoldes*, which is given by Ussher himself at the outset of his second essay: "When elders were ordained by the apostles in every church to feed the flock of Christ, whereof the Holy Ghost had made them overseers, they, to the intent they might the better do it, by common counsel and consent, did use to assemble themselves and meet together. In the which meetings, for the more orderly handling and concluding of things pertaining to their charge, they chose one amongst them to be the president of their company and moderator of their actions." This arrangement for a presidency in the board of elders or ministers in a church was countenanced and sanctioned, Ussher maintains, by the apostles. His great arguments are the angels of the Apocalypse,

^{*} Ussher's *Works*, vol. vii.

whom he takes for bishops or head pastors—contrary to the prevailing view of the best critics now, including Dr. Lightfoot: and the Ignatian Epistles, which were then fresh and seem to have made a strong impression on Ussher's mind. It is this mild sort of episcopacy, and nothing more—a superintendence or presidency exercised by one presbyter over his peers—that the archbishop tries to prove to have had an apostolical origin. But even for this system he does not claim any *jus divinum*; that is, a church can exist without it. He nowhere pretends that a church cannot exist without it. It was this form of synodal episcopacy which was drawn out by Ussher in writing, and which Baxter and his associates proposed, at the time of the Savoy Conference, as a basis for agreement between the Presbyterian and Episcopal parties. Apostolic succession, regarded in the light of a vehicle for the transmission of grace and as indispensable to the existence of a lawful ministry, is something utterly foreign to Ussher's whole theory and way of thinking. It is governmental, not sacerdotal episcopacy that he favors. "The intrinsical power of ordaining," says Ussher, "proceedeth not from jurisdiction, but only from order. But a presbyter hath the same order *in specie* with a bishop—*ergo*, a presbyter hath equally an intrinsical power to give orders and is equal to him in the power of order; the bishop having no higher degree in respect of intention or extension of the character of order, though he hath a higher degree—*i. e.*, a more eminent place in respect of authority and jurisdiction in spiritual regiment."

Baxter, in his *Life*, relates an interesting conversation which he had with Ussher on this subject. "I asked him, also, his judgment about the validity of presbyters' ordination. Which he asserted, and told me that the king [Charles I.] asked him, in the Isle of Wight, wherever he found in antiquity that presbyters alone ordained any; and that he answered, I can show your Majesty more, even where presbyters alone successively ordained bishops, and

instanced in Hierom's [Jerome's] words of the presbyters of Alexandria choosing and making their own bishops from the days of Mark till Herodius and Dionysius."

Respecting the foreign Protestant churches Ussher writes thus: "I have ever declared my opinion to be that *Episcopus et Presbyter gradu tantum differunt, non ordine*, and consequently that in places where bishops cannot be had the ordination of presbyters standeth valid; yet, on the other side, holding, as I do, that a bishop hath a superiority in degree over a presbyter, you may easily judge that the ordination made by such presbyters as have severed themselves from those bishops, unto whom they have sworn canonical obedience, cannot possibly by me be excused from being schismatical. And howsoever I must needs think that the churches which have no bishops are thereby become very much defective in their government, and that the churches in France, who, living under a Popish power, cannot do what they would, are more excusable in this defect than the Low Countries, that live under a free state, yet for testifying my communion with these churches (which I do love and honor as true members of the Church Universal), I do profess that with like affection I should receive the blessed sacrament at the hands of the Dutch ministers, if I were in Holland, as I should do at the hands of the French ministers, if I were in Charenton." "The agreement or disagreement in radical or fundamental doctrines, not the consonancy or dissonancy in the particular points of ecclesiastical government, is with me (and I hope with every man that mindeth peace) the rule of adhering to or receding from the communion of any church." * Considering that Ussher was a contemporary of Laud, and lived in the heat and ferment of the Puritan controversy, these extracts do credit at once to his learning and to the native liberality of his mind. They show, first, that he considered the episcopate an ar-

* *Works*, Appendix, vii.

rangement of government, not a vehicle for the transmission of grace; secondly, that a polity that dispenses with the episcopate he considered less desirable, but in given circumstances admissible; thirdly, that he had no disposition to break off communion with the other Protestant bodies abroad. The distinction which Ussher makes between Dissenters or Separatists in England and the foreign churches is worthy of special attention. His objection to the Puritans was founded not on their polity in itself considered, but on what he considered the schismatical character of their movement. They had no just ground, as he thought, for renouncing the government of the Church of England. The Dutch and French Churches he honored and loved. The Puritans, under substantially the same polity, he could not approve and recognize. It required another step (and a very long one) to be taken before the High Church ground could be reached, where the absolute necessity of Episcopal ordination is affirmed and all the Protestant churches of Europe are cast out of fellowship. As the Puritans and the Dutch were alike among the first settlers in this country, and as we have no national church, it must be somewhat difficult, on Ussher's principles, to make out a case of schism against the churches which they here established.

Bishop Hall, being then Dean of Norwich, had sat, as one of the deputies sent by James I. from the Church of England, in the Synod of Dort. In various writings—for example, in his *Apology against the Brownists*—he had expressed his affection and veneration for the Protestant churches abroad, the “sisters” of the Church of England, as he repeatedly styles them. The expulsion of episcopacy from Scotland, and the formation of the Solemn League and Covenant, in 1638, sharpened his polemical feeling against the opponents of the Episcopal polity. At the request of Laud, he wrote his work on the Divine Right of Episcopacy. Laud, at the outset, was dissatisfied with the positions which he proposed to take; for he was careful to avoid all con-

demnation of the churches abroad.* How far Hall fell short of the *jure divino* doctrine, in the proper sense, may be seen from the following passage in his subsequent *Defence of the Humble Remonstrance for Liturgy and Episcopacy* :

“ The imputation pretended to be cast upon all the Reformed churches which want this government, I endeavored so to satisfy, that I might justly decline the envy which is intended thereby to be raised against us: for which cause I professed that we do ‘love and honor those our sister churches as the dear spouse of Christ,’ and give zealous testimonies of our well-wishing to them. Your uncharitableness offers to choke me with these scandalous censures and disgraceful terms, which some of ours have let fall upon those churches and their eminent professors; which I confess it is more easy to be sorry for than on some hands to excuse. The error of a few may not be imputed to all.

“ My just defence is that no such consequent can be drawn from our opinion; forasmuch as the divine or apostolical right, which we hold, goes not so high as if there were an express command, that upon an absolute necessity there must be either episcopacy or no church; but so far only, that it both may and ought to be. How fain would you here find me in a contradiction! while I onewhere reckon episcopacy among matters essential to the church; anotherwhere deny it to be of the essence thereof! Wherein you willingly hide your eyes, that you may not see the distinction that I make expressly betwixt the being and the well-being of a church; affirming that those churches to whom this power and faculty is denied lose nothing of the true essence of a church, though they miss something of their glory and perfection. No, brethren; it is enough for some of your friends to hold their discipline altogether essential to the very being of a church; we dare not be so zealous.”

“ The question which you ask concerning the reason of the different entertainment given in our church to priests converted to us from Rome, and to ministers who in Queen Mary’s days had received imposition of hands in Reformed churches abroad, is merely personal, neither can challenge my decision. Only I give you these two answers. That what fault soever may be in the easy admittance of those who have received Romish orders, the sticking at the admission of our brethren returning from Reformed Churches, was not in case of ordination, but of institution: *they had been acknowledged ministers of Christ, without any other hands laid upon them*; but, according to the laws of our land, they were not

* See the correspondence, in Hall’s *Works*, vol. x. Also, Lawson’s *Life of Laud*, ii., 334 seq.

perhaps capable of institution to a benefice unless they were so qualified as the statutes of this realm do require. And, secondly, I know those, more than one, that by virtue only of that ordination which they have brought with them from other Reformed churches, have enjoyed spiritual promotions and livings, without any exception against the lawfulness of their calling." *

Bishop Hall wrote his *Humble Remonstrance* in 1640-41, and the defence of it, from which this extract is taken, afterwards. Nothing can be more definite and satisfactory than the proof which it affords that the ordination of the foreign churches was then allowed to be lawful and sufficient. Difficulties were sometimes raised about their institution; but, notwithstanding these difficulties, Hall knew of instances in which they were admitted to benefices.

Few of the divines of England in the seventeenth century, that golden age of English theology, equal in vigor of reasoning powers and in extent of erudition, not to speak of perspicuity and force of style, Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Norwich. His *Origines Sacrae* may be somewhat antiquated in respect to its learning, through the wider reach of oriental studies in modern days; but in power of argument and in the intellectual mastery of the theme, it remains a noble defence of the Christian faith and a worthy memorial of the genius and attainments of its author. Stillingfleet did not fear to measure swords with Locke on questions of metaphysics; and it was the letter of the Bishop of Norwich that drew from the philosopher the nearest approach to an explicit assertion of an *a priori* source of knowledge, which really goes beyond the function of sensation and reflection.

When Stillingfleet was only twenty-four years of age and Rector of Sutton, he published *The Irenicum, a Weapon-salve for the Church's Wounds*. The second edition appeared in 1662, the memorable year when the Act of Uniformity was passed, by which two thousand of the ministers

* Hall's *Works*, ix., 355, 356.

of England, and those among the best for knowledge, piety, eloquence, and pastoral fidelity, were driven from their parishes, and thrown into the ranks of non-conformity. The *Irenicum* is directed against the assumed divine right of particular forms of church government. Among the mottoes on the title-page is a sentence of Casaubon, in which it is asserted that if a proper discrimination were made between "divine right"—*jus divinum*—and positive or ecclesiastical law, controversy among good men would cease to be bitter or of long duration. This sentence is followed by another from Grotius of the same purport. Stillingfleet aims to win non-conformists over to the established church by demonstrating that there is no definite form of government prescribed to the church; that neither the Episcopal nor the Presbyterian system can claim divine, or exclusive, authority; and that, therefore, there is no reason why a dissenter should not reconcile himself to the system of the English church, whatever may be his preference in the matter. He seeks to make good his thesis, first by an inquiry into the dictates of the law of nature, and, secondly, by an examination of positive or revealed law; his aim being under each head to disprove the claim to a sanction from either source for the exclusive pretensions of the episcopal or the non-episcopal method of organization. Later in life, Stillingfleet thought that, from a desire for peace, he had conceded too much to dissenters; but there is no reason to think that he ever renounced the main principles of his work, or came to question the justice of its principal arguments. Taken as a whole, it is one of the finest pieces of historical and theological reasoning within the compass of English theological literature.

We advert to Stillingfleet's famous *Irenicum*, in this place, chiefly in order to call attention to his excellent statement of the position of the Anglican Reformers and divines before his time, and to the absence in them of the *jure divino* theory of episcopacy—the theory that bishops are indispensable to the constitution of a church, and to the

validity of orders. This lucid and correct statement is given in chapter viii. of Part II. He does not confine himself to English divines, but shows "that the most eminent divines of the Reformation," at home and abroad, "did never conceive any one form of church government necessary." He proves his proposition; first, by referring "to those who make the form of church government mutable, and to depend upon the wisdom of the magistrate and of the church." This he declares has been the opinion of most divines of the Church of England since the Reformation. He quotes, in full, Cranmer's Erastian declarations, which go so far as to dispense with the *necessity* of ordination altogether. Archbishop Whitgift, Bishop Bridges, Hooker, and others it is shown, advocated the same general view. Secondly, he refers to the divines who had believed in the original parity of the clergy, yet considered episcopacy lawful. Here are placed Calvin, Beza, Melancthon, and others. Thirdly, he enumerates those who judge episcopacy to be the primitive form, yet look not on it as necessary. Here come Bishop Jewel, Fulke, Field, and many more. All these men who are named under the three heads, whatever were their views respecting the origin and antiquity of episcopacy, considered it neither necessary on the one hand, nor wrong and intolerable on the other. They held it to be one of various admissible systems of polity, neither of which is necessary to the existence of a church, and either of which is of such a character that a Christian may live under it and submit to it with a good conscience. There are slight errors in Stillingfleet's classification. Jewel does not maintain the apostolic institution of episcopacy, as distinct from the office of presbyters, but intimates that the distinction rests on human authority alone. Generally speaking, however, Stillingfleet's historical statements are correct, and they present a most conclusive refutation of the High Church assumption that the fathers of the Anglican Protestant Church denied the validity of the orders of non-episcopal churches. The

whole treatise of Stillingfleet contains wholesome reading for partisans of whatever stripe.

A part of another letter to the *Tribune*, in reply to criticisms of an Episcopal clergyman, is reproduced here, for the reason that it handles a special theory, brought forward to account for the ecclesiastical sympathy between England and the Continent in the period following the Reformation.

Your correspondent dwells on the fact that the first generation of preachers in the Protestant churches were mostly ordained in the Roman Catholic Church—as if the question about the necessity of Episcopal ordination was not a practical one. “Their orders,” he says, “were all alike to begin with.” Were not hundreds of new preachers going forth from Wittenberg, and afterward from Geneva? But, apart from this fact, the difficulty in the way of all such pleas as your correspondent makes on this point is that the English Reformers do express themselves explicitly on these questions. They declare their opinions without ambiguity. They knew, moreover, perfectly well the constitution of the Lutheran Churches, and of the Churches of Geneva, Zurich, Holland, France, and other Protestant countries, and they make their constitution no barrier in the way of fraternal recognition and church fellowship. I have not been so heedless as to confound personal friendship with ecclesiastical fellowship; but, apart from the direct evidence in the case, the personal intimacy of the English and the foreign divines involves, under the circumstances, convincing proof of such ecclesiastical fellowship. Your correspondent criticises my statement of the opinion of Jewel. If he will turn to the seventh book of Hooker’s *Ecclesiastical Polity*, he will find a reference to Jewel’s belief on the origin of bishops. Hooker speaks of that opinion “which many have thought good to follow, and which myself did sometimes judge a great deal more probable than now I do, merely that after the apostles were deceased, churches did agree among themselves, for preservation of peace and order, to make one presbyter in each city chief over the rest.” In the margin Hooker refers to Jewel among those who held this theory, and to his reply to Harding. It is probable that Hooker knew the opinions of his revered master, and the proper interpretation of the reply to Harding quite as well as anybody at the present day.

The insinuation, by whomsoever made, that the recognition of the foreign Protestant churches and of their ministry, by the bishops and divines of the Church of England, was owing to the excitement or disorder of the times, or to the immature form of the polity of the various Protestant bodies, is in violation of historical truth. The contest with

the Roman Catholics caused all the questions connected with ordination to be freely and fully discussed. This recognition was far from being confined to the first three Protestant reigns. There is no more honored name among the prelates of the seventeenth century than that of Bishop Hall, the author of *The Contemplations*. In his *Apology against Brownists* (fol. ed., p. 498), Bishop Hall says: "I reverence from my soul (so doth our church, their dear sister) those worthy foreign churches which have chosen and followed those forms of outward government that are every way fittest for their own condition." In another place, after referring to the recognition of the English Church by the foreign divines, and to the fact that Laski "was the allowed bishop of our first Reformed strangers in this land"—that is, pastor of one of the foreign churches in England *—Bishop Hall says: "These sisters have learned to differ, and yet to love and reverence each other; and in these cases to enjoy their own forms without prescription of necessity or censure." Hall, as is well known, was employed by Laud, at a later time, to defend episcopacy against the Puritans; and Laud was dissatisfied with the concessions which even at that day he proposed to make in favor of the foreign churches. It would be interesting to trace the rise and progress of the sacerdotal theory of episcopacy in the English Church, and to show how it gradually supplanted, in the minds of a large part of that church, the old governmental theory which was held by the Reformers, and, in the seventeenth century, by such men as Ussher and Stillingfleet. But even the hospitable *Tribune* would hardly find room for a full treatment of this theme. Episcopacy was first advocated in the English Church as a tolerable, expedient, a very ancient, and, by some, as the most ancient form of polity. Then it came to be defended as decidedly the best form, and the only legitimate one where circumstances will permit it to be adopted. This is the doctrine of Hooker. Then followed, in the era of Laud, the High Church or sacerdotal theory. These facts are notorious; they are familiar to students of English history. They are conceded by writers of the Anglican Church of the highest repute for knowledge and impartiality.

Why not frankly and honestly admit them, as Keble does, instead of resorting to various and incongruous methods of evading them? It was the contest with the Puritans that developed among their opponents the *jure divino* doctrine. The Puritans first set up this exclusive claim for their own system.† The leading antagonists of the Puritans, for a long

* Laski was superintendent of the Churches of the German, Italian, and French Protestants, residing in London.

† It should be said, however, that Presbyterians did not generally question the validity of ordination by bishops, or deny that Episcopal ministers may lawfully administer the sacraments. The Episcopal system they asserted to be inconsistent with Scripture.

period, fought them by asserting that there is no particular form of polity prescribed in the Bible for all time, and therefore of perpetual obligation. They took substantially the ground which Stillingfleet assumed in his *Irenicum*. Even Hooker makes room for the foreign churches, and founds his whole discussion on the distinction between eternal and positive laws. He distinctly affirms (in b. vii. Keble's ed., vol. iii., p. 165) that the church, for urgent cause, by general consent, is competent to take government away from the hands of her bishops. By degrees defenders of episcopacy imitated their opponents, and asserted for their own system a *jure divino* sanction and an exclusive right. The Puritans, thrown on the defensive, generally retreated to the old position of their adversaries, and contended that no form of polity is binding on Christians forever. In this long combat, Hamlet and Laertes have exchanged rapiers—an event that not unfrequently occurs in political and theological warfare.

Your correspondent calls for the proof of a recognition, by conciliar or formal synodal action of the Church of England, of any orders but Episcopal. In view of the known action of the Church of England, in the past, and the avowed opinions of her—I had almost said “founders”—Reformers and noblest divines, one may well inquire whether the burden of proof is not on the other side. By what conciliar or synodal action have the orders of other Protestant churches been discredited? It may be said that ministers who have not been ordained by bishops, are reordained when they pass over to the Episcopal Church. But this proceeding may perhaps be defended by some on the Low Church ground, taken by Archbishop Leighton, when he was ordained a second time as presbyter, viz. : that ordination is merely a ceremony of induction to the ministry and service of a particular church, and may, therefore, be repeated. These are questions, however, with which I have nothing to do.

A student derives from converse with the documentary sources of various kinds, which pertain to any period of history, impressions respecting the state of things, which may be verified by adducing special proofs, but which no single items of evidence, however convincing, can transfer to the reader in their full force.

In illustrating the intimate relations of the Church of England with the Helvetic Churches, in the seventeenth century, we have more than once referred to the correspondence of the Reformers.* There are a multitude of letters

* Two volumes, published by the Parker Soc., contain letters during the reigns of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Mary. Two additional volumes, united in one in the second edition, cover the reign of Elizabeth.

written by Cranmer, Coverdale, Hooper, Cox, Horn, Pilkington, Sampson, Sandys, Jewel, Foxe, Parkhurst, Grindal, Humphrey, and other reformers, bishops, and leading divines, of the Church of England, to Calvin, Melancthon, Bucer, Bullinger, Gualter, Martyr, and other continental divines, with their letters in return. This correspondence stretches over an interval extending from the establishment of Protestantism in England to the closing part of Elizabeth's reign. Yet in all these free, unreserved communications, in which the differences among Protestants, as on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, are frequently considered, there is no hint of any trouble, alienation, or want of sympathy, on account of the difference of the English polity from that of the continental churches. The authors are engaged in a common cause, fighting under a common banner, and the question of episcopacy does not excite a ripple of discontent with one another. This silence, under the peculiar circumstances, is a more impressive proof of ecclesiastical sympathy than any overt declaration would be. Why, as late as 1573, Sandys, then Bishop of London and, afterwards, Archbishop of York, reports to Bullinger, the pastor of Zurich, the platform of the party which was aiming at the destruction of episcopacy, and says: "I anxiously desire, most learned sir, to hear your opinion, and those of masters Gualter, Simler, and the rest of the brethren, respecting these things; which for my own part I shall willingly follow, as being sound and agreeable to the Word of God. For if the whole matter in controversy were left to your arbitration, it would doubtless much contribute to the peace of our church. These good men are crying out that they have all the reformed churches on their side." *

In 1580, a prayer was issued, by public authority, to be used on Fridays in the churches of England, in which, after a prayer for the church, we read: "And herein (good Lord)

* *Zurich Letters*, p. 440.

by special name we beseech Thee for the churches of France, Flanders, and of such other places." Then follows a supplication for "this church of England." In the prayers to be used by the English armies, who are fighting by the side of the Huguenots in France, and in the prayers to be offered at home for their success, the Protestants of France are spoken of as the members and representatives of the true church, in arms against Antichrist. We "most heartily beseech Thee, through the merits of Jesus Christ, our Saviour, to protect and strengthen thy servants, our brethren in France, that are now ready to fight for the glory of thy name." "Go before them, fight the battles of thy children, and subdue their enemies: so shall that proud generation have no cause to exult over thy true church, and over thy servants," etc.*

The churches of the foreigners, which were established in London, under the auspices of Edward I., furnish an illustration of the sentiments of the English reformers towards their foreign brethren. The foreigners in London were to have four ministers, under the superintendence of John à Lasco. In the letters patent which were granted, in the fourth year of Edward, to these ministers, and constituting them a corporation, the motive assigned for the act is the duty of kings to care for the diffusion "of pure and uncorrupted religion," and for the preservation of a church "constituted in truly Christian and apostolic doctrines and rites." The grant is made with the intent that the gospel may be preached, and the sacraments administered "according to the Word of God and apostolical observance, by the ministers of the Germans and of the other foreigners."† Lasco states, in a letter to the King of Poland, that Edward, his council, and Cranmer were zealously favorable to his enterprise. The king hoped, through the influence of these foreign

* *Liturgical Services*, etc., in the reign of Elizabeth, p. 578.

† *Ibid.*, p. 649. J. à Lasco, *Opera*, ii., 280, 281.

churches, to be aided in carrying forward the work of reform in England.* At Glastonbury, the weavers from Strasburg were organized into a church. They ordained their ministers by a method similar to that of the French churches. The ordination of the ministers of the churches of Lasco was, also, Presbyterian. If this reception of the foreigners and incorporation of them into churches had been merely an act of toleration extended to strangers, it would not have taken place in that age, had there not been an ecclesiastical recognition of them and sympathy with them. But there was more than bare toleration; there was efficient encouragement and patronage. An edifice was given them in London, in which to meet for worship, and their ministers were treated with marked respect and fraternal confidence.

The Articles of the Church of England exhibit no trace of the theory which gives an exclusive sanctity to episcopacy. They are obviously drawn up according to the idea which prevailed when they were composed under Edward, and revised under Elizabeth, that each national church is to determine its own polity and ceremonies. In Art. XIX., the visible church of Christ is defined to be a congregation of faithful men in which the Gospel is preached in its purity, and the sacraments administered in conformity, as to essentials, with Christ's ordinance. Here are the notes of the church, as they are given usually in Protestant creeds. Episcopacy is not among them. In Art. XXIII., the choice and call of ministers is declared to be in the hands of men "who have public authority given unto them in the congregation" for this purpose. In Art. XXXIV., we read: "It is not necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in all places one and utterly like, for at all times they have been diverse and may be changed according to the diversities of countries, times, and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against God's Word." Then the wrong of breaking from ceremonies "not

* *Letters of Lasco to the King of Poland, Opera, ii., 10.*

repugnant to God's Word," and approved by authority, is asserted. The most that is claimed by implication is that the rites of the church of England are not inconsistent with Scripture, nor forbidden by the Word of God. This was the old ground taken in the contest with the Puritans. The same Article ends with ascribing to "every particular or national church" the authority, "to ordain, change, and abolish ceremonies and rites of the church," so far as they are of human authority. There is a fact respecting this Article which bears on the interpretation of it. There is a close resemblance in its language to the 11th Article in the thirteen which were drawn up as the basis of an agreement between the English and German divines, at their conference in London, in 1538.* It was a platform on which Lutherans and Anglicans could alike stand. The XXXIVth Article relates to the "consecration of bishops and ministers." Here, if anywhere, we should look for the exclusive theory; but there is not a word of it. The Ordinal of the Prayer-Book is declared "to contain all things necessary to such consecration and ordering;" "neither hath it anything that of itself is superstitious and ungodly." All who are consecrated or ordered according to that form, are said to be "rightly, orderly, and lawfully consecrated and ordered." The Article is, so to speak, merely defensive. That there is no other lawful method of ordination is not in the faintest manner implied. That any one should suppose himself able to draw any sanction for the exclusive theory from the articles would occasion astonishment, if we did not know that a class of theologians have professed to find in them an assertion of Arminianism. After such a feat of interpretation, nothing in this line is surprising.

We turn now to the Ordinal; for this is the last refuge of the defenders of the *jure divino* construction of Anglican

* See Cranmer's *Miscellaneous Writings* (Parker Soc. ed.), p. 477. Compare the Latin Articles of the English Church, in Niemeyer, *Collectio Confessionum*, p. 608.

law. We are far from asserting that the Anglo-Catholic party has nothing to found itself upon. Such a party has existed from the beginning. The Prayer-Book contains various features which bear witness to the desire of its compilers to conciliate old prejudices and opinions, or to their inability to overcome them. But that party was comparatively weak when the formularies of the church of England took their shape, in the period of the Reformation. Had Edward VI. lived longer, or had Elizabeth been less conservative and less domineering, other changes would have taken place; for the Reformers averred that they considered their work far from complete. However, the party to which we refer did not succeed in incorporating their shibboleth into the law of the church. The preface to the Ordinal is the principal source of argument for the advocates of the exclusive interpretation of the Anglican system. We print in brackets the words that were added in 1661, after the Restoration:

It is evident unto all men diligently reading the holy Scripture and ancient authors, that from the apostles' time there have been these orders of ministers in Christ's church; bishops, priests, and deacons, which offices were evermore had in such reverend estimation, that no man might presume to execute any of them, except he were first called, tried, examined, and known to have such qualities as are requisite for the same; and, also, by public prayer, with imposition of hands, were approved and admitted thereunto by lawful authority. And therefore, to the intent that these orders may be continued, and reverently used and esteemed in the Church of England; no man shall be accounted or taken a lawful bishop, priest, or deacon in the Church of England, or suffered to execute any of said functions, except he be called, tried, examined, and admitted thereunto, according to the form hereafter following [or hath formerly had episcopal consecration, or ordination.]

On this document we have several remarks to make.

1. The preamble simply asserts that from the apostolic age there have been in the church these orders of ministers. It does not affirm, or imply, that this arrangement is prescribed by the divine law; much less, that a church cannot exist without it, or that where there is a modification of this

system, the validity of ordination is destroyed. The intent is only to preserve this system in the Church of England—"this Church of England," as the phrase ran, in the Revision of 1552—not to impose it, as a condition of ecclesiastical communion, on other churches.

2. The form of ordination is presented exclusively as a condition of holding office in the Church of England.

3. The invalidity of the ordination of Roman Catholic priests was never asserted, although they were not ordained by the Anglican form. How, then, can the invalidity of Presbyterian ordination be inferred from this injunction of the preface? Moreover, the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth opened the way for the institution of Roman Catholic converts, and, as we have shown, of Protestant ministers ordained abroad.

4. The validity of the ordination of the other Protestant churches was admitted by those who framed the Ordinal, and has been admitted by a numerous body of the most eminent doctors of the English Church. This fact ought to settle the interpretation of this document.

5. If the term "orders" was meant to be taken in the strict, technical sense, then the preface says that bishops have existed as a distinct order in the church since the apostolic age. Under this view of the term, a fact is asserted, and nothing more; and this assertion was allowed to enter into the preamble, without being challenged by such as held bishops and presbyters to be of the same order. But, in point of fact, the term "order" was not unfrequently used in a loose and general sense by those who held that the difference between the two classes of ministers is one of degree only. We will give a marked instance. Jewel, in his *Apologia*, says: "Credimus . . . varios in ecclesia esse ordines ministrorum; alios esse diaconos, alios presbyteros, alios episcopos," etc. In the edition of the same work in English (1563), the passage reads: "Furthermore, that there be divers degrees of ministers in the church, whereof

some be deacons," etc. * The word *ordines* is rendered *degrees*. We know that Cranmer, who is supposed to have had a leading part in shaping the Ordinal of 1549, held bishops and presbyters to be different degrees of the same order. The revision of 1551, which resulted in Edward's second book, of 1552, was made under the direct or indirect influence of men like Peter Martyr, John à Lasco, Bucer, and Calvin. † The next revision, on the accession of Elizabeth, was accomplished by Parker, Cox, Pilkington, Grindal, Sandys, and others. Of those who were actually concerned in forming and revising the Ordinal, some of the most prominent are known to have held that bishops and presbyters differ only in degree. We know that many of the bishops of the Episcopal Church, of the highest repute, from Cranmer to Ussher, and since Ussher's time, have entertained this opinion. The High Church editors of the Prayer-Book say: ‡ "The distinction of the order of bishops from that of priests was definitely asserted for the first time in 1661," although they maintain that it was previously implied in the preface to the Ordinal. "It was not," they add, "until the close of the sixteenth century that the distinction between the orders of bishops and priests was asserted." Very little can be made from the mere use of the word "orders" in this preface.

6. The changes made in the Ordinal in 1661 are very significant as to its original character. To the preface were added the words: "or hath formerly had Episcopal consecration or ordination." Why this addition, if the preface without it wholly excludes non-episcopal ministers from service in the Church of England? But the alterations of 1661 are obviously with a view to make a distinction between bishops and presbyter, such as the Ordinal had not recognized. The phrases, "Episcopal consecration *or ordination*,"

* Jewel's *Works* (Parker Soc. ed.), iii., 10.

† Blunt's *Annotated Prayer-Book*, p. 536.

‡ Ibid., 566.

"*ordained* or consecrated a bishop," "form of *ordaining* or consecrating a bishop," for the first time definitely asserted the distinction of order between bishop and presbyter. * In the ordination of a priest, after the words "Receive the Holy Ghost," there were added the words: "for the office and work of a priest in the church of God now committed to thee by the imposition of hands." Analogous phraseology was added in the service for the ordination of a bishop. Thus the distinction of the two offices was affirmed by implication, in a way in which it had not been affirmed before. Various other minor changes in the revision of 1661 indicate plainly the same design. But there was one alteration which deserves special attention. Prior to 1661, Acts xx., which describes the meeting of the Ephesian elders with Paul, and 1 Tim. iii., were read both at the ordaining of a priest and at the consecration of a bishop. Both these portions of Scripture were now assigned to the service for the consecration of bishops exclusively. The latter passage—1 Tim. iii., 1-8—relates to the character and work of a "bishop." Before 1661, this chapter was deemed appropriate for the ordination of a presbyter; then it was not. No one can look at the alterations effected in the Ordinal by the reactionary party of the Restoration, and not see that they spring from different ideas of the Episcopal office from those which the original framers of the Ordinal entertained.

It is sometimes said that, when the Ordinal was composed, Cranmer had changed the opinions which he had expressed at an earlier day respecting episcopacy. The extreme Erastianism which led him to consider the king a proper fountain of episcopal authority, so that even ordination from any other source might be dispensed with, is certainly not recognized in any formal action of the English Church or State, unless the commission granted by Henry VIII. to Bonner, and that taken out by Cranmer after Henry's death are

* *Annotated Prayer-Book*, p. 566.

counted as exceptions.* Certainly the "*Institution of a Christian Man*" (1536), and the "*Necessary Doctrine and Erudition of a Christian Man*" (1543) give to the secular authority no such function, but reserve it to the church and to its ministers. The king's authority enables them to perform acts within his realm, for which the church has previously empowered and qualified them. A declaration, which defined the relation of the clergy to the civil authority in a similar way, was made in 1538, and was signed by Cranmer, Cromwell, and many others. The opinion of Cranmer, which attributes to the king this extraordinary power, bears the date of 1540. Whatever may have been his final conviction on this matter, whether he had any settled view or not, there is no evidence of any modification of his ideas upon the relation of bishops to presbyters. The essential equality of the two classes of ministers is assumed in all the documents to which we have just referred. Just before the death of Edward, Cranmer was busy in trying to procure a general assembly of representatives of the various Protestant churches, for the formation of a common creed. He was writing to Melancthon, Bullinger, and Calvin on the subject. In his letter to Calvin (March 20, 1552), he says: "Shall we neglect to call together a godly synod, for the refutation of error, and for restoring and propagating the truth?" He is very anxious to procure an agreement on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. If he had suddenly become convinced of the necessity of episcopacy to the being of a church, or if he had attached much importance to the differences in polity among the Protestant bodies, it is hardly possible that he would not have made some allusion to the subject, on such an occasion. The representation that he

* This matter is discussed in the *Correspondence of Lord Macaulay with the Bishop of Exeter* (2d. ed., 1861). We have observed a note of Henry VIII. to "*the Institution of a Christian Man*," which appears to suggest this lofty notion of his prerogative. Cranmer, *Miscellaneous Writings*, p. 97.

had changed his opinions when the Ordinal was composed, is a pure myth. Lasco informs us that he had special encouragement in the formation of his foreign churches in England from Cranmer, as well as from the king's council. "The Archbishop of Canterbury," he says, "promoted it with all his might." Lasco was urged to organize his churches according "to the divine Word," and not to follow "the rites of other churches." *

A modern writer of the Church of England, who is quite removed from all sympathy with Puritanism, remarks that, "till the passing of the Act of Uniformity in the reign of Charles II. the ordination conveyed by presbyters, though resisted by the governors of the church, had never been disowned by the legislature." However theologians of the school of Laud might have exerted their power to exclude all ministers not ordained by bishops, the law of England could not be used as an instrument for their purpose. But the legislation at this epoch was shaped by the extreme partisans of episcopacy. "The substitution," says the same writer, † "in the Prayer-Book, of 'church' for 'congregation,' the specific mention of bishops, priests, and deacons, instead of a more general designation, the reintroduction of Bel and the Dragon into the Calendar, and other similar alterations, though none of them new in principle, seemed designed to convince the non-conformists that instead of any wish to admit them to further power or privilege within the church, there was a distinct and settled desire to restrain or exclude them." ‡ This writer would not have erred if he had attributed these measures to the bitter resentment of a formerly depressed, but now victorious party.

The Revolution of 1688 offered a splendid opportunity for undoing this bad work, and for a new measure of comprehension, such as justice and policy alike called for. The

* See the *Works of Lasco*, ii., 10, 278 seq.

† Cardwell, *History of Conferences*, etc., p. 419.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

king and court favored such a measure. The churchmen of noblest gifts, of whom Tillotson was one of the chiefs, strove to accomplish it. Among the concessions which Tillotson proposed, and which are recorded as having been sent by him, through Stillingfleet, to the Earl of Portland, stands the following: "That for the future those who have been ordained in any of the foreign reformed churches, be not required to be reordained here, to render them capable of preferment in this church." At first, Tillotson and his associates expected to carry the measure which they proposed. But it failed. One reason of its failure was the recent forcible expulsion of episcopacy from Scotland, where, as Cardwell observes, there was "no stated liturgy in general use," and where "they allowed the validity of Presbyterian orders." * Another reason was the fear that the Jacobite non-jurors, in case the Liturgy should be altered, would organize a formidable schism under the name of the old and true Church of England. These considerations lent their aid to the party which, on theological grounds, were hostile to the offering of any concessions to the dissenters.

It is, therefore, the misfortune of the Episcopal Church that it inherits, not the constitution that was given to it by the reformers, but the same as amended for the worse, in the middle of the seventeenth century, by the controlling faction at the restoration of the Stuarts. But, even in this form, although it shuts out from service in the Church of England all ministers not ordained by a bishop, it pronounces no condemnation upon the orders of non-episcopal churches. In an opinion which was given not long ago by three eminent ecclesiastical lawyers, not only is the liberal interpretation of the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth sanctioned, and this statute, in connection with the XXIII^d Article, and with the practice of the Church of England, prior to the Act of Uniformity, declared to preclude the seeming exclusiveness

* *History of Conferences*, p. 421.

of the preface to the Ordinal, but these lawyers express doubts whether even now, since the Act of Uniformity, it is illegal for non-episcopal ministers to preach occasional sermons in any church of England, with the permission of the incumbent.*

When a clergyman of the Church of England, like the Dean of Canterbury on a late occasion, finds himself in a foreign country, there is nothing in the law of England, or of the Church of England, to prevent him from performing acts of ecclesiastical communion with the churches and ministers of non-episcopal bodies. The Episcopal Church in

* This legal opinion is referred to by Principal Tulloch, *Contemporary Review*, December, 1871.

[A writer in *The Quarterly Review* for October, 1878, after proving that the English Church was in complete communion and sympathy with the foreign Protestant churches up to the eve of the Restoration, shows that even then the requirement of the Act of Uniformity that ministers should be episcopally ordained, carried in it no denial of the validity of Presbyterian ordination. "At the very moment of insisting on this qualification as a general rule, the Act makes an exception in favor of the members of foreign Protestant bodies. Immediately after the clauses which, in England, Wales, and Berwick-upon-Tweed, require Episcopal ordination as a preliminary condition to the tenure of a benefice, and to the administration of the Lord's Supper, the Act proceeds:—'Provided that the penalties in this Act shall not extend to the foreigners or aliens of the foreign Reformed churches—allowed, or to be allowed, by the king's majesty, his heirs and successors in England.'" The rule of Episcopal ordination was established for Englishmen; but the defenders of the Act of Uniformity disowned the intention of pronouncing judgment adverse to the orders of the foreign churches. Archbishop Bramhall, immediately after the Act of Uniformity, required conditional or hypothetical reordination on this ground alone, that "we are now to consider ourselves as a national church, limited by law." "Non annihilantes priores ordines (si quos habuit) nec validitatem aut invaliditatem determinantes"—is his language. The bishops who were consecrated for Scotland in 1661, received Episcopal ordination and consecration, but there is no evidence that they required Episcopal reordination of the Scottish clergy. The bishops went into Scotland in 1610, had been sent to preside over Presbyterian clergy. The Bishops of Winchester, whose diocese embraces the Channel Islands, recognized, from the days of the Reformation, as parish priests, the ministers of the French Protestant churches.]

this country is not a national church. It is only one among various denominations of Christians, which are equal before the law. The first settlers of this country, in establishing new political communities, availed themselves of the right, universally conceded by Protestants to every people, to shape their church polity to suit themselves. Some of them were from the Church of Holland; some were Huguenots; and some were English non-conformists. These Christian non-episcopal denominations are not dissenters or schismatics, in any proper or intelligible sense of the terms. They stand on the same footing in relation to the Church of England as do the Lutheran Churches of Germany and Sweden, or the Protestant Church of France. Whoever raises an objection to such an act as that of the Dean of Canterbury in taking part in the communion service with a Presbyterian clergyman, has a right to his notions as to the law of the Church of England, but he has no moral right to condemn others, who do not share in them, for obeying their own convictions. Certain it is that the great divines of the Church of England, for more than a century after the Reformation, would have lifted up their hands in amazement on hearing anybody object to such an act of fellowship with foreign non-episcopal churches as Dean Alford performed at Berlin, or Dean Smith in New York. The circumstance that the law of England requires certain formalities before an Episcopal clergyman from abroad can officiate in a pulpit of the national church, is not apposite to the case in hand. Apart from the difference, that here there is no national church, whose clergymen are bound by civil regulations, the analogous case would be that of an American Episcopal minister officiating in a Methodist or Independent chapel in England. Mere questions of ecclesiastical etiquette we must leave for experts to determine. Moral obligation, however, is higher than conventionalities. A liberal-minded Anglican clergyman, visiting America, is not bound to submit himself to the supervision and control of local bishops who hold that all

Protestant denominations, except their own, are destitute of an authorized ministry and of the sacraments, and whose conceptions of episcopacy are derived, not from divines like Cr  nmer, Jewel, Ussher, and Whately, but from the interpretations and theories of Laud and Sheldon. John Wesley was complained of for preaching in parishes, not in the church but in the open air, and without an invitation from the incumbent. He answered that, being excluded from the parish churches, if he preached nowhere else, he would be silenced. If he had complied with current notions of regularity and etiquette, where would Methodism have been? And what would the Church of England have been, without the reactionary influence of that Reformation? So now, the demands of Christian catholicity may justly override the prescriptions of a punctilious etiquette; especially when these are acknowledged by only one of the parties concerned.

The Church of England, notwithstanding all its defects, is a great and noble institution. We wish it no evil. But it is now tasting the fruit of errors in the past. On three great occasions at least, golden opportunities for a larger comprehension were presented, and those opportunities were cast away. The first was at the accession of James I. when the millenary petition was offered, and when, at the Hampton Court Conference, to the unspeakable delight of a knot of partisan and sycophantic bishops, that "Solomon of the age" bullied the Puritans. The second was at the restoration of the throne, at the accession of Charles II., when his most solemn pledges were violated, and when the Savoy Conference was attended by another victory of a bigoted faction. The third was at the Revolution, when the same faction, aided by peculiar circumstances to which we have adverted, gained another triumph. At both of these last epochs, the noblest and wisest men of the clergy and laity were the advocates of a liberal policy. Now, nearly half of the English nation is arrayed in hostility to the national

church. If the Church of England should be disestablished, it would most probably be divided. It is hardly possible that the party which cleaves to that Judaizing type of religion, which is an heirloom from Pharisaism, and is an eternal foe of the Gospel—as truly so to-day as it was when Paul denounced it without stint, in the Epistle to the Galatians—should abide in the same communion with the adherents of the principles of the Reformation. The extreme Ritualists, with their candles, “their flexions and genuflexions,” their elevation of ceremonies above truth and godliness, will form a church by themselves, or go back to the Pope, where they belong. Under the present circumstances, the signs of the times being what they are, and when the Romanizing faction are active, it is not strange that enlightened men of the Low Church and Broad Church parties should be inclined to draw closer to the other Protestant bodies, which hold the same faith, and should desire to see the Church of England abandon the habit of seclusion, which is not required by her constitution, but which was forced upon her in the servile days of the Stuarts, and resume her old position by the side of her sisters of the Reformation. Such men feel that the contests of the seventeenth century are over, and that the passions engendered by them should die out, and that the barriers that were erected by partisan feeling should be levelled. In each of the branches of the High Church party, there are good men. But with the principles of this party it is impossible for a genuine Protestantism to feel any sympathy. The astronomers tell us that any star, however diminutive it might be, on which we should place ourselves, would appear to be the centre of the universe, and that the whole creation would seem to revolve around the particular spot where we stand. It must be through some similar delusion that this party of the Anglican Church, a party which constitutes but an insignificant fraction of the Christian world, while it turns its back on the Protestant churches, and, in turn, is spurned by the

Church of Rome, yet imagines itself the centre and embodiment of catholic unity. Archbishop Whately was not a man of genius, but he was a man of remarkable good sense. In his work on the *Kingdom of Christ*, he shows that the Articles of the Church of England "rest the claims of ministers, not on some supposed sacramental virtue, transmitted from hand to hand in unbroken succession from the apostles, in a chain, of which if any one link be ever doubtful, a distressing uncertainty is thrown over all Christian ordinances, sacraments, and church-privileges forever; but, on the fact of those ministers being the regularly-appointed officers of a regular Christian community." Those, he says, who seek to take what they call higher ground, "are in fact subverting the principles both of our own church in particular, and of every Christian Church that claims the inherent rights belonging to a community, and confirmed by the sanction of God's Word as contained in the Holy Scriptures." "It is curious," adds Whately, "how very common it is for any sect or party to assume a title indicative of the very excellence in which they are especially deficient, or strongly condemnatory of the very errors with which they are especially chargeable The phrase 'Catholic' religion (*i. e.*, 'Universal'), is the most commonly in the mouths of those who are the most limited and *exclusive* in their views, and who seek to shut out the largest number of Christian communities from the Gospel covenant. 'Schism,' again, is by none more loudly reprobated than by those who are not only the immediate authors of schism, but the advocates of principles tending to generate and perpetuate schisms without end."* It would be well for the party, which Whately here delineates in language not more caustic than it is just, to learn, that to take a part for the whole is the very essence of a sect.

* *Kingdom of Christ* (Am. ed.), pp. 126, 127, 128.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JONATHAN EDWARDS.*

It was pretty clearly implied in a remark of Dugald Stewart that up to his time Jonathan Edwards was the only philosopher of note that America had produced. "He," it is added, "in logical acuteness and subtilty, does not yield to any disputant bred in the universities of Europe."† This was said more than a half century ago; but all will agree that Edwards even now is incomparably the foremost among those who have cultivated metaphysical studies on this side of the Atlantic. He was the pioneer in this department, and the same might also be said of his relation to our literature generally. "The foundation of the literature of independent America," writes F. D. Maurice, speaking of the treatise on the Will, "was laid in a book which was published while it was a subject of the British crown."‡ Edwards is an example of that rare mingling of intellectual subtilty and spiritual insight, of logical acumen with mystical fervor, which make up together the largest mental endowment, and qualify their possessor for the highest achievements in the field of thought. Augustine is an instance of this remarkable blending of the rational with the mystical, this union of light and heat. In his *Confessions*, in the midst of glowing utterances of adoration, transporting visions of a glory unseen, he turns off into a speculation upon the nature of time, or an argument upon the infinitude of the divine attributes. In the typical men of the scholastic age, Anselm and Aquinas, there is found the same combination

* An Article in *The North American Review* for March, 1879.

† Stewart's *Works* (Hamilton's ed.), vol. i., p. 424.

‡ *Modern Philosophy*, p. 469.

of intellect and feeling. The understanding follows out its problems, being quickened and illuminated, yet not in the least blinded, from a deeper source of light. The lack of the one element, that of devout sensibility, was the weakness of Abélard; a degree of deficiency in the other, that of dialectic enterprise and keenness, lessened the greatness of Bernard. A like conjunction of diverse qualities appears in the most subtile, the most powerful, the most interesting of living English theologians, John Henry Newman. Let any competent student take up Edwards's treatise on the Will, and mark the sharp, unrelenting logic with which he pursues his opponents through all the intricate windings of that perplexed controversy, and then turn to the same author's sermon on the *Nature and Reality of Spiritual Light*. It is like passing from the pages of Aristotle to a sermon of John Tauler; only that, unlike most of the mystics, Edwards knows how to analyze the experiences of the heart, and to use them as data for scientific conclusions. He has left a record of meditations on "the beauty and sweetness" of divine things, when even the whole face of nature was transfigured to his vision. We see this keen dialectician, whose power of subtile argument Sir James Mackintosh pronounces to have been "perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed, among men,"* melted in an ecstasy of emotion. We shall have occasion to point out the effect of this characteristic upon his ethical and religious philosophy.

Edwards was only thirteen when he entered Yale College; and it was while he was a member of college that he committed to writing philosophical remarks that would do credit to the ablest and maturest mind. He is one of the most astonishing examples of precocious mental development of which we have any record. Pascal is in some respects a parallel instance. He was only twelve years old when he framed, from his own ingenious observations, a dis-

* *Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, p. 108 (Philadelphia ed., 1832).

sertation upon sound, and when he discovered anew, without aid, the truths of geometry as far as the thirty-second proposition of the first book of Euclid. It was chiefly as a mathematical prodigy that Pascal was distinguished in his boyhood. Edwards, at the age of twelve, wrote a letter, which is really a well-reasoned scientific paper, on the habits of the spider, as ascertained from his own singularly accurate observations.* His copious *Notes* on physics and natural science, which afford a striking proof of his intellectual grasp and versatility, were written, at least in great part, before he left college. But prior to the composition of these, he set down, under the head of *Mind*, a series of metaphysical definitions and discussions, which, as emanating from a boy of sixteen or seventeen, are truly marvellous. In them may be found the germs of much that is developed afterwards in his theological writings.

Edwards was a Berkeleian. A large part of these juvenile papers are devoted to the elucidation and defence of the doctrine that the percepts of sense have no existence independently of mind; that, although they are not originated by us, but by a power without, that power is not a material substance or substratum, but the will of God acting in a uniform method. Sensations are the divine ideas, communicated to creaturely minds by the will of Him in whom these ideas inhere, and by whom they all consist. "The world is an ideal one; and the law of creating and the succession of these ideas is constant and regular."† If we suppose that the world is mental in the sense explained, natural philosophy is not in the least affected.‡ The common questions which are brought forward by way of objection—as, "What becomes of material things when we do not see them?"—he ingeniously answers, and in a tone that renders his own belief in their nullity plain. He quotes from Cud-

* In Dwight's *Life of Edwards*, chap. ii.

† Ibid., p. 669.

‡ Ibid.

worth Plato's famous passage about the cave, to illustrate his doctrine that material things are shadows and not substances. The substance of all bodies is declared to be "the infinitely exact and precise divine idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact, precise, and stable will, with respect to corresponding communications to created minds, and effects on their minds."* The objection that the ideal theory is contradicted by common-sense, he confutes by showing how erroneous, on any theory, is the vulgar impression as to the character of our perception of distant objects, and by exhibiting the Berkeleian discovery, which Professor Bowen calls the one great psychological discovery of later times,† that our impression of objects of sense from visual perception is totally diverse from that given through the sense of touch. Take away color, take away the secondary qualities of matter which are confessed to be relative—view matter as one who is born blind would regard it—and we have only resistance, with the connected ideas of place and of space. Matter is thus known to be something quite different from what the vulgar imagine it to be. So the way is opened for a more just appreciation of the ideal theory, and for the conclusion, which Edwards considers to be the truth, that there are only spiritual beings or substances in the universe.

It is important to decide whether Edwards adhered to the Berkeleian doctrine in after-life. It is found in the *Notes on Natural Philosophy*, as well as in the manuscript entitled *Mind*. These, however, were nearly contemporaneous. But in the last-mentioned manuscript there are passages inserted of a somewhat later date; and in these the same doctrine is defended.‡ Moreover, I find in the treatise on *Original Sin*, one of his latest compositions and a posthumous publication, this remark: "The course of nature is

* Dwight's *Life*, p. 674.

† *Modern Philosophy*, p. 141.

‡ See Dwight's *Life*, p. 674.

demonstrated by late improvements in philosophy to be indeed what our author himself says it is, viz., nothing but the established order of the agency and operation of the Author of nature." * Here it is altogether probable that the reference is to the philosophy of Berkeley. With this passage may be compared incidental statements on perception, in the treatise on the will, which, however, do not go so far as necessarily to imply the Berkeleian theory. †

A less important yet interesting question relates to the particular source from which Edwards derived his acquaintance with Berkeley. Professor Fraser, in his very thorough and instructive biography of this philosopher, conjectures that it may have been through the influence of Dr. Samuel Johnson, who was a personal friend of the philosopher, and adopted his system. Johnson was a tutor at Yale from 1716 to 1719, when Edwards was a student. But, from 1717 to 1719, a portion of the students, of whom Edwards was one, were taught at Wethersfield, Johnson remaining in New Haven. The seceding students who went to Wethersfield did not regard Tutor Johnson with favor. Nor is it certain that he had himself espoused the Berkeleian theory at that time. But the *Theory of Vision* was given to the world in 1709, and the *Principles of Human Knowledge* in 1710; so that it is not improbable that copies of these works had come into the hands of Edwards, independently of Johnson. They found in him an eager and congenial disciple.

Locke is the author whose stimulating influence on Edwards is most obvious. He read Locke when he was fourteen years old, with a delight greater, to use his own words, "than the most greedy miser finds when gathering up handfuls of silver and gold from some newly discovered treasure." ‡ Deeply affected as Edwards was by this great writer, he read Locke with independence, and not only pur-

* Dwight's edition, vol. ii., p. 540.

† Ibid., pp. 206, 207.

‡ Dwight's *Life*, p. 30.

sued a theological direction quite opposite to that of his master, but also criticises not unfrequently his doctrines and arguments. For example, he exposes the fallacy of the illustration by which Locke would support his distinction between preference and choice; and he likewise shows that Locke does not rightly define the difference between desire and will.* In this last point, Locke goes counter to the description which he gives of the will in the context, according to which it cannot be at variance with predominant desire. Edwards could easily detect the inconsistency of Locke in postulating a power to suspend the prosecution of a desire; since this act of suspension must itself be a choice, determined, like every other, on Locke's principles, by the strongest motive. It is to Locke's chapter on *Power* that Edwards was most indebted for quickening suggestions. This discussion, as we are explicitly informed, caused him to perceive that an evil man may properly be said to have a natural or physical ability to be good. Locke anticipates Edwards in combating the proposition that choice springs from a previous state of indifference, an absolute neutrality of feeling, either preceding the act of judgment or interposed between that act and the act of will. Locke's conception of liberty as relating exclusively to the effects of choice, or events consecutive to volition, and not to the origination of choice itself, is precisely coincident with that of Edwards. "Freedom," says Locke, "consists in the dependence of the existence, or non-existence, of any action upon our volition of it." Locke asserts that the question whether the will itself be free or not is unreasonable and unintelligible; and he precedes Edwards in seeking to fasten upon one who asks whether a man is free to choose in a particular way rather than in the opposite, the absurdity of assuming the possibility of an infinite series of choices, or of inquiring whether an identical proposition is true. "To

* Vol. ii., pp. 16, 17.

choose as one pleases," if it does not mean "to choose as one chooses to choose"—which involves the absurdity of a series of choices *ad infinitum*—can only mean "to choose as one actually chooses," a futile identical proposition. In the psychology of the act of choice there is no essential difference between Locke and Edwards. Both represent the mind as perpetually moved by the desire of good. Locke's invariable antecedent of choice, "uneasiness of desire," or last dictate of the understanding as to good or happiness, does not differ from Edwards's "view of the mind as to the greatest apparent good." In one grand peculiarity they coincide: will and sensibility are confounded. The twofold division of the powers of the mind still prevailed in philosophy. We are endued with understanding and will; and mental phenomena which do not belong to the understanding are relegated to the will. It is impossible to ignore wholly the existence of a third department of our nature; and the principal inconsistency of Edwards in his discussions of this subject, in his various writings, is the failure persistently to identify or persistently to distinguish voluntary and involuntary inclinations. Inclination and choice are treated as indistinguishable,* and yet the one is spoken of as the antecedent and cause of the other. The ambiguity of "inclination" and of its synonyms has been a fruitful source of confusion. It was reserved for the metaphysicians of the present century to establish the bounds between sensibility, an involuntary function, and will. It is important, however, not to overlook the distinction between those choices which are permanent states of the will, and constitute the abiding principles of character and motives of action, and the subsidiary purposes and volitions which they dictate. It is right to add that, however Edwards may have owed to Locke pregnant hints on the subject of the will, these fell into the richest soil; and the doctrine of philosophical ne-

* See, e. g., vol. v., pp. 10, 11.

cessity was elaborated and fortified by the younger writer with a much more rigid logic and a far wider sweep of argument than can be claimed for Locke's discussion. Locke modified his opinions from one edition to another; and his correspondence with Limborch discloses the fact that he was himself not satisfied with the views of the subject which he had presented in his work. The conviction of Edwards, on the other hand, was attended by no misgivings, and stayed with him to the end of life.

The resemblance of Edwards's treatise on the Will to the treatises of Hobbes and Collins on the same subject is another topic that merits attention. As to Hobbes, Edwards has occasion to observe that he had never read him. There is no probability that he had ever seen a copy of Collins's *Inquiry*. Edwards was not the man to conceal a real obligation. His intellectual resources were too large to make it requisite for him to borrow, and no one has ever questioned his thorough honesty. Whatever similarity is found to exist between him and the authors referred to is accidental. Hobbes, like Edwards, holds that "he is *free* to do a thing, that he may do if he have the will to do it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear" *—that is, freedom is concerned not with the genesis, but with the event, of the choice. "The last dictate of the judgment concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action," in agreement with Edwards, "is made the proximate efficient cause of the will's determination on one side or the other." † The objection that counsels, admonitions, commands, and the like, are vain and useless on the necessitarian doctrine, is met by Hobbes with the retort that, on no other doctrine, can they have any effect at all. This is precisely in the manner of Edwards. The argument for necessity from the principle of causation, applied to the determinations of the will, is substantially the

* *Works* (Molesworth's edition), vol. ii., p. 410.

† *Ibid.*, p. 247.

same in both writers. Collins brings forward the same definition of liberty as "a power in man to do as he wills, or pleases." * He applies, also, the *reductio ad absurdum* to the statement that a man can choose as he pleases: it is an identical proposition. † He seeks to prove the necessity of volitions by bringing them under the law of cause and effect, and by driving his antagonists into the admission that the mind is determined by causal agency to choose so and not otherwise, the alternative being atheism. ‡ This corresponds closely to the reasoning of Edwards. Their arguments from the divine foreknowledge are in substance the same. § Things must be certain in order to be foreseen, and they are not certain unless antecedent causes render them certain. Persuasions, appeals, and laws, are addressed to men only on the supposition that they tend to produce effects, or contain within them causal energy. These coincidences between Edwards and the authors above named are really not remarkable. The defenders of the doctrine of necessity naturally take one path. They demand an explanation of the determination of the will, so far as it involves the election of one thing in preference to another. They deny that the mere power of willing accounts for the *specification* of the choice, by which one thing is taken and another rejected. Taking this weapon, the axiom of cause and effect, they chase their opponents out of every place of refuge. Edwards is peculiar only in the surpassing keenness and unsparing persistency with which he carries on the combat, even anticipating defences against his logic which had not been as yet set up. He was anxious to demolish forts even before they were erected. His habit of taking up all conceivable objections to the proposition which he advocates, in advance of the opponent, is one main source of his strength as a disputant. He not only fires his own gun, but spikes that of the enemy.

It is far from being true that Edwards was the first to

* *Inquiry* (London, 1717), p. 2.

† *Ibid.*, p. 41.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 59.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 83 seq.

assert the impropriety of the term "necessary" as a predicate of acts of will, on the ground that necessity presupposes an opposition of the will, which, of course, is precluded when the occurrence in question is itself a choice. I am constrained to that to which my will is opposed, but which nevertheless occurs. That is necessary "which choice cannot prevent." * The same objection is made to the terms "irresistible," "unavoidable," "inevitable," "unable," and their synonyms, as descriptive of the determinations of the will. I do not find in Augustine this criticism of the above-mentioned terms in any explicit form; yet there lurks continually under his statements the feeling that underlies this criticism; as, for instance, when he speaks of "the most blessed necessity" of not sinning, under which the Deity is placed, "if necessity it is to be called"—"si necessitas dicenda est." † But the objection to all terms implying coercion, especially to the word "necessity," is set forth by Thomas Aquinas as clearly as by Edwards. "That which is moved by another," writes Thomas, "is said to be constrained (cogi), if it is moved against its own inclination (contra inclinationem propriam); but if it be moved by another which gives to it its own inclination (quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem), it is not said to be constrained. . . . So God in moving the will does not constrain it, because he gives to it its own inclination. To be moved voluntarily is to be moved of one's self, that is, from an internal principle; but that intrinsic principle can be moved by another principle extrinsic; and so to be moved of one's self is not inconsistent with being moved by another." ‡

It is the doctrine of Edwards, then, that the will is determined by "that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition." § This an-

* Edwards's *Works*, vol. ii., p. 84.

† Op. imp., i., 103.

‡ *Summa*, Part I., Question 5, Article 4.

§ *Works*, vol. ii., p. 25.

tecedent mental state secures the result by a strictly causal efficiency. Moral necessity is distinguished from the natural necessity that prevails in material nature, in that the former is concerned with mental phenomena, with motives and the volitions which they produce; but the difference "does not lie so much in the nature of the *connection*, as in the two terms *connected*." * It is cause and effect in both cases. To the objection that morality and responsibility are subverted by this doctrine, Edwards replies that men are responsible for their choices, no matter what the causes of them may be; that moral quality inheres in the choices themselves, and not in their causes. As liberty "does not consider anything of the cause of the choice," † so it is with moral accountableness, with merit and ill-desert. Sufficient that the choice exists in the man as an operation of will. ‡ On no other hypothesis than the necessitarian did Edwards think it possible to hold to the omniscience of God and his universal providence and government. Principles which freethinkers maintained for other ends, he defended as the indispensable foundations of religion.

Edwards came forward as the champion of Calvinism against Whitby and its other English assailants. He intended "to bring the late objections and outcries against Calvinistic divinity to the test of the strictest reasoning." § He scattered to the winds the loosely defined notions of free-will which made it include the choosing of choices, and choice from a previous indifference, or apart from all influence of motives. It is not true that, out of various possible choices, the mind decides upon, *i. e.*, chooses one. Nor is it true that the act of choice starts into being independently of inducements. Although his adversaries must have felt that he took advantage of the infirmities of language, and confuted what they said rather than what they meant, yet it

* *Works*, vol. ii., p. 34.

† *Ibid.*, p. 39, cf. p. 191.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 185 seq. (Part IV., § 1).

§ Letter to Erskine. *Dwight's Life*, p. 497.

is quite untrue that he was guilty of any conscious unfairness. He was not the man purposely to surround himself with

. . . . "mist, the common gloss
Of theologians."

He had no faith in their conception of freedom, however it might be formulated. But, in prosecuting his purpose, Edwards set up a philosophy of the will which is not consonant with the doctrine that had been held by the main body of Augustinian theologians. It is true that the Wittenberg Reformers, at the outset, and Calvin, in his earlier writings, especially the *Institutes*, pushed predestination to the supralapsarian extreme. The doctrine of Augustine, however, and the more general doctrine even of Calvinistic theologians, the doctrine of Calvin himself and of the Westminster Assembly's creeds, is that a certain liberty of will *ad utrumvis*, or the power of contrary choice, had belonged to the first man, but had disappeared in the act of transgression, which brought his will into bondage to evil. It was the common doctrine, too, that in mankind now, while the will is enslaved as regards religious obedience, it remains free outside of this province, in all civil and secular concerns. In this wide domain the power of contrary choice still subsists. But Edwards's conception of the will admits of no such distinction. Freedom is as predicable of men now as of Adam before he sinned; of religious morality as of the affairs of worldly business; of man as of God. He asserts most emphatically that he holds men to be possessed now of all the liberty which it is possible to imagine, or which it ever entered into the heart of any man to conceive.* Of course, there can have been no loss of liberty, no forfeiture of a prerogative once possessed. Philosophical necessity belongs to the very nature of the will. Therefore it binds all spiritual beings alike. This is not the philosophy of Augus-

* Letter to Erskine, vol. ii., p. 293.

tine or of the Westminster divines. They held to a mutability of will once belonging to man, but now lost; to a freedom pertaining at present to men in one sphere of action, but not in another.

Refraining, for the present, from comments on the drift of this philosophical creed, we follow this acute and powerful thinker into another but adjacent field. Not satisfied with the timid, half-hearted way in which Watts, Doddridge, and other English Calvinists of that day, had attenuated the doctrine of original sin, in deference to the attacks of the Arminians, Edwards undertook to reclaim the ground which had been surrendered, and to put to rout the confident assailants. For their "glorying and insults" he believed there was no foundation.* He took up a great theme, belonging alike to philosophy and theology, the dominion of moral evil in the race of mankind. It cannot be said that he does not squarely grapple with his adversaries. He fully understood himself, and had the courage which comes from undoubting conviction. He invited for his arguments the closest scrutiny, and only deprecated the objection that they were "metaphysical," as vague and impertinent. "The question is not," he on one occasion remarks, "whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, English, French, or Mohawk, but whether the reasoning be good and the arguments truly conclusive."† His ardor is a white heat which never moves him to substitute declamation for reasoning. In this treatise on "Original Sin," he blinks no difficulties; but, having established by cogent reasoning and by Scripture, with appeals to heathen as well as Christian authority, the tremendous fact of sin, as a universal characteristic of mankind, he endeavors to prove that men are truly, and not by any legal fiction, judged to be sinful from the start, and literally guilty of the primal transgression. To this end, he seeks to bring the continuance of sin

* Dwight's *Life*, p. 569.

† *Works*, vol. ii., p. 474.

in the individuals of the race, onward from the beginning of their personal life, under the familiar law of habit. It is analogous to the self-perpetuation of any habit which arises from an initial act. To prove that Adam's act *was* our act, he launches out into a bold speculation on the nature of identity. Personal identity, he asserts, is the effect of the divine will and ordinance. If it consists in the sameness of consciousness, that is kept up by divine acts from moment to moment. If it be thought to consist in the sameness of substance, even this is due to the perpetual divine preservation; and preservation is not to be distinguished from constantly repeated acts of creation. Our identity is a constituted identity, dependent upon the creative will, and in this sense arbitrary, yet conformed to an idea of order. So the individuals of the human race are the continuation of Adam; they truly—that is, by the will and appointment of God—constitute one moral whole. It is strictly true that all participated in the act by which “the species first rebelled against God.”* We are not condemned for another's evil choice, but for our own, and the principle of sin within us is only the natural consequence of that original act. Time counts for nothing: the first rising of evil inclination in us is one and the same with the first rising of evil inclination in Adam; it is the members participating in, and consenting to, the act of the head. The habit of sinning follows upon this first rising of evil inclination, in us as in Adam. Such is the constitution of things; and on the divine constitution, the persistence of individuality, of personal consciousness and identity, equally depends. It is to be noticed that, in defence of his realistic theory, Edwards does not lay hold of the traducian hypothesis of the evolution of souls. He admits that souls are created; but so are consciousness and the substance of our individual being at every successive instant of time. Like Anselm, and the schoolmen gen-

* Vol. ii., p. 543.

erally, he is a creationist. It is evident that Locke's curious chapter on *Identity and Diversity** put Edwards on the track on which he advanced to these novel opinions. Locke there attempts to prove that sameness of consciousness is the sole bond of identity, and that identity would remain were consciousness disjoined from one substance and connected with another. Edwards's opinion is peculiar to himself, but there is no reason to doubt that the initial impulse to the reflections that issued in it was imparted by the discussion of Locke.†

We now turn to the ethical theory of Edwards. In his masterly treatise on the *Nature of True Virtue*, he does not content himself, as philosophers before him had so often done, with the inquiry, What is the abstract quality of virtue, or the foundation of moral obligation? but he sets forth the nature of virtue in the concrete, or the principle of goodness. This he finds to be benevolence, or love to intelligent being. It is love to the entire society of intelligent beings according to their rank, or, to use his phrase, "the amount of being" which belongs to them. It is thus a proportionate love; supreme and absolute as regards God, limited as regards inferior beings. Under this conception, ethics and religion are inseparately connected. True love to man is love to him as being, or as having being in himself, and is indissolubly connected, if it be real and genuine, with a proportionately greater love to God. This benevolence, which embraces in itself all goodness, is the fountain and essence of specific virtues. It is described as a propensity to being, a union of heart to intelligent being, a consent to being, which prompts one to seek the welfare of the objects loved. It is not synonymous with delight in the happiness of others, but is the spring of that delight. Now,

* Locke's *Essay*, book ii., c. 27.

[† The influence of Berkeley as well as Locke is seen in Edwards's speculation. It is really the application of the Berkeleian idea to the mind—a step which Berkeley himself had not taken.]

he who actually exercises this love delights in the same love when it is seen in others ; and this delight induces and involves an additional love to them, the love of complacency. There is a spiritual beauty in benevolence which is perceived only through experience. The relish which this beauty excites and gratifies is possible only to him who is himself benevolent. There is a rectitude in benevolence, a fitness to the nature of the soul and the nature of things ; and the perception of this rectitude awakens the sense of obligation, and binds all men to be benevolent. The natural conscience makes a man uneasy "in the consciousness of doing that to others which he should be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his case, and he in theirs." This feeling may be resolved into a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself, of a disagreement with his own nature. With the feeling of approbation and disapprobation, there is joined a sense of desert, which consists in a natural agreement, proportion, and harmony between malevolence or injury and resentment and punishment. An essential element in Edwards's whole theory is this double excellence of universal love : first, a rightness recognized by all men, whether they be good or bad ; and a peculiar, transcendent beauty revealed only to the good, or on the condition of the exercise of love as a practical principle. Of the natural conscience in its relation to love he says : "Although it sees not, or rather does not *taste* its primary and essential beauty, *i. e.*, it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to being in general, simply considered, for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that ; yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may *approve* it from that uniformity, equality, and justice, which there is in it ; and the *demerit* which is seen in the contrary, consisting in the natural agreement between the contrary, and being hated of being-in-general." * The moral sense which is common to all men, and the spir-

itual sense which belongs to the benevolent, may be called sentiments; but not with the idea that they are merely subjective or arbitrary, and not correspondent to the objective reality. The quality of rightness and the quality of spiritual beauty inhere in love as intrinsic attributes. By means of this distinction between the intrinsic rectitude and the spiritual beauty of the virtuous principle, Edwards built up a foundation for his doctrine of spiritual light, or for that mystical side which has been pointed out in his character and in his conception of religion. The reaction of benevolence against its opposite as being unrighteous and offensive to the sense of spiritual beauty, and as an injury to the beings on whom benevolence fixes its regard, is a form of hatred. This hatred on the part of God and of all benevolent beings toward "the statedly and irreclaimably evil" inspires a feeling of satisfaction in their punishment. Those descriptions in Edwards of the sufferings of incorrigible evil-doers in the future world, and of the contentment of the righteous at beholding them, which grate on the sensibility of most of the present generation, he felt no difficulty in reconciling with the doctrine that impartial and universal love is the essence of virtue.

The disinterested love which is identical with virtue is the antipode of self-love. If self-love signifies nothing but a man's loving what is pleasing to him, this is only to say that he loves what he loves; since, with Edwards, loving an object is synonymous with being pleased with it. It is "the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will." * But the proper meaning of self-love is regard to self in distinction from others, or regard to some private interest. Edwards undertakes to resolve all particular affections which do not involve a regard to universal being, and a willingness that the subordinate interest should give way whenever it competes with the rights and the interests of the whole, into

* Vol. iii., p. 118.

self-love. This is true of habits of feeling and actions that are done at the dictate of natural conscience, which may be looked upon "as in some sort arising from self-love, or self-union," or the uneasy consciousness of being inconsistent with one's self. The most questionable feature in Edwards's whole theory is the position to which the natural perception of right and sense of moral obligation are reduced, in order to exalt the sense of spiritual beauty as the one necessary attendant of true virtue. But he is not justly chargeable with displacing the particular affections—love of family, patriotism, and the like—although Robert Hall thinks that Godwin built up his ethical notions on the reasoning of Edwards, as Godwin avowedly leaned upon Edwards in his exposition of liberty and necessity. *

In the dissertation on *God's Chief End in Creation*, which, like the essay on the *Nature of True Virtue*, was posthumous, Edwards "o'erleaped these earthly bounds," and sought to unveil the motive of the Deity in calling the universe into being. He rejects every notion of an indigence, insufficiency, and mutability in God, or any dependence of the Creator on the creature for any part of his perfection or happiness. Every pantheistic hypothesis of this nature he repels. God must be conceived of as estimating the sum total of his own excellence at its real worth. This regard for his glory, or his glorious perfections, not because they are his, but for their own sake, is not an unworthy feeling or motive to action. The disposition to communicate the infinite fulness of good which inheres eternally in himself, *ad extra*, is an original property of his nature. This incited him to create the world. That his attributes should be exerted and should be known and esteemed, and become a source of joy to other beings, is fit and proper. His delight in his creatures does not militate against his independence,

* Compare Hall's *Works* (Bohn's edition), p. 284; Godwin's *Political Justice*, vol. i., p. 279 (Dublin, 1793).

since the creation emanates from himself, and this delight may be resolved into a delight in himself. In God, the love of himself and the love of the public are not to be distinguished as in man, "because God's being, as it were, comprehends all." Nor is it selfish in him to seek for the holiness and happiness of the creature, out of supreme regard to himself, or from the esteem which he has for that excellence, a portion of which he imparts to them, and which he reasonably desires to see an object of honor, and the source of a joy like his own. "For it is the necessary consequence of true esteem and love, that we value others' esteem of the same object, and dislike the contrary. For the same reason, God approves of others' esteem and love of himself." The creature is intended for an eternally increasing nearness and union to God. Under this idea, his "interest must be viewed as one with God's interest," and is therefore not regarded by God as a thing distinct and separate from himself. Thus, all the activities of God return to himself as the final goal.

Edwards was acquainted with Hutcheson. "The calm, stable, universal good-will to all, or the most extensive benevolence," and "the relish and reputation of it," or "the esteem and good-will of a higher kind to all in whom it is found," are phrases of this writer * which remind us of the American philosopher. But the scientific construction of the theory of virtue, especially in the place which love to God finds in it, is original with Edwards. It is gratifying to notice the admiration which the younger Fichte expresses for this essay, which is only known to him through the brief sketch of Mackintosh. "What he reports of it," says Fichte, "appears to me excellent."† He speaks of the bold and profound thought that God, as the source of love in all creatures, on the same ground loves himself infinitely more than any finite being; and therefore in the creation of the world

* *Moral Philosophy*, vol. i., p. 69.

† "Was dieser von ihm berichtet finden wir vortrefflich." *System der Ethik*, i., 544.

can have no other end than the revelation of his own perfection, which, it is to be observed, consists in love.* "So," concludes Fichte, "has this solitary thinker of North America risen to the deepest and loftiest ground which can underlie the principle of morals: universal benevolence which in us, as it were, is potentially latent, and in morality is to emerge into full consciousness and activity, is only the effect of the bond of love, which encloses us all in God." The degree or amount of being is a somewhat obscure idea; nevertheless the German critic considers it a true and profound thought that the degree of the perfection of a being is to determine the degree of love to him. Mackintosh, to whom Fichte owed his knowledge of Edwards, apparently fails, in one passage, to apprehend Edwards's distinction between love and esteem, or benevolence and moral complacency.

In the interesting letter which Edwards wrote to the trustees of Princeton College, he gives reasons for his reluctance to assume the office of president of that institution, which he afterward accepted. He explains that he had always been accustomed to study with pen in hand, recording his best thoughts on innumerable subjects for his own benefit. Among the results of this practice there had grown up in his hands an unfinished work, "a body of divinity in an entire new method, being thrown into the form of a history." This was nothing less than a philosophy of the history of mankind, contemplated with reference to the redemption of the world by Christ, the centre toward which the whole current of anterior events converged, and from which all subsequent events radiate. There were to be interwoven in the work "all parts of divinity," in such a method as to exhibit to the best advantage their "admirable contexture and harmony." The conception was a grand one, resembling that of Augustine in the *De civitate Dei*. The treatise, in its

* Ibid., pp. 544, 545.

unfinished state, was published after the author's death, under the title, *A History of the Work of Redemption, containing the Outlines of a Body of Divinity, including a View of Church History in a Method entirely new.* In its incomplete form, and notwithstanding the greater disadvantage of the author's limited leisure and opportunity for the prosecution of historical investigation, it remains an impressive monument of the variety of his powers and of the broad range of his studies and reflections. He proposed to unfold the course of Divine Providence in all its successive stages, from the decree of creation to the end of the world. The preparation of redemption, the accomplishment of it through the life and death of Christ, and its effects, are the three divisions into which the book is cast. He compares the work of redemption, which he undertakes to delineate in its orderly progress, to "a temple that is building: first, the workmen are sent forth, then the materials are gathered, the ground is fitted, and the foundation laid; then the superstructure is erected, one part after another, till at length the top stone is laid and all finished." * Of course the acts of the drama, which are still in the future, have to be learned from prophecy.

We have seen that Edwards believed in predestination in the extreme or supralapsarian form. He encloses in the iron network of philosophical necessity all intelligent beings. Verbal objections to the term "necessity," and the ascription of "a natural ability" to voluntary agents, do not subtract an iota from the real significance of the dogma. The sovereignty of God in the realm of choices, as in the realm of matter, and his omnipresent agency, are fundamental in his creed. To the charge that their principles are destructive of morality, the theological advocates of predestination have triumphantly appealed to facts. Where have the obligations of morality been felt more than among the Calvinists

* Vol. iii., p. 171.

of Geneva and of Holland, the Huguenots of France, the Scottish Covenanters, and the Puritans of England and of New England? If the doctrine of necessity has borne bad fruits in the lives of free-thinkers who have espoused it, such is not the case as regards the professors of the Calvinistic creed. It must be observed, however, that it is not from their favorite dogma that extreme Calvinists have drawn their ethics. Their moral sense has been invigorated from other sources. The Stoics believed in fate, but were personally upright and conscientious. They borrowed their ethics from earlier philosophers, and their morals stood in no genetic relation to their metaphysics. With Calvinists, predestination stands as the correlate of the sense of absolute dependence, of faith in the control of Divine Providence, and of gratitude for grace as the source of all that is good within them. Predestination is an inference rather than a premise. Macaulay says of William III.: "The tenet of predestination was the keystone of his religion. He even declared that, if he were to abandon that tenet, he must abandon with it all belief in a superintending Providence, and must become a mere Epicurean." * Calvinists have not piled up tome upon tome of theological controversy, they have not pined in dungeons and faced death on the battlefield, for the sake of a merely speculative notion. It is the moral truth for which it stands in their minds as the logical equivalent, that has made them so strenuous in the maintenance of it.

Julius Müller, one of the ablest of recent theologians, has well remarked that, while the supralapsarian conception, by which the will is held to be determined to good or to evil, in the first man as in all others, by exterior causes, might have been held, and was held, at a former day, in conjunction with a sincere theism; such a union of opposites at present would not be possible. Pantheism would now be

* *History of England*, vol. ii., p. 149 (New York, 1849).

connected with such a philosophical tenet. The power of God, acting in man through the machinery of motives, would be held to be the sole efficient. Nay, all things would be traced to impersonal agency. Personality would be considered merely phenomenal. The idea of creative action would be supplanted by that of emanation.

The doctrine of Edwards, apart from all theological prejudice, fails to satisfy the generality of mankind, when it is set up as a complete and exclusive solution of the problem of liberty and necessity. He labors hard to prove that common sense is with him, but he labors in vain. It is one thing, however, to utter a moral protest, and another to furnish a logical answer or a valid rectification.

Certain eminent theologians of New England in later times have asserted the power of contrary choice as existing ever in connection with a previous certainty of the determination of the will being what it actually is. They have maintained that motives, the internal antecedents of choice, constitute a special order of causes, which are distinguished from all others by giving the certainty, but not the necessity, of the action which follows them. On this theory they claim that a foundation is laid for the practical truth relative to God's providence and human dependence, at the same time that freedom and responsibility are left untouched. Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his *Remarks* on Collins's book, presents the leading points of this theory. Clarke asserts that there exists a principle of self-motion in man, a power of initiating motion, or of voluntary self-determination. This power is not determined as to the mode of its exertion by anything but itself; that would involve a contradiction. It is self-moving. It is absurd to attribute efficiency to the mental states which are called motives. If they had efficiency, man would be like a clock, or a pair of scales, endowed with sensation or perception. He would not be an agent. What we call motives are bare antecedents, or occasional

causes.* Clarke shows that the opposite supposition involves an infinite regress of effects with no cause at all. Moreover, uniformity of action does not imply a necessity in the connection of the act with its antecedents. "The experience of a man's ever doing what he judges reasonable to do, is not at all an experience of his being under any necessity so to do. For concomitancy in this case is no evidence at all of physical connection." † The argument for necessity from God's prescience, Clarke seeks to confute by maintaining the previous certainty of acts, even on the supposition that they are free, and claiming for God "an infallible judgment concerning contingent truths," which is only a power that we ourselves possess, carried to perfection. This power of judging, however, Clarke subjects to no searching analysis; and his reasoning is hardly sufficient to meet the objections to the possibility of foreknowing contingent actions, which are advanced by Edwards.‡ The later New England philosophy postulates, however, a certainty which is produced by the antecedent causes, taken in the aggregate. Can we conceive of a causal influence which makes an event infallibly certain, and yet not necessary? On this question the validity of the later New England theorem seems to hinge.

The Scottish philosophy of Sir William Hamilton solves the problem by affirming the inconceivability of both freedom and necessity, on the ground that the first implies a beginning of motion, and the other an infinite regress of effects; and it accepts the truth of free-will on the basis of our moral feelings, the feelings of self-approbation and remorse, praise and blame, which presuppose moral liberty.

A middle position is that taken by able philosophers and theologians, of whom the late Dr. Mozley is a leading representative. We have an apprehension of two truths which

* *Remarks*, etc., p. 9 (London, 1717).

† *Ibid.*, p. 25.

‡ *Treatise on the Will*, Part II., § 12.

appear irreconcilable with one another; but on this ground solely, that our idea or apprehension, in either case, is obscure, imperfect, an incipient and not a completed conception. These truths are therefore mysterious. They are not a zero in our apprehension, nor are they fully comprehended. Hence our deductions from them are subject to a corresponding imperfection. They may serve us, up to a certain point, as the groundwork of moral truth; but neither can be used to subvert that moral truth which is related to the other. When moral truth is contradicted by logic, there is a flaw in the logic; and this is traceable to the imperfect character of the notions which enter into the premises. Mozley would probably sanction the dictum of Coleridge that, when logic seems to clash with moral intuitions, the superior authority belongs to conscience. It need hardly be said that the problem belongs not exclusively to theology—it belongs to philosophy as well. The perplexities that pertain to it are not escaped by those who renounce the Christian faith.

It is a growing conviction of students of Scripture and of philosophy that, on the subject before us, there is more than one hemisphere of truth. That which both the Calvinist and Arminian chiefly prized was truth, not error. What each contended against was the supposed implications of a proposition which was valued by his opponent from its relation to a set of implications of a different sort. Each connected with his antagonist's thesis inferences which that antagonist repudiated. One hemisphere of truth Jonathan Edwards saw with clearness, and upheld with a strength of argument and a subdued but intense fervency which have never been surpassed.

Edwards died at the age of fifty-four, three months after he had entered upon the duties of president at Princeton. He was an indefatigable student, working often for thirteen hours in the day. A biographer says of him that perhaps

there never was a man more constantly retired from the world. He was never physically strong. Not at all morose, but courteous and gentle in his ways, he was yet taciturn, and he himself refers to what he calls "the disagreeable dulness and stiffness of his demeanor, unfitting him for conversation and contact with the world."* His countenance is not such as we should expect a polemical theologian to wear, but is more like that given by the painters to St. John, according thus with the deep mystical vein of which we have spoken. He is the *doctor angelicus* among our theologians, and, had he lived in the thirteenth century instead of the eighteenth, he would have been decorated by admiring pupils with such a title. If it be true that, in the last century, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, are the three great names in philosophy, there might have been added to the brief catalogue, had he chosen to devote himself exclusively to metaphysics, the name of Jonathan Edwards. On the memorial window in honor of him, in the chapel of Yale College, of which he is the most illustrious graduate, stands the just inscription: "Jonathan Edwards summi in ecclesia ordinis vates fuit, rerum sacrarum philosophus qui saeculorum admirationem movet, Dei cultor mystice amantissimus: hic studebat, docebat."

* Dwight's *Life*, p. 568.

CHANNING AS A PHILOSOPHER AND THEOLOGIAN.*

CHANNING is regarded by common consent as the most eminent representative of the Unitarian movement in this country. It is true that others among the gifted men who have been conspicuous in that school have equalled or surpassed him in some of the titles to distinction. There have been in their number more eloquent preachers. The younger Buckminster was one, of whom Edward Everett declared that he had the most melodious voice "that ever passed the lips of man;" † of whom, also, one of the ablest of the early Unitarian preachers, who has since rendered most honorable service in literature and in public life—Dr. Palfrey—has said that his pulpit utterances approached near "to what we imagine of a prophet's or an angel's inspiration." ‡ In the graces of style and delivery, according to the taste of that time, Channing was outdone by the youthful Everett himself, in the short time in which the latter served as the successor of Buckminster in the Brattle Street church. No doubt, Channing's manner was marked by a glow of chastened earnestness, indicating deep emotions held under restraint, and thus had a peculiar fascination of its own. Sometimes, though rarely, he broke out in a more impassioned strain. Of a sermon preached by him in New York, in 1826, an admiring listener writes: "The man was full of fire, and his body seemed, under some of his tre-

* An Article in *The International Review* for July, 1879.

† *Memoirs of the Buckminsters*, p. 396.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 481.



mendous sentences, to expand into that of a giant; . . . his face was, if any thing, more meaning than his words." *

If there were others who had more of the qualifications considered to be characteristic of the clerical orator than were possessed by Channing, it is also the fact that, as a theological scholar, he was much surpassed by Andrews Norton; in familiarity with philosophical and general literature, by George Ripley; and in a certain cautious accuracy and weight of reasoning in moral science, by James Walker. Nor in devoutness of spirit does he excel the younger Henry Ware and Ephraim Peabody. Those who knew Channing remarked in him something delicate, fastidious, patrician, notwithstanding his humane sympathy; and hence in the aptitude to reach directly the common mind he was outstripped by Theodore Parker, whose robust energy and racy dialect better fitted him for contact with the multitude. But Channing unites in himself various characteristics which conspire to give him pre-eminence. A clear mind, not wanting in imaginative warmth, a transparent, natural style, neither slovenly nor overwrought, the sympathies and attainments of a man of letters, even though he was not widely read—are manifest in his writings. Superadded to these qualities, there was a sanctity of spirit which was felt by those who heard him in the pulpit, or met him even casually in conversation. It was not simply that he was sincere, and that he spoke in the accents of conviction. It was not only that he was above the influence of personal motives, like the love of praise and the dread of censure, and that he had a courage corresponding to his convictions—a necessary attribute in a popular leader—which he exemplified in an inspiring letter to Henry Ware, Jr., when the latter was desponding over the poor outlook for their cause in New York, and in other more serious emergencies.† Channing's

* *Life of Henry Ware, Jr.*, vol. i., p. 219.

† *Ibid.*, p. 132.

eminence is chiefly due, first, to the elevated fervor which inspired his teaching, and which was of inestimable advantage in a movement in which the intellectual factor stood in so high a ratio to the religious; and, secondly, to the circumstance that he embodied in himself so fully the ethical and philanthropic impulse which principally constituted the positive living force of the Unitarian cause. Following out the humanitarian tendency, he acquired, at home and abroad, a high and, in the main, a deserved fame as the champion of justice in opposition to slavery and other social evils. But I am to speak of him chiefly as a theologian.

Really to do justice to the subject, it would be requisite to review the history of religious thought in New England from the beginning. But this broad theme can be only briefly touched upon. How the Congregationalists, the descendants of the first settlers and proprietors of the soil, forming a united, enlightened body, having in their hands the great seats of education, Harvard and Yale, at length divided into hostile camps, existing side by side in a state of ecclesiastical non-intercourse, is a topic too large to be satisfactorily treated here. In England and in New England the eighteenth century was signalized by a reaction against the theological tenets of the seventeenth. In the Church of England, Calvinism had given way to the creed of Arminius. Among dissenters the Calvinistic doctrines were feebly and apologetically defended by men of moderate theological ability, like Watts and Doddridge. The obnoxious points of the Genevan creed were softened down, in a deprecatory spirit, to accommodate its adversaries. Watts, though inimical to Socinians, himself abandoned the orthodox formulas of the Trinity, and broached on that subject a peculiar notion of his own devising. The chief metaphysician of the day, Dr. Samuel Clarke, was an Arminian and an Arian. Locke's writings acquired more and more influence, and these were antagonistic to the main points of what had been counted the Evangelical theology.

In New England, the closing part of the seventeenth century—the era of the Mathers, who, whatever may have been their virtues, were not equal in mental stature to the Cottons and Hookers of the earlier age—was lamentably distinguished by the outbreacking of the witchcraft delusion. When we pass into the eighteenth century, the atmosphere rapidly changes. Old opinions gradually relax their hold upon the faith of many. The English contemporary writers are imported and read. The characteristic points of Calvinism are less frequently and more vaguely inculcated. Whitby, Dr. John Taylor, and radical anti-Trinitarians like Emlyn and Priestley, are brought in, and some of them find so many readers that they are reprinted. What was called Arminianism, which was often more a silent ignoring than an explicit rejection of the Calvinistic opinions—which involved an impatience of creeds, a proclamation of the rights of free thought and of the duty of toleration for wide diversities of religious opinion, and which laid more stress in pulpit teaching on moral precepts than on theological doctrines—prevailed widely among the ministers of New England, and was the seed-plot out of which Unitarianism was developed. In Boston Mayhew and, later in the century, Freeman, the minister of King's Chapel, were outspoken anti-Trinitarians; and they did not stand alone.

Meantime there was a rally of the defenders of the old system, under the lead of Jonathan Edwards and his theological disciples, and through the instrumentality of the great revival of 1740, when the persuasive eloquence of Whitefield reinforced the teaching of the New England ministers who were strongly averse to the Arminian way of thinking. But the revival was extensively opposed as well as befriended. By emboldening the zeal of the Calvinists, by putting new weapons of defence into their hands—especially through the writings of Edwards and his followers—and by giving them in this way renewed confidence in their cause, the Edwardean movement probably accelerated rather than

hindered the rupture of the Congregational brotherhood of ministers and churches. This effect was produced by the sharpening of the antagonism which existed between the two diverse types of religious belief. One of them could not crystallize without a like effect on the other. The traditional Calvinism roused itself from slumber, buckled on its new armor, and took the offensive. It had assumed a more clearly defined position, which it felt itself perfectly competent to maintain against assailants. Moreover, in the practical administration of the gospel, the revival method was introduced, so that the more zealous tone of preaching, and the more active measures adopted for making converts—changes which the Moderates discountenanced as “enthusiasm”—widened the breach between the two sections of the New England Church.

Another influence that tended to precipitate a conflict was the spread in Eastern New England of the Hopkinsian theology, one of the later fruits of the theological activity of Jonathan Edwards. This, in some of its features—as, for example, in its doctrine of a general in opposition to a limited Atonement—was a mitigated form of Calvinism, and was so characterized by Channing himself. But the cardinal peculiarity of the Calvinistic system—the idea of divine sovereignty—it presented in extreme forms of statement, with no attempt to qualify it by clothing it in mystery, by connecting it with any supposed counter truth, or by cloaking it under conciliatory phrases. Edwards, in maintaining the doctrine of Original Sin, had ventured to apply the Berkeleian idea to the mind, which the founder of that philosophy never had thought of doing. This exaltation of God’s power at the expense of man’s agency, if consistently carried out, would issue in a form of Pantheism—that form which merges human personality in the divine. It is the opinion of most philosophical critics of Edwards, that the real drift of his treatise on the Will is in the same direction. It is doubtful whether any of the Hopkinsian

leaders were actual adherents of the Berkeleian theory ; still less probable that they consciously carried it so far beyond the intention of its author—although Berkeley's theory of perception had a decided influence on some of the New England divines. But the ideas of Edwards—even his scattered hints—were subsequently very fruitful in the minds of his disciples. The Hopkinsians attributed the moral choices of men—evil choices as well as good—to “divine efficiency.” President Dwight wrote against Emmons a sermon to show that the mind is not “a chain of exercises,” and significantly spoke of theology in certain quarters as verging towards Pantheism. Whatever was the real intent of the Hopkinsian writers, however much we are to set down to the credit (or discredit) of ill-chosen phraseology, they made on the public, notwithstanding their verbal assertions of human power or “natural ability,” the impression of teaching that moral choices, bad and good, are literally produced by a creative act of God. Coupled with these extravagant views was naturally connected the idea of “submission to God” as the first and supreme act of human duty, preceding faith in the Redeemer ; and this submission, it was held, must take the form of a willingness to be cast off for ever, if the glory of God should require it. Man is condemned by the divine law, they said : he must condemn himself, therefore ; and since he deserves the full penalty, he must be willing to endure it : otherwise, he is not in full sympathy with the divine justice and government. But the moment that he reaches this acme of submission he becomes a fit subject of mercy. Perhaps for the first time in the history of the church, it was made by Christian pastors a necessary condition of being saved that one should be “willing to be damned.” There can be no doubt that the exaggeration of Calvinism in the direction of divine power and sovereignty, the sharp, relentless formulating of these obnoxious dogmas, and the obtrusion of them in season and out of season, had something to do in provoking the doctrinal reaction and re-

volt, although the main cause was deeper and of a more general nature.

It is remarkable that the Unitarian movement was confined chiefly to Eastern New England, and did not extend into Western Massachusetts and Connecticut. In Connecticut there were never more than two or three Unitarian churches, and these in obscure towns. One ground of this fact is, that in that State the Episcopal Church struck a deeper root than in Massachusetts. For all who might dislike the style of preaching and the peculiar measures which characterize what is called "revivalism," with its exciting appeals and its prying interrogation of individuals as to their religious experience, and for all who recoiled from rigorous metaphysical definitions of religious truth, the door of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut stood open. Here was a church with an evangelical creed and evangelical worship, where those who were disaffected with Puritan ways, old or new, could find a quiet harbor. Another reason for the difference of which I speak lay in the circumstances which gave to the Edwardeans a complete ascendancy in Connecticut. The old Arminianism was not so strong or so strongly intrenched there as in Eastern Massachusetts. The Calvinists of the older school, from their greater fear of Arminian doctrine, were inclined to coalesce with the followers of Edwards, as is seen in the case of President Clap, of Yale College (1739-1766). President Stiles, of the same college (1777-1795), was more of a latitudinarian in his opinions and affiliations; he looked back on the Revival "as the late period of enthusiasm." But he was succeeded by Dwight, whose accession to the presidency secured the complete ascendancy of the school of Edwards. The moderation of Dwight in his theological statements, his strenuous opposition to Hopkinsian extravagances, and, more than all, his commanding influence as a preacher and an instructor of theological students, contributed much towards keeping the Congregational churches and ministers in the old path. This

result, however, might not have occurred had there been that deep and varied preparation for a doctrinal revolution which had been going forward in Boston and its neighborhood through the greater part of the eighteenth century.

If we would understand the Unitarian schism, we must take into account the fact that there were not only two interpretations of the Bible which came into collision, but that there were, at the same time, two types of culture. Unitarianism, as it has appeared in history, has been conjoined with no single form of church polity. It has sprung up in the midst of Anglican Episcopacy. It has sprung up at Geneva, in connection with Presbyterianism, and close by Calvin's grave. But it has frequently gone hand in hand with literary criticism and belles-lettres cultivation. This was the case in the Italian Unitarianism of the sixteenth century, which arose out of the Renaissance culture, and in the Unitarianism that spread so widely among the gentry of Poland. The same was conspicuously true of the Unitarian party in New England. There grew up about Boston and Cambridge a method of biblical criticism which was nourished by the study of Griesbach, and of the Arminian scholars of an earlier date. In connection with these studies there was a new and wider range of literary activity, and an altered style and standard of literary and æsthetic training. Dwight and the elder Buckminster had been fellow-students and tutors together at Yale College, in the latter part of the last century. They broke loose from the metaphysical style of discussion which had been in vogue before in the pulpit, and fostered the reading of the contemporary English classics. But they still exhibit a stiff and somewhat tumid quality of style. In the sermons of the younger Buckminster we find that these faults have been outgrown; although even he expresses himself with a certain formality, and with an avoidance of the vocabulary of common life. From these remaining fetters Channing escaped, thereby evincing the continued advance of literary taste. He speaks somewhere of the habit

that had prevailed of shunning familiar words as if they had been soiled by common use. In his own style there is nothing artificial and nothing slovenly. As the Unitarian movement went forward to later stages, the changes in the type of literary culture became very decided and very influential. But at the outset, at the epoch when Channing began his career, one feels, in looking at the writers on the Unitarian side, that they have passed beyond the point of bending entranced over the pages of Sir Charles Grandison, and are likely soon to become quite insensible to the attractions of Miss Hannah More. Theodore Parker says of Unitarianism: "The protest began among a class of cultivated men in the most cultivated part of America; with men who had not the religious element developed in proportion to the intellectual or the æsthetic element."* Of this there can be no doubt—that, along with a real interest in theology and religion, there was a very decided taste and aptitude for literary pursuits. Among those who have left the Unitarian pulpit to devote themselves to literature or politics are Mr. Sparks, Mr. Everett, Mr. Bancroft, Mr. Emerson, Mr. Ripley, Dr. Palfrey, Mr. Upham. If an equal number of leading minds had withdrawn themselves from the pulpit in the Methodist denomination—supposing that, in its early days, it had possessed so many able and learned men—or from any other religious body not more numerous than the Unitarians were, the fact would be considered very remarkable. I refer to this matter merely as an indication of the general change of atmosphere, so to speak, in the places where Unitarianism appeared. The old Puritan, training with its altogether predominant devotion to religious and theological writers, its austere jealousy of imaginative literature, and its rigid metaphysical habit, was fast giving way to a different and more diversified type of culture. In the circle of students to which Channing belonged at Cam-

* Weiss's *Life of Parker*, vol. i. p. 270.

pear that perplexities of doctrine or metaphysical problems, such as we might look for in a New Englander sprung from the Puritan stock, disturbed his thoughts in the least at that critical time. In truth, at all times moral and spiritual relations were uppermost in his mind. He is spoken of in the title of this article as a "philosopher;" but if philosophy is used in its limited sense, to denote metaphysics, or the metaphysics of theology, there is little more to be said under this rubric than is contained in the noted chapter on Snakes, in the *Natural History of Ireland*: "There are no snakes in Ireland." His strongest objection to the doctrine of the Trinity is the practical perplexities which he supposed it to occasion in worship; his objections to Calvinism are not so much logical, but lie principally in what he terms the moral argument against it. He was never fond of Priestley. In this case, to be sure, the materialistic and necessarian theories of this author were repugnant to his convictions. Much as he honored Locke as a man, and frequently as he refers to him as an example of anti-Trinitarian belief in conjunction with high intellectual endowments, Locke's philosophical tenets were not congenial to him. He was delivered from them by his favorite writer, Price, whose dissertations won him over to the intuitive school, and who contributed essentially to the formation of his philosophical and theological opinions. This author is really a lucid as well as an animated expositor of the spiritual, in opposition to the empirical, philosophy. He vindicates the reality of *a priori* truth in the spirit of Cudworth. The genial tone of Price and his anti-Trinitarian opinions, also recommended him to Channing's favor.

There is one link of connection between Channing and the earlier New England theologians. This is through Hopkins, who was a minister at Newport in the youth of Channing, and had not a little personal intercourse with him. A notice of his relation with Hopkins brings us naturally to one of the cardinal features of Channing's re-

ligious system. He says: "I was attached to Dr. Hopkins chiefly by his theory of disinterestedness. I had studied with great delight during my college life the philosophy of Hutcheson and the stoical morality, and these had prepared me for the noble, self-sacrificing doctrines of Dr. Hopkins." * The theory of virtue to which Channing alludes was unfolded in its essential points by Jonathan Edwards. Holiness, goodness, virtue—moral excellence, by whatever name it may be called—consists in Love. It is love towards the universal society of intelligent beings, of which God is the head. This love is impartial; it goes out to every being, and gives to each his due portion. God, the infinite One, is entitled to love without limit. Every one who is of the same order of being as myself I am to love equally with myself. Love is disinterested. I am to love myself not as *my* self, but only as one member of this universal society—a member whose welfare is a proper object of pursuit, not less and not more than is the welfare of any other human being, every other one being of equal worth or value. Self is merged in the sum total of being, as a drop in the ocean. It is obvious that Love, as thus defined, has two directions: one upward to God, and the other outward towards our fellow-men. Not that piety and philanthropy, in their true and perfect form, are really separable from one another; yet it is quite possible for the feelings of adoration, devotion, submission, and the whole religious side of love to engross as it were the mind, so that the interests of man and of human life in this mundane sphere, except so far as man is to be prevented from inflicting dishonor on God and ruin upon himself by that means, should be left in the background. God is to be exalted and glorified—this is the main thought. Such was the tendency of Calvinism; of Calvinism in New England as elsewhere. All such statements are, indeed, subject to much qualification. Calvinists

* *Memoir*, vol. i., p. 137.

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demanded righteousness of conduct. Channing was taught by Hopkins to hate slavery. This intrepid old man lifted his voice against slavery and the slave-trade in Newport, when that town was a principal mart of this iniquitous traffic. But, speaking generally, it was the first and great commandment, and the feelings directly involved in it, that mainly absorbed the attention. It was not absolutely forgotten that the second commandment is "like unto it." The duties of man to his neighbor were placed on the ground of religious obligation. But an active, warm-hearted, many-sided philanthropy, which looks after the temporal as well as the eternal interests of mankind, and goes out with tender sympathy to minister to suffering of every kind; which raises hospitals, builds comfortable habitations for the honest poor, visits those who are sick and in prison, cherishes a conception of education as comprehensive as the faculties of the mind—such a spirit of philanthropy was not characteristic of the religion of New England, and Channing and Unitarianism have done much to promote it. The disinterested benevolence of Edwards and Hopkins now turned from lofty and sometimes almost ecstatic meditations upon the sovereignty and perfection of God, and the iteration of the solemn demand to submit to his authority and to live to His glory, to the man-ward side of this principle. Edwards was transported by visions of the sweetness of Christ and of the sublime attributes of God; Channing, by the exalted nature and infinite possibilities of man.

The *dignity of human nature*, then, was a fundamental article in Channing's creed. In every human being there is the germ of an unbounded progress. An unspeakable value belongs to him. His nature is not to be vilified. A wrong done to him is like violence offered to an angel.

This idea of the dignity of man is a great Christian truth. No one can doubt that it was a living conviction in Channing's mind. It imparted to him that "enthusiasm of humanity" which became the passion of his soul. But there is

another side to the picture. "It is dangerous," says Pascal, "to make man see how he is on a level with the brutes, without showing him his greatness. It is dangerous, again, to make him see his greatness without seeing his baseness. . . . Let man estimate himself at his real value. Let him love himself, if he has in him a nature capable of good ; but let him not love on this account the vilenesses that belong to it. Let him despise himself, because this capacity is waste ; but let him not on this account despise this natural capacity. Let him hate himself ; let him love himself." Channing avowed himself an opponent of what may properly enough be termed the Catholic theology. He considered the church in all past ages to have been immersed in error on religious themes of capital importance. This was his judgment respecting the churches of the Reformation, as well as the church of the middle ages. On these topics, which stand in the forefront of Christian theology, he frankly and boldly, but always without bitterness or malignity, declared that the leading Reformers were the victims of superstition. The movement of which he was an advocate was represented as a new instauration of Christianity. The light which had been obscured by dismal clouds had at last broken forth in its full illuminating power. He openly, though without the least arrogance, claims the character of an innovator and a dissentient. It is not amiss, therefore, to attempt to account for his rejection of the general creed. What has the Catholic theology to say in justification of itself ? It has to say simply that Channing had a view—that is, an adequate, penetrating view—of only one side of the truth. Not but that he had a mournful perception of the evils wrought by sin in defacing God's image in man, and in inflicting misery upon individuals and communities. Not that he was incapable of moral indignation in view of atrocities done by man against his neighbor. But the Catholic theology, if I may venture to interpret its verdict, does not find in him and in his teaching, as a whole, that discernment of the *guilt* of sin, of that

particular quality of evil-doing, which may blanch the cheek and strike terror to the heart of even the prosperous criminal; which moved the publican to beat upon his breast, which makes the strong man bow his head in shame and trembling, and which pierced as a sharp arrow the souls of Augustine, Luther, Edwards, and the Apostle Paul. I have no wish to bring an accusation against Channing, or to magnify a defect. I simply seek to account for an antagonism which he himself, and everybody else, admits to exist. The Catholic theology, once more, fails to discover in Channing a sufficiently strong grasp of sin as a principle, revealing itself in multiform expressions or phenomena, entering into numberless phases of manifestation, exercising sway in mankind, and holding fast the will in a kind of bondage. The diversified forms of selfish and unrighteous action are not habitually traced back by him to the *fons et origo malorum*—the mysterious alienation of men from the fellowship of God. The moral malady is not explored to its sources; and hence the tendency is to treat it with palliatives. He is too much inclined to rely on education to do the work of regeneration. The forces requisite for the redemption of the captive from servitude are underrated: as John Randolph said of Watts and Beattie, given him as an antidote to Hume, "Milk-and-water for the bite of a rattlesnake!" This tendency was not fully carried out by Channing. He belongs to a transition. But he shows plainly the drift of the stream; and he speaks of customary accusations of sin brought against mankind as exaggerated. If this is not the right clew to the explanation of Channing's dissent, we know not where to look for it.

It may be deemed a palliation of what the Catholic theology must consider a grave error in Channing, that current expositions of the mystery of sin were so justly open to criticism. The Hopkinsians, to be sure, made the will the seat of moral evil, but they did not distinguish with any steadiness between voluntary and involuntary inclinations,

between choice and constitutional sensibility; and, worse still, they referred the beginning of sin in each individual of the race to a sovereign decree, and did not scruple to ascribe it to a creative act, or, as they termed it, to divine efficiency. Such was their usual phraseology, that it was hard for those who heard it to find any firm ground of human responsibility for character thus originated. The rest of the New England Calvinists, on the other hand, made sin a physical inheritance, a taint or contamination, which is entailed like the color of the eyes, or, rather, like a disease of the lungs. In this abject condition was orthodox theology, in this branch of it, when the Unitarian polemics opened their guns upon it. And here is the place to say, that the real point of controversy between the two parties was the doctrine of Sin and the correlated doctrine of Conversion. The field of debate was Anthropology. The New England mind was not speculative; and Jonathan Edwards was almost the only one of our divines who showed an extraordinary talent or relish for speculative divinity. It was the practical side of theology, sin and regeneration in their relation to the conditions of human responsibility, that interested his successors. They wanted to make Calvinism self-consistent, and to parry objections that arose in the minds of their own hearers, or were disseminated by the English Arminian writers. It is remarkable, although the Trinity and the person of Christ were nominally the subject of contention in the Unitarian controversy, how little of importance was contributed on either side to the elucidation of these topics. Even Norton and Stuart, the best-equipped disputants, say little that had not been said before.

On the doctrine of Man, then, as I humbly conceive, the defect of Channing was that he was captivated by an ideal. He saw what man might be, what man ought to be; but he did not thoroughly see what man really is. The obstacle to be overcome in the redemption of man he imperfectly apprehended. In other words—not applying the term in any

offensive meaning—he was a sentimentalist. He had never experienced in himself any flagrant outbreking of sin; he had never wrestled in mortal agony with any sensual propensity. In these particulars he resembled Pelagius rather than Augustine. Nor did his associations in life bring him very much in contact with gross manifestations of wickedness.

It may be added to these remarks that the Catholic theology does not degrade human nature, but exalts it, by the emphasis which it lays on guilt. It is only an exalted being that can make himself an object of moral indignation to the infinite Creator. The consciousness of guilt forbids man to think lightly of himself, to conceive of himself as beneath the notice of God, or to count upon the indulgence to which feeble and imperfect orders of being may reasonably lay claim. Sin, when we seek to comprehend its inception and spread through mankind, is enveloped in mystery; but, as Coleridge has said, it is the one mystery which makes all things else clear.

The next of the leading ideas of Channing was that of the Fatherhood of God. Against the Calvinistic assertion of the sovereignty of God, he was never tired of proclaiming God's paternal character. In the Scriptures, God is spoken of as a King, and He is denominated a Father. That there is an administration of the world by moral laws, and that these laws are enforced by penal sanctions, is a matter of experience as well as of revelation. In other words, there is a moral government over mankind. How are we to conceive the deepest, the essential, relation of God to human beings whom he has created in his image? Is it best typified by the relation of a parent to his children? It must not be overlooked that almost uniformly in the New Testament it is believers in Christ, his disciples, and they exclusively, who are designated the children of God. "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name" (John 1: 12). This is the point of view of all the New Testament

writers. Sonship is a privilege of true followers of Christ, and is referred to as an exalted and a new relation. The Lord's prayer was given to the disciples. They constitute a family; a line of demarcation is drawn about them. A sound exegesis cannot fail to recognize this. At the same time, it is not to be supposed that the constitution of man is altered, or that new faculties are imparted to men, or that a relation totally new and foreign to the nature of things is introduced by their recovery to God. Rather does man find himself; he comes back to his true nature, and is reinstated in his normal relation to his Creator. This is implied in the parable of the prodigal son, and in the quotation which Paul made at Athens from a heathen poet, who said that we are the offspring of God. He is the Father of our spirits. Channing meant and professed to follow the Scriptures; but he would have followed them more strictly if he had dwelt less on the paternal relation of God to mankind in their present state, and had insisted more on the fact that a relation which is practically subverted by their disloyalty can be restored only by their return to filial allegiance. We are commanded in the New Testament to behold the goodness *and* the severity of God. The severe side, the side of judgment and penalty, which is adapted to produce fear, had been held up to view, sometimes disproportionately. Both Edwards and Hopkins had stated in the boldest language that the righteous in heaven would derive satisfaction from contemplating the torments of the lost. This conclusion they supposed to follow by an irresistible logic from the justice of the appointed penalty—as if a due sympathy with the righteous administration of law required that we shall attend and enjoy public executions. In the powerful reaction against representations of this character, against the corresponding portraiture of God, against sensuous pictures of retributive torment, and the predominant appeals to fear, the Unitarians tended towards the other extreme of emasculating religion by divesting it of those elements which

awaken dread in the guilty—elements which are just as prominently set forth in the Bible as are the paternal feelings of God, and can never safely be left out of the teaching of Christianity. Channing, when he was a boy, not only never killed a bird, and avoided crushing an insect, but he let rats out of a trap to save them from being drowned.*

To bring men back to God as penitent children is recognized also by the Catholic theology as the end of the Gospel. But how? *Through the Son.* The sonship of Christ is the power and the pattern of sonship in those who have fallen away from God. In the church doctrine, fatherhood is an eternal characteristic of God. It does not begin to be with the human race, or with redemption. The Son is sent to bring back in himself the fallen race. His sonship is eternal; the mode of his derivation and dependence elevates him above the rank of a creature. But he is sent; and his coming is thus the highest conceivable evidence of the love of God to mankind, and of his pity towards them, and of self-sacrifice on the part of him who voluntarily becomes a partaker of human nature with all its burdens and exposures. It is in the fellowship of the Son—according to St. John and St. Paul—that we attain to the realization of the filial relation to God. But what was Channing's conception of Christ? According to Channing, Christ was a pre-existent rational creature, an angel or spirit of some sort, who had entered into a human body. He was not even a man except so far as his corporeal part is concerned, but was a creature from some upper sphere. Now we can see some plausibility in the theory that Christ was merely a man; was human just as Moses and Paul were human; and that this is a complete account of his person—although we believe this theory to be unscriptural and untrue. But one must be excused for saying—and this is said without the least polemical acri-

* *Memoir*, vol. i., p. 40.

mony—that the particular conception which Channing set up in the room of the church doctrine of the Incarnation is one of the crudest notions which the history of speculation on this subject has ever presented. The transitional character of Channing's type of theology is strikingly indicated in this indefinite, unphilosophical sort of Arianism, to which it would seem that he adhered to the end.

Here, again, we are obliged to trace error in part to the particular conception of the Trinity which had come to prevail in New England. Hopkins was the last to hold to the Nicene doctrine of the primacy of the Father and the eternal sonship of Christ. The whole philosophy of the Trinity, as that doctrine was conceived by its great defenders in the age of Athanasius, when the doctrine was formulated, had been set aside. It was even derided; and this chiefly for the reason that it was not studied. Professor Stuart had no sympathy with, or just appreciation of, the Nicene doctrine of the generation of the Son. His conscious need of a philosophy on the subject was shown in the warm, though cautious and qualified, welcome which he gave to the Sabelianism of Schleiermacher. What he defended against Channing, though with vigor and learning, was the notion of three distinctions to which personal pronouns can be applied—a mode of defining the Trinity which the Nicene Fathers who framed the orthodox creed would have regarded with some astonishment. The eternal fatherhood of God, the precedence of the Father, is as much a part of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity as is the divinity of the Son.

What, according to Channing, is the purpose of the mission of Christ? What work does he perform? Here he agrees with the church in the general proposition that he came to deliver men from sin and its consequences.* The accepted doctrine, and what has always been considered the

* Sermon at Mr. Sparks's Ordination: *Works*, vol. iii., p. 88.

doctrine of the Scriptures, is that an expiatory effect is accomplished by Christ ; that although he reveals the Father's love, and is sent by the Father out of compassion to the sinful race, there is yet in the conscience of God a demand to which the consciences of men respond, for something of the nature of compensation in the moral order violated by sin ; that this compensation being made, the foundation is laid for a forgiveness which brings honor to the divine character on all sides, and is consistent with a righteous moral administration. Thus a new relation is established between God and men—a reconciliation. This doctrine of the mediation of Christ is purposely stated here in the most general terms, in order that none of the special theories in which it has been embodied may be confounded with the essential idea. Now Channing did not absolutely renounce the orthodox opinion. Having referred to the opposite view, he says : "Many of us are dissatisfied with this explanation, and think that the Scriptures ascribe the remission of sins to Christ's death, with an emphasis so peculiar that we ought to consider this event as having a special influence in removing punishment, though the Scriptures may not reveal the way in which it contributes to this end." But, in keeping with his transitional position, he lays no stress on this truth. On the contrary, he is unsparing, though never intentionally unfair or extravagant, in his denunciation of the current expressions in which it is set forth. Either from a want of familiarity with the history of doctrine, or from not being addicted to patient intellectual analysis, he is content with giving expression to his revolted feeling. He does not stop to inquire whether a profound truth may not be contained in a statement which, if literally taken, is obnoxious. He sticks in the phraseology. Nor does he attempt to separate a particular representation of some school in theology from the deep, underlying truth which theology, with varying degrees of success, has been endeavoring to formulate. There is a contrast between the clearness, and evident honesty of

purpose, with which he describes the position of his adversaries, and the inability profoundly to appreciate that position. Propositions, the terms of which are capable of more than one interpretation (as that 'the atonement appeases God'), are taken in one sense—an admissible sense, indeed, if the words only are considered, but yet not the sense which these words suggest to the minds of those who utter them—and then a variety of inferences are deduced, repugnant to sound Christian feeling and to a portion of the teaching of Scripture.

Apart from his criticism of adverse views, Channing's positive idea is that Christ does his work of reclaiming men from sin by teaching truth, which is recommended by his spotless character and by his death, and confirmed as having authority by his miracles, especially his resurrection from the dead. Of the teaching of Christ, especially of his ethical teaching, and of the unapproachable beauty and perfection of his character, it is well known that Channing has written much that is admirable. When we inquire specifically what the capital points of that doctrine are which Christ was sent into the world to announce, we find them to be the doctrine of God the Father, and of the immortality of the soul. This last truth is brought home to men's belief by the resurrection of Jesus. These two truths are singled out by Channing, in writing on *Christian Evidences*, as most important points of the Saviour's teaching. The paternal character of God is declared and evinced, and thereby superstitions and gloomy fears growing out of them are dispelled; and the soul's destiny to survive death is vividly exhibited, and is also proved, by the raising of Jesus from the dead. The Christian revelation is reduced in its contents substantially to these two articles of faith.

It might have been predicted, from the analogies of experience, that the Liberal movement would not stop with the abandonment of the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement, and with the resolution of Christianity into the incul-

cation of an elevated monotheism, coupled with the truth of immortality, and verified by miracles.* A ferment like that which Channing and his associates excited could not stop where it began. In such an atmosphere changes occur fast. The revolution of thought, like political revolutions, could not halt where its authors might wish it to stop, but must move on to more advanced stages. The first remarkable phenomenon was the development of the Intuitional Theory, if so it may be styled. Schleiermacher, and the French and German philosophers, were read by some. The thoughts of these writers fell into a genial soil. Religious truth, which the older Unitarians, after the manner of Locke and Paley, received on the ground of miraculous proof, was now affirmed to be evident to the soul independently of that species of evidence, which was pronounced to be of secondary value. This view of things involved a carrying of mental freedom further than had been anticipated. It was supposed to threaten the basis of supernaturalism. It awakened alarm. Professor Norton, learned in New Testament criticism and in the early patristic literature, in an address to the Cambridge Divinity School, uttered a warning against the new doctrine of a light within the soul as the latest form of infidelity. Spinoza, Schleiermacher, De Wette, and kindred spirits, were put under the ban, and their followers excommunicated with bell and candle. His position was that "no proof of the divine commission of Christ could be afforded save through miraculous displays of God's power." "No rational man," he said, "can suppose that God has miraculously revealed facts which the very constitution of our nature enables us to perceive." To this address, Mr. George Ripley responded in a scholarly and trenchant pamphlet, in

* Among the works which throw light on the history of Unitarianism in New England, in its successive phases, are the *Memoirs of Dr. Buckminster* and of *J. S. Buckminster*, *Channing's Memoirs* (by W. H. Channing), the *Life of Dr. Gannett* (by his son), the *biographies of Parker* (by Weiss and by Frothingham), *Frothingham's Transcendentalism*, and the *Memoir of Margaret Fuller*.

which he earnestly vindicated Schleiermacher and others from the charge of infidelity, and proved by citations from eminent theologians that the internal proof of the Gospel had been considered by the deepest thinkers of various schools the principal evidence of its divine origin. It is needless to trace the progress of this interesting discussion. The Transcendental school at length emerged into a distinct, flourishing life. Inspiration is not limited to men of the Bible; the soul has voices within it which reveal eternal truth: let the individual hearken for these utterances of the universal spirit, and no longer lean on the crutches of authority. The maxim, "Every man his own prophet," seemed to some to need no further verification when Mr. Emerson, professing a carelessness of logic, as with the insight though with none of the assumption of an oracle, and with the subtle, exquisite charm of his peculiar genius, began to improvise in the hearing of sympathetic listeners of both sexes. A crisis was produced, however, by Parker's relegating miracles to the transient in Christianity, and by his classification of Christianity with the ethnic religions as a purely natural product. Without renouncing theism, he affirmed that its doctrine issues from the progress of religion on the plane of nature, and is not derived from supernatural teaching. The truths which the Unitarians had made the sum and substance of the Gospel he asserted that we know intuitively. What need, then, to use Paley's phrase, of "the splendid apparatus of miracles," to prove what we already know by the light of Nature? The immortality of the soul, it had been said, is established by the resurrection of Jesus. But it is easier, Parker declared, to prove that we are immortal than to prove the resurrection. In short, he pronounced the evidence of miracles superfluous: there was no *dignus vindice nodus*. If there was nothing to prove, why should there be any proof? The essentials of Christianity had been reduced to a *minimum*; that minimum Parker conveyed over to natural theology.

As between the older Unitarians and the orthodox, so now between the conservative Unitarians and the Radicals, there was a striking difference in the type of culture. The intuitionist party had given a hospitable and eager welcome to the continental literature, not only to the metaphysicians and theologians, like Cousin, Schleiermacher, and De Wette, but also to the poets and critics—to such as Herder and Schiller, and especially to Goethe. Carlyle's critical essays, before and after he began to pour out the powerful jargon which became the characteristic of his style, were eagerly read, and the new evangel of sincerity, unconscious genius, and hero-worship mingled its stream in the current already swollen by its Teutonic tributaries. The memoir of that woman of rare intellectual gifts, Margaret Fuller, gives one a lively impression of the enthusiasm awakened by the European authors. To men like Professor Norton, a student of German, but who had derived no very agreeable conception of the German mind from the earlier Rationalistic writers whom he had been called upon to confute—to men like him, highly cultivated, according to the older standard, by the perusal of Locke and the English classics, and whose favorite poet was not Goethe but Mrs. Hemans, this influx of continental speculative mysticism and poetry was odious in the extreme. Some of the devotees of the new culture cherished ardent visions of an improved organization of society, in which existing abuses and hindrances to intellectual progress should be swept away. The Brook Farm Association, with its highly educated circle of members, was one fruit of this class of ideas.

Mr. Parker was not the man to hide his light under a bushel. The open avowal in the pulpit of opinions which had commonly been considered infidel, made it necessary to draw lines. This, on several accounts, was awkward. There was, to be sure, a real difference between those who admitted and those who denied a miraculous element in Christianity. But the promoters of the Unitarian movement had made

large professions of liberality. They had called for an unrestricted mental freedom. They had uttered a constant protest against "the system of exclusion," which thrusts men out of the pale of the church for their opinions. They had made it a merit to cast off the yoke of creeds. Now it seemed requisite to construct a creed, to define Christianity, to separate between liberality and license, and practically to excommunicate ministers, not for an alleged want of the Christian spirit, but for their doctrines. It is always embarrassing for a party of freedom and of progress to have to change front, and take the rôle of conservatives. It is easy to taunt them with inconsistency, to contrast their former professions with their present conduct, to make it seem at least that they are apostates from their principles, or that they have contended only for that precise measure of freedom which was fitted to their own need. How far these reproaches were just or unjust, there is no need that we should inquire here. No one will doubt that the appearance of Parkerism was a highly unwelcome phenomenon, and a rather unmanageable one, to the leading representatives of the liberal theology. What added to the difficulty was, that there might not be that amount of agreement among themselves which would appear requisite if a creed were to be framed that should embrace even so much as a tolerably precise definition of the authority to be ascribed to the Scriptures and to Christ.

We are concerned now with the view taken of Parker's position by Channing. He naturally leaned strongly to an intuitional philosophy. We have seen how he was drawn away from Locke by the influence of Price. He had made much of the moral and spiritual faculties of man, and of the spontaneous response which the contents of the Gospel call forth from human nature. There were not wanting, then, affinities to draw him towards the new school of Liberals. On the other hand, however, he was deeply attached to historical Christianity. His biography contains a num-

ber of memorable and beautiful letters in which he expresses himself respecting Parkerism temperately but frankly. In their whole tone they manifest, in the most attractive way, the loveliness of his Christian spirit. He felt that a rejection of the miracles was a rejection of Christ. The miracles, he says, are so interwoven with his history, that, if they are torn away, nothing is left; that history is turned into fable; the historical Christ is gone. But why not let him go? First, the soul craves not only the *idea*, but the *existence*, of perfection. Christian truth without Christ and his character loses a great portion of its quickening power. The miracles are among the manifestations of Christ's character; they are symbolical of his spiritual influence—for these reasons they cannot be spared. The miracles are credible. God could not approach a darkened, sensual world by mere abstract teaching. The inward perfection of Christ is itself a miracle, which renders the outward acts of superhuman power easy of belief. Channing recoils from Pantheism, which he sees to be latent in the mind of the new school of "true spiritualists." Speaking of a sermon which he had heard on "the loneliness of Christ," he says: "I claim little resemblance to my divine Friend and Saviour, but I seem doomed to drink of this cup with him to the last. I see and feel the harm done by this crude speculation, while I also see much nobleness to bind me to its advocates. In its opinions generally I see nothing to give me hope. . . . The immense distance of us all from Christ" in character is a fact so obvious that not to recognize it implies such a degree of self-ignorance, and of ignorance of human history, "that one wonders how it can have entered a sound mind."* In these letters there is no unseemly denunciation, but there is genuine, manly sorrow at the promulgation of opinions that are regarded as undermining historical Christianity. Had Channing gone a step further, and dis-

* *Memoir*, vol. ii., p. 448.

tingly perceived the necessity of a present, abiding relation of the soul to the living Christ, he would naturally have advanced to a view of his person not dissonant in substance from that of the Catholic theology, and would have perceived at the same time how indispensable to Christian piety is the assumption of the reality of the Gospel history. He cannot desert the old anchorage, but his reasons for not doing so are less convincing than if he could have pointed out plainly how a shipwreck is the necessary and immediate consequence. Christ was really, if not theoretically, more to him than a teacher and an example.

From the consideration of the theology of Channing we turn to his ethical writings. The two great subjects with regard to which he produced a powerful and lasting impression upon public opinion are War and Slavery. It is not these gigantic evils in their economical bearings that engage his interest. The predominant thought is the wrong which they involve, and the suffering which they inflict. His strong sense of the dignity of human nature excites in him a reprobation of whatever degrades man. His discourse on War is for the most part a well-guarded statement. He does not weaken the impression which is made by his description of the horrors of war by taking up an extravagant position as to its wrongfulness—as Mr. Sumner afterwards did in his oration on “The True Grandeur of Nations,” the main points of which, so far as they are sound, are suggested in Channing’s discussion, where they are presented without the pedantry, magniloquence, and tincture of egotism which were the common blemishes of Mr. Sumner’s otherwise impressive discourses. Mr. Sumner laid down the false proposition that in the present age there is no peace that is not honorable, and no war that is not dishonorable. He made no exceptions to the assertion of the moral unlawfulness of war. He advocated arbitration as a substitute for the struggle of arms, without intimating that there are cases, like our late contest for the Union, where the party that deems itself

wrong or invaded will never, and ought never, to refer the adjudication of the controversy to a third power. Channing justifies defensive warfare. His principle does not go so far as to require him to condemn Greece for repelling the armies of Xerxes, Washington for fighting the troops of George III., or Germany for driving back the late French invasion. It is not true that strict self-defence is the only lawful ground for taking up arms. There are wars undertaken for purposes of humanity, and there will continue to be such so long as Bulgarian massacres are perpetrated on earth. Canon Mozley, in an instructive sermon on War, has shown how wars necessarily arise from the very existence of nations as corporate unities, there being no common tribunal for the settlement of international disputes, and no tribunal, so far as we can see at present, being possible, to which every instance of grave national aggression could be referred. Force is the defender of justice and right within the limits of each nation, and so likewise as between peoples. Christianity, in recognizing nations as a part of the divine economy and the obligations of civil obedience, has sanctioned war as an ultimate resort against flagrant and destructive injustice, just as it has sanctioned force when wielded by the magistrate for the ends of public order within the bounds of each civil community. Channing might well have placed the right of war on a somewhat broader philosophical ground. He has not done full justice to the noble qualities of human nature, such as courage and self-sacrifice, which war may call into exercise; although he has words of praise for "the soldier of principle, who exposes his life for a cause which his conscience approves, and who mingles clemency and mercy with the joy of triumph." These, however, are slight criticisms upon a production which breathes in every line the noblest spirit of Christian love, and, without any admixture of false rhetoric, paints truly as well as vividly the criminality and misery which wars occasion.

The papers which Channing wrote on the slavery question are among the most meritorious of his writings. He never forgets his aim, which is to impress upon the consciences of men at the South as well as the North the injustice of slave-holding, and to extricate the national authority from complicity with it. He does not allow himself to be tempted into passionate declamation. On the other hand, there is nothing tame or timid in the condemnation which he expresses. Channing, as is well known, did not connect himself with the Anti-slavery Society, and objected to the unmeasured vituperation in which Anti-slavery leaders were prone to indulge. No one should wish to pluck from the brows of Mr. Garrison and his associates any laurels which they fairly earned by their long and unflinching warfare against the slave-power. It is a fact, however, that they were disunionists; and that the great political opposition to slavery which set in with full vigor at the epoch of the Missouri Compromise, and which went forward with fluctuating, indeed, but on the whole with increasing energy, until it triumphed in the election of Mr. Lincoln and in the emancipation of the slaves through the victory over the Rebellion,—it is a fact that this political opposition moved on to its complete success without the sympathy or aid of the Anti-slavery agitators to whom we have referred. It is another fact that numbers of sound and earnest antagonists of slavery, including numerous ministers, broke off their co-operation with Mr. Garrison from unwillingness to identify themselves with other heterogeneous reforms, as they were called, of which he made himself the champion. Dr. Channing understood the value of the American Union as well as the wrong of slavery. He wished to preserve the one and to destroy the other. It is true that he considered the annexation of Texas, for the purpose for which it was desired, to be so grave and mischievous a departure from the design of the national Union, as to furnish a sufficient reason for its dissolution. But of the importance of one united government

he had the deepest conviction. There were times when the frequent threats of dissolution at the South, and the encroachments of slavery, led many at the North to speak lightly of the American Union. All whose opinion is worth anything can now see that this was a mistake; and that the interests of civilization, and the interests of philanthropy, would have suffered a terrible blow if the Union had been broken up, either as the result of the labors of Abolitionists at the North, or of slave-extensionists at the South. Channing had to endure the censure of zealous men for what they considered his excessive moderation in the use of the vocabulary of invective. But this quality will redound to his lasting honor. No one doubted his courage. No one believed that he was restrained by the fear of unpopularity. It was the spirit of truth and the spirit of love united, which held him back from unwise and intemperate speech, and from measures which might be dictated by an honest zeal, but which did not tend to secure the end for which they were devised. His philanthropic zeal was not tainted with fanaticism. It was not a fault, that, while uttering his protest plainly and earnestly, he shunned exaggeration. The agitation which was kept up by the disunionist Anti-slavery leaders had its effect on the conscience of the people; but such an effect was produced, to say the least, in an equal measure, and in a way to provoke far less of irritation and disgust, by the arguments of Channing.

On the whole, while Channing cannot be said to have had a very deep comprehension of the evangelical creed, or to have contributed to the advancement of scientific theology, those who reject his theological opinions may be glad to see him—to quote the language of his epitaph—“honored throughout Christendom for his eloquence and courage in maintaining and advancing the great cause of truth, religion, and human freedom.”

THE SYSTEM OF DR. N. W. TAYLOR IN ITS CONNECTION WITH PRIOR NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.*

PHILIP MELANCHTHON, a few days before he died, wrote on a loose sheet of paper a memorandum of reasons why death should be less unwelcome to him. Among them was the prospect of escaping "from the fury of theologians."† The outcry against him, that began before Luther's death, increased afterwards; and men who copied in excess the faults of Luther, without a grain of his nobleness, were barking and howling round the great scholar—the Preceptor of Germany, the St. John of the Reformation—for presuming to deviate

* [This Essay (from the *New Englander* for 1868), was occasioned by an article on "Presbyterian Reunion," from the pen of the late Dr. Charles Hodge, of Princeton. One of the objections made by Dr. Hodge to reunion was the circumstance that ministers in accord with the theological opinions of Dr. Taylor were received into the pulpits of the "New-School" Presbyterian Church. This objection he fortified by alleging objections to Dr. Taylor's theology. In reprinting this essay, it has been abridged by leaving out some passages of no permanent interest. It was impracticable to omit all polemical references with respect to the interpretation of Dr. Taylor's system, as these, in a few cases, are so interwoven with the text of the article that they could not well be eliminated. The *Outlines of Theology*, to which reference is made, is the work of Dr. A. A. Hodge, based partly on the lectures of the senior Dr Hodge. This able work has since been rewritten and much expanded. (R. Carter and Brothers, 1879.)]

† The whole memorandum is pathetic:—"Discedes a peccatis; liberaberis ab ærumnis et a rabie theologorum; venies in lucem; intueberis Filium Dei; disces illa mira arcana, quæ in hac vita intelligere non potuisti—cur sic simus conditi, qualis sit copulatio duarum naturarum in Christo."

in some particulars from Luther's doctrine. He could not help agreeing with Calvin on the Lord's Supper; he could not admit the slavery of the will as Luther had proclaimed it; he would go, perhaps, too far in retaining old forms of worship for the sake of peace. For these conscientious opinions, the author of the Augsburg Confession was pursued with unrelenting hostility; so that a half century after he died, the leading professor of theology at Wittenberg was so enraged at hearing him referred to by a student as an authority for some doctrinal statement, that, before the eyes of all, he tore his portrait from the wall and trampled on it.

There is such a thing, then, as *rabies theologorum*. Of course we do not mean to imply that Dr. Taylor was ever in the same degree the object of it. Yet, it was well that even he was made of sterner stuff than poor Melancthon. He never complained of a manly, courteous opposition to his opinions. He who brings forward new ideas has no right to claim exemption from unfavorable criticism. But he did feel that there was far more effort to make him out heretical, to rob him of his good name among orthodox Christians, and to stir up prejudice against him, than to judge fairly, or even to hear candidly, his teaching. It did not diminish his sense of wrong that in some cases the stabs upon his reputation were inflicted with a bland and unctuous manner, with professions of personal regard, and under the guise of a holy zeal for the truth. Dr. Taylor was himself an honest, magnanimous, open-hearted man; and he knew well who, among his opponents, were moved by a conscientious dissent from his opinions, and who of them were instigated by self-interest or by resentment for imagined slights.

Dr. Taylor was a metaphysician; he was a philosopher, who has had no equal in this department, on our side of the ocean, since President Edwards. It was in some respects a misfortune that his philosophical views and reasonings were brought forward in the form of theological discussions. In this country, not only every minister, but most laymen, sup-

pose themselves to be adepts in the science of theology. They expect that everything shall be made perfectly easy of comprehension to everybody. Hence, so clear, common-sense a thinker as Dr. Taylor, who hated all mysticism, was constantly complained of as too "metaphysical," as obscure and unintelligible. Itinerant preachers, who had no training in mental science, and little capacity for receiving one, felt that there must be something dreadful under that cloud which their eyes could not penetrate. They felt sure that it was not "the simplicity of the Gospel." So President Edwards, in his day, frequently alludes to the reproach that was cast upon him because he reasoned metaphysically. Moreover, bringing forward his philosophical opinions exclusively in their bearing on theological questions of present interest, Dr. Taylor would be liable to excite the opposition of existing theological parties. Calm discussion would be interrupted by ecclesiastical interference. Had he brought the results of his thinking into the forum of philosophy, where they might be examined, as are the tenets of Leibnitz, or Locke, or Dugald Stewart, who supposes that all of those who actually took up arms against him would have deemed themselves qualified by nature or education for this work of assault?

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In our judgment, it is a grand merit of our New England theologians, that while holding the past in due reverence, they have not bowed down before it, but have expected progress. They have seen that the denial of the hope of progress in theology—that is, in the understanding and expression of the truths of the Bible—would have shut out the Protestant Reformation, as well as every other access of light since theology began to be a science. Smalley, while engaged in combating theories of Emmons which he earnestly rejected, is careful to add:

"It has doubtless been perceived by every attentive reader, that the sentiments remarked upon, are not objected against merely, if at all, be-

cause of their being innovations ; there may be danger no doubt, of holding over tenaciously the traditions of the elders, as well as of departing too hastily from the long received opinions of our ancestors. There have been many innovations in Christian theology, which were doubtless real improvements. Calvin himself was a great innovator in his day ; and it cannot reasonably be supposed, that either he, or any of the other first reformers, just emerging from the darkness of popery, had all the light that was ever to come into the world." *

To our mind there is something noble in this willing, hopeful spirit of progress and emancipation from slavish deference to human authority. They mark a truly scientific, as well as a truly Christian temper. There is no contempt for the past ; there is no rash and flighty desertion of received doctrine ; but there is a readiness to learn, to modify traditional tenets at the coming of new light, and a disposition to confront the errors of good men by dispassionate argument instead of church anathemas. How much better is New England to-day, and the Christianity of the country too, for the line of theologians from Edwards to Taylor—not to speak of the living—who, whatever may have been their eccentricities or mistakes, have dared to think for themselves and have endeavored to present the truths of the Gospel in more reasonable as well as defensible forms of statement. This freedom is an invaluable possession. Wherever it may be lightly esteemed, let it be still cherished in New England !

The present seems a favorable opportunity for setting forth the theological system of Dr. Taylor, in itself and in its historical relations. This we undertake more as an expositor than as a critic, and shall therefore in this place abstain, generally speaking, from either vindicating or opposing his distinctive tenets.

Everybody who is much acquainted with New England theology knows that the elder Edwards set out to clear the

* Smalley, *Works*, ii., 421

Calvinistic system of difficulties and objections that were felt both by its advocates and opponents; an attempt which was continued by subsequent theologians. "The Calvinists," writes the younger Edwards, describing the state of things when his father commenced his work, "themselves began to be ashamed of their own cause, and to give it up, so far at least as relates to liberty and necessity. This was true, especially of Drs. Watts and Doddridge, who in their day were accounted leaders of the Calvinists." * The full justice of this remark will be evident to any one who will examine the theological writings of these two eminent men. We know not where to look for more striking specimens of weak and inconsequent reasoning than they present; and this impression is heightened in the case of Doddridge, by the *quasi* mathematical form in which his lectures are cast. The sum of the charge brought against the Calvinists was that "the sense in which they interpreted the sacred writings was inconsistent with human liberty, moral agency, accountableness, praise, and blame." "How absurd, it was urged, that a man totally dead should be called upon to arise and perform the duties of the living and sound—that we should need a divine influence to give us a new heart, and yet be commanded to make a new heart and a right spirit—that a man has no power to come to Christ, and yet be commanded to come to him on pain of damnation!" †

The fundamental points in the indictment preferred by the Arminian writers, Edwards took up in his two treatises, that on the *Will* and that on *Original Sin*. It had been the Augustinian, mediæval, and old Protestant doctrine, that the posterity of Adam are answerable for Adam's sin, and therefore both sinful and condemned at birth, because they really participated in it. They are condemned and punished for their own deed in Adam. After the notion of a covenant with Adam—the so-called Federal theology, which is now

* *Works*, i., 482.† *Ibid.*, p. 482.

maintained at Princeton—was superimposed, in the course of the seventeenth century, on the realistic conception, still theologians, when they were pressed by objections, fell back on the old idea of a true and real participation on the part of mankind in their progenitor's act. But the inconsistency of this doctrine with other accepted beliefs—for example, with Creationism, or the doctrine that each soul is created by itself, in opposition to the Traducian theory, and more than all with the Lockian philosophy, in which philosophical realism found no countenance, broke down this prop. Participation in Adam's sin did not cohere with nominalism. The opponents of Calvinism now demanded with one voice some explanation of the imputation of a sin to the descendants of Adam, which it was confessed they had no agency in committing. They inquired how the infliction of an infinite penalty upon them, for an act that was done by an individual long before they were created, is consistent with those intuitive principles of justice which are written on the heart and sanctioned, directly or indirectly, everywhere in the Bible.

In the latter part of his treatise on original sin, President Edwards endeavors to meet "that great objection," as he styles it, "against the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that such imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his posterity are not one and the same."* His whole tone implies that he considers this a grave and formidable objection, and his great powers are tasked to the utmost in meeting it. He meets it by denying the fact which it assumes, that Adam and his posterity *are* distinct agents. The guilt of a man at his birth is declared to be "the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God."† "The sin of apostasy is not theirs, merely because God *imputes* it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that *ground* God imputes it to

* *Works* (Dwight's ed.), vol. ii., p. 342.

† *Ibid.*, p. 543.

them." * His curious speculations upon the nature of identity are to demonstrate that the sin of the posterity of Adam is one and the same—identically, numerically the same,—with his. The first rising of a sinful inclination in any and every individual since Adam is that consent to the first sin which they really gave in him, and which, in the individualization of the species, appears in the soul of every person at birth. In short, he answers the objection that we did not commit the first sin, by affirming that we did.

The second great objection of the Arminians, that according to Calvinism men are required to do what they are said to have no power to do—that the freedom of the will is denied, and fatalism substituted for it—Edwards particularly considers in the treatise on the Will. He endeavors to confute them on this point by his doctrine of natural ability coupled with moral inability. The germs of this treatise are in Locke's chapter on "Power." † Locke there maintains that "freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or non-existence, of any action upon our volition of it;" ‡ that liberty relates to events consecutive to volition. Given the volition, will the thing chosen follow in accordance with it? If so, we are to that extent free. This is the proper, and the only proper, use of the terms freedom and liberty in their application to personal agents. Hence, Locke declares that the "question whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases," is absurd; for this, he adds, is to ask "whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with. A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on *in infinitum*." § Here is Edwards's refutation of the Arminian objections, in a nutshell. He defines one's lib-

* Ibid., p. 559.

† Ibid., chap. xxi.

‡ "Univ. Ed.," p. 159.

§ Ibid., p. 153.

erty to be freedom "from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills." * Necessity, constraint, coercion, and all similar terms are inapplicable to the will, for the reason that they all presuppose an opposition of the will, which in the case of a choice is by the supposition excluded.† That only is necessary which choice cannot prevent. ‡

Casting out these terms, he then, by a remorseless application of the maxim—every event must have a cause—to the *specification* of choice—to the choice of one thing *rather* than another—established his doctrine of determinism, and drove the Arminians to the wall. There was full liberty, there was no necessity, and yet there was an absolute certainty given by the antecedents; and on this foreordained certainty, the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination might have a sure foundation.

What did Edwards mean, then, by his "natural ability"? He meant that nothing but a right choice or inclination is needed by a wicked man in order to repent and turn from his ways. "There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and everything else sufficient; nothing is wanting but a will." § But coexisting with this natural ability, is a moral inability, by which is meant a fixed and habitual inclination such as renders a perseverance in evil—a perseverance of the will in its evil choice—perfectly certain.

It is, therefore, according to Edwards, an impropriety of speech to say that a sinner cannot repent and be holy. We say that a man *cannot* accomplish an event, when the event will not take place in consequence of, or on the supposition of, his choice. But here the event is itself a choice; it is a case where doing is choosing. || For a like reason, Edwards

* *Works*, ii., 38.

† *Ibid.*, ii., 26 et passim.

‡ *Ibid.*, ii., 84.

§ *Ibid.*, ii., 38.

|| It is nothing new for Necessitarians to deny the propriety of applying the terms "necessity," "coaction," "inability," and the like, to acts of the will. Their argument on this point is concisely put by Thomas

continually treats the question whether a man *can* choose otherwise than he does, as absurd. For what does it signify? It signifies, when reduced to a proposition, *either* that if he chooses in a particular way, he chooses in that way—an identical proposition, *or* that he will choose in a particular way, if he chooses to choose in that way—which leads to an infinite series. Thus he rules out the question of the power of contrary choice, in the ordinary understanding of the phrase, by his definitions. To ask if a man can repent, or if he can repent if he choose, or if he can repent if he will, is either mere tautology, or involves the blunder of supposing an infinite series of choices. He silences the objector by depriving him of the power to put his question, or by pronouncing that question an absurdity. Man is responsible because he is naturally able; he is helpless because he is morally unable.*

Aquinas. "Illud quod movetur ab altero, dicitur cogi, si moveatur contra inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio, quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi." "Sic igitur Deus movendo voluntatem non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei ejus propriam inclinationem." "Sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei, quod movetur ab alio." P. i. Qu. 105, Art. 4.

There is great similarity between the definitions and arguments of Edwards and those of Hobbes and Collins. He says that he had not read Hobbes, and although Dugald Stewart implies that he had read Collins, this is not at all probable. Sir William Hamilton once made a remark to us, which implied that he considered Edwards a borrower from Collins. On repeating Hamilton's observation to Dr. Taylor, he said that probably Edwards had never seen a copy of Collins.

* Sometimes Edwards appears to leave the beaten track, and really to take up the question of the power of contrary choice. One instance is in Part iii, § iv. (ii. 160), where he says that "the inclination," in the case of the original determination or act of the will, "is unable to change itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to change itself." But the context shows that the *unable* is only a moral inability, or certainty; and the reason alleged is still the incompatibility of opposite choices (or inclinations) at the same time. "Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise: for that would be *at present* to choose something diverse from what is *at present* chosen." The italics belong to Edwards.

Unquestionably the statements of President Edwards on this subject are verbally at variance with the Calvinistic symbols and standard writers. The old form of doctrine was that men since the fall are free to sin, but have no other freedom. But the frequent assertion of Edwards is that men *now* have all the liberty that ever existed or that could ever possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive.* This, however, is a verbal incongruity, due to his peculiar use of terms. Yet his theory of the will differs from that of the old Calvinists, if we except the high supralapsarian view, in that they, like Augustine, explicitly gave to Adam in his act of apostasy the power of contrary choice.† And that “mutability” of will that was ascribed to him prior to transgression can find no place in President Edwards’s notion of liberty.‡

The solution which Edwards offered of the problem of

The nearest approach to a perfectly distinct and unequivocal assertion of properly necessitarian doctrine, which we remember in Edwards, is in the remark that the difference between natural and moral necessity “does not lie so much in the nature of the *connection*, as in the two terms *connected* ;” the cause and effect in the case of moral necessity being of a moral kind. P. i., § 4.

* *Letter to a Minister of the Church of Scotland*, vol. ii.

† Comp. *West. Confession*, chap. ix., iii. Man “hath wholly lost *all* ability of will to any spiritual good,” etc.

‡ It is remarkable that the Jansenists, in striving to make a distinction between their doctrine and that of Calvin, use phraseology very similar to that of Edwards. Men can resist grace *if they will*. Calvin is quite wrong, says Pascal, in the seventeenth of the Provincial Letters, in holding that the sinner *cannot* resist grace—even “la grâce efficace et victorieuse.” “Ce n’est pas qu’il ne puisse toujours s’en éloigner, et qu’il ne s’en éloignât effectivement, s’il le voulait.” But what does he mean by *can*—by *power*. It is the Augustinian *potestas si vult*, as Mozley has pointed out in his *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, p. 427. Calvin would have admitted all that Pascal says, for he did not hold, as was represented by the Jansenists, that the will is moved like an inanimate thing. See (e. g.) *Inst.* ii., iii., 14. The Dominicans endeavored to distinguish their doctrine from that of the Jansenists, as the latter professed to reject the doctrine of Calvin. But the difference in both cases was merely verbal.

original sin failed to satisfy his successors. Hopkins, in certain passages, seems to adopt the realistic propositions of his teacher. Of Adam it is said that "being by divine constitution the natural head and father of the whole race, they were all *included and created* in him as one whole which could not be separated; and, therefore, he is treated as the whole in this transaction."* But looking at all that he says on the subject, we find his doctrine to be that men are sinners from birth through a divine constitution establishing an infallible connection between Adam's sin and their sin. If he sins, it is certain that they will begin their existence as sinners. But all sin consists in exercise or act. And "the children of Adam are not guilty of his sin, are not punished, and do not suffer for that, any further than they implicitly or expressly approve of his transgression by sinning as he did; their total moral corruption and sinfulness is as much their own sin, as it could be if it were not in consequence of the sin of the first father of the human race, or if Adam had not first sinned."† It is explicitly held that men do not become sinners as a penalty of the law for Adam's sin. Their sin is at once a consequence or effect of Adam's sin by the divine constitution, and their own free act. Yet they begin to sin at the beginning of their existence. "As soon as children are capable of the least motion and exercise of the heart which is contrary to the law of God, such motions and exercises are sin in them, though they are ignorant of it." "Persons may be moral agents, and sin without knowing what the law of God is, of what nature their exercises are, and while they have no consciousness that they are wrong."

Hopkins brought in the doctrine of divine efficiency in the production of sin. He considered this a legitimate deduction from the teachings of Edwards. It had been held that sinful choices, not less than holy, result with infallible cer-

* *Works* (Boston ed., 1852), i., 199.

† *Ibid.*, i., 235.

tainty from causes which God had set in operation. He is, then, the first cause to whose power the effect must be attributed. The efficiency that issues in the origination of a sinful choice emanates from him.* His agency is universal.

In Emmons, Hopkinsianism is seen in full flower. All men become sinners by Adam. He did not make them sinners by causing them to commit his first offence. "We could no more eat of the forbidden fruit before we were born, than Adam could have eaten of it before he was created." Nor did he make men sinners by transferring to them the guilt of his first transgression. "The guilt of any action can no more be transferred from the agent to another person, than the action itself." Nor did Adam make men sinners by conveying to them a morally corrupted nature. "There is no morally corrupt nature distinct from free, voluntary, sinful exercises." Adam had no such nature. Supposing that he had such a nature, he could not convey it to his descendants; for "the soul is not transmitted from father to son by natural generation.† The soul is spiritual; and what is spiritual is indivisible; and what is indivisible is incapable of propagation." Adam's sin caused our sin only as God determined that in case Adam should sin, we should be brought into existence morally depraved.

"Accordingly, in consequence of Adam's first transgression, God now brings his posterity into the world in a state of moral depravity. But how? The answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants, he forms them with moral powers, and makes them men in miniature. And being men in miniature, he works in them as he does in other men, both to will and to do of his good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists. Moral depravity can take place nowhere but in moral agents; and moral agents can never act but only as they are acted on by a divine operation. It is just as easy, therefore, to account for moral depravity in infancy, as in any other period of life."‡

* *Works*, i., 232.

† *Works*, iv., Sermon xxxv.

‡ *Ibid.*, iv., Sermon xxvi., p. 357.

The objection that God is made the author of sin, is answered by the assertion that sin pertains to the nature of actions and not to their cause. He who creates the poison of rattlesnakes has not in himself the quality to which he gives existence. Edwards had suggested this answer in his doctrine that "the essence of the virtue and vice of the dispositions of the heart and acts of will, lies not in their cause, but their nature." *

On one point in the doctrine as to the conditions of responsible agency, Emmons went a step beyond Hopkins. Emmons maintains that a knowledge or perception of law is a prerequisite of moral, accountable action. He contends that infants have this consciousness of duty. Without it, he says, they would be mere agents, but not moral agents; and if mere agents he maintains that they never would become moral agents. †

The question was, how are men responsible for sin which they could not have prevented and for continuing to sin when they cannot stop? Theology, in the Hopkinsian line, had reached the propositions that no individual is accountable for any sin which he does not personally commit by violating known law; that sin begins with the personal life of each man in this world, and is not the penalty of the offence of Adam, but only consequent upon it in the divine plan and appointment. But with these doctrines there was coupled a more bald determinism than Christian theology had ever tolerated. A divine efficiency was made the cause of sinful choices, and sin, not less than holiness, was declared to be the product of divine agency.

Among the adversaries of the Hopkinsian peculiarities is Dr. Smalley. He discards the notion of a federal representation in Adam, one individual acting for the rest, and compares it to "a draught in a lottery." ‡ He rejects likewise

* *Works*, vol. ii., 186 seq.

† *Ibid.*, iv., Sermon xi.

‡ *Works* (Hartford, 1803), i., 180, Serm. xi.

Edwards's theory of our identity with Adam, which, he says, is "diving into metaphysics below the bottom of things or quite beyond the fathom of common-sense." * Denying all imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, he holds that his sin *occasions* our sin from our birth; but this sin *is* ours and not his, and *as* ours it is condemned. So far he coincides with Emmons. But he differs in holding to a sinful propensity or "disposition back of exercises"—"prior to knowledge and prior to actual sin." † How shall he escape from the conclusion that God is the author of sin, as being the creator of the soul? "Perhaps," he replies, the creation of sin by God "need not be supposed. Perhaps the depravity of a sinner may consist, primarily, in mere privation, or in the want of holy principles, and if so, it need not be created." ‡ In this last hypothesis of the privative character of sin, whether he knew it or not, he followed a long line of thinkers, including Augustine and Aquinas, who struggled to avoid an inference to which their logic appeared irresistibly to carry them. He combats the theory of divine efficiency in the production of sin and in the hardening of men's hearts. He holds, too, that regeneration is the imparting of a new taste, relish, or disposition anterior to holy volitions, to which it gives rise. It is obvious that, on Smalley's own premises, this privation, which constitutes sin, is due to the make of the soul and occurs by necessary consequence from the act of the Creator. It is difficult to see the advantage of his theory, in this aspect of it, over that of Emmons.

In more direct relation to Dr. Taylor's system is the theology of Dr. Dwight. Dwight rejects imputation. "Moral actions are not, so far as I can see, transferable from one being to another. The personal act of any agent is, in its very nature, the act of that agent solely; and incapable of being participated by any other agent. Of course, the guilt of such a personal act is equally incapable of being

* *Works*, i., p. 180.

† *Ibid.*, p. 188.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

transferred or participated. The guilt is inherent in the action; and is attributable, therefore, to the agent only." * "Nor are the descendants of Adam punished for his transgression." † The Bible explicitly affirms that no man shall be punished for the sin of another. We become sinners in consequence of Adam's sin, but how we cannot explain. Inability is disinclination. "The words *can* and *cannot* are used in the Scriptures, just as they are used in the common intercourse of mankind, to express willingness or unwillingness." ‡ The general expressions of Dwight on the nature of moral agency would lead one to conclude that he must hold all sin to consist in the wilful transgression of known law. In the course of his sermon on the Temptation and Fall, he comes to the question, Why did God permit Adam to sin? He observes of this question that it affects not the sin of Adam only, but *all sin*. He then states the distinction between the permission of sin, which he accepts, and the creating of it. "*In the former case one man is the actor of his own sin*. His sin, therefore, is wholly his own; chargeable only to himself; chosen by him unnecessarily, while possessed of a power to choose otherwise; avoidable by him; and of course guilty and righteously punishable." § He declares that "sin, universally, is no other than selfishness, or a preference of one's self to all other beings, and of one's private interests and gratifications to the well-being of the universe, of God, and the intelligent creation." || "This," he says in another place, "is sin and all that in the Scriptures is meant by sin." ¶ In his sermon on the benevolence of God, he speaks of sin, the opposite principle, as "that disposition in us, which God, by the dictates of his infinite benevolence is in a sense compelled to hate and punish, because it is *a voluntary opposition to his own perfect character*, and a fixed enmity to the well-being of his crea-

* *Works*, Sermon. xxxii. (ii., 2).† *Ibid.*, Sermon. cxxxiii. (iv., 467).|| *Ibid.*, Sermon. c. (iii., 464).† *Ibid.*, p. 4.§ *Ibid.*, Sermon. xxvii. (vi., 460).¶ *Ibid.*, Sermon. lxxx. (iii., 162).

tures.”* How zealously Dr. Dwight controverts the theory of divine efficiency, as making God the author of sin, all of his readers are aware. In his sermon to prove that the soul is not a series of ideas and exercises, he says: “A finite agent has been supposed to exist, possessed of understanding to perceive, and ability to choose, that which was good or evil; that which was conformed, or not conformed to the law under which it was placed. Whenever he was unpossessed of such an ability, it has been further supposed, that he was incapable of either virtue or vice. *According to this view of common sense*, the scheme of the Scriptures seems everywhere to be formed.”† But in his discourse on the “Derivation of Human Depravity from Adam,” he argues that death must be considered an indubitable proof of the existence of depravity in every moral being who is subject to death. That infants “are contaminated in their moral nature, and born in the likeness of apostate Adam” he holds to be a fact “inevitably proved, so far as the most unexceptionable analogy can prove anything, by the depraved moral conduct of every infant who lives so long as to be capable of moral action.”‡ In interpreting Dr. Dwight, it is important to ascertain in what sense he used the terms taste, relish, disposition, propensity, principle. He speaks of these words as descriptive of an unknown and inexplicable cause of holy or sinful volitions.

“I do not deny,” he says, “on the contrary I readily admit that there is a cause of moral action in intelligent beings, frequently indicated by the words *principle, affections, habits, nature, tendency, propensity*, and several others. In this case, however, as well as in many others, it is carefully to be observed, that these terms indicate a cause which to us is wholly unknown; except that its existence is proved by its effects.” “When we use these kinds of phraseology, we intend that a reason really exists, although undefinable and unintelligible by ourselves, why one mind will, either usually or uniformly, be the subject of holy volitions

* *Works*, Sermon ix. (i., 157).

† *Ibid.*, Sermon xxiv. (i., 406).

‡ *Ibid.*, Sermon xxxii. (ii., 13).

and another of sinful ones." "We mean to indicate a state of mind, generally existing, out of which holy volitions may, in one case, be fairly expected to arise, and sinful ones in another." "This state is *the cause*, which I have mentioned; a cause the existence of which must be admitted, unless we acknowledge it to be a perfect casualty, that any volition is sinful rather than holy." "This cause is what is so often mentioned in the Scriptures under the name of *the heart*." "I have already remarked, that this cause is unknown except by its effects." "It is not so powerful, nor so unchangeable, as to incline the mind in which it exists, so strongly to holiness, as to prevent it absolutely from sinning, nor so strongly to sin, as to prevent it absolutely from acting in a holy manner." To account for sin in a holy being, we have to suppose "that a temptation, actually presented to the mind, is disproportioned in its power to the inclination of that mind towards resistance."*

Now what is really meant by this unknown, mysterious disposition? Regeneration is defined to be the communication by God of a relish for spiritual objects, which leads to holy choices—such a relish as He communicated to Adam prior to his holy acts. Dr. Taylor considered himself justified in interpreting these ambiguous terms in conformity with the expressions of Dr. Dwight relative to the nature of sin and of agency, which have been cited; that is, as implying voluntary action. By volitions, Dr. Dwight undoubtedly means imperative acts of will. He styles the "new disposition" in regenerated souls, "disinterestedness, love, *good-will*, benevolence."† He says that "the influence which God exerts on them by His Spirit is of such a nature, that their *wills*, instead of attempting any resistance to it, coincide with it readily and cheerfully, without any force or constraint on his part, or any opposition on their own."‡ But if a "disposition" is voluntary, then Dr. Dwight must have held with Hopkins and Emmons that infants are voluntary transgressors of law from their birth. Moreover, he sometimes speaks of holy love as one of the *fruits* or *consequences* of the new relish, instead of strictly identifying the

* *Works*, Sermon. xxvii. (i., 456). See, also, Sermon. lxxiv. (iii., 63).

† *Ibid.*, Sermon. lxxxix. (iii., 280). ‡ *Ibid.*, Sermon. lxxii. (iii., 40).

two. And why does he speak of this "disposition" as of something so mysterious and inexplicable, as when he says: "of the metaphysical nature of this cause, I am ignorant"? *

In interpreting a philosophical or theological writer, we are not at liberty to say that he *must* have meant this or that, because otherwise we cannot make him consistent with himself. Rather is it true that out of what is left obscure or self-contradictory in a writer, comes the spur to further investigation and progress on the part of those who follow. In this case, it is reasonable to conclude that Dr. Dwight had not arrived at a clear view of the nature of the holy or sinful "disposition" at the root of special or imperative volitions, or brought this element into a consistent relation to other features of his doctrinal system.

One of the most industrious and influential of the adversaries of Dr. Taylor was Dr. Leonard Woods, Professor at Andover. He had expounded his opinions respecting the doctrine of sin in his *Letters to Unitarians*, and in his controversy with Dr. Ware. He had expressed himself in accordance with the Hopkinsian views. He rejects imputation, and refuses unqualified assent to the statements of the Westminster Assembly in regard to original sin.

"In Scripture," he said, "the word *impute*, when used in its proper sense, certainly in relation to sin, uniformly signifies charging or reckoning to a man that which is his own attribute or act. Every attempt which has been made to prove that God ever imputes to man any sinful disposition or act which is not strictly *his own*, has failed of success. As it is one object of these letters to make you acquainted with the real opinions of the orthodox in New England, I would here say, with the utmost frankness, that we are not entirely satisfied with the language used on this subject in the Assembly's Catechism. Though we hold that catechism, taken as a whole, in the highest estimation, we could not with a good conscience subscribe to every expression it contains, in relation to the doctrine of original sin. Hence it is common for us, when we declare our assent to the catechism, to do it with an express or implied restric-

* *Works*, Sermon lxxiv. (iii., 63).

tion. We receive the catechism *generally* as containing a summary of the principles of Christianity. We are not accountable for Adam's sin, but our personal sinfulness is in consequence of his sin." *

He had defined moral agency as involving a knowledge of duty and a natural power of performing it. "As accountable beings, *we have a conscience and a power of knowing and performing our duty.* Our zeal in defence of this principle has been such, as to occasion no small umbrage to some, who are attached to every feature and every phraseology of Calvinism. On this subject there is, in fact, a well known difference between our views, and those of some modern, as well as more ancient divines, who rank high on the side of orthodoxy." † All sin consists in the *exercise* of a disposition contrary to what the law requires." ‡ "Sin in its highest sense is sin in the heart, that is wrong affection, corrupt inclination." § As to the time when sin begins, Dr. Woods remarks :

"I make it no part of my object in this discussion to determine precisely the time when moral agency begins. There are difficulties in the way of such a determination, which I feel myself wholly unable to surmount. My position is, that as soon as men are moral agents, they are sinners." "It seems to me as unreasonable and absurd to say, that human beings are really sinners before they are moral agents, as to say that birds or fishes are sinners." ¶

But, notwithstanding his caution in defining the date of incipient moral agency, he labors to disprove the negative position that sin cannot begin with the beginning of the soul's life. There is no difficulty in supposing them to sin from birth, and such he plainly indicates to be his opinion. ¶

In 1835, Dr. Woods published an essay on native depravity. Through a considerable part of this essay, he ad-

* *Letters*, etc. (Boston, 1822), p. 32. We quote from the controversial papers of Dr. Woods in the original editions, and not in the altered form in which they appear in his collected works.

† *Letters*, etc. (Boston, 1822), p. 95.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 305 et passim.

vocates the opinions which have just been described. He argues that infants may be capable of "moral emotions" of a sinful character from the start, inasmuch as the *divine law is written on the heart*, and therefore no instruction from without is requisite to render them accountable agents.* He explains that he means by their having the law written on their hearts, that they have "moral faculties and moral perceptions."† They have from the first "some feeble degree of moral affection"—some degree of "personal depravity."‡ "Children are in some small degree moral agents from the first."§

Having pursued this line of argument, he makes one of the most remarkable transitions which we have ever met with in the course of our theological reading. He proposes a different hypothesis which he at first suggests as plausible and entitled to consideration, but which he proceeds to defend and avow as his own belief. Stated in his own words, it is that the depravity of man "consists originally in a *wrong disposition* or a *corrupt nature*, which is antecedent to any sinful emotions, and from which, as an inward source, all sinful emotions and actions proceed."|| There is an inclination, disposition, propensity, or tendency to sin, existing prior to all sinful *feelings* even, and out of that hidden fountain all such feelings, and all sinful choices and actions flow. This propensity to sin is itself sinful—the very *fons et origo malorum*. Dr. Woods quietly ignores his doctrine as to the nature of moral agency, and the nature of sin, and assumes the existence, back of all exercises, of a constitutional, innate, inherited, and propagated propensity of which sin is the object.

Turning back now to his controversy with Ware, we find the same doctrine less plainly suggested, and standing side by side with the Hopkinsian propositions which have been already noticed as making up the main part of that earlier discussion. There are passages in which he traces sin to

* Essay, p. 147.

† Ibid., p. 150.

‡ Ibid., p. 155.

§ Ibid., p. 154.

|| Ibid., p. 158.

what is "original or native in our *moral constitution*,"* "a uniformly operating cause or law of nature," passing from father to son like "the serpent's bite, the lion's fierceness," or "intelligence, gratitude, sympathy, or kindness," in the human soul.† This propensity is something distinct from the "natural appetites, affections, and passions," and is "itself sinful; yea, it is what every one must consider as the very essence of sin."‡

In his essay, after advocating both these diverse forms of doctrine, in the manner stated above, he makes an attempt to unite them; but it is unnecessary to trace his path in this unsuccessful enterprise.

Besides the questions which have been specially noticed above, there is another great topic which could not escape the attention of the New England divines. We refer to the permission of sin and the kindred questions which belong to the theodicy. This subject, as all know, was debated in the ancient heathen schools. It was elaborately handled by the scholastic writers, and by Thomas Aquinas in particular. Differing from Scotus, who, like Anselm and Abelard, held that the present is the best possible system, Aquinas maintained, though in doubtful consistency with some of his own principles, § that we can conceive of the present system of things as amplified and extended, whence, indeed, a system in this sense better would result; but within the present system we can conceive of no change that would not be an evil. Sin, in itself considered, is an evil, but, as related to the whole order of things in which it has a place, this is not the fact. Sin is not the *direct* means of the greatest good; its proper tendencies are not good, but evil; yet, indirectly, as an indispensable condition, it is the necessary means of the greatest good. It follows from the per-

* *Letters and Reply*, p. 159.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 158, 162.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 334, 335.

§ See, on the relation of this doctrine to the system of Aquinas, Ritter, *Gesch. d. Christ. Phil.* iv., 283.

fections of God, from his omnipotence and benevolence, that it is good that evil exists. If sin did not exist when and where it does, the system would be damaged in other respects. Sometimes the schoolmen appealed to the principle of *variety*, and argued that virtue is set off advantageously by the contrast of moral evil, or that sin is useful as a test and purifier of the good, or that, without sin, forms of excellence—patience, for example—could never exist. Commonly they supported their denial of the divine authorship of sin by the fallacious position which was borrowed from Augustine, that sin is a mere defect—is *nihil*. But their real doctrine is that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. The old Protestant theology came to a like conclusion. It is the conviction of Calvin that because sin exists under the divine administration, in the system of which God is the author, we must suppose it preferable that sin should exist rather than not. It is this conviction in great part that leads him to deny that sin is barely permitted, and to maintain a volitive permission, and, in this sense, an ordination of sin on the part of God. Hence he has often been thought a supralapsarian, as if he held even the first sin to be an object of an efficient decree. But this is not his doctrine, as a careful study of the *Consensus Genevensis*, as well as of his writings generally, will demonstrate. He constantly falls back on the statement of Augustine, who is acknowledged to be sublapsarian, that God not only permits, but wills to permit, sin; and he puts his whole theory into this sentence. Calvin's principles respecting the divine justice, as underlying all decrees and providential action, clash with the supralapsarian scheme. He labors to repel the imputation that he holds God to be the author of moral evil; yet, as we have said, he could not escape, as he thought, from the doctrine that it is good that evil exists.* This doctrine, that the existence of sin is to be

* Not a few distinguished scholars, and among them, Gieseler, Julius Müller, Neander, and Baur, have supposed Calvin to go beyond Augus-

preferred to its non-existence—that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, passed into the New England theology. Hopkins is full of it. Bellamy advocates it in an elaborate treatise. He holds that this is the best of all possible systems; it will be more holy and happy than if sin and misery had never entered it; God could have kept all his creatures holy without infringing on their free agency, but the result would have involved a greater loss than gain.* Sin, “in itself and in all its natural tendencies,” is “infinitely evil;”† yet every sin is overruled “to a greater good on the whole.” He says, and quotes Augustine to the same effect, that it is good that evil should exist.

Dr. Woods in his controversy with Ware, had argued in a similar strain; maintaining that the system is better than it would be if sin were not in it.

When Dr. Taylor began his investigations, New England theology asserted a doctrine of natural ability, as the condition of responsible agency; it rejected imputation in every form; but outside of the Hopkinsian school, it associated with this denial a vague theory of an hereditary sinful taint, or a sinful propensity to sin, propagated with the race—what Dr. Taylor termed “physical depravity;”—and it vindicated

tine in connecting the first sin with divine agency. Strong expressions seeming to favor this view, are in the *Inst.* iii., xxiii., 6, 8, and in the *Respons. ad Calum. Neb.* (*Works*, Amst. ed., tom. viii., p. 634). But this last tract is the work of Beza, for which Calvin is not responsible. Judging by the passages in the *Institutes*, without reference to other expressions of Calvin, we should unhesitatingly agree with the interpreters above named. But, in other writings, as we have said, he plants himself on the Augustinian formula. His doctrine is that of a volitive permission. See, for example, *Cons. Genev.* (Niemeyer's ed.), p. 230. That justice lies back of all acts of the divine will, is emphatically asserted. See tom. viii., p. 638. He says: “*Quamquam mihi Dei voluntas summa est causa, ubique tamen doceo, ubi in ejus consiliis vel operibus causa non apparet; apud eum esse absconditam, et nihil nisi juste et sapienter decreverit.*” “*Clare affirmo nihil decernere sine optima causa: quæ si hodie nobis incognita est, ultimo die patefiet.*”

* *Works*, ii., p. 61 seq.

† *Ibid.*, p. 145.

the introduction, or permission, of sin, by affirming that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and that the system of things is better with sin than without it.

The aim of Dr. Taylor was to relieve New England theology of remaining difficulties on the side of human responsibility. He could not regard the prevailing theology as consistent with itself or as successful in solving the problems which it professed to solve.*

The fundamental question was that of liberty and necessity. There must be, on the one hand, a firm foundation for the doctrine of decrees, and universal providential government, and for the exercise of resignation, submission, and confidence on the part of men in view of all events; otherwise, the Calvinistic system is given up. There must be, on the other hand, a full power in men to avoid sin and perform their duty; otherwise, the foundation of accountability is gone, and the commands and entreaties of the Bible are a mockery.

The true solution of the problem, in Dr. Taylor's view, is in the union of the doctrine of the previous certainty of every act of the will—a certainty given by its antecedents, collectively taken—with the power of contrary choice. Freedom is exemption from something; it is exemption from the constraining operation of that law of cause and effect which brings events to pass in the material world. If the antecedents of choice produce the consequent according to that law, without qualification, there is no liberty. Yet Dr. Taylor did not hold to the liberty of indifference or of contingency, which had been charged upon the Arminians, and had been denied by his predecessors. He held to a connection between choice and its antecedents, of such a character as to give in every case a previous certainty that the former will be what it actually is. The ground, or reason of this

* See the letter of Dr. Taylor to Dr. Beecher (Jan. 14th, 1819), written before Dr. Taylor became professor, and describing what was needed in theology.—*Life of Beecher*, i., 384.

certainty lies in the constitution of the agent and the motives under which he acts ; that is to say, in the antecedents taken together. The infallible connection of these with the consequent, the divine mind perceives ; though we may not dogmatize on the exact *mode* of his perception. The precise nature of the connection between the antecedents and consequent, Dr. Taylor did not profess to explain ; but he held that the same antecedents *will* uniformly be followed by the same consequent. In short, he asserted that choice is a phenomenon *sui generis*, not taking place after the analogy of physical events, but involving the power to the contrary. There is another species of causation, another category of causes, besides that with which we are made acquainted in the realm of physical phenomena. There are causes which do not necessitate their effect, but simply and solely give the certainty of it. Now, all admit that every event is previously certain. It is a true proposition that what is to occur to-morrow, *will* thus occur. No matter, then, what may be the ground of this certainty ; as long as the events in question are not necessitated, there is no interference with moral liberty.

Augustinians and Calvinists, except the supralapsarians, had admitted the power of contrary choice in the case of the first sin, as well as in the case of the previous moral actions of Adam.* They erred, according to Dr. Taylor, in assuming that this power was lost, and that the continuance of it is incompatible with the actual permanence of character.

* It is plain that Augustinians are cut off from the use of three very common arguments against Dr. Taylor. The first is that the supposition of a power of contrary choice admits the possibility of an event without a cause. But they themselves make this supposition in the case of Adam. The second is that a choice, in case there is a power to the contrary, cannot be foreseen. The third is that the supposition of such a power would make holiness self-originated, or the product of creaturely activity. But is not this inference equally necessary in the case of Adam ?

It will be understood that we are not engaged in expounding views of our own, but in explaining those of Dr. Taylor.

Rather, as he believed, is this power involved in the consciousness of freedom, and recognized as real in the Scriptures, as well as by the common sense of mankind.

The leading principles of Dr. Taylor's system may now be stated in an intelligible manner.

1. All sin is the voluntary action of the sinner, in disobedience to a known law. The doctrine of a "physical," or hereditary, sin, which had lingered in the New England theology, though inconsistent with its principles, and was defended by Dr. Woods and Dr. Tyler, was discarded by Dr. Taylor. In his doctrine of the voluntariness of all moral action, he agreed with the Hopkinsians. This, in truth, is the ancient, orthodox opinion, coming down from the days of Augustine. On this point we shall speak in another part of this Essay.

2. Sin, however, is a permanent principle, or state of the will, a governing purpose, underlying all subordinate volitions and acts. Stated in theological language, it is the elective preference of the world to God, as the soul's chief good. It may be resolved into selfishness. An avaricious man makes money the object of his abiding preference. He acts perpetually under the influence of this active, voluntary, continuous, principle. He lays plans, undertakes enterprises, encounters hazard and toil, under its silent dictation. A like thing is true of an ambitious man, a voluptuary, and of every other sinner. Each shapes his conduct in conformity with the dictates of an immanent, deep-lying, yet voluntary or elective preference—choice—of some form of earthly good. In its generic form, sin is supreme love to the world, or the preference of the world to God. It is a single principle, however varied its expressions, and is totally evil. It is the "evil treasure of the heart." It excludes moral excellence, since no man can serve two masters.

This profound conception of the nature of character is in its spirit Augustinian. Dr. Taylor held that character is simple in its essence. It is a principle, seated in the will,

existing and continuing, by the will's consent, knowingly cherished, yet a fountain of action so deep that it rarely comes into the foreground of consciousness. Only in an hour of earnest reflection is a man's attention turned back to this governing purpose of his life.

We regard this feature of Dr. Taylor's system as an important contribution to theological science. That "disposition," "propensity," "inclination," which had so puzzled his predecessors in New England, he defined accurately, and in accordance with the conceptions of moral agency which they had themselves laid down.

3. Though sin belongs to the individual and consists in sinning, yet the fact that every man sins from the beginning of responsible agency is in consequence of the sin of Adam. It is certain that every man will sin from the moment when he is capable of moral action, and will continue to be sinful, until he is regenerated; and this certainty, which is absolute though it is no necessity and coexists with power to the opposite action, is somehow due to Adam's sin. In this sense, Adam was placed on trial for the whole human race.* On the relation of the sinfulness of men to the sin of Adam, Dr. Taylor agreed with the New England divines generally after the first Edwards. As to when responsible agency, as a matter of fact, begins, Dr. Taylor did not profess to state. He was not concerned to combat the doctrine of a sin from birth, though he did not hold it: if sin was correctly defined and the right doctrine as to the conditions of responsibility was held fast, he was satisfied.

There is in men, according to Dr. Taylor, a bias, or tendency,—sometimes called a propensity, or disposition—to sin; but this is not *itself* sinful; it is the cause or occasion of sin. Nor is it to be conceived of as a separate desire of the soul, having respect to *sin* as an object. Such a propensity as this does not exist in human nature. But this

* *Revealed Theology*, p. 259.

bias results from the condition of our propensities to natural good, as related to the higher powers of the soul and to the circumstances in which we are placed. As a *consequence* of this tendency or bias, there is a *sinful* disposition, or the wrong governing purpose before described, which is the cause of all *other* sins, *itself* excepted.*

It is proper to say that men are sinners by nature, since, in all the appropriate circumstances of their being, they sin from the first. If a change of circumstances, as by transferring them from one place on the earth to another, or from one set of circumstances to a more favorable one, would alter the fact and render them, or any of them, holy from the start, then their sin might properly be attributed to circumstances and not to nature. The certainty of their sin as soon as they are capable of sinning is the consequence of two factors, the constitution and condition of the soul (subjective), and the situation (objective). These together constitute nature in the statement, "we are sinners by nature."

4. Man is the proximate efficient cause of all his voluntary states and actions. The Hopkinsian theory of divine efficiency is rejected. No man is necessitated to choose as he does. There is ever a power to the contrary. A sinner can cease to love the world supremely and can choose God for his portion. He not only *can* if he will; but Dr. Taylor uttered his protest against what he considered a necessitarian evasion, by affirming that "*he can if he won't.*" He did not admit that the possible meanings of the question, Can a man choose otherwise than he does, are exhausted in the senseless tautology and the infinite series, into one or the other of which Edwards and his followers insisted on resolving it. He did not admit that a man could properly be called free and responsible, merely because he wills to sin, provided it is assumed that his will is determined in its

* Ibid., p. 194.

action by laws like those which govern the association of ideas, or by a positive exertion of divine efficiency.

5. Inseparable from the foregoing assertion of a power to the contrary choice, however, is the doctrine of a moral inability on the part of the sinner to repent and convert himself. He *can*, but it is certain he *will* not. His repentance without the help of the Spirit is therefore just as hopeless as if it were completely out of his power. To expect him to repent by his own unaided powers is not less vain, and *so far* not less irrational, than if he were destitute of these powers. "Certainty with power to the contrary" is a condensed statement of the truth on both sides. Thus the sinner is both responsible and dependent—perfectly responsible, yet absolutely dependent. It is just to require him to repent; it is just to punish his impenitence; yet his only hope is in the merciful and gracious help of God.

6. Natural ability being a real power and not an incapable faculty, there must be something in a sinner's mind to which right motives can appeal—some point of attachment for the influences of the law and the Gospel. Hence, the importance of the distinction between the sensibility and will, or of the threefold classification of mental powers, which Dr. Taylor was among the first to introduce. The writers before him had commonly followed the old division of the mind into understanding and will. By failing to distinguish carefully the involuntary part of our nature from the will proper—the elective faculty—they had often fallen into a confusing ambiguity.* It is doubtful whether the doctrine of divine efficiency, or of a creation of sinful as well as holy volitions, would have come in, if the threefold classification had been sharply made. Such terms as incli-

[*Dr. Ide subjoins to one of the Sermons of Emmons this note: "The terms will, choice, and volition, are generally used by Dr. Emmons as they are by President Edwards, in a general sense, including the affections, desires, etc., as well as the executive acts of the mind." Emmons's *Works*, new ed., vol. ii., p. 449.]

nation, disposition, propensity, are used now of a choice and now of an impulse or tendency anterior to choice. But a sinful man can be made to feel the force of truth, and this, too, without supposing him to be thereby in any degree holy; for there is a neutral part of his nature which truth can move. Hence, too, when he is commanded in the Bible to consider his ways, he does not of necessity sin in doing so. This neutral part is the region of the sensibilities.*

What is the particular feeling which may thus be addressed? According to Dr. Taylor, it is the love of happiness, or self-love.

We are thus brought to the consideration of what has been deemed one of the most obnoxious features in his system—"the self-love theory." It has been so often misunderstood that we shall give some space to explaining it.

Dr. Taylor never held that love to God, or benevolence, or moral excellence, however it may be designated, is a subordinate or executive volition dictated by the predominant choice of one's own happiness. He never held that a man is *first* to choose his own highest happiness, and *then* choose the highest happiness of the universe subordinately.

In the first place, Dr. Taylor believed, with a great company of philosophers, from Aristotle to the present time, that the involuntary love or desire of personal happiness is the subjective, psychological spring of all choices.† Says Locke:

* The existence of a neutral part of our nature, to which motives can appeal, is admitted by opponents of Dr. Taylor, in the case of holy Adam. See Dr. A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, p. 237.

† Says Augustine: "omnes istæ et aliæ tales voluntates suos proprios fines habent, qui referuntur ad finem illius voluntatis qua volumus beate vivere, et ad eam pervenire vitam quæ non referitur ad aliud, sed amanti per se ipsam sufficiat." *De Trin.*, xi. 6. See also, *De Lib. Arbit.*, I., xiii. (*Conf.*, X., xxi.) etc. It is the scholastic maxim, "quidquid appetitur, appetitur sub specie boni." But the doctrine is older than Augustine. It is the groundwork of Aristotle's Ethical discussion. See *Nic. Eth.*, I., vii., and the whole first book of this treatise. Calvin calls it the common doctrine of philosophers, to which he gives his assent. *Inst.*, II., ii., 26.

“That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is some present uneasiness; which is, or at least is always accompanied with that of desire. Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it; because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness; but every good, nay, every greater good does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any necessary part of our happiness; for all that we desire is only to be happy.” “All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man’s desires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness under this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it: other things acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without desire, pass by, and be content without.”

He develops and defends this view at length, in his chapter on “Power,” from which the preceding passages are quoted. President Edwards adopts the doctrine that the “will is as the greatest apparent good.” “Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or perceived *as good*; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such.” “To appear *good* to the mind as I use the phrase, is the same as to *appear agreeable*, or *seem pleasing* to the mind.” Explicitly and many times, in connection with these passages, he uses “pleasure,” “enjoyment,” “happiness,” as synonyms of “good.”* Even Bishop Butler says:

* “In some sense, the most benevolent, generous person in the world, seeks his *own* happiness in doing good to others; because he places his happiness in their good.” Edwards’s *God’s Chief End in Creation* (iii., 38). He expounds this view more fully and emphatically in his *Charity and its Fruits*, pp. 232, 233.

“There are two kinds of original good; enjoyment and deliverance from suffering; or as the case may be, from the danger of suffering. These two are the only objects of desire to percipient beings; and to intelligent beings, as truly as any others. When virtue itself is desired, it is desired only for the enjoyment it furnishes. Were there no such things in the universe there would be no such thing as desire; and consequently no such thing as volition, or action.” “A moral government is entirely

“ Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbor, is as really our own affection as self-love ; and the pleasure arising from its gratification is as much my own pleasure, as the pleasure self-love would have from knowing I myself should be happy some time hence, would be my own pleasure. And if, because every particular affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called self-love ; according to this way of speaking, no creature can possibly act but merely from self-love ; and every action and every affection whatever is to be resolved up into this one principle.” “ All particular affections, resentment, benevolence, love of arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own gratification, *i. e.*, the gratification of ourselves ; and the gratification of each gives delight. So far then it is manifest they have all the same respect to private interest.”

In claiming that choice universally proceeds from a constitutional love of happiness, Dr. Taylor considered himself in agreement with writers on mental science generally, and he regarded the outcry against him on account of this doctrine as mostly the offspring of ignorance.

Dr. Taylor held that the object of choice is either happiness of some kind or degree, or the means of happiness. In the language of President Edwards, “ volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which *causes it to appear* most agreeable.” But a broad distinction is to be made between the direct and the indirect means of happiness. That which is chosen as the *direct* means of happiness to the subject of the choice, is chosen for its own sake. If I love knowledge and pursue it, in order to gain money or distinction, I do not love knowledge for its own sake ; that is, I am after the happiness derived from wealth or fame, and not after the happiness *directly* imparted by knowledge and by the pursuit of it. I love knowledge for its own sake, when it yields me delight immediately and independently of any relation of it to an ulterior end.

founded on motives. All motives are included in the two kinds of good, mentioned above.”—Dwight, Sermon. lxxx. (iii., 166).

Universal happiness, or the highest happiness of the universe, is one mode of stating the object of a holy or benevolent choice. Now the highest happiness of every individual is indissolubly linked with the choice of this object and the pursuit of it as the chief end of living. That is to say, in the exercise of this choice there is a joy superior to that derived from anything else. From the object itself and the choice of it, as an immanent, voluntary preference, comes the highest happiness of which the soul is capable. Benevolence is the choice of the highest good of the universe, in preference to everything that can come into competition with it. But one's own highest happiness can never thus come into competition with it. Rather are the two—one's own highest happiness and that of the universe—in the nature of things inseparably connected. So that in the choice of the highest good of the whole, the choice of one's own highest happiness is blended. Virtuous self-love and virtuous benevolence denote one and the same complex state; and one or the other term is employed, as the speaker has in view one or the other of its relations, viz., to one's own highest happiness as depending on the highest happiness of the universe, or to the highest happiness of the universe as producing his own highest happiness.

We are not vindicating Dr. Taylor's position, we are simply explaining it; and without doubt a great part of the reproach heaped on him for his theory on this subject is due to the mistaken supposition that he considered benevolence, or love to God, a subordinate choice. *

We may add that Dr. Taylor's unfortunate choice of the term "self-love," as an expression of his doctrine, was partly owing to a like use of this term in Dugald Stewart's *Active and Moral Powers*. Hopkins's doctrine of disinterested be-

* It is needless to add that Dr. Taylor considered the moral excellence of virtue—or the *virtuousness* of benevolence—to consist in its tendency to promote the highest happiness of the universe. In this he agreed with the younger Edwards (ii., 541), and with Dwight (Serm. xcix., iii., 439).

nevolence, also, had led Dwight and other Anti-Hopkinsians to distinguish between *uninterested* and *disinterested*, and to call the innocent love of happiness *self-love*, in distinction from selfishness.

It may serve to illustrate the comparative impunity from theological odium which is enjoyed by writers on philosophy, if we call attention to the doctrine, on the topic before us, contained in the recent able work on moral science by President Hopkins, of Williams College. This doctrine is the same as that of Dr. Taylor. Dr. Hopkins holds that the desire of happiness has the same relation to the other desires as "that of consciousness to the several specific faculties of cognition."

"In this way it is that a desire of good enters into every specific form of desire, and that, as consciousness is the generic form of cognition, so the desire of good or of happiness is the generic form of all the desires."* "A third peculiarity of moral good is that in seeking it for ourselves we necessarily promote the good of others." "By some it has been held that all virtue has its origin in a regard to the good of others. The true system is found in the coincidence of the two; and that becomes possible only from the peculiarity of moral good now mentioned."† "It has already been seen to be the characteristic of a rational being to act with reference to an end. But an end can be sought rationally only as there is in it an apprehended good."‡ But what is meant by *a good*? "As there is, then, no good without consciousness, which involves activity, it would seem that the good must be found in the activity itself, or in its results.

But activity in itself cannot be a good. If it had no results, it would be good for nothing, and those results may be evil and wretchedness, as well as blessing.

We turn then, in this search, to the results, in consciousness, of activity. We are so constituted that any form of normal activity, physical or mental, produces satisfaction, enjoyment, blessedness, according to the faculties that act. Of these the conception is simple and indefinable, except by synonymous terms." "We say then that in the satisfaction attached by God to the normal activity of our powers, we find *a good*, an end that is wholly for its own sake. We say, too, that it is only in and from such activity that we can have the notion of any satisfaction, enjoy-

* *Love as a Law*, etc., p. 95.

† *Ibid.*, p. 188.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

ment, blessedness, either for ourselves or others ; and that that form and proportion of activity which would result in our perfect blessedness would be right." *

This doctrine is identical with that of Dr. Taylor. This agreement does not extend to all points in the ethical theory of the latter ; but on "self-love" and its relation to benevolence and selfishness, there is a perfect agreement.

We may add that on the nature of moral agency, President Hopkins expresses himself in entire harmony with the familiar principles of Dr. Taylor. The former says :

"Man is responsible for his preferences, his choices, the acts of his will generally—for these and their results—and for nothing else." Responsibility cannot attach to spontaneous affections, but only to the choice of an end. "There is a broad distinction between what is called, sometimes an immanent preference, sometimes a governing purpose, sometimes an ultimate intention, and those volitions which are merely executive, and prescribe specific acts under such a purpose." † "Character is as the governing preference or purpose—it consists in an original and thorough determination by a man of himself with reference to some end chosen by himself as supreme." ‡ "The choice of a supreme end is generic. It is made once, in a sense only once. In a sense, too, it is made always, constantly repeated, since it is only under this that other choices are made. It is like the light of consciousness, and would naturally be the last thing investigated. Indeed, as consciousness is the generic form of intelligence, and the desire of happiness that of the desires, and love that of affections, so the choice of a supreme end is the generic form of volition. It enters into all others ; they are made in its light and partake of its character." §

These are familiar propositions in Dr. Taylor's system. In pointing out this coincidence, however, we do not mean to detract in the slightest degree from the reputation of Dr. Hopkins as a fresh and independent thinker.

7. The exposition of Dr. Taylor's conception of the elements of moral agency renders it easy to set forth his view of Regeneration. The author of regeneration is the Holy

* *Love as a Law*, pp. 51, 52. See, also, pp. 131, 190, 191.

† *Ibid.*, p. 170.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 168, 169.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

Spirit. The change that takes place in the soul is due to His influence so exerted as to effect that change in the sense of rendering it infallibly certain. It is a change of character. It is the production of love to God as the supreme object of choice, in the room of love to the world. But the change takes place within the soul; and it is the man himself who repents and believes, and chooses God for his portion. Hence, it takes place in the use of his natural powers, and in conformity with the laws of the mind. As a psychological change, it can be analyzed and described. To do this was a part of Dr. Taylor's design in his noted Review of Spring on the "Means of Regeneration." * He held that the attention of a sinner might be excited and directed to his duty, that the motives of the Gospel appeal to the instinctive desire of happiness, which underlies all choosing, that impelled by this movement of a part of his nature which is neither holy or sinful, but simply constitutional, a sinner could suspend the choice of the world as his chief good, which forms the essence of sinful character, and could give his heart to God. Dr. Taylor thus draws out analytically the steps of a mental change, giving them in the order of nature rather than that of chronological succession. Now a sinner is *naturally* able to make this revolution in the ruling principle of his life. There is adequate power, and there is no absurdity in supposing that power exerted. But there is a moral inability, which constitutes practically an insuperable obstacle; and this is overcome only by the agency of the Spirit who moves upon the powers of the soul, and induces, without coercing, them to comply with the requirements of the Gospel.

8. Dr. Taylor's doctrine on the relation of the introduction of sin and its continuance to the divine administration, accords with the general spirit of his theology. Theologians from Calvin to Bellamy had discussed the question as

* *Christian Spectator*, 1829.

if there were only this alternative, the existence of sin or the prevention of it by *the power of God*. Holding that God was able to exclude sin from the system, and knowing that he has not done so, they proceeded to the inference that the system is better for having sin in it—that the existence of sin, wherever it is found, is better, all things considered, than its non-existence would be—that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good.

In the first place, Dr. Taylor held that we are not shut up to the alternative just stated. There is a third way in which sin might have been prevented, and that is by the free act of the beings who commit it. To say that it was better for them to commit than to avoid sin, is, in Dr. Taylor's judgment, an unwarranted and false proposition. To say that it is better for them to be permitted to sin, as they do, rather than for them to be prevented from sinning by such a positive exertion of divine power as would be requisite to effect this result, is another and quite a different proposition, which carries with it no dangerous consequences. It is not true, then, that sin is ever better than holiness in its stead would be, or that sin, all things considered, is a good thing. But it may be true that the non-prevention of sin by the act of God is in certain cases better than its forcible prevention by his act.

It is a question as old as philosophy, Why did not God prevent the occurrence of moral evil? Hume revived the argument of Epicurus: Either God can prevent it and will not, in which case he is not benevolent; or he will and cannot, in which case he is not omnipotent; or he neither can nor will, in which case he is neither omnipotent nor benevolent. The New England theologians and other Calvinistic theologians had assumed that he can prevent sin, and had sought to vindicate his benevolence by assuming that it is good that evil exists. Dr. Taylor took up the question in answering skeptical objections to the benevolence of the Creator. The ground that he took in reply was this, that it may be im-

possible for sin to be excluded by the act of God from the best possible system. He did not deem it necessary to his purpose, which was to ward off an objection, to affirm that it *is* thus impossible; but he modestly said that it *may be*. He did not say that it may be that God cannot exclude sin from *every* moral system, but only from the best—from that which will secure the largest amount of good on the whole.* He did not say that it may be impossible for sin to be excluded from such a system; for he held that free agents might exclude it by abstaining from sin. He only said that for aught that can be shown, it may be inconsistent with the nature of things for God, by His intervention, to exclude sin from that system which of all possible systems is the most eligible for the good that it will secure.

*[A more accurate statement would be that he did not deem it *absolutely essential* to say that God cannot, etc. That is, it is not necessary to say this, in order to silence the skeptic. Dr. Taylor was in the habit of affirming that it cannot be proved *a priori* that God can prevent sin in *any* moral system. Of course he must have held that *it may be* that God cannot do this. And this proposition he does maintain in his volumes on *Moral Government* (i., 303 seq., ii., 441 seq.).

There has been a general impression that he held that there is *no ground for the opinion* that God can exclude sin from *any* moral system. But he distinctly stated to us, in reply to an inquiry, that this impression is erroneous, and that his meaning was as we have given it above. On a close examination of the passages referred to in the published Lectures, it will be seen that he says nothing inconsistent with this. He maintains that it cannot be demonstrated that God can exclude sin from a moral system, *from the nature of agency*; nor can it be proved (that is, demonstrated) from facts—since wherever sin is actually prevented, its prevention *may be* due to the system with which all the sin that does exist is certainly connected.

The possible incompatibility of the prevention of sin by the divine power, with the best system, is the doctrine on which he finally rested his refutation of the skeptical objection to the benevolence of God. That is to say, he usually discussed the question with reference to the actual state of things—the existing system. At the same time he contended that there can be no demonstrative proof that a moral being who *can* sin, will not sin, and hence no complete, decisive proof, that sin can be kept out of any moral system by the act of God.]

The system would be better without sin, if this result were secured by the free action of the creatures comprising it, with no other alteration of its characteristics. It might not be so good, if the same result were reached by divine intervention. We are too little acquainted with the relations of divine power to free agency to declare confidently to what extent the exertion of such power is beneficial, when the universal system is taken into view. It is wiser and more modest to judge of what is best by what we actually see done.

Dr. Taylor was warmly censured for abridging the divine power; and this by theologians who affirmed that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that is, that the divine Being is *shut up* to this means of attaining the ends of his benevolence!

The student of philosophy will be at once reminded of the theodicy of Leibnitz. This great writer advocates a scheme of optimism. Out of all ideal systems present to the omniscient mind of God, he chooses the best possible; that is the best that can be realized by him, consistently with the nature of things. This theory, as Leibnitz abundantly shows, involves no limitation of God's power.* Sin is not chosen by him as an end or a direct means to an end, but as a *conditio sine qua non* of the best system. Interference of God to prevent sin would derange the system, and thus produce more evil than good. He *can* thus interfere, but not wisely or benevolently; and power in God is never dissociated from wisdom and benevolence. So far, there is accord between the system of Dr. Taylor and that of Leibnitz. But we have not found in Leibnitz any consideration of the hypothesis of sin being excluded from the existing system by *the free choice of the creature*, nor any discussion of the question

* "Adsentior principio Baelii, quod etiam meum est, omne, quod contradictionem non implicat, esse possibile." 224. He says that his theory no more abridges the divine power than does the assertion that God cannot draw a shorter than a straight line between two points. Among numerous passages to the same effect, see 130, 158, 165, 216 (ed. Dutens).

whether, supposing this hypothesis realized, the system would not be better for the change. And in assigning the reasons why divine interference to exclude sin would be unwise, Leibnitz mingles two very diverse grounds. He connects the possibility of sin with the large spiritual endowments of moral creatures; but he also speaks of sin as affording a beneficial contrast with virtue, and thus indirectly contributing to the beauty and harmony of the whole system. He compares moral evil in the system to the shading in a picture, which is essential to its proper effect and highest beauty. This is the old principle of the need of *variety*, to which the schoolmen appealed. In passages, he even verges on the theory of the *necessity* of sin, as well as of its possibility, in consequence of the metaphysical imperfection, or finite constitution of the beings who fall into sin. But this last doctrine is at war with his prevailing view. It would seem, therefore, that the New Haven divines carried the general theory on which the masterly work of Leibnitz is constructed, a single step, but a very important step, beyond him. Their discussions, however, were not at all connected with his speculations, but were a growth upon the preceding New England discussions of the same high themes.*

* A theory respecting the permission of sin, identical with that of the New Haven divines, is suggested in one or two passages of Thomas Aquinas, but is not consistently carried out. He says: "Sicut igitur perfectio universitatis rerum requirit, ut non solum sint entia incorruptibilia sed etiam corruptibilia: ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quædam quæ bonitate deficere possint, ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere." "Ipsam autem totum quod est universitas creaturarum melius et perfectius est, si in eo sint quædam quæ a bono deficere possunt; quæ interdum deficiunt, Deo hoc non impediante." Summa, I., ii., xlviii., A. ii. But Aquinas goes on immediately to argue that much good would be lost, if it were not for sin; for example, that there would be no vindictive justice and no patience, if there were no sin. He takes refuge in the doctrine that sin is merely privative, like blindness in the eye, and so, being *nothing*, has not God for its author! Another passage, still more plainly suggesting the main idea of the New Haven theory, has been cited from Aquinas's *Com. in Pet. Lomb.* (I., i., Dist. 39, Q. 2, A. 2.) But this work we have not now at hand.

9. Dr. Taylor's conception of election is conformed to his doctrine respecting the divine permission of sin. Regeneration is the act of God. Since the renewal of the soul is his work, he must have purposed beforehand to do it. He has determined to exert such a degree of influence upon a certain part of the race who are sinful by their own act, and justly condemned, as will result with infallible certainty in their conversion. He is not bound to give such influence in equal measure to all. Rather does he establish a system of influence which his omniscient mind foresees to be most productive of holiness in his kingdom as a whole. It is not the act or merit of individuals that earns or procures this effectual influence, but that large expediency which has respect to the entire kingdom and the holiness to be produced within it.

Election is a part of a vast and complex system of administration, extending over a universe of intelligent beings. The *material*, so to speak, to be dealt with in this moral kingdom, is free agency; just as *matter* is the material in the outward kingdom of nature. To what extent it is desirable to exert power to control the actions of free agents at any given time or place, only the omniscient mind, who surveys the whole system and knows its laws, can judge. When, where, and to what extent, it is desirable to exert the extraordinary influence of his Spirit to regenerate and sanctify souls, He alone can determine. He organizes a plan, not in an arbitrary way, but in order to secure the best results that are attainable consistently with the wise and benevolent laws that underlie his whole administration. Under the operation of this plan, the Gospel call goes to one *land* sooner than another. Antioch hears the good news at once; other cities and countries must wait for ages. Not that God loves Antioch better than the cities of Eastern Asia; but his beneficent plan involves this selection of Antioch. So of individuals. The system of influence is adapted to sweep into the kingdom of heaven a certain number, and those alone;

not from any partiality to them, not because they deserve more than others, but because the system that secures their salvation is the wisest and most beneficent. The effectual call is addressed, for example, to Paul, not because he has claims superior to those of his associates in travel, but because the same benevolent plan involves his conversion. His conversion was purposed, as the certain futurition of the event was secured by the plan.

Dr. Taylor believed that his doctrines, on the points considered under this and the preceding head, must be admitted in order to give their full, natural sense to the numerous passages of Scripture in which the unwillingness of God that sinners should continue impenitent, and his earnest desire that they should turn to him and be saved, are emphatically expressed. Theology was embarrassed by the supposition of two contrary wills in the divine Being, both having respect to the same object, namely, the repentance of the sinner. There was a difficulty in reconciling the merciful declarations and invitations of the Bible, with an unwillingness, all things considered, on the part of their Author that the latter should be complied with. Can he sincerely say that he prefers all men to abandon sin, if, on the whole, he prefers that they should not? The old Protestant theologians adopted the distinction of the revealed and secret will of God, which had come down from the Schoolmen—the *voluntas signi* and the *voluntas beneplaciti*. Calvin was too fair-minded an exegete not to betray his perplexity in the presence of some of the passages to which we have referred. Thus, in his comment on Matthew xxiii. 27 (the Saviour's lament over Jerusalem), he says of the will of Jesus to gather its inhabitants to himself, that it is the will of God *ex verbi natura*—that is, the revealed will. Yet, he adds, the will of God is one and simple, and the representation of it as twofold is anthropopathic. He admits that God wills to gather all. Standing face to face with the "*I would*," "*but ye would not*," he says: "*est autem inter velle Dei et ipso-*

rum nolle emphatica oppositio." The *secret* will of God is to him an ineffable, unfathomable mystery. On this subject he says that nothing is better than a learned ignorance.

Dr. Taylor considered that all this perplexity is removed, and full credit given to the universal offers of grace and invitations of mercy, if it is only understood that while God prefers that every one should repent *under the recovering influences* to which he is subject, He at the same time cannot wisely alter this system of influences; and *rather* than do this, he prefers that the sinner should perish.* In itself considered, and all things considered, He prefers his repentance to his continued and fatal impenitence; but He prefers the latter—that is, He prefers to permit the latter—sooner than to do more than He is doing (which is all that He wisely can do) for his conversion. Christ most earnestly desired that the inhabitants of Jerusalem should receive him and

* In harmony with Dr. Taylor's ideas on this subject is the letter (to Boyle) of John Howe, the great Puritan divine, on *The Reconcilableness of God's Prescience of the Sins of Men with the Wisdom and Sincerity of His Counsels, Exhortations, and whatsoever Means He uses to Prevent Them*. Howe dislikes the contrasted terms *secret will* and *revealed will*. "The truth is," he says, "that God doth really and complacentially will (and therefore doth with most unexceptionable sincerity declare himself to will) that to be done and enjoyed by many men, which he doth not, universally, will to make them do, or irresistibly procure that they shall enjoy." "Methinks it should not be difficult for us to acknowledge that God doth truly, and with complacency, will whatsoever is the holy, righteous matter of his own laws." That he does not actually procure the obedience of all, "is upon so much more valuable reasons, as that, not to do it was more eligible, with the higher complacency of a determinative will." Although he foresees that many will not be moved by his exhortations, promises, and threats, but persist in sin, "he at the same time sees that they might do otherwise, and that if they would comply with his methods, things would otherwise issue with them." "For they do it not because he foreknew it, but he only foreknew it because they would do so." That he does not reclaim them from sin "proceeds not from the imperfection of his power, but from the concurrence of all other perfections in him." "His wisdom doth as much limit the exercise of his power, as his righteousness or his truth doth." See, also, Howe on *The Redeemer's Tears Wept over Lost Souls*, where are sentiments to the same effect.

be saved. "How often would I . . . but ye would not." But he preferred to leave them to that dreadful lot which they were bringing on themselves, rather than to bring a different kind, or an increased amount of influence to recover them. There is no contradiction in his will, for the objects of choice in the two cases are different.*

Under the New Haven theory, there is room not only for the hardening of heart under a law of character, which is *certain* in its operation, but also for the judicial withdrawal of the influences of grace, on which all hope depends.

How earnestly Dr. Taylor upheld the doctrine of Special Grace, and of sovereignty in the bestowal of it, may be learned from the following extracts from his Review of Spring on "The Means of Regeneration":—

"According to the principle which we have advanced, there is no ground of certainty that the renewing grace, or the grace which secures the performance, *will attend* any call to duty, addressed to any individual sinner. Here, as we shall now attempt to show, lies the practical power of the doctrine of dependence, viz., in the fearful uncertainty, which it imparts to the great question of the sinner's regeneration." This doctrine "was taught with great plainness, and pressed in all its pungency, and all its mysteriousness, upon the wondering Nicodemus by the Saviour himself." "Why is the high and uncontrollable sovereignty of God in the gifts of his grace, so clearly announced and so formally and trium-

* It would seem to be felt by many opponents of Dr. Taylor that the very supposition of a successful withstanding of the Spirit of God by the human will cannot be entertained without impiety. But they must read their New Testaments with little attention, or they would not argue in this strain. "Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost," says Peter (Acts viii. 51); where the word for *resist* (ἀντιτίτω) in its primary import signifies "to fall upon,"—as an enemy. There is *an* exertion of the Spirit, a *real* exertion, which yet does not prevail over the will. Only a perfectly sophistical exegesis can shut this fact out of the New Testament. Granted, that in the case of the elect, grace is effectual, unresisted—is of a kind and degree to secure the futuration of the event. This does not affect the truth stated before. "Grieve not the Spirit," writes Paul (Eph. iv. 30); representing the Spirit in the light of a loving friend, who is troubled or hurt by neglect and opposition. How different is this conception of the Spirit's influence from that which makes it a *mere* exertion of power!

phantly defended against the murmurings of the ungodly?" "Have we no evidence that this is an unwelcome truth, and unwelcome because it is terrible, and terrible because it shows man's eternal destiny to depend on the unknown counsels of an offended God?" "What is better fitted to confirm this confidence"—the delusive confidence of the sinner that he shall escape future misery—"than the assurance, or even a high probability, that the grace of God is, and ever will be, ready to renew the heart." "They believe in their dependence on God; but they also believe that the necessary grace is, and will be, ready for their use, when they shall be ready to use it. This is the grand opiate of the adversary by which he holds enthralled multitudes, under the light of salvation, in their guilty sleep of moral death." But "his salvation, by his own perverseness, is forfeited into the hands of a sovereign and offended God. Point then the thoughtless man to God's high counsels, and show him that God will save or destroy, 'as seemeth good in his sight.'" "According to the principles which we have advanced, the gift of renewing grace cannot be inferred from the nature, tendency, or relations of any prior acts of the sinner. It cannot be inferred from any divine promise, but is thrown into fearful uncertainty by the divine threatenings." "Whether, therefore, this blessing be given or withheld in respect to individual sinners, is an inquiry which, according to the views we have maintained in the previous discussion, as well as according to the scriptural doctrine of dependence, must be left with the sovereignty of God, whose secret counsels no eye can penetrate." *

Now, we ask any candid person who knows enough about the subject to form an intelligent judgment, if the system which we have sketched above, is Pelagian. The Pelagian system is a tolerably coherent one, and is well understood. Underlying Pelagianism, is the assumption that an act of sin has little or no tendency to self-perpetuation. It may be repeated, or may not, but it does not, of course, result in a character—a permanently sinful state of the will. In fact, there is no character in the sense of a single, central, all-governing principle, at the root of special virtues or special forms of sin. Hence there is rather a graduation from the worst to the best men, than a radical difference between the good and evil. Consistently with this fundamental assumption is the doctrine that Adam's sin did not

* *Christian Spectator*, 1829, pp. 706, 708, 710.

affect his posterity, except in the way of example—an example which is not universally followed. There have been sinless men, many of whom can be named. The world grew worse, but this was owing to the multiplying of evil examples and the power of education. But the virtues of the heathen are such as to entitle them to reward. The Revealed Law was given as a moral influence to deter men from committing sin; the Gospel was added as an additional influence tending to the same end. Men need grace, but grace in the view of the Pelagian leaders, principally, if not exclusively, consists in the giving of truth, precepts, admonitions, and the like; not in an inward operation of the Spirit. Free-will itself, with the other native powers of the mind, is reckoned under the term grace. There are two states of blessedness, corresponding to the lower and higher type of salvable character, the *vita eterna* and *regnum celorum*. This is in keeping with the legal spirit and quantitative estimate of excellence, that characterize Pelagianism.*

* For the correctness of this statement of the tenets of the Pelagians, we only need refer to the ordinary histories of doctrine. We here call special attention to two particulars, viz., *the Pelagian conception of grace, which excludes the operation of the Spirit, and the "atomical view" of character*. 1. After Pelagius was acquitted at Diospolis, Augustine attached no blame to the bishops, but considered that they had been misled by ambiguities; and he expressly says that Pelagius really resolved grace into law and teaching. "Quid manifestius, nihil aliud eum dicere gratiam, qua Deus in nobis operatur velle quod bonum est, quam legem atque doctrinam." *De Grat. Christ.* x. See, also, *De Gest. Pel.* x., *De Har.*, 88. Whether Augustine was altogether right in his interpretation of Pelagius, is for the present purpose immaterial. What was condemned as Pelagianism was the doctrine thus ascribed to him. 2. It is the well-known philosophy of Pelagianism that an *act* of sin does not result in a sinful *character*. The act passes by and leaves the will in *equilibrio*. We are aware of what Pelagius says (*Ad. Demetriad.*, 8) respecting the "*longa consuetudo vitiorum*" and its corrupting influence. Niedner infers that he must have differed from Cœlestius and Julian on this point, and have been less a Pelagian than they. But "the custom" of sinning is a vague conception in Pelagius. "Pelagius and Julian," says Julius Müller (*Lehre, v., d. Sünde, ü.*, 50), "content themselves here with a notion

Now, there is not one of these essential tenets of the Pelagians which Dr. Taylor does not deny. Vital points of their system, as, for example, their superficial notion of character and of what is morally excellent and acceptable to God, Dr. Taylor was most earnest in opposing. He spared no effort to inculcate a profounder view of the essence of character and to show that so-called virtuous acts or virtuous habits, when they do not emanate from love to God, are destitute of that quality of holiness which alone meets with his approbation. That true excellence consists in a congeries of virtues is a proposition which he continually combated.

In fact, the great aim of Dr. Taylor was to answer Pelagian objections and to maintain the substantial, practical features of Calvinism against them. This he supposed himself able to do by showing that the power of contrary choice which they claimed as an inherent attribute of the will, and a condition of moral responsibility, involves no such conclusions as they drew from it. So far from this, Dr. Taylor insisted that one act of sin carries with it, uniformly and infallibly, an established principle of sin, which nothing but the inward operation of the Spirit of God will ever overcome. The Pelagians, with their power to the contrary, had seized on a half-truth, and thus fallen into gross error. Men may hold that the power to the contrary involves the Pelagian

which, had they gone deeper into its nature and scope, would have sufficed to disturb their confidence in their doctrine of freedom; but which, as it was taken up by them *unwillingly* and in an *external and superficial way*, was necessarily without any deep influence on their system." "The single act," adds Müller, "is thought of as completely isolated. There is no insight into the law, according to which it must bring forth a moral state," etc. Exactly what Pelagius believed, it may not be easy, on all points, to determine. The question is, what was the *understanding* of his doctrine—what was the Pelagianism which was *condemned*. That the Gospel only renders *less difficult* what was not only possible but *practicable to be accomplished* by human agency without it, was unquestionably the teaching of the Pelagian leaders.

notion of the mutableness of character ; but Dr. Taylor does not admit this, and they have no moral right to charge upon him an inference of their own which he spent half of his life in confuting.

Pelagianism is a superficial philosophy, taking no earnest account of the self-propagating power of sin ; acceptable sometimes to acute, but never to deep-thinking minds ; making so little of the need of redemption as to threaten the foundations of the Gospel system. Such was not the spirit of the New Haven theology.

Having stated in general Dr. Hodge's unfair representation of Dr. Taylor's theology, we specify some particulars.

1. Dr. Hodge gives great prominence to Dr. Taylor's doctrine of Natural Ability, but scarcely mentions his doctrine of Moral Inability. An ordinary reader of his Article would hardly be aware that Dr. Taylor held this last doctrine. That it had any importance in his system, such readers would never dream. In the July number of the *Princeton Review*,* Dr. Hodge expressly ascribes to Dr. Taylor the doctrine that "absolute certainty is inconsistent with free agency"—a proposition which Dr. Taylor constantly denied and incessantly opposed.

In the Article under consideration, Dr. Hodge expatiates (pp. 62, 63, 64) on Dr. Taylor's "Pelagian doctrine" of plenary ability, involving the power of contrary choice, and then dwells on four corollaries from this doctrine, which he also attributes to Dr. Taylor. Under the second of these corollaries, he does admit that Dr. Taylor held to moral inability ; but he alludes to this doctrine as if it were of slight consequence in weighing the orthodoxy of Dr. Taylor's system. "It is true," he says, "that Dr. Taylor admits that men are depraved by nature ; that is, that such is their nature that they will certainly sin. But this was

* Pp. 517, 518. As the incorrect statements on these pages are repeated in the later Article, we have no occasion to say more respecting them.

admitted by Pelagius, except in a case here and there among millions."* We do not know what authority there is for this last statement. But we do know that Pelagius did not hold the doctrine of moral inability as President Edwards, and Dr. Taylor with him, held it. Dr. Hodge speaks of Pelagius and Dr. Taylor as separated on this great point by "a shadowy difference."† He can prove the same thing just as well and no better of President Edwards. Dr. Hodge says,‡ that Christians, and especially Calvinists, have maintained that "God commands what man *cannot* perform;" "that man by the fall lost all ability of will to anything spiritually good;" and he contrasts these propositions with Dr. Taylor's denial of them. But President Edwards denies these same propositions, in what he considers the proper sense of their terms, and holds that men are endowed "with the utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of." It is President Edwards's doctrine of *moral inability* that saves his essential Calvinism; and on this subject *Dr. Taylor agrees with him*. They both held that the sinner's unwillingness to repent is the *sole obstacle in the way of his salvation, and is such an obstacle that nothing but regenerating grace will ever remove it*. President Edwards rested man's need of grace on *this certainty alone*, and so did Dr. Taylor.

2. Dr. Taylor did not hold, as Dr. Hodge represents that he did, that God "cannot prevent sin, or the present amount of sin, in a moral system." He taught, as we have explained above, that it *may be* (for aught that can be shown to the contrary) that God cannot prevent sin in the *best* moral system. He said in the *Concio ad Clerum* that it cannot be *proved*—that is, proved *a priori*, or demonstrated—that God can prevent sin in a moral system. This was the sense in which he used the term *proved*, as he himself explained. He held that it *can* be proved by probable reas-

* *Princeton Review*, Jan., 1868, p. 67. † *Ibid.*, p. 64. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

oning that God can prevent sin in *a* moral system. Hence the unqualified proposition that "God cannot effectually control free agents, without destroying their nature," is incorrectly ascribed to the New Haven divines by Dr. Hodge.*

3. Dr. Hodge reiterates the utterly erroneous statement that, according to Dr. Taylor, God "brings all the influence that he can to secure the conversion of every man."† He represents him as holding that "a free agent can, and multitudes do, effectually resist the utmost efforts of the Spirit of God to secure their salvation" (p. 71); "that God does all he can to convert every man, and elects those whom he succeeds in inducing to repent" (p. 74); that "He does all he can to convert every sinner, consistent with his moral agency (p. 76)." Dr. Taylor did not hold the doctrine that is here attributed to him. Dr. Taylor says, illustrating the feeling and action of God, by reference to a human father: "it by no means follows that he will, or that he ought to, *do all that he can*, and all that may be necessary, to secure the return of the prodigal."‡ Dr. Hodge himself, in another place, presents Dr. Taylor's real view in a quotation from the *Spectator*, where it is said of God that he "brings all those kinds, and all that degree of moral influence in favor of it [*i. e.*, the sinner's compliance with the Gospel invitation], which a system of measures best arranged for the success of grace in a world of rebellion allows." Can Dr. Hodge fail to see the difference between this proposition and the one he imputes to Dr. Taylor? Among the various conjectural reasons which the latter gives why God sanctifies a part and not the whole, one is that those elected "may be more useful than others for promoting his designs."§ "The general interest, the public good, may forbid that he should do any more than he does for the lost sinner."|| Dr.

* p. 71.

† p. 71.

‡ *Revealed Theology*, p. 378.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 418.

Taylor states his doctrine in these words: "God does all that he can *wisely* to bring every sinner to repentance."* Would Dr. Hodge deny this? Would he say that God does *not* do all he can wisely to bring every man to repentance?

Dr. Hodge (on p. 73) endeavors to fasten on the New Haven theology the doctrine of *scientia media*, as it was held by Jesuit theologians. "This distinction," he says, "was introduced with the conscious and avowed intention of getting rid of the Augustinian doctrine, held by the Jansenists, of predestination and sovereign election." Molina, who first gave notoriety to this distinction, died in 1600, when Jansenius was only fifteen years old; and his avowed motive in introducing it was to *reconcile* the Augustinian and semi-Pelagian view. But this is unimportant; it is true that the Molinist theory was warmly debated by the Jansenists and their opponents. Dr. Hodge proceeds to define the *scientia media*, in its bearing on election: "God foresees who will, and who will not, submit to the plan of salvation. Those whom he foresees will submit, he elects to eternal life; those whom he foresees will not submit, he predestinates to eternal death. The New Haven divines adopt the same distinction, and apply it to the same purpose." Dr. Hodge then quotes a paragraph from Dr. Fitch, in the *Christian Spectator*, 1831, in which it is said, "it was to *be* believers, and not *as* believers, that he chose them under the guidance of his (*scientia media*) foreknowledge."

Dr. Hodge has mistaken Dr. Fitch's position. Dr. Fitch introduces the term *scientia media* in replying† to the objection of Dr. Fisk, that the Calvinistic doctrine makes God form his decrees blindly—without knowledge—by an unintelligent act of will. Dr. Fitch replies that God consults his omniscience in forming his decrees. He knows what free agents, under given circumstances, will voluntarily do.

* *Revealed Theology*, p. 378. See, also, *infra*, p. 327.

† *Christian Spectator*, 1831, p. 609.

But Dr. Fitch holds that in the case of the elect, it is God who by his grace produces their repentance and faith, and that he purposed to do this. There is not only foresight on his part, but a distinct purpose to secure the result, and a providing of means to this end. And there is an inherent efficacy in the means to secure the end. He does not foresee the end independently of the means; yet both end and means are predetermined.

This is a different theory from that of the Molinists and the Arminians. According to both, "sufficient grace" is given to all, and it is called "efficacious" or effectual, in the cases where it is complied with. That is, it is called efficacious, only *ex eventu*. God decrees that all who he foresees will believe shall be saved; but their faith results from no special measures on his part. It is the object of a *purpose*, in no proper sense of the term. God dispenses his gifts of grace universally, and lets the result be what it will; although, of course, being omniscient, he foresees what it will be. The Socinians even denied this foresight; and some of the Arminians came near doing the same. Suarez and the other Jesuit theologians explicitly taught that the difference between *gratia sufficiens* and *gratia efficax* is not in *primo actu*, or in God, but in *secundo actu*, or the deportment of the will. *

* Molina says: "Deus sine ulla intermissione ad ostium cordis nostri stat, paratus semper conatus nostros adjuvare, desideransque ingressum." Of the will in relation to "sufficient grace," his doctrine is:—"Si consentiat et coöperetur ut potest, efficiat illud efficax; si vero non consentiat, neque coöperetur—reddat illud inefficax." Gieseler, K. G. iii. 2. 614 n.

The Molinists held, moreover, that God saves or condemns men, according as he foresees that under any and all circumstances they will be holy, or under any and all circumstances resist his grace.

"*Gratia efficax vocatur ex eventu.*" *Conf. Rem.*, 17, 5. "Sufficiens vocatio, quando per coöperationem liberi arbitrii sortitur suum effectum, vocatur efficax." Limborch, 4, 12, 8. This whole distinction between "sufficient" grace and "efficacious" grace, which belongs alike to the Arminians and the Congruists, has no more place in the New Haven system than in that of Calvinists generally.

The New Haven doctrine was essentially dissimilar from this. The New Haven divines did not teach that grace is given in equal measure to all individuals; nor did they teach that the number of the elect is made up of those who were foreseen to be most pliable under recovering influences, and *vice versa*. It is true that they only are saved who it was foreseen would repent and believe. But their repentance and faith are not only foreseen; they result from a peculiar, sovereign distribution of the gifts of grace.* What Dr. Fitch teaches in the Article referred to may be seen from such declarations as the following:—"It is true that God's foreknowledge of what would be the results of his present works of grace, *preceded* in the order of nature the purpose to pursue those works, and presented the grounds of that purpose" (p. 622); but "why do given sinners repent? Is there no ground of certainty, but what lies in their *powers* of agency?" "Does God use no influences and means to induce sinners to come to him with voluntary submission, and accept of life?"

* The *scientia media*, in some proper sense of the term, everybody who believes that God has a plan of providential government, must admit. The *principle* is involved in 1 Sam. xxiii. 9-12, Matt. xi. 22, 23. Tyre and Sidon would have repented, had their situation in one respect been like that of Bethsaida and Chorazin. These passages, says Dr. A. A. Hodge, are not cases of *scientia media*, they "simply teach that God, knowing all causes, free and necessary, knows how they would act under any proposed condition" (*Outlines of Theology*, p. 114). What is this but *scientia media*? In fact, Fonseca, who devised the term *scientia media*, divides it into two parts, the second of which (*scientia pure conditionata*) is the knowledge of acts which would have come to pass under certain conditions never actually realized. And he refers to this very case of Tyre and Sidon. (Hamilton's *Supplementary Notes on Reid*, p. 982.) This form of knowledge some may think best to include in the knowledge of *simple intelligence*; but this is an objection not to the thing, but to the name. Dr. A. A. Hodge resolves the foreordination of sin into *scientia media*. "God knowing certainly that the man in question would in the given circumstances so act, did place that very man in precisely those circumstances that he should so act" (*Outlines*, etc., p. 170). This agrees entirely with the remark respecting the occurrence of sin, with which Dr. Fitch first connects the term *scientia media*. (*Spectator*, 1831, p. 609.)

Are these influences brought to bear alike on all nations and on all individuals?"* Election always includes in it "the *purpose* of God which *secures* the repentance and faith of those particular persons who are saved and adopted."†

That Dr. Fitch uses the phrase *scientia media*—a phrase quite unexceptionable in reference to the foreordination of *sinful* voluntary actions—is of no consequence. The question is whether he regarded the faith of the believer as due to an efficacy residing in the means which God employs for his conversion. He says:—

"Dr. Fisk overlooks the distinction made by Calvinists, between an election to *holiness*, and an election to *salvation*. The latter all admit to be conditional—to have a 'reference to character.' God has elected none to be saved, except on the condition that they voluntarily embrace the Gospel, and persevere unto the end. But the question is, How comes any man to comply with this condition—to *have* the character in question? Does not God secure that compliance; does he not elect the individuals, who shall thus voluntarily obey and persevere? Calvinists affirm that he does. The election unto *holiness* is the turning-point of their system. They never speak of an election unto *salvation*, except as founded upon it—as presupposing God's purpose to secure the *condition* of salvation, in the hearts of the elect."

Dr. Fitch does not, indeed, teach that grace is, properly speaking, irresistible; neither does Dr. Hodge. But both agree that it is *unresisted* and effectual.

Dr. Taylor illustrates his idea of election as follows:—"Suppose a father can wisely do more to secure the repentance of one child than he can wisely do to secure the repentance of another; suppose that a higher influence in one case would be safe and even salutary in respect to the conduct of his other children, while in the other case it would in this respect prove fatal; suppose him for these reasons to use the higher influence with a design to secure the obedience of one child, and to use it with success;—is not this election—is not this *making one to differ* from another—is not this *having*

* *Spectator*, p. 631.

† *Ibid.*, p. 619.

mercy on whom he will have mercy—and doing more for one than for another, and with good reason too?” Dr. Taylor declares that the probability of success to be held out to sinners, as an encouragement to present effort and action, “must be lowered down to what the Apostle calls *a peradventure* that God will give them repentance; and that delay and procrastination are ever lessening this probability.” *

In short, the New Haven theologians taught that God does all the good he wisely can; he produces among his fallen creatures the largest amount of holiness in the aggregate which the nature of things, or the essential requisites of the best system, admit of; they did *not* teach that the sole or the principal of the considerations regulating the distribution of his recovering influences among the individuals of the race, is the greater or less degree of obstinacy in sin which they are severally foreseen or perceived to have.

Among Calvinists no one is more emphatic in asserting that God has good and wise reasons for all his decrees, than Calvin himself. He is a sovereign; he takes counsel with no one, and reveals the reasons of his determinations and actions no further than he deems best. But there *are* the best reasons, and one day they will be made known. Dr. Taylor and his associates believed that the reasons why he does not choose to recover all from sin, may lie not in any limitation of his benevolence, or, properly speaking, of his power, but in limitations in the nature of things—in the essential characteristics of the best system. Omnipotence lays certain restraints upon itself in governing a universe of free agents; just as God, to quote the pithy expression of Lyman Beecher, does not govern the stars by the ten commandments.

The New Haven doctrine, then, did recognize an elec-

* *Reply to Dr. Tyler's Examination*, p. 18. *Revealed Theology*, p. 434. See, also, *infra*, p. 334.

tion and a sovereignty in election, which are not found in the Arminian system. There is no claim, of any sort, on the part of an individual who is elected; but his salvation—his repentance not less than the blessings that follow it—is the certain consequence of the operation of a plan which has in view the highest attainable good; and in effecting his repentance, the determining influence is with God, so that all the glory of the change is due to him.

At the same time, the New Haven doctrine differed from the old Calvinism in explicitly admitting that the universal recovery of sinners by grace, may be inconsistent with that system in which free agency is to play so essential a part, and which God has freely chosen as being the best.

On the whole it seems fair to describe the New Haven type of doctrine as moderate Calvinism.*

4. Dr. Hodge gives a very erroneous view of Dr. Taylor's doctrine of regeneration. Proposing to give the doctrine of "the New Haven divines," the former says: "Regeneration is defined to be not an act of God, but an act of the sinner himself." What reader of this sentence would suppose that Dr. Taylor, when treating, in his published Lectures, of this very subject, uses the following language: "*The Spirit of God is the author of the change in Regeneration.* I cannot suppose it necessary to dwell on this fact in opposition to Pelagian error, or the proud self-sufficiency of the human heart. The *fact* of divine influence in the production of holiness in the heart of man, meets us, as it were, on almost

* If the New Haven theology is so objectionable, what is to be thought of the theology of Baxter? He holds that sufficient grace is given to all "to enable them to seek salvation, and God will not forsake them until they forsake him;" that "it is the wise design of the Redeemer not to give to men the same degrees of aid; but to vary the degree, sometimes according to the preparation and receptivity of men, and sometimes only according to his good pleasure;" and that the divine working is not such as "takes away the simultaneous power to the contrary (*simultatem potentiae ad contrarium.*)" *Meth. Theol.*, P. iii., c. 25, *Cath. Theol.*, B. ii., p. 133.

every page of the sacred record ;” and Dr. Taylor adds, quoting from the Synod of Dort: “This divine grace of regeneration does not act upon men like stocks and trees, nor take away the properties of the will, or violently compel it while unwilling ; but it spiritually vivifies, heals, corrects, and sweetly, and at the same time, powerfully inclines it :” and Dr. Taylor says still further, that “this influence of the Spirit is distinct from the natural influence of the truth ; and though not miraculous, is supernatural.” He says, indeed, that “the change in regeneration is the sinner’s own act ;” because “the thing produced by the power of God is their own act—the act of putting on the new man.”* He cites, with approbation, the sentence of President Edwards respecting this change: “God produces all, and we act all. For that is what he produces, viz., *our own acts*.”†

Why not say that President Edwards believes that regeneration “is not an act of God,” because he says that “we act all ?”

5. Dr. Hodge, in seeking to identify Dr. Taylor’s doctrine on the office of grace in the recovery of the sinner, with that of Pelagius, has made a very misleading statement of the latter’s position. Having quoted from Dr. Taylor the remark that “the error of Pelagius is, not that he attained man’s ability without grace, but that man does *actually* obey God without grace,” Dr. Hodge observes: “It is a mistake to say that Pelagius held that ‘men do actually obey God without grace,’ so that this shadowy difference between him and Dr. Taylor on this point vanishes.” Does not Dr. Hodge know that Pelagius and Dr. Taylor use the term “grace” in a very different signification ? That Dr. Taylor means here by “grace” the inward, supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit ? that in this sense Pelagius did hold that men sometimes “actually obey God without grace ?” Pe-

* *Revealed Theology*, pp. 390, 391.

† *Outlines of Theology*, pp. 290, 361.

lagius, as we have explained before, called the law of the Old Testament, providential dispensations, the precepts of Christ and various other things, by the name "grace," whilst he made little or nothing of the inward operation of the Divine Spirit.*

Let us now sum up Dr. Hodge's charges against Dr. Taylor's system. His generic charge is that plenary ability, or the power of contrary choice, is made to belong inseparably to the will; but he keeps out of sight, as far as practical impression is concerned, Dr. Taylor's associated doctrine of moral inability. In the formula, "certainty with power to the contrary"—"certainty" is uttered *sotto voce*.

Of the heretical corollaries charged on the system, the first is "that all sin consists in the voluntary transgression of known law." That all sin is voluntary, is the common assertion of orthodox theology. It is the doctrine of Augustine, as well as of Dr. Taylor.† It is the doctrine of Dr. Hodge

* Dr. A. A. Hodge defines the Pelagian Conception of grace, as excluding the internal operation of the Spirit. (*Outlines of Theology*, p. 335.) Pelagians hold, he says, "That the Holy Spirit produces no internal change in the heart of the subject, except as he is the author of the Scriptures, and as the Scriptures present moral truths and motives, which of their own nature exert a moral influence upon the soul."

† The doctrine of Augustine on the nature of sin is frequently misconceived. This is chiefly owing to the fact that he uses the term *voluntas* in so various meanings, and often does this in the same paragraph. His precise conception of the *concupiscentia* with which the descendants of Adam are born, must be ascertained. 1. Concupiscence, which is inordinate desire for the inferior good—in particular, fleshly desire—belongs to all men from birth, and gives rise to a conflict in the soul and to a disordered condition not belonging to man's original nature. 2. In the case of the baptized and regenerated, concupiscence remains as a principle, but brings guilt only so far as its impulses are obeyed. "*Quamdiu ergo manet lex concupiscentialiter in membris, manente ipsa reatus ejus solvitur; sed ei solvitur, qui sacramentum regenerationis accepit renovarique jam coepit.*" (*De Pec. Mer. et Remis.*, II., xxviii.) "Nam ipsa quidem concupiscentia jam non est peccatum in regeneratis, quando illi ad illicita opera non consentitur." (*De Nupt. et Conc.*, I., xiii.) The same thing is said in a multitude of other passages. 3. That native *concupiscentia* is sin, is not only implied in the passages above, but is explicitly asserted

himself.* And Dr. Taylor does not mean that sin is in

in many places. It is at once sin and the punishment of sin. "Sed per-
tinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum est, ut
ipsum sit et poena peccati." (*Op. Imp. Cont. Jul.*, I., xlvii.) Dr. Emer-
son, in a note to his translation of Wiggers on Augustinism and Pelagian-
ism, supposes Augustine to teach that concupiscence is not "really sin;"
but he inadvertently applies what Augustine says of the regenerate or bap-
tized, to all. The very passage which Dr. Emerson quotes (p. 128) in
proof of his position, speaks of the guilt of concupiscence as *pardoned* in
baptism—"cujus jam reatus lavacro regenerationis absumtus est." (*Cont.*
Duas Epist. Pel., I., xiii.)

4. But Augustine regarded concupiscence as voluntary. In the long
passage of the *Opus Imp. C. Jul.* (I., xlv. seq.), where he discusses the
question whether native sin is in the will, and in the *Retractationes* (I.,
cxv.) where he explains the previous statement which he had made in the
treatise *De libero Arbitrio*, on this subject, he goes no further than to say
that sin is "ex voluntate" and is not "*sine voluntate*"—i. e. it is conse-
quent on the sin of Adam. In these places, however, he has in mind
voluntariness involving power to the contrary; as he elsewhere says:—
"cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de illa scilicet
in qua homo factus est, loquimur." (*De Lib. Arb.*, III., xviii.) But that
native concupiscence involves the consent of the will, he clearly teaches.
"Nam quid est cupiditas et lætitia, nisi voluntas in eorum consensionem
quæ volumus?" "Cum consentimus appetendo ea quæ volumus, cupidi-
tas." "Voluntas est quippe in omnibus: imo omnes nihil aliud quam
voluntates sunt." (*De Civ. Dei*, XIV., c. vii.) "Si quisquam etiam di-
cit ipsam cupiditatem nihil aliud esse quam voluntatem, sed vitiosam
peccatoque servientem, non resistendum est: nec de verbis, cum res con-
stet, controversia facienda." (*Retract.*, I., c. xv.) "Cupiditas porro im-
proba voluntas est. Ergo improba voluntas malorum omnium causa est."
(*De Lib. Arbit.*, III., xvii.) Native sin belongs to the will, but to a will
enslaved. *Voluntas* is, also, frequently used by Augustine for the voli-
tive function, by which executive acts of choice are put forth; and in
this meaning he frequently speaks of sin as involuntary, or existing
against the will. Under this head, he is never tired of referring the Pela-
gians to Rom. vii. 18.

Thus *Voluntas* is used by Augustine (1) for the free-will in Adam,
which included the power to the contrary; (2) for the spontaneous sinful
affections consequent on the first sin, in him and his posterity, or the will
in servitude; and (3) for the volitionary faculty, or the faculty which
puts forth imperative choices.

* This is the view given by Dr. A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, pp.
223, 234, 257.

volitions merely, or superficial, imperative choices. He would agree with Dr. Shedd, in the following statements:

"It seems to us that by the will is meant a voluntary power that lies at the very centre of the soul, and whose movements consist, not so much in choosing or refusing, in reference to particular circumstances, as in determining the whole man with reference to some great and ultimate end of living. The characteristic of the will proper, as distinguished from the volitionary faculty, is determination of the whole being to an ultimate end, rather than selection of means for attaining that end in a particular case." "The will, as thus defined, we affirm to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature. Indeed this sinful nature is nothing more nor less than the state of the will; nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self, as the ultimate end of living." *

In short, Dr. Taylor held that sin is a profound, immanent, permanent preference of the will, whereby a man lives to self, instead of living to God; a preference at the root of all subordinate action. Dr. Taylor held that this is an elective preference; the soul *sets before it* this end of living; and by this distinction, he removed a great source of ambiguity and confusion from theology. There *are* involuntary, strictly constitutional dispositions, inclinations; but *this* is voluntary, flowing from an elective act, yet central, permanent, and controlling.

But Dr. Taylor holds that sin is the transgression of *known* law. Dr. Hodge, in his definitions of moral agency, says the same thing, though inconsistently with other parts of his own teaching. † Dr. Taylor held that consciousness

* Essays, pp. 240, 243.

† Dr. A. A. Hodge says that to be morally responsible, "a man must be a free, rational, moral agent." "1st. He must be in present possession of his reason to distinguish truth from falsehood. 2d. *He must have in exercise a moral sense to distinguish right from wrong.*"—*Outlines of Theology*, p. 221. "Only a moral agent, or one endowed with intelligence, conscience, and free will can sin." *Ibid.*, p. 225. "All sin has its root in the perverted dispositions, desires, and affections which constitute the depraved *state of the will*. P. 234. If Dr. Hodge would distinguish *will* from *desire*—that which is purely spontaneous from that which is elective—he would clear his system of one prolific source of confusion.

is a thing of degrees; men commonly sin without reflection; there are sins which may be called thoughtless, and there are those which may be called sins of ignorance. The "awakening" of a sinner is the deepening of consciousness or the passing of consciousness into reflection; the coming of a man to himself.

But let it be granted that while Dr. Hodge holds that during a certain undefined period of infantile existence, sin is committed, or there is sin when there is no knowledge, and no possibility of the knowledge, of law, while Dr. Taylor supposes that during this period there is either no sin, or there is some degree of consciousness of duty. Shall this difference cast Dr. Taylor beyond the pale of "all organized churches?" Let it be noticed that Augustinians who hold to sin in infants prior to choice, believe that their guilt is washed away by the easy remedy of baptism; and at the present day the universal salvation of those who die in infancy is generally held.

And here it would be interesting to ascertain how Dr. Hodge reconciles his own opinion on this last topic with the creeds. We have been led to believe that he holds to the salvation of all persons dying in infancy. The Augustinian system holds to the perdition of unbaptized and non-elect infants. This is the doctrine of Augustine himself. So Jansenius teaches. Moreover, the Westminster Confession declares: "Elect infants dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ, through the Spirit." This plainly implies that non-elect infants are not saved. It is nonsense to speak of *elect* infants as saved, if *all* infants are meant. Besides the added clause, in the same paragraph, about the salvation of "all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word," settles the meaning of the passage; for, of course, not *all* of the heathen are here declared to be among the saved. Moreover it is immediately declared that "others not elected" "cannot be saved." The framers of the confession held that *de jure* all

infants are lost; that *de facto* there are two and only two ways in which they can be saved—through the Abrahamic covenant which saves the baptized among them, and sovereign election which is not limited by the covenant. The Augustinians believed with Dr. Hodge, that new-born infants have in them that sin which is the parent of all sins; they believed with him that they are hell-deserving; and they believed that only the baptized and elected ones among them will be saved. Does Dr. Hodge agree to this last proposition? If not, does he accept the confession in its fair import? *

One ground of complaint against the New Haven theology is, that it leaves no room for infant regeneration. But it is entirely consistent with Dr. Taylor's system to suppose that even those who die in infancy, need the sanctifying influence of the Spirit to prevent them from beginning their moral life sinfully, and thus that they owe their salvation to Christ.†

In regard to the second of the special errors of the New Haven theology—the denial of hereditary sin, it is enough to answer that Augustinian theology holds to no hereditary sin which is not also voluntary. Whatever is peculiar to Dr. Taylor on this point results from his disbelief in our legal responsibility for Adam's sin. Men will differ in their estimate of the importance of this opinion. But it must be remembered that Dr. Taylor believed that all men are totally depraved from the beginning of moral agency, and until they are regenerated by the Spirit of God; and that this depravity is connected, as a certain consequence, with the first sin of Adam.

The other points in Dr. Hodge's indictment refer to the

* We are not so ignorant as to suppose that the old Calvinists all believed in the *de facto* perdition of infants. Yet not only supralapsarians, but some infralapsarians, *did* maintain this dogma; and the *language* of the Westminster Confession, in its fair import, implies it.

† *Christian Spectator*, vol. v., p. 664.

power of God in relation to the control of free agents, and rest, to a considerable extent, as we have shown, on a misapprehension of Dr. Taylor's teaching.

We may state now in a few words the relation of the New Haven divinity to Old Calvinism.

The peculiarity of the New Haven system is in its view respecting the non-prevention of sin—of sin in its beginning and in its continuance in the non-elect.

Supralapsarian Calvinism held that the fall is divinely ordained as a means to an end—that end being the furnishing of sinful subjects, on whom God could illustrate both his compassion and his punitive justice. The election of the one class and the reprobation of the other, is the decree first in order. This system in reality traces all sin to the efficient agency of the First Cause. "The sixteenth century," says Julius Müller, "might carry out such thoughts, and the most energetic Christian piety was compatible with them. To-day, with the clearer consciousness of the premises and consequences of that view, it could not be scientifically developed without leading to Pantheism." *

The infralapsarian Calvinism made election have respect to the race already fallen. Sin is permitted for inscrutable reasons, and from the race of sinners the elect are chosen. The decree of election follows the decree permitting the introduction of sin.

The infralapsarian system left room for supposing other reasons for the permission of sin than that assigned by the supralapsarians.†

The New Haven divines suggested as a possible explanation, that to the eye of infinite wisdom it may be better for this universe of free agents, to *permit* sin to exist *when and where* it does exist, than to exert the positive influence requisite to prevent it; that such a voluntary limitation, on

* *Lehre v. d. Sünde*, i., 364.

† So says Alexander Schweizer, *Central-dogmen der Ref. Kirche*.

the part of God, of his agency, alone comports with the characteristics of that moral system which he has chosen to establish, and which is the best. A like limitation, for the same general reason, takes place in reference to the non-elect.

To the objection that this theory derogates from the divine power, it is replied that every theodicy is a scheme of optimism; that the opposite theory of sin being the indispensable instrument of accomplishing the greatest good, palpably implies a limitation of the divine power. The dogma that God could prevent all sin without detriment to the system, clashes with his benevolence.

These advantages were claimed for the theory suggested by the New Haven divines: (1.) that it silences the infidel objection to the benevolence of God; (2.) renders the denunciation of sin as an unqualified evil, consistent with truth; (3.) vindicates the perfect sincerity of the invitations and entreaties addressed in the Gospel to sinners; (4.) directly connects the dispensation of the Spirit with the divine benevolence, acting with a view to accomplish the greatest good in the aggregate.

It had been objected to Calvinism that in representing the compassion of God as fastening on particular persons to the exclusion of others, whose case equally appeals to compassion, the very idea of compassion, as a benevolent feeling, is violated. That is to say, it is not from *compassion* that even the elect are saved. It was claimed for the New Haven doctrine that it took from election this arbitrary quality by identifying it with a benevolent plan, in the formation of which, while compassion is felt equally for all, there is no respect of persons, but only an eye to the largest good which impartial love, under the guidance of wisdom, can attain.

In a word, the New Haven theology carried the infralapsarian scheme another step, by directly connecting the decrees of God respecting the fall and recovery of man, with

his *benevolence*; in such a way, however, as to exclude the idea that sin, either in itself considered or all things considered, is ever preferred by him to holiness in its stead. God gives mankind a probation under law; foreseeing the fact of universal sin, he provides a salvation which is sufficient for all and is sincerely urged upon the acceptance of all; foreseeing the universal rejection of the Saviour, he adds a peculiar supernatural influence to convert the soul, but this influence is not dispensed indiscriminately, and without stint, but in accordance with a wise plan which will effect the actual conversion of only a part of a race, all of whom are alike guilty.

On the subject of human agency in conversion, there have been, as all students of history know, two generic types of opinion—two great streams of doctrine, taking their rise far back in the ancient church. According to one of these types of opinion, there belongs to man a coöperative agency in relation to the grace of the Spirit. According to the other, the Spirit is the sole Efficient, and the human will is merely the theatre of His operation. The Greek Church, from the earliest times, has cherished the first form of doctrine. Her great fathers, Origen, Athanasius, the two Gregories, Basil, Chrysostom, and her theologians generally, let them differ on other points as they may, are unanimous in ascribing to man some remaining power to good. This, too, was the Latin theology down to Augustine. It was the earlier theology of Augustine himself, after his conversion. He at first rejected unconditional election and irresistible grace; and his earlier views unquestionably correspond to the current type of thinking at and before that time. While the church was fighting Stoics, Gnostics, and Manichæans, stress was laid upon the liberty of the will. Augustine, carrying out half-developed suggestions of Latin theologians before him, brought forward views respecting the power of sin over the will, which induced a revolution in

anthropology, and have exerted the most extensive and lasting influence. But before Augustine died, the rise of the semi-Pelagian party showed how many there were whom his opinions failed to satisfy. Henceforward, in the Roman Catholic Church, the two types of doctrine are found side by side. They are severally represented in the middle ages by the two great schools, the Thomists and the Scotists, coincident with the two great monastic orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans. The Reformers followed Augustine; but soon, on the Lutheran side, Melancthon set up the synergistic doctrine, and among the Lutherans, even where the Philippist view was in form disavowed, the prevailing doctrine has been that of conditional election. In the Reformed branch of the Protestant Church, Arminius was persuaded of the error of the doctrine which he was set to defend, and began a most influential movement, the essential feature of which is the denial of unconditional election and irresistible grace. The Church of England, at first in sympathy with Calvinism, became mostly Arminian. Within that church, there sprang up the Wesleyan movement, the most zealous, aggressive, and successful religious movement on the Protestant side, since the age of the Reformation—which had for one of its main characteristics an energetic, not to say passionate, protest against the doctrine of unconditional, personal election. Glancing back to the Catholic Church, we find, in the sixteenth century, the Molinists in conflict with the Dominicans, and the Congregatio de auxiliis adjourning, after years of fruitless effort, without adjusting the dispute; the Council of Trent, unable to harmonize the two great parties, and taking refuge in ambiguities; the Jansenists, in the sixteenth century reviving the Augustinian doctrine, only to kindle anew the flames of an unending controversy. The marvellous subtlety of the great Catholic theologians from Bellarmine to Perrone, has been exercised in defining the tenets of the various contending schools, on the relation of free-will to grace.

The advocates of each of the two types of doctrine have supposed themselves to be standing in defence of practical truth of the highest consequence. On the one hand, the full responsibility of man is kept prominently in view; on the other, his full dependence on God. On the one hand there is a purpose to take from the sinner every excuse for his rejection of Christ; on the other there is a purpose to ascribe to God all the praise of his conversion. Man's need of redemption, and his capacity of redemption, are both to be saved. A moral government over free and accountable beings, the authors of their own actions, and therefore proper subjects of punishment and reward, and a providential government, laying a foundation for implicit submission, resignation, and confidence under all events, and for unre-served gratitude for the restoration of the soul from sin, must both be recognized in a just and comprehensive system of theology.

Now there have been individuals who, while seeing that the Calvinistic doctrine not only has a place in Scripture, but also in Christian experience, have not felt that the objections which have been brought forward age after age by able and pious men, and by powerful sections of the church, are the mere offspring of "carnal reason." They have felt that a certain force belongs to these objections; that they embody real difficulties. Under this conviction, they have endeavored to solve them, without parting with the essential principles and practical interests inseparable from the system against which those objections are directed. Such a man, among the English Puritans, was Richard Baxter. Another of the same class was Dr. Taylor. Both were charged with deserting the cause which they wished to defend and to recommend to serious men who regarded it with aversion.

It is a curious fact that men who are loud in their denunciation of Dr. Taylor's system, profess themselves willing to tolerate the extreme Hopkinsians. They are shocked at

the assertion of a power of contrary choice, but they can put up with the doctrine that God is the creator of sin! They can freely tolerate propositions which are not only denounced by all the creeds of Christendom, but, if logically carried out, would banish all religion from the earth. But these, it is said, are errors "in the right direction." In the right direction! That is, in the direction of Spinoza and Hegel—in the direction of an all-devouring Pantheism! Nobody at the present day denies predestination. Buckle, Mill, *et id omne genus*, outdo Calvin in asserting predestination. But the truth which is denied in these days is the free and responsible nature of man and the *moral* government of God—a government of law, and of rewards and punishments, over free agents; the truth which Dr. Taylor was so concerned to rescue from all assaults. Theologians, before they cast their anathemas among their brethren, would do well to attend to the times in which they live, and to the peculiar dangers of the present generation.

The union of the two dissevered branches of the Presbyterian church will be a good thing or an evil thing, according to its effect in promoting or weakening the intolerant spirit which forced the separation. If it bring with it a catholic temper, and if it do not tend to stifle theological inquiry, it will be a great good. But if it result in building up sectarian walls to greater height and strength and in reinforcing the party of intolerance, it will bring no advantage. The danger is that the fear of exciting discord, mingled with the fear of church censure, will lead to at least a tacit compliance with the wishes of the more exacting section. Division is better than stagnation, and is far less to be dreaded than the tyranny of an illiberal dogmatism. In our age and country, evangelical Christianity is called upon to cling to the fundamental contents of the Gospel, but it must also tolerate differences in non-essential points, and freely concede that measure of freedom of opinion, without which a healthy life and progress are impossible.

A church which could not find room in its ministry for men like Moses Stuart, Lyman Beecher, and Albert Barnes, would be, however big in numbers, about the meanest and narrowest sect in America. A sect that would cast Zwingle, the first founder of the Reformed Church, out of its ministry!*

Every man who can read the signs of the times must see that the Protestant world is growing tired of sectarian Christianity, and is yearning for a more catholic and fraternal connection among the disciples of Christ. If the union of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church can be effected on a truly catholic basis, we shall hail it with warm satisfaction. It will be an event in consonance with the prevailing tendency of Christian minds. It will be a blow at that sect-system, which is the scandal of our Protestant Christianity. We shall regret the reunion, only in case it

* Zwingle, as is well known, denied that native vitiosity is properly sin, though it be the uniform occasion of sin: "Non enim facinus contra legem. Morbus igitur est proprie et conditio," etc. (*Ratio Fidei*, Niemeyer's ed., pp. 20, 21.) It is true that the old Protestant creeds emphatically asserted the opposite doctrine. The question here is not whether they were right or wrong in this. Nor is the question what the feelings of men were in regard to such a difference, in an age when, for differences no greater than those which divided Calvinists from Lutherans, men were ready to bite and devour one another. But the question is whether at the present day, which has the credit of being less swayed by the spirit of exclusion, a man who believes in total and universal depravity, and the truths of redemption, is to be cast out for holding an opinion like that of Zwingle. At that time even, and in his case, it formed, as far as we know, no barrier to fellowship with him on the part of those, whether Lutheran or Reformed, who held the contrary doctrine.

Objection had been made to Zwingle's expressions on the subject of original sin; and this led him, in 1524, to write his *De Peccato Originali Declaratio*, in the form of a letter, to Rhégius (*Works*, t. iii.). But, with some inconsistencies, his doctrine is here substantially what it had been before. The conference at Marburg was in 1529; so that the *Ratio Fidei*, to which we refer above, which was presented at Augsburg in 1530, represents his mature opinions. He died the next year.

serves to give a little longer respite to that over-dogmatic, intolerant, seventeenth-century tone of Protestantism, which exaggerated minor differences, left an open way for the great Papal reaction, provoked the spirit of scepticism in all Protestant countries, and stands in perpetual contradiction to the precepts and spirit of the Testament.

We have written the foregoing pages, not because we are able to accept all the solutions of the high problems of theology, which the New Haven divines incorporated in their system; for we are not. We have written as expositors, not as advocates. But we regard the persistent effort to stigmatize the New Haven system by affixing to it the epithet *Pelagian*, as utterly groundless and unjustifiable. And we hold in high honor the originators of this theological system. Drs. Taylor, Fitch, and Goodrich formed together a corps of theologians of whom it is not too much to say that any university in Christendom might well be proud. The rare and admirable ability which they displayed in the discussion of theological questions was mingled with an untiring zeal in promoting practical religion. In the pulpit or the conference room, as religious teachers or counsellors, their labors were abundant, and were attended with unsurpassed success. They investigated theology, not so much to gratify an intellectual curiosity, as to arm themselves for the practical work of persuading men to turn to God. One of this group of eminent men still survives;* one in whom philosophical power, rhetorical felicity, and poetic feeling are equally mingled, and whose modest, unambitious character serves to set in stronger relief his almost unrivalled genius as a theologian and preacher.

* [Dr. E. T. Fitch. He died Jan. 31, 1871.]

THE AUGUSTINIAN AND THE FEDERAL THEORIES OF ORIGINAL SIN COMPARED.*

THE one word which expresses both the nature and the end or aim of Christianity, is redemption. The correlate of redemption is sin. Parallel, therefore, in importance with the doctrine of redemption in the Christian system is the doctrine of sin. The two doctrines, like the facts which they represent, are mutually inseparable. If it be true just now that the person and work of the Redeemer engross attention, to the comparative exclusion of other topics of theology, it is equally true that no adequate discussion, and much more no adequate solution, of the questions belonging to this theme, are practicable, apart from right views of sin. The disease must be known and admitted before you can comprehend the remedy. "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." The Gospel is unintelligible or is a folly to him who is blind to the vast disorder which the Gospel comes to rectify. Either as a theoretical or as a practical system, he can make nothing of it.

We deem it to be of the highest consequence to distinguish, so to speak, great doctrinal facts from philosophical theories attached to them. The truths of Christianity involve and suggest problems, which, in some cases, the Scriptures do not profess to explain. Explanations of human invention may be of more or less value; but it is hurtful not only to theology as a science, but also to the cause of practical religion, when these explanations are elevated to the rank

* From *The New Englander* for July, 1868.

of dogmas, and the inculcation of them is made part and parcel of the teaching of the Gospel.

It is partly this conviction which has led us to undertake the present discussion. We believe that a great, unquestionable, universal fact, like that of sin, deserves to be admitted in full earnest by everybody. At the same time, we believe that there are theories of human device, which have been invented to clear up difficulties, but which, in truth, create vastly more embarrassment than they remove. We do not here assert this equally of *all* the theories which theology has broached concerning this great matter. The limits and applications of our remark, the progress of the discussion—especially if we should pursue it beyond the present essay—will make clear.

There are three theories respecting original sin which we shall have occasion specially to consider in this Article. The first is the Augustinian; the second may be called the Augustino-federal or the semi-federal; and the third the federal theory.

The fundamental idea of the Augustinian theory is that of a participation on the part of the descendants of Adam in his first sin; in consequence of which they are born both guilty and morally depraved. The fundamental idea of the federal theory is that of a vicarious representation on the part of Adam, in virtue of a covenant between God and him, whereby the legal responsibility for his first sinful act is entailed upon all his descendants; participation being excluded, but the propriety of his appointment to this vicarious office being founded on our relation to him as the common father of men. The Augustino-federal or semi-federal theory is a combination of the two, the covenant relation of Adam being prominent, but participation being also, with more or less emphasis, asserted.

Besides these theories, some have held to hereditary sin, but rejected both participation and the covenant. Others

have embraced the doctrine of an individual pre-existence and fall—a pre-existence either transcendental and timeless, or in time. Others still have denied the existence of native sin, or of any sin prior to a personal act of choice in the present life. Spinoza and all other Pantheists deny, of course, the essential antagonism of moral good and moral evil, so that to them the problem loses its proper significance. But these last theories of Christian theology, as well as this antichristian, necessitarian hypothesis, we have no particular occasion to discuss in this place.

The federal doctrine is the offspring of the seventeenth century. In fact it may almost be said of it, in the form in which it is now held, that it is the offspring of the eighteenth century ; since, in the preceding age, the great majority of the theologians who adopted the theory of a covenant coupled with it the Augustinian principle. That is to say, they maintained the Augustino-federal or semi-federal doctrine as above defined.

The federal theory has of late been defended chiefly by Scottish theologians and by the Princeton school in this country. It supposes a contract or covenant of the Creator with the first man, to the effect that he should stand a moral probation on behalf of mankind, so that his act, whether sinful or holy, should be judicially imputed to them, or accounted theirs in law ; and the legal penalty, in case he sinned, be duly inflicted on them as well as on him. Adam's relation to us in this matter is compared to that of a guardian to his wards, an envoy plenipotentiary to his sovereign, or, generally speaking, of an agent to his principal, it being understood that the agent keeps within the legal bounds of his commission. Adam sinned, his act is imputed to us, and the penalty is inflicted. We are condemned to begin our existence destitute of righteousness and positively sinful, and under a sentence of temporal and eternal death. Notice certain particulars of this theory :

(1.) In distinction from ordinary covenants, in the cove-

nant with Adam the conditions are not mutually imposed, but it is a sovereign constitution imposed by the Creator upon the creature.*

(2.) The representative element, in virtue of which Adam stood for his posterity, depends on the special and sovereign ordination of God, in distinction from the principles of natural and universal justice. In other words, it is not the natural union of men with Adam, but the "federal union which is the legal ground of the imputation of his sin to them."† The kinship of Adam and his descendants is a reason why he, and not another, is appointed their representative; but the justice of imputation depends exclusively upon the covenant or the federal relation in which he is placed.

(3.) Our "guilt" for Adam's sin is simply and solely a legal responsibility. As we had no real agency of any sort in committing that sin, there is no ground for self-reproach on account of it; we are not called upon to repent of it; nor can God, for that act of Adam, look upon us with moral disapprobation. There is no more propriety in regarding ourselves with moral displeasure on account of that transgression, than there would be in taking credit to ourselves for the righteousness of Christ.

(4.) It is said that our inborn moral depravity is the penalty of that imputed sin, and eternal death the penalty of this inborn depravity. But it is also said that for imputed sin alone, apart from this inherent depravity, which is its penalty, eternal death would not be inflicted.

Augustine's theory rests on the idea that human nature as a whole was deposited in the first man. This nature, as it came from the hands of God, was pure. The long battle which Augustine fought with Manichæan philosophy, both in his own personal experience and after his conversion,

* Dr. A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 240.

made him sedulous to avoid their peculiar tenet. But human nature, existing in its totality in Adam, was corrupted in the first act of transgression, and as such is transmitted to his descendants. The instrument of this transmission is the sexual appetite. This appetite is itself the fruit of the first sin, as well as the means whereby the sinful nature is communicated from father to son. The race was embodied in its first representative, and the qualities which it acquired in his act, which was both generic and individual, appear, when the race is unfolded or developed, as the personal possession of each individual at birth. As a personal act, the first sin was not our act but the act of another; yet it was truly the common act of mankind in their collective or undistributed form of existence. For the consequences of this act all are therefore responsible; and as soon as they exist as individuals, they exhibit in themselves the same corruption of nature—the same inordinate appetites (concupiscence), and slavery of the will to sin—which resulted to Adam. “This theory,” says Neander, “would easily blend with Augustine’s speculative form of thought, as he had appropriated to himself the Platonico-Aristotelian realism in the doctrine of general conceptions, and conceived of general conceptions as the original types of the kind realized in individual things.” Into this particular topic connected with Augustine’s philosophy, we do not care to enter here. It is a fact that realism, either in the extreme Platonic form or in the more moderate Aristotelian type, prevailed from Augustine down through the middle ages, being embraced by the orthodox schoolmen, and ruling both the great schools during the productive, golden era of scholastic theology. That the realistic mode of thought extensively influenced Protestant theology at the Reformation and afterwards, admits of no question. But since it is far from being true that all Augustinians have been avowed,

* *Church History*, ii., 609.

much less, self-consistent, realists, it is better when we speak of them as a class, to say that they are swayed by a realistic mode of thought than that they are the advocates of an explicit realism. It should be added that realism, as far as it affected Augustine, was rather a prop than a source of his doctrine. The fact of innate sin was so deeply lodged in his convictions that he was ready to welcome any plausible support or defence of it that lay within his reach.

There is no need of citing from Augustine passages in which his doctrine of a generic sin in Adam is set forth. They are familiar to scholars. Indeed, after he became established in this opinion, and through all of his numerous treatises relating to the Pelagian controversy, there is a great uniformity in his expressions on this subject. The same set of propositions and arguments appears and reappears. In that great sin of the first man, our nature was deteriorated, and not only became sinful, but generates sinners.* We were all in Adam and sinned when he sinned. In his interpretation of Romans v. 12, he first sets aside the supposition that the *in quo* of the Vulgate refers to "sin" or to "death," and infers that it must refer to Adam himself. "Nothing remains," he says, "but to conclude that in that first man all are understood to have sinned, because all were in him when he sinned; whereby sin is brought in with birth and not removed save by the new birth." He then quotes approvingly the sentence ascribed to Hilary, the Roman deacon: "it is manifest that in Adam all sinned, so to speak, *en masse*."† By that sin we became a corrupt mass—*massa perditionis*.

So important was this hypothesis, in his view, that his defence of the doctrine of original sin turned upon it. Without it, he knew of no refuge against the sharp and merciless logic of his adversaries. Pelagias himself was a man of no mean ability; but in Julian of Eclanum, Augustine found his

* *De Nupt. et Concup.*, II., xxxiv.

† *Cont. duas Epp. Pelag.*, iv., 7; *Conf. Op. Imp.*, II., lxiii.; *De Pec. Mer. et Remis.*, III., vii.

full match in dialectic ability. Julian was an acute and vigorous, as well as an honest and fearless antagonist. He seized on the vulnerable points in Augustine's theory, and pursued him with questions and objections, which the latter was utterly unable to parry except by his realistic hypothesis. This is strikingly shown in the *Opus Imperfectum* or rejoinder to the second response of Julian. The Pelagian makes his appeal to the sense of justice which God has implanted in every human breast, and which utters a firm and indignant protest against the doctrine that we are blamed, condemned, and punished for what we could not have prevented. He lays hold of passages which Augustine had written in favor of the voluntariness of sin, whilst he was bent on controverting the Manichæans. To all this Augustine could only reply that sin began in an act of the human will—the will of Adam; that in him was the very nature with which we are born; that we thus participated in that act, and justly partake of the corruption that ensued upon it. He constantly falls back, first on the authority of Paul, in the fifth of Romans, and hardly less often on the authority of Ambrose, whose assertion of our community of being with Adam and agency in his transgression, had the greatest weight with his admiring and reverential pupil.

But how vital the hypothesis of sinning in Adam was in Augustine's theology is perhaps most manifest in the way in which he treats the litigated question of the origin of souls. We may say here that a great mistake is made by those who imagine that creationists—that is, those who believe that each soul is separately created—cannot be realists. Whether they can be consistent and logical realists may, to be sure, be doubted. At the present day traducianism—the theory that souls result from procreation—is accepted by theologians who believe, with Augustine, that we sinned in Adam. But this is very far from being the uniform fact in the past. Even Anselm, like the schoolmen generally, was a creationist. He, with a host of theologians before and after him,

held firmly to our real, responsible participation in Adam's fall, and to the corruption of our nature in that act, and yet refused to count himself among the traducians. We must take history as it is and not seek to read into it our reasonings and inferences. If we do not find philosophers self-consistent, we must let them remain self-inconsistent, instead of altering their systems to suit our ideas of logical harmony.

In respect to the question of the origin of souls, the letter of Augustine to Jerome is a most interesting document, and one, the importance of which, we are inclined to think, has not been duly recognized.* He had previously expressed himself as doubtful on the question, though obviously leaning towards the traducian side.† But the fear of materialistic notions, enhanced as it was by the opposition of the church to the refined materialism of Tertullian, deterred Augustine then, as always, from espousing the traducian theory. This fear, it may be here observed, together with the feeling that this theory gives too much agency to second causes in the production of the soul, operated in subsequent times to dissuade theologians from giving sanction to the same hypothesis. The letter to Jerome is a candid and memorable expression of the difficulties in which the writer found himself involved on the subject to which it relates. To him Augustine resorts for light. He begins by saying that he has prayed and still prays God to grant that his application may be successful. The question of the origin of souls is one of deep concern to him. Of the soul's immortality he has no doubt, though it be not immortal as if it were a part of God, and in the same mode in which he is immortal. Of the immateriality of the soul, he is equally certain; and his arguments to show the absurdity of supposing the soul to occupy space, are convincingly stated. He is certain, moreover, that the soul is fallen into sin by no necessity, whether imposed by its own nature or by God.

* *Epistol.*, Classis III., clxv.

† *De Gen. ad Lit.*, L. x.

Yet the soul is sinful, and without baptism will perish. How can this be? He entreats Jerome to solve the problem. "Where did the soul contract the guilt by which it is brought into condemnation?" In his book *De Libero Arbitrio*, he had made mention of four opinions in regard to the origin of souls—first, that souls are propagated, the soul of Adam alone having been created; secondly, that for every individual a new soul is created; thirdly, that the soul pre-exists in each case, and is sent by God into the body at birth; fourthly, that the soul pre-exists, but comes into the body of its own will. A fifth supposition that the soul is a part of Deity, he had not had occasion to consider. But he had gained no satisfactory answer to the problem. Beset by inquirers, he had been unable to solve their queries. Neither by prayer, reading, reflection, or reasoning, had he been able to find his way out of his perplexity.*

"Teach me, therefore, I beg you, what I should teach, what I should hold; and tell me, if it be true that souls are made now and separately with each separate birth, where in little children they sin, that they should need in the sacrament of Christ the remission of sin;" "or if they do not sin, with what justice they are so bound by another's sin, when they are inserted in the mortal, propagated members, that damnation follows them, unless it is prevented by the church [through baptism]; since it is not in their power to cause the grace of baptism to be brought to them. So many thousands of souls, then, which depart from their bodies without having received Christian baptism—with what justice are they condemned, in case they are newly created, with no preceding sin, but, on the contrary, by the will of the Creator, each of these souls was given to each new-born child, for animating whom he created and gave it—by the will of the Creator, who knew that each of them, through no fault of his own, would go out of the body without Christian baptism? Since, then, we can neither say of God that he compels souls to become sinful, or punishes the innocent, and since likewise it is not right to assert that those who depart from the body without the sacrament, even little children, escape from damnation; *"I beseech you to say how this opinion is defended which assumes that souls come into being, not all from that one soul*

* IV.—"et ea neque orando, neque legendo, neque cogitando et ratiocinando invenire potuimus."

of the first man, but for every man a separate soul, like that one for Adam? ”

Other objections to creationism, Augustine feels competent easily to meet; but when it comes to the penalties inflicted on little children, he begs Jerome to believe that he is in a strait and knows not what to think or to say. “Magnis, mihi, crede, coactor angustiiis, nec quid respondeam prorsus invenio.” What he had written in his book on Free-Will of the imaginary benefits of suffering even to infants, will not suffice to explain even the sufferings of the unbaptized in this life. “I require, therefore, the ground of this condemnation of little children, *because, in case souls are separately created, I do not see that any of them sin at that age, nor do I believe that any one is condemned by God, whom He sees to have no sin.*” He repeats again and again this pressing inquiry. “Something perfectly strong and invincible is required, which will not force us to believe that God condemns any soul without any fault.” He fervently desires from Jerome the means of escaping from this great perplexity; he would prefer to embrace the Creationist theory; but on this theory, he sees no possible mode in which native, inherent depravity and the destruction of the unbaptized can be held, consistently with the justice of God.

Such was the theology of Augustine. No one can be charged with sin but the sinner. He knows nothing of guilt without fault. If there is no real participation in Adam’s transgression on our part, he can see no justice in making us partakers of its penalty, or in attributing to us a sinful nature from birth. “Persona corrumpit naturam; natura corrumpit personam.” So the doctrine was summarily stated. In Adam human nature, by his act, was vitiated. That corrupted nature is transmitted, through physical generation, to his descendants. They acted in him—in another—and are, therefore, truly counted sinners, being sinfully corrupt from the beginning of individual life.

This became the orthodox theology of the Western

Church. Where there were deviations from it in the Catholic Church, in the middle ages or subsequently, the attempt was always made to cover up the difference and to maintain a seeming conformity to the teaching of the authoritative Latin Father. As Augustine, more than any other human teacher, inspired the Reformers, so his doctrine on this subject was generally accepted without dispute. The pages of the leading Reformers swarm with citations from him on this as on various other topics. Nor is this agreement with Augustine confined to them. Through the seventeenth century, after the doctrine of original sin, in a great portion of the Protestant Church, had taken on a new phase, still it was to Augustine that all appealed. There is hardly a Calvinistic writer of distinction in that age who does not fall back on his characteristic definitions, and seek by means of them to fortify the doctrine of innate guilt and depravity. Having pointed out the essential features of the Augustinian view, we might spare ourselves the trouble of showing in detail, by historical inquiry, that every theory at variance with it is modern and an innovation. Who does not know that the old Protestant, as well as the orthodox Catholic theology, was Augustinian? But as our main design is to explain the origin of certain departures from this ancient and long-prevailing doctrine, we shall, as briefly as possible, follow down the course of its history.

Anselm, from his mingled devoutness and intellectual subtlety, not less than from his chronological position, may be called the father of the schoolmen. As a theologian, until we come to the Angelic Doctor, he stands without a rival. In his able and ingenious treatise on original sin, which forms a kind of sequel to the *Cur Deus Homo*, he says, in agreement with the Augustinian theory, that when Adam and Eve sinned

“The whole, which they were, was debilitated and corrupted;” not only the body, but through the body, the soul; and “because the whole

human nature was in them, and outside of them there was nothing of it, the whole was weakened and corrupted. There remained, therefore, in that nature the debt of complete justice"—that is the obligation to be perfectly righteous—"which it received, and the obligation to make satisfaction, because it forsook this justice, together with the very corruption which sin induced. Hence, as in case it had not sinned, it would be propagated just as it was made by God; so, after sin, it would be propagated just as it made itself by sinning." Thus it follows "that this nature is born in infants with the obligation upon it to satisfy for the first sin, which it always could have avoided, and with the obligation upon it to have original righteousness, which it always was able to preserve. Nor does impotence excuse it"—that is, this nature—"even in infants, since in them it does not render what it owes, and inasmuch as it made itself what it is, by forsaking righteousness in the first parents, in whom it was as a whole—in quibus tota erat—and it is always bound to have power which it received to the end that it might continually preserve its righteousness." *

That sin pertains exclusively to the rational will is a proposition which Anselm clearly defines and maintains; and on this branch of the subject he gives to the Augustinian theology a precision which it had not previously attained. Augustine holds that native concupiscence, or the disorder and inordinate excitableness of the lower appetites, is sinful; but he also holds it to be voluntary, in the large sense of the term. In the regenerate, the guilt (*reatus*) of concupiscence is pardoned; but the principle is not extirpated. It does not bring new guilt, however, upon the soul, unless its impulses are complied with, or consented to, by the will. To these opinions the strict Augustinians in the Catholic Church have adhered; but, laying hold of that distinction between concupiscence and the voluntary consent to it, which Augustine assumes in respect to the baptized, the semi-Pelagians, as they have been generally styled by their opponents, have affirmed that *native* concupiscence is not itself sinful, but only becomes such by the will's compliance with it. At the first view, it would seem as if Anselm adopted this theory, and so far deviated from Augustine.

* *De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pec.*, ii.

Anselm declares that as sin belongs to the will, and to the will alone, no individual is a sinner until he is possessed of a will, and with it inwardly consents to the evil desire. "The appetites themselves," he says, "are neither just nor unjust in themselves considered. They do not make a man just or unjust, simply because he feels them within him; but just or unjust, only as he consents to them with the will, when he ought not." The animals have these appetites, but are rendered neither holy nor unholy on account of them. "Wherefore there is no injustice (or unrighteousness) in their essence, but in the rational will following them."* This certainly sounds like "new-school" theology. But we find that Anselm holds fully to the propagation of sin through seminal or spermatic corruption, after the manner of Augustine. He asserts, as we have seen, the existence of a properly sinful nature which is transmitted from generation to generation. His real theory would appear to be, that a wrongly-determined will, or a will already determined to evil, is a part of our inheritance. But he sticks to his sharply-defined proposition that sin is predicable of the will alone; and hence he denies that spermatic corruption is sinful. Sin is not *in semine*, but simply the necessity that there shall be sin when the individual comes to exist and to be possessed of a rational soul.† This whole theory turns upon the distinction of nature and person. The descendants of Adam were not in him as individuals; yet what he did as a person he did not do *sine natura*; and this nature is ours as well as his.‡ Thus, no man is condemned except for his own sin. "Therefore, when the infant is condemned for original sin, he is condemned not for the sin of Adam, but for his own. For if he had not sin of his own, he would not be condemned." This sin originated in Adam, "but this ground which lay in Adam, why infants are born sinners, is not in other parents,

* *De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pec.*, c. iv. † *Ibid.*, c. vii. ‡ *Ibid.*, c. xxlii.

since in them human nature has not the power, that righteous children should be propagated from it.* This matter was decided and irreversibly so far as more immediate parents are concerned, in Adam. It is Anselm's opinion, we may add, that original sin in infants is less guilty than if they had *personally* committed the first sin, as Adam did. The quantity of guilt in them is less. In this he does not differ from Augustine, who thought that the perdition of infants would be milder and easier to bear than that of adult sinners.

The most popular text-book of theology in the middle ages was the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. It held its place for centuries in the European universities, and there were few of the foremost schoolmen who did not produce a commentary upon it. It presents the doctrine of Augustine in its essential parts, with abundant citations from his writings. Sin did not spread in the world, it affirms, by imitation of a bad example, but by propagation, and appears in every one at birth.† Original sin is not mere liability to punishment for the first sin, but involves sin and guilt. That first sin not only ruined Adam, but the whole race likewise; since from him we derive at once condemnation and sin. That original sin in us is concupiscence. Our nature was vitiated in Adam; "since all were that one man; that is, were in him *materialiter*." We were in him "materialiter, causaliter," or seminally. The body is wholly derived from him. It is the doctrine of the Lombard that each soul is created by itself, but is corrupted by contact with the material part which is vitiated in Adam.‡ He gives this explicit answer to the problem which Augustine declines to solve. The law of propagation, says Peter Lombard, is not suspended in consequence of the entrance of sin into the world; and the corruption of the soul in each case is an inevitable re-

* *De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pec.*, c. xxxi.

† Lib. ii., Dist. xxx. (Cologne, 1576).

‡ Lib. ii., Dist. xxxi., xxxii.

sult of its conjunction with the body. Augustine, in the *Encheiridion*, had admitted that the sins of more immediate parents as far back as the third or fourth generation, *may* be imputed to the child, but had not positively sanctioned this view. The Lombard argues that he could not have entertained it without inconsistency, since it would be incompatible with his doctrine that the sin and punishment of infants are comparatively light.* He does not deny the position of Anselm that sin belongs to the will; † yet he is careful to say that the soul on uniting with the body becomes *ipso facto* corrupt; since if an act of self-determination be supposed to intervene, it would be actual, and not original sin. On the whole, his representations accord with what we have explained to be the idea of Anselm.

We pass now to the prince of the scholastic theologians, Thomas Aquinas. This most acute and profound writer manifests caution in handling so difficult a theme; but his conclusions, as might be expected, coincide with the dogma of Augustine. Aquinas says that “although the soul is not transmitted, since the *virtus seminis* cannot cause a rational soul,” yet by this means “human nature is transmitted from parent to offspring, and with it, at the same time, the infection of nature.” ‡ Hence the newborn child is made partaker of the sin of the first parent, since from him he receives his nature through the agency of the generative function. No man is punished except for his own sin. We are punished for the sins of near ancestors only so far as we follow them in their transgressions. § The main point in the explication of original sin is the nature of our union with Adam. This Aquinas sets forth by an analogy. The will, by an imperative volition, bids a limb, or member of the body, commit a sin. Now an act of homicide is not imputed to the hand considered as distinct from the body, but is imputed to it as far as it belongs to the man as part of him,

* Lib. ii., Dist. xxiii.

† Ibid., Dist. xlii.

‡ *Sum. Theol.*, I., ii. Q. lxxx. i., Art. i.

§ Ibid., Q. lxxx., Art. viii.

and is moved by the first principle of motion in him—that is, the will. Being thus related, the hand, *were it possessed of a nature capable of sin*, would be guilty. So all who are born of Adam are to be considered as one man. They are as the many members of one body.

“Thus the disorder (inordinatio) which is in that man who sprang from Adam, is not voluntary by the act of his own will, but by the will of the first parent, who moves ‘*motione generationis*,’ all who derive their origin from him, just as the soul’s will moves all the limbs to an act; whence the sin which is derived from the first parent to his posterity is called original: in the same way that the sin which is derived from the soul to the members of the body, is called actual; and as the actual sin which is committed by a bodily member is the sin of that member, only so far as that member pertains to the man himself (*est aliquid ipsius hominis*), so original sin belongs to an individual, only so far as he receives his nature from the first parent.” *

Cajetan, the renowned commentator of Aquinas, undertakes to explain and defend the analogy. The descendant of Adam belongs to Adam, as a hand to the body; and from Adam, through natural generation, he at once receives his nature and becomes a partaker of sin.

The realistic character of Aquinas’s doctrine appears strongly in the argument by which he attempts to prove that no sins but the first sin of the first man are imputed to us. † He sharply distinguishes between nature and person. Those things which directly pertain to an individual, like personal acts, are not transmitted by natural generation. The grammarian does not thus communicate to his offspring the science of grammar. Accidental properties of the individual may, indeed, in some cases, descend from father to son, as, for example, swiftness of body. But qualities, which are purely personal, are not propagated. As the person has his own native properties and the qualities given by grace, so the nature has both. Original righteousness was a gracious gift to the nature at the outset, and was lost in

* *Sum. Theol.*, I., ii. Q. lxxxi., Art. i.

† *Ibid.*, Art. ii.

Adam in the first sin. "Just as original righteousness would have been transmitted to his posterity at the same time with the nature, so also is the opposite disorder (inordinatio). But other actual sins of the first parent, or of other later parents, do not corrupt the nature, as concerns its qualities (*quantum ad id quod naturæ est*), but only as concerns the qualities of the person." *

Original righteousness was principally and primarily in the subjection of the will to God. From the alienation of the will from God, disorder has arisen in all the other powers of the soul. Hence the deprivation of original righteousness, through which the will was subject to God, is the first or *formal* element in original sin, while concupiscence or "inordinatio" is the second, or *material* element. Thus original sin affects the will, in the first instance. Its first effect is the wrong bent of the will. Aquinas's analysis of native, inherent depravity is substantially accordant with that of Anselm.

The Reformers, as we have said, were Augustinians. As the imputation of Adam's sin was conceded generally by their Catholic opponents, as Pighius and Catharinus, at the same time that innate depravity, in the strict sense, was frequently denied, it was on this last element in the doctrine of original sin that the first Protestant theologians chiefly insisted. But the same realistic mode of thought—the same theory of a common nature corrupted in Adam—pervades their writings. In Calvin's representation of the doctrine, two propositions are constantly asserted. One is, that we are not condemned or punished for Adam's sin, apart from our own inherent depravity which is derived from him. The sin for which we are condemned is our own sin; and were it not for this, we should not be condemned. The other proposition is, that this sin is ours, for the reason that our nature

* Ibid., II., Q. lxxx., Art. iii., iv.

was vitiated in Adam, and we receive it in the condition in which it was put by the first transgression.

These propositions are so clearly set forth, both in the *Institutes* and the Commentaries, that it is hardly requisite to prove that he held them. But to remove all doubt on this point, and for another purpose which will appear later, we translate the following passages:

“Observe the order here, for Paul says that sin preceded; that from it death followed. For there are some who contend that we are so ruined by the sin of Adam, *as if we perished by no iniquity (culpa) of our own, in the sense that he only as it were sinned for us.* But the apostle expressly affirms that sin is propagated to all who suffer its punishment. And he urges this especially when he assigns the reason shortly after, why all the posterity of Adam are subject to the dominion of death. The reason is, he says, that all have sinned. That sinning of which he speaks, is being *corrupted and vitiated.* For that natural depravity which we bring from our mother's womb, although it does not at once bring forth its fruits, yet it is sin before the Lord and deserves the penalty. And this is the sin which is called original. For as Adam at his first creation had received gifts of divine grace as well for himself as for his posterity; so, separating from God, he depraved, corrupted, vitiated, ruined, our nature in himself; for having lost the image of God, he could only bring forth seed like himself. Therefore we have all sinned, as we are all imbued with natural corruption, and so are iniquitous and perverse.”*

Calvin renders his doctrine perfectly clear by the distinction which he makes, in his note on ver. 17, between Christ and Adam. “The first difference,” he says, “is that we are condemned for the sin of Adam not by imputation alone, *as if the punishment of the sin of another were exacted of us:* but we bear its punishment because we are guilty of the sin (culpae) also, in so far as our nature, vitiated in him, is held bound (obstringitur) with the guilt of iniquity.”

To the same effect are his remarks on Ephesians ii. 3 (“we are by nature children of wrath”). The passage, he says, confutes those who deny original sin; “for that which naturally is in all, is surely original: Paul teaches that we

* *Com. on Roman, v. 12.*

are all naturally exposed to damnation : therefore sin is inherent in us, *because God does not condemn the innocent.*" "God," he adds, "is not angry with innocent men, but with sin. Nor is it a cause for wonder if the depravity which is born (*ingenita*) in us from our parents is deemed sin before God, because the seed which is thus far latent, he discerns and judges."

In full coincidence with these statements, is the chapter on Original Sin, in the *Institutes* :

These two things are to be distinctly observed ; first, that being thus vitiated and perverse in all the parts of our nature, we are, on account of this corruption, deservedly held as condemned and convicted before God, to whom nothing is acceptable but justice, innocence and purity ; *for this is not liability to punishment for another's crime* ; for when it is said that by this sin of Adam we become exposed to the judgment of God, it is not to be understood as if, being ourselves innocent and undeserving of punishment we had to bear the sin (*culpam*) of another ; but because by his transgression we all incur a curse, he is said to have involved us in guilt (*obstrinxisse*). Nevertheless, not only has punishment passed from him upon us, but pollution instilled from him is inherent in us, to which punishment is justly due. Wherefore Augustine, although he often calls it another's sin (that he may the more clearly show that it is derived to us by propagation), at the same time asserts it to belong to each individual. And the apostle himself most expressly declares (Rom. v. 12) that 'death has passed upon all men, for that all have sinned'—that is are involved in original sin and defiled with its stains. And so also infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation with them from their mother's womb, are exposed to punishment, not for another's sin but for their own. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, they have still the seed inclosed in them ; even their whole nature is as it were a seed of sin, and cannot be otherwise than odious and abominable to God. Whence it follows that it is properly accounted sin in the eye of God, *because there could not be guilt (reatus) without fault (culpa)*. The other thing to be remarked is that this depravity never ceases in us, but is perpetually producing new fruits, etc."*

That sin has its seat in the will and that the wrong bent of the will is the sole obstacle in the way of the sinner's repentance, Calvin distinctly affirms.

* *Inst.*, I., i., 8.

Turning to the Lutheran side, we find that Melancthon defines original sin to be the corruption with which we are born, and which is consequent on the fall of Adam.* He says further: "If any one wishes to add that we are born guilty on account of the fall of Adam, I make no objection (*non impedio*)."[†] But he strongly objects to the imputation of the first sin, independently of our native, inherited depravity. Original sin, he says, is, in its *formal* aspect, guilt, or the condemnation of the person who is guilty; but this relation pertains to some sin. The question, therefore, is, what is the proximate foundation of this relation, or as they call it, the proximate matter—*materiale propinquum*. The foundation of this guilt is the vice in man which is born with us, which is called defects, or evil inclinations, or concupiscence." The imputation of the first sin is conditioned on—in the order of nature, consequent upon—this innate depravity.[‡]

Both elements, imputation of the first sin and inherent depravity are distinctly brought out in the Augsburg Confession, as issued by Melancthon in 1540.

Brentius, another leading name, among the early Lutheran theologians, exemplifies the prevalent realistic mode of representation upon this subject. "Inasmuch as all the posterity of Adam were in his loins, not for himself alone was he made an idolater in his own person, but he propagated idolatry to all his posterity, so that as many men as descend from him, are idolaters." "He drew with him the whole human race, which was then in his loins and was to be propagated from him, into so great ruin, that it could neither entertain right sentiments respecting God with its mind or obey God with its will."[§]

The Lutheran theologians were most of them, including Luther himself, traducians. Herein they differed from the body of the Calvinists.

* *Loc. Com.* (Hase's Ed., v. p. 86). † *Ibid.*, p. 85. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

§ Quoted by Heppe, *Dogm. d. Deutsch. Prot. im 16tn. Jahrh.* I., 390, 391.

We have now to inquire into the origin of the federal theory? How did the doctrine of a covenant with Adam become connected with Augustinism? The best histories of doctrine ascribe this innovation to Cocceius the celebrated theologian of Holland, Professor at Franeker, and then at Leyden, where he died in 1669. It is not denied that germs of this theory may be found scattered in the writings of theologians of an earlier date. It is seldom that a theory is absolutely new with him who first gives it currency, and with whose name it is afterwards associated. But Cocceius has the credit not only of introducing the method of bringing the matter of systematic theology under the three covenants, but also of engrafting the conception of a covenant with Adam, as the representative of the race, upon Calvinistic theology. There is no distinct mention of such a covenant, as far as we have been able to discover, either in the writers of the first age of the Reformation, or afterwards until near the time of Cocceius. There is no mention of such a covenant in the Augsburg Confession, the Form of Concord, or in any other of the principal creeds of the Lutheran Church. There is no mention of it in the principal Confessions of the Reformed Church, with the exception of the Creeds of Westminster; for the Formula Consensus Helvetica, where the Covenant appears, is a creed of minor importance and of comparatively insignificant authority. We do not find the doctrine of a covenant with Adam in the First Basle Confession (1532), the Second Basle (or First Helvetic) (1536), the Gallic (1559), the First Scottish Confession (1560), the Belgic (1562), the Heidelberg Catechism (1573), the Second Helvetic Confession (1565), the Hungarian (1570), the Polish (*Declaratio Thoruniensis*, 1645), or the Anglican Articles (1562).

Perhaps we shall best satisfy our readers in regard to this historical question, by referring to one or two authorities of great weight. The first is Weissmann, the learned Lutheran, who in his history of the church in the seventeenth cen-

ture, has entered into a somewhat full account of the rise of the federal theology. The federal method, he says, originated with Cloppenburgius, a Franeker theologian, and was farther carried out by Cocceius. To these men it is chiefly due. From their time, the federal method spread in the Reformed Church, especially of Holland, so that the systems constructed on this model can hardly be numbered. "Among Lutherans," adds Weissmann, "this method did not find many favorers. Rather does Foertschius think, and publicly teach in his *Breviarium Select. Theol.*, that this method has not less inconveniences than belong to methods previously used; adding, that the federal doctrine, both respecting covenants and promises, as it is held among the learned and publicists, cannot be applied to theology, except by an abuse and perversion of terms."* In another passage, Weissmann sets forth the objections to federalism, which were brought forward by Lutheran theologians. Among them are the considerations, that the word *covenant* in the New Testament is very sparingly used, and does not signify that which is here in controversy; that in covenants and contracts respect is had to a benefit to be conferred on both parties, which, as far as God is concerned, cannot be here supposed; that man previously owed all things to God, and, therefore, there is no need of a covenant and compact; that the Mosaic economy alone partakes of the nature of a covenant.†

Under the name of Cocceianism, were included a variety of opinions; and the advocates and antagonists of this theologian waged a heated conflict that agitated the Reformed Church, especially in Holland. Numerous opponents of Cocceianism who were actuated by hostility to the Cartesian philosophy, or to some other real or imaginary doctrine which came to be identified with the name of Cocceius, held to the

* Weissmann, *Introductio in Memorabilia Eccl. Historiæ Sacræ*, etc., vol. ii., p. 698 seq.

† Ibid., p. 1103.

theory of a covenant with Adam. Van Mastricht, for example, was an Anti-Cocceian. Yet it remains true that this last theory found its way into theology, very much through the influence of the most distinguished advocate of the federal method.

A second witness respecting the rise of the federal theory, is Campegius Vitringa. In the text, and especially in the editorial notes connected with the text, of his system, is a very full statement of the history of this change in theology. For some time, says Vitringa, it has pleased divines to describe the state of man in Paradise, by the term covenant, which they style the covenant of works or of nature, to distinguish it from the covenant of grace. "That Adam lived in a state of friendship with God, and looked for a certain good under certain conditions, has been already shown. That this state can *sano sensu*, be called a covenant, is not doubted. *Still we must hold that in the Scriptures this designation does not clearly appear, unless, perhaps, you choose to apply Hosea vi. 7 to this relation rather than to the Mosaic history ; so that the Bible makes no mention of the covenant :* on the contrary, this notion is clearly presented to us, that God, as absolute and natural Lord of man, has treated him as a *subject*, of whose affection and obedience he desired to make trial. *And it really seems that the notion of a covenant pertains to the economy of grace ; both Scripture and reason favoring this view.*" It is stated in the note, that the opposition to this notion by Episcopius and other Arminians, in which they were followed by Socinians, stimulated Calvinistic theologians to espouse and defend it with more zeal.*

These last observations are deserving of especial notice. It would appear that the idea of the covenant of works was carried back to the Adamic constitution from the analogy of the covenant of grace, with which theologians were familiar ;

* Vitringa, *Doctrina Christ. Relig.*, etc., vol. ii., p. 241.

and the opposition of Arminians and Socinians tended to confirm and spread the innovation.

The federal system was considered, at the outset, a softening of Calvinism. Predestination was mitigated, in appearance at least, by this introduction of juridical considerations. Theology seemed to take on a more biblical cast. Hence the federal method was disliked by the Protestant schoolmen, as they were called; that class of Calvinistic writers in whose hands theology, especially after the rise of the Arminian controversy, ran out into endless hair-splitting, according to a dry and rigid scheme, predestination being the central idea.

But what is the covenant with Adam, as distinguished from the law of nature? What is the nature of this positive constitution? The covenant is, in its essence, a *promise*—a promise of such blessings, on the condition of obedience, as the rational creature is not entitled to by the law of nature. It is a gracious act on the part of God; an act of condescension. He couples with obedience a reward wholly disproportionate to the creature's deserts—namely, eternal life. In this general definition all are agreed. In regard to more specific points in the definition, theologians vary from one another. The attaching of the promise to a *brief* term of obedience, for example, is sometimes regarded as one element in the covenant. But if we seek for the precise difference between the provisions of the covenant and the principles of natural and universal justice, which were of binding force, independently of it, we find this difference to consist in the magnitude of the promise and in the appointing of a special test of obedience. Inasmuch, however, as this special test was a revealed law, and might have been laid upon Adam, had there been no covenant, the substance of this positive constitution lies in the gracious promise that is connected by the Creator with the law.

Thus it will be seen that the covenant does not of necessity affect the substance of the Augustinian doctrine at all.

The theory of the covenant may be accepted at the same time that the posterity of Adam are held to be really partakers in his sin and guilt. The breach of the law and the breach of the covenant were one and the same act. If the posterity of Adam really broke the law in Adam, they broke the covenant also. Even on the supposition that they took part in the transgression of the law, and did not take part in the violation of the covenant, still Adam brings on them no *condemnation* which they do not themselves deserve by sinning in him ; they merely lose blessings to which they have, and could have, no title on the foundation of natural law. I lay a command upon a child. It is a reasonable command, and by the law of nature, I have a right to impose it ; and I have a right to affix a certain punishment to disobedience. But I freely promise that in case he obeys I will grant to him, and to his brothers also, some high and undeserved privilege. Now suppose him to disobey. They, as well as he, lose something ; but they lose nothing which the law of nature gave them. Suppose them, in some way, to participate in his disobedience ; they, too, justly incur the positive penalty prescribed by the law, in addition to the negative forfeiture through his breach of the covenant. They suffer no greater penalty than they really deserve ; they lose a greater reward than obedience would have given them a title to, apart from a special, gratuitous promise.

The mistake of the modern defenders of imputation is in ignoring and denying the capital fact of a TRUE AND REAL PARTICIPATION IN ADAM'S SIN, which still formed the groundwork of the doctrine of original sin long after the federal theory came into vogue. They mistake history likewise, by ascribing their own purely federal view to the great body of Calvinistic theologians in the seventeenth century, who were Augustinians as well as federalists, holding to the second type of doctrine which we mentioned in the beginning—the Augustino-federal.

There is another historical error of a kindred nature,

which pervades the Princeton discussions of original sin. These assume that the old Calvinists held to the immediate or antecedent imputation of the first sin—that is, to the condemnation of men for it, independently of their native depravity. But with the exception of certain supralapsarians, the Calvinistic view was, that the ascription to men of the first sin, and the ascription to them of native, sinful corruption, are each conditional to the other. The first could not take place without the second, as an inseparable part or accompaniment; and the order in which the two occur, is indifferent, as far as orthodoxy was concerned. This has been conclusively proved, and the error above stated has been fully exposed, in a series of learned articles, from the pen of R. W. Landis, D.D., which were published in *The Danville Review*.* As we do not care to do what has been so well done already, we shall have less to say here on this particular point. But having had occasion, before and since the appearance of these Articles, to traverse a great portion of the same ground, we can give an intelligent assent to this main position of the learned author.

The proposition which we are now concerned to maintain, is that in the prevailing theology of the seventeenth, as well as the sixteenth century, even after the covenant theory was adopted, the doctrine of participation in the first sin—the old groundwork of Augustinism—was still cherished.

(1.) The most approved orthodox theologians of that age confirm this statement. From a throng of witnesses we select one, for the reason that he is an acknowledged representative of the strict Calvinism of his times. The following passages are from John Owen :

Of original sin, he says “that it is an inherent sin and pollution of nature, having a proper guilt of its own, mak-

* In the Numbers from September, 1861, to December, 1862, inclusive.

ing us responsible to the wrath of God, and not a bare imputation of another's fault to us, his posterity." * Answering the objection that the first sin is not ours, is not our voluntary act, he refers to the covenant, but adds :

"That Adam, being the root and head of all human kind, and we all branches from that root, all parts of that body whereof he was the head, *his will may be said to be ours*. We were then all that one man,† we were all in him, and had no other will but his ; so that though that be extrinsical unto us, considered as particular persons, yet it is intrinsical, as we are all parts of one common nature. As in him we sinned, so in him we had a will of sinning.‡ Original sin is a defect of nature, and not of this or that particular person." "It is hereditary, natural, and no way involuntary, or put into us against our wills. It possesseth our wills, and inclines us to voluntary sins." § "If God should impute the sin of Adam unto us, and therein pronounce us obnoxious to the curse deserved by it—if we have a pure, sinless, unspotted nature—even this could scarce be reconciled with that rule of his proceeding in justice with the sons of men, 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die;' which clearly granteth impunity to all not tainted with sin. Sin and punishment, though they are sometimes separated by his mercy, pardoning the one, and so not inflicting the other, yet never by his justice, inflicting the latter where the former is not. Sin imputed, by itself alone, without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any but Christ. The unsearchableness of God's love and justice, in laying the iniquity of us all upon him who had no sin, is an exception from that general rule he walketh by in his dealing with the posterity of Adam." ¶ The grounds of the imputation of Adam's sin to us are : "1. As we were then in him and parts of him ; 2. As he sustained the place of our whole nature in the covenant God made with him ; both which, even according to the exigence of God's justice, require that his transgression be also accounted ours." ¶¶ "There is none damned but for his own sin. When divines affirm that by Adam's sin we are guilty of damnation, they do not mean that any are actually damned for this particular fact, but that by his sin, and our sinning in him, by God's most just ordination, we have contracted that exceeding pravity and sinfulness of nature which deserveth the curse of God and eternal damnation." "The soul then that is guilty shall die, and that for its own guilt. If God should condemn us for original sin only, it were not by reason of the imputation of Adam's fault, *but of the iniquity of that*

* "Display of Arminianism," *Works*, x., 70.

† "Omnes eramus unus ille homo."—Aug.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¶¶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

*portion by nature, in which we are proprietaries."** "The sin of Adam holds such relation to sinners, proceeding from him by natural propagation, as the righteousness of Christ *doth unto them who are born again of him by spiritual regeneration*. But we are truly, intrinsically and inherently sanctified by the Spirit and grace of Christ; and, therefore, there is no reason why, being so often in this chapter (Rom. v.) called sinners, because of this original sin, we should cast it off, as if it were concerned only by an external denomination, for the right institution of the comparison and its analogy quite overthrows the solitary imputation."†

One of the great arguments of the defenders of immediate or antecedent imputation in our day is founded on the analogy of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and especially of his righteousness to us. But Owen, like the old Calvinists generally, supralapsarian speculatists being excepted, makes a marked distinction between these various instances of imputation. This is evident from two of the passages quoted above.

In his work on justification, also, he says:

"None ever dreamed of a transfusion or propagation of sin from us to Christ, such as there was from Adam to us. For Adam was a common person to us, we are not so to Christ; yea, he is not so to us; and the imputation of our sins to him, is a singular act of divine dispensation, which no evil consequences can ensue upon." "There is a great difference between the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to us, and the imputation of our sins to Christ; so that he cannot in the same manner be said to be made a sinner by the one, as we are made righteous by the other. For our sin was imputed to Christ, only as he was our surety for a time, to this end, that he might take it away, destroy it and abolish it. It was never imputed to him, so as to make any alteration absolutely in his personal state and condition. But his righteousness is imputed to us, to abide with us, to be ours always, and to make a total change in our state and condition as to our relation to God," etc.‡

The combination of the Augustinian and federal theories, which is manifest in the citations from Owen, appears in the creeds of the Westminster Assembly. In the Confession, it is said of Adam and Eve—

* "Omnes eramus unus ille homo."—Aug., p. 80. † Ibid., p. 71.

‡ *The Doctrine of Justification*, etc. (Philadelphia ed.), p. 227.

"They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of his sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation."

In the larger Catechism, we read—

"The covenant being made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation sinned in him and fell with him in that first transgression."

The proof-texts which were attached to these statements, and were printed with the emphatic portions in italics, show most clearly that the Augustinian conception was side by side with the Federal, in the minds of the framers of these creeds. What they meant to teach is clearly set forth in the *Brief Sum of Christian Doctrine*, which was issued by the authority of the Assembly.

"God in six days made all things of nothing, very good in their own kind, in special he made all the angels holy ; and made our first parents, Adam and Eve, the root of mankind, both upright and able to keep the law within their heart ; which law they were naturally bound to obey, under pain of death ; but God was not bound to reward their service, till he entered into a covenant or contract with them, and their posterity in them, to give them eternal life upon condition of perfect personal obedience, without threatening death, in case they should fail.

"Both angels and men were subject to the change of their own free-will, as experience proved, God having reserved to himself the incommunicable property of being naturally unchangeable. For many angels, of their own accord, fell by sin from their first estate, and became devils. Our first parents being enticed by Satan, one of these devils, speaking in a serpent, did break the covenant of works, in eating the forbidden fruit, whereby they and their posterity, being in their loins, as branches in the root, and comprehended in the same covenant with them, became not only liable to eternal death, but also lost all ability of will to please God ; yea, did become by nature enemies to God, and to all spiritual good ; and inclined to evil continually. This is our original sin, the bitter root of all our actual transgressions in thought, word, and deed."*

Plainly we have here the old doctrine of a nature, corrupted in Adam, and as such, transmitted to his posterity ;

* Quoted by Dr. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, p. 41.

the covenant idea being superadded, but not yet supplanting the Augustinian. Baxter, Goodwin, and most of the contemporary Calvinistic divines, are full and explicit in the inculcation of this same doctrine.

(2.) The Placæan controversy and the publications consequent upon it, afford decisive proof of our position that the Augustinian idea of participation in the first sin prevailed among Calvinistic writers long after the acceptance of the covenant theory. The French school of Saumur, one of the Protestant academies of theology, had for its professors, after the year 1633, three men of marked ability and erudition, Louis Capellus (Cappel), Moses Amyraldus (Amyraut), and Joshua Placæus (La Place). Before them, John Cameron, a Scotchman by birth, had produced some commotion by his doctrine in regard to the operation of grace, which was that the spirit renews the soul, not by acting on the will directly, but rather by an enlightening influence on the intellect. This was broached partly for the sake of parrying Catholic objections to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination and election. Cameron's theory did not mitigate this doctrine in the slightest degree, as was admitted so soon as his theory was understood. His substantial orthodoxy was allowed by those who withheld their sanction from the theory. The most eminent of his pupils was Amyraut. He boldly propounded the doctrine of hypothetical, universal grace, as it was called, which was really the doctrine of universal atonement. He maintained that there is in God, in some proper sense, a will or desire (*velleitas*, *affectus*) that all should repent and be saved. The decree of election follows in the order of nature the decree providing the atonement. The attempt was made in two national synods to procure a condemnation of his doctrine, but in both cases it failed. He successfully defended himself, and proved that his doctrine was not inconsistent with the creed of the Synod of Dort. Cappel was a biblical scholar, and by his critical opinions in this department caused a commotion

only less than that excited by his colleague. He taught that the vowel pointing of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is an invention later than the Christian era, and clothed with no infallible authority ; and that the masoretic text of the Ancient Scriptures is open to amendment from the comparison of manuscripts and versions. Placæus is the one of these three disturbers of theological quiet, with whom we have to do at present. He was understood to deny that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, and to resolve original sin into mere hereditary depravity. At the Synod of Charenton, in 1644-5, Garrisoli (Garriso), the head of the rival school of Montauban, presided. In no small degree, through his influence, there was carried through the synod a condemnation of the opinion attributed to Placæus, although his name was not mentioned. This opinion was pronounced an error, and was declared to involve in peril the doctrine of inherent sin itself, since apart from the imputation of the first transgression, this doctrine rests on no secure foundation. Placæus did not consider himself to be at all touched by the decree of Charenton. He explained afterwards that he did not deny the imputation of Adam's sin ; but only that this imputation is independent of, and prior to, inherent depravity. He distinguished between mediate and immediate or antecedent imputation. The former imputes Adam's sin not directly, but mediately—on the ground of our inherent depravity, which is its first fruit and effect. This depravity is first imputed to us, and then the sin from which it comes. When he made this explanation, Drelincourt, the distinguished Pastor of Paris, who had been a member of the synod and on the committee that drafted the decree, wrote to Placæus an expression of his satisfaction and confidence, saying that they had never intended to condemn the doctrine thus explained. That the doctrine of Placæus involved no serious departure from the current orthodoxy, was likewise conceded by other prominent theologians who at first arrayed themselves

against him. While the matter was in agitation, and before Placæus had corrected what he deemed a grave misapprehension of his views, Andrew Rivet, a Frenchman by birth, but then a professor in Holland, prepared, for the purpose of counteracting the supposed error of Placæus, a copious collection of testimonies on the subject of imputation. It is a collection of citations from standard creeds and numerous orthodox theologians. His prime end, as we have said, is to make it manifest by an appeal to authorities, that besides native, inherent depravity, original sin involves the imputation of the first transgression. These testimonies are very interesting and important for the light which they throw on the particular questions which we are here considering. In former articles in the *Princeton Review*, the mistake has been made of supposing that the design of Rivet was to assert the doctrine of antecedent or immediate imputation—that is to say, to maintain that Adam's sin is imputed to us and made a ground of condemnation prior to, and irrespectively of, native corruption. This was no part of his plan. If it had been, his testimonies would have overthrown himself. For, as we have already remarked, if we count out a handful of supralapsarians, the general theory was that the imputation of Adam's sin and native depravity are inseparable, so that the one cannot exist without the other. Rivet is simply opposing the theory that original sin comprises no element but native depravity. Whoever held to a participation in Adam's sin, such as involves a legal responsibility for it, might put the elements of the doctrine in whatever order he saw fit. •

Here let us explain what we consider the real philosophy of imputation, as the subject was generally viewed. Sometimes Adam's actual sin was said to be truly and really ours; but this was not the common representation. That sin was the act of another: it is imputed to us, as far as its guilt and legal responsibility are concerned, because we were all *participes criminis*. In a strict philosophical view, partici-

pation is the first fact in order, and the first thing to be proved. Take an illustration. A. B. is charged with a crime. Three other persons are accused of being accomplices. They did not do the deed—with their own hands fire the dwelling or commit the act of homicide. But they are charged with being participants, in the legal idea of the term, and *therefore* partakers of the guilt of the principal and liable to the same penalty. His act is imputed to them by the law. But before this is possible, the *fact* of participation must first be established; for on this fact their legal responsibility for the criminal act depends. Now extend the illustration and suppose that this deed was the transgressor's first criminal act, and as such brought on him a corrupt character, or engendered, as it inevitably must, a corrupt principle. A principle of the same sort is found to have simultaneously arisen in the hearts of those whom we have spoken of as accomplices. But as they in their proper persons have done no criminal act, can this principle, in their case, be regarded as truly and properly sinful? Not unless they can be connected with the original act of wrong-doing, as accomplices or participants. Now it will be found that Rivet and his witnesses, when they insist on the imputation of the first sin, are contending against the idea that mere native corruption is the whole of original sin; just as Calvin and many others deny that imputation is the whole. Both belong inseparably together. One may give the logical priority to inherent depravity, provided he includes under it participation in the first sin, on which imputation ultimately rests; and another may make imputation first, it being understood that participation is the condition of it. The fact of *participation*, by which the first act is both personal and generic, and therefore ours in one sense, and not ours in another, is the point of coincidence between both views. The circumstance that participation is sometimes implied, rather than expressed, both by those who give the precedence to imputation, and those who give the precedence

to native corruption, occasioned some misunderstanding between them, and has been since a fruitful source of misunderstanding to their interpreters. But, as we have already observed, if we except a few supralapsarians, the fact of a true and real, though not personal, participation in the first sin, is everywhere held. Not unfrequently the true philosophical order, with participation in its proper place, is found in the writers quoted by Rivet. We may cite Pareus as an example:

“Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity, includes these three deadly evils, actual iniquity (*culpam*), legal guilt (*reatum*) or the penalty of death, and habitual depravity or deformity. These concur in connection with the first sin, simultaneously in the parent and posterity: with this difference only, that Adam was the principal sinning agent, admitting iniquity, meriting guilt, casting away the image of God, and depraving himself. All these things belong to his posterity by participation, imputation, and generation from a sinful parent. Thus it is a futile dispute of sophists, whether it was only the first iniquity (*culpa*) or only guilt, or only disorder, pollution or native vitiosity. For it is all these. Giving a broad definition, you may say it is the fall and disobedience of the first parents, and in them of the whole human race, in which all alike (*pariter*), the image of God being cast away, depraved their nature, were made enemies of God, and contracted the guilt of temporal and eternal death, unless deliverance and reconciliation take place by the Son of God, the Mediator.” “All are dead by the offence of one man. Therefore, the offence was the offence of all, but by participation and imputation.” *

Statements parallel with this of Pareus might be quoted in abundance. †

* *Riveti Opera*, t. iii., 319.

† That participation is an essential element in original sin, may be seen especially by reference to the passages, in Rivet, from Musculus, Viretus, Bucanus, Polanus, Chamierus, Mestrezatius, Whittaker (Professor at Cambridge), Davenant, Ames, Walæns, Junius, Frisius, Hommius—who says, “*Peccatum Adami non est nobis omnino alienum, sed est proprium cujusque, quod propter hanc naturæ communionem singulis hominibus non tantum imputatur, sed a singulis etiam est perpetratum*”—Laurentius, Zanchius, Piscator, Textor, Crocius, Bucer, Chemnitz (the author of the *Examen. Conc. Trid.*). Compare the two Dissertations on Original Sin by Rivet himself, *Disput. II.* (t. iii., p. 747), and the *Theses Theolog.*

What has been said will prepare us to comprehend the Placæan controversy. Having made a careful examination of the writings of Placæus, we feel competent to state what his views really were. His great aim was to confute the doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation. He was at first understood to deny participation, but this misunderstanding, as was said above, he corrected. His opinions are expressed, prior to the Synod of Charenton, in the *Theses Salmurenses*.* God, he says, counts no man a sinner who is not truly so. Either Adam's actual sin is imputed to us, or our original, inherent depravity. The former cannot be proved from the Bible. We sinned in Adam, as we died in him. Human nature was in Adam, generically the same as in us, but numerically distinct from human nature in us considered as persons. Hence our sin is the same generically, but not numerically with his. If he was appointed to obey or disobey instead of us, why not to be punished instead of us, also? If his first actual sin was ours, why not his act of generating Cain or Seth? The true doctrine is that of seminal corruption. The sensitive soul—the animal soul—is produced from the parent; the intellectual or rational soul is directly created. The soul on entering the corrupted physical nature, is not passively corrupted, but becomes corrupt actively, accommodating itself in character to the other part of human nature; as water, by an appetency of its own, takes the form of the bowl into which it is poured.

In the copious treatise on Imputation, which he wrote after the action of the synod, he develops his system with great fulness and likewise with great ability.† The report

de pec. orig. (t. iii., p. 824). In the former, sections x.—xvi. (inclusive) and xxiv. deserve particular attention; in the latter, sections 5, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 42.

* *Syntagma Thes. Theolog. in Acad. Salm.*, etc. Edit. Secunda., Pt. i., 205 seq.

† Placæi, *Opera Omnia*: Editio novissima: Franequer. *De Imp. primi pec. Adami Disput.*, etc. Tom i., p. 161 seq.

that his doctrine had been condemned by the synod, he says, had been eagerly caught up by those unfriendly to Saumur.* But the terms of their decree did not touch him. The decree did not condemn those who restrict original sin to inherent depravity, but those who *so* restrict it to inherent depravity as to deny the imputation of Adam's first sin.† This he does not deny. He holds to imputation, but to mediate, not immediate imputation.‡ Adam's first actual sin is imputed to us in the sense that it is the cause of our guilt by causing our depravity, and further as our inherent sin involves and implies a consent to his first transgression.§ In defence of the propriety of using the term "imputation" to designate this view, he appeals to Romans ii. 27: "If the uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision."|| He holds that we participate in Adam's sin, and habitually consent thereto at the outset of our personal life. It may be truly said that we were in the loins of Adam, and sinned in him and with him.¶ The sin of Adam is communicated to us by propagation. The corruption that followed Adam's first actual sin is imputed to us as passing over to us—*idem specie*—Adam communicating at once sin and nature.** He appeals to Calvin, to Gualter, to Chamier, to Rivet, in support of his doctrine as to the difference in the mode of the imputation of Adam's sin and Christ's righteousness.†† The analogy of Christ's relation to us proves nothing in favor of immediate imputation. Our sins are not imputed to Christ as their author, but as a surety; but Adam's sin is imputed to us as its authors. The one is of grace, the other on the ground of desert.‡‡ But our own faith is the necessary condition of justification, just as our intermediate depravity is the necessary prerequisite of the imputation of

* *De Imp. primi pec. Adami Disput.*, etc. Tom. i., p. 162.

† *Ibid.*, p. 176.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 284, 286.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 284.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

** *Ibid.*, p. 198.

†† *Ibid.*, pp. 195, 198, 201, 206.

‡‡ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

Adam's sin. He contends that his antagonist, Garrison, admits everything that is essential to the Placæan doctrine. For he allows that the guilt of Adam's first sin and of inherent depravity are one and the same guilt. There are not two guilts, or guiltinesses, but only one.

Placæus claimed that his conception of the subject is identical with that of Calvin. He could appropriate the language of Calvin in the *Institutes* and in the *Commentary* on the Epistle to the Romans, as a faithful description of his doctrine. It appeared at first to the opponents of Placæus, as we have more than once remarked, that he had dropped the idea of participation in the first sin; but this was simply because he dwelt so much on seminal corruption and the law of propagation, according to which depravity passes from father to son. But Anselm and Calvin might have been attacked with as much justice as Placæus. This attack on Placæus is an indication that the doctrine of original sin was in danger of being removed from its Augustinian foundation.

One of the most active opponents of the doctrines of the Saumur professors was Francis Turretine. Though he had studied at Saumur as well as at Paris, he allied himself with the more rigid theologians of Montauban. He became the head of a party at Geneva, which labored to procure the condemnation of the Saumur views by the Swiss Church. Opposed to this party at Geneva were Mestrezat and Louis Tronchin, colleagues of Turretine, and other theologians of a liberal and tolerant spirit. Turretine and his party at length effected a partial success by securing the promulgation and partial enforcement, for a time, in Switzerland, of the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, which they took the lead in framing. They were not deterred from this step by the remonstrance of eminent ministers of foreign churches, among whom were the Paris pastors, the younger Daillé, and the famous Claude, together with the distinguished theologian of Holland, J. R. Wetstein. Turretine and the party to which he belonged professed to regard with charity and toleration the ministers

who differed from them on the points of theology to which the *Consensus* relates; they were only anxious to keep the Swiss Church free from erroneous teaching. Their creed is levelled at the peculiar doctrines of each of the three Saumur professors. Against Cappel, they go so far as to assert the inspiration of the Hebrew vowel points in the Old Testament, and to condemn, also, his critical views respecting the Hebrew text—thus giving their solemn sanction to the Buxtorfian grammar and criticism! Having demolished Capellus, the *Consensus* condemns Amyraldism—universal atonement and the doctrine that God desires the salvation of all. Amyraut's doctrine of universal grace is carefully defined and denounced. Then the Placæan doctrine, or the doctrine which Turretine persisted in ascribing to Placæus, is put under the ban. The *Consensus* never acquired authority outside of Switzerland. Within about fifty years it was abrogated. One of the strongest advocates of this last measure was Turretine's own son, Alphonso Turretine, who was as zealous in opposing as his father had been in advocating it.* If there was ever a creed which deserves to be called the manifesto of a theological party, rather than a confession of faith on the part of the church, the *Formula Consensus* is that one. And yet we have seen this partisan document, with its not only verbal but literal inspiration, according to the grammar of Buxtorf, quoted side by side with passages from the *Augsburg Confession* and the *Heidelberg Catechism*!

* In a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the younger Turretine says that the *Consensus* would exclude from the ministry many excellent ministers of God; almost all the doctors of the first four centuries and a great number of ages following; almost all of the Reformers, a great part of the reformed theologians of France, and the ablest among them; a great portion of the German theologians, and almost all the theologians of the English church.

This letter may be read in the *Supplement to Bayle's Dictionary* by Chauseppié—Art. "Louis Tronchin," Note C. The earlier letter of F. Turretine to Claude, on the other side, is in curious contrast with the sentiments of his son. This may also be read in *Chauseppié*.

But even the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* associates with the theory of the covenant that of a real participation in the first sin. It affirms that prior to actual sin, man is exposed to the divine wrath for a double reason, "first, on account of the παράπτωμα and disobedience which he committed in the loins of Adam ; then by reason of the consequent hereditary corruption, introduced at his very conception, by which his whole nature is depraved and spiritually dead."

If we turn to the *Institutes* of Turretine, which was published in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, and when the antagonism to Placæus had produced its full effect in determining the form of theology on this subject, we see, indeed, vestiges of the genuine Augustinian doctrine, but we see also that this is well-nigh supplanted. Turretine leans strongly to the supralapsarian philosophy, which explains moral phenomena by reference to the will of God, as the ultimate foundation, rather than his immutable justice. The doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation coheres with that system, and was espoused by its advocates. In their view, it is sufficient that God determines to consider one guilty if another sins. His determination to establish such a constitution makes it just. There is one word in Turretine's discussion of imputation which is quite significant as marking the doctrinal transition which we are attempting to sketch. He founds imputation on our natural union with Adam, as the father and root of the race, and on the federal union with him, our appointed representative. "The foundation, therefore, of imputation is not only the natural union which comes in between us and Adam—otherwise all his sins would have to be imputed to us, but chiefly the *moral and federal*, by which God framed a covenant with him as our head."* It is chiefly—"præcipue"—the covenant relation on which the justice and propriety of imputation are made to rest. At the same time there are passages in this author

* *Institutes*, P. I. Loc. IX., Q. IX., xi.

which go beyond the more modern theory of immediate imputation and in the direction of Augustinism. He declares, in arguing against Placæus, that the orthodox doctrine holds to both sorts of imputation, immediate and mediate; implying that they are inseparable. He says: "In the propagation of sin, the accident does not pass from subject to subject"—that is, sin does not go from person to person—"because the immediate subject of sin is not the person, but human nature, vitiated by the actual transgression of the person, which being communicated to the posterity of Adam, this inherent corruption is communicated in it. As, therefore, in Adam, person infected nature, so, in his posterity, nature infects person." * Sin is transmitted—handed down. But sin is not a substance, it is an accident. Hence it inheres in something. It inheres not in the person, but in the *nature*, which being corrupted in Adam, passes down to his descendants. Alluding to Hebrews vii. 9—"Levi, also, who receiveth tithes, paid tithes in Abraham"—Turretine denies that it is to be figuratively taken. It is to be taken in the proper sense. Abraham in that solemn action sustained the person of Levi or of the Aaronic sacerdotal order that was to spring from him; and this he did properly and truly, though his other relations—his faith, for example—were merely personal.†

Apart from the supposed scriptural foundation for the theory of the covenant, it is easy to account for the spread of it, and for its displacement of the Augustinian idea. The old difficulty growing out of the origin of souls by separate acts of creation, which was the accepted hypothesis among Calvinists, was felt with ever-increasing force. In particular, the covenant theory suggested a plausible mode of meeting two objections to the doctrine of original sin in its ancient form. One thing which had not been satisfactorily explained was the non-imputation of other sins of Adam, besides the

* *Institutes*, P. I., Loc. IX., Q. X., xxii.

† *Ibid.*, Q. IX., xxv.

first, not to speak of all his other actions, to his posterity. If we participated responsibly in the first sin, why not in his subsequent acts also? The other fact that demanded explanation was the non-imputation of the sins of nearer ancestors, even of all mankind, to each individual. The theory of a common nature, when taken as a sufficient explication of the subject, was attended with these difficulties. The solution had been commonly sought in the hypothesis that all acts of Adam subsequent to the first, as well as the acts of nearer kindred, are phenomenal, personal. That act alone corrupted the nature. But the covenant, it was thought, furnished an easier and better answer. The covenant, by its terms, turned upon the conduct of Adam for a limited period, and one act of sin on the part of Adam forfeited all its privileges and brought upon mankind the judicial forfeiture. It is true that the difficulty remained until the fundamental principle of Augustine was wholly given up. How can mankind, it might still be asked, participate in the first act alone? For it was still the prevailing view, throughout the seventeenth century, among adherents of the covenant theology, with the exception of supralapsarians, that in that first sin there was a true and proper participation. It seems to have been long felt by theologians that the covenant would not answer of itself, without the doctrine of real participation, in confronting objections to imputation and native depravity; and yet the two props were hardly congruous with one another. When the justice of imputation on the ground of a federal relation was called in question, they fell back on the theory of participation; but when asked why all the actions of Adam are not imputed to us, they pleaded the covenant.

The process of supplanting the Augustinian theory was consummated in the eighteenth century. But Calvinistic theology in England, having nothing but the covenant to rest upon, found itself in the hapless plight which is described by the younger Edwards in his account of the state of things when his father began his labors. To illustrate

the half-hearted tone and helpless situation of the representatives of Calvinistic doctrine, we have only to refer to three of the most conspicuous of them, Ridgeley, Doddridge, and Watts. Ridgeley says that Adam's sin is ours only in a forensic sense.* He considers how the imputation of it can be justified. 1. It is said: "If Adam had not fallen, we should be content with the arrangement." This, replies Ridgeley, is not a sufficient answer. 2. If his posterity had existed, the law of nature would have directed them to choose Adam for their representative, he being the common father. This answer, says Ridgeley, "bids fairer to remove the difficulty," but does not wholly remove it. 3. God chose Adam to be our representative, and we ought to acquiesce. But this, Ridgeley replies, will not satisfy the objector; it puts the sovereignty of God, he will say, against his other perfections. Ridgeley comes to the conclusion that the guilt of men for Adam's sin cannot be so great as the guilt we contract by actual sins.† Here he takes up an opinion which the schoolmen and later Roman Catholics had avowed, but which the old Protestant theology had looked upon with disfavor. The punishment of infants, Ridgeley thinks, will be the mildest of any. Accusations of conscience will not belong to those who have no sin save original sin. How we can be properly sinful at birth is the point which Ridgeley, even with the help of the covenant, is obviously puzzled to explain.

According to Doddridge, men are born with evil propensities; but the difficulty of supposing this "*is considerably lessened*" if we suppose that things are so constituted upon the whole as that a man is not *necessarily* impelled to any actions which shall end in his final destruction."‡ What remains of the difficulty, says Doddridge, is the same under other schemes as under the scheme of Christianity. The

* These citations are from the Am. ed. of Ridgeley's *System*, vol. i.

† Ibid., p. 141.

‡ Doddridge's *Lectures*, Prop. 133, Schol. 3.

sin of Adam is, "in some degree," imputed to his posterity.* The covenant with Adam is, "in some measure," for his posterity.† "It may seem probable" that the posterity of Adam would have been advantaged by his obedience, but to what extent we cannot say.‡ One rational creature, we may be certain, will not be made finally and eternally miserable for the sin of another. What the state of those who die in infancy is, we know not.

Watts affirms that the fact of infants being the descendants of Adam will not account for their miseries and their death. We must also suppose that he is our legal representative. Of this theory of representation, Watts naively observes: "I must confess I am not fond of such a scheme or hypothesis." "No! I would gladly renounce it," "if I could find any other way" to vindicate Providence.§ The appearance of injustice, in one man's making millions of men sinners, is relieved, "*in some measure*," if Adam is regarded as our natural head. Legal representation will "do much" towards removing all remaining appearance of injustice.|| Watts tries to answer the objection that we did not consent to this representation by Adam. 1. A nobleman, when guilty of treason, disgraces and impoverishes his descendants as well as himself. 2. God bestows blessings on children and deprives them of privileges on account of parents' sins. 3. The appointment of Adam, with his advantages for remaining upright, was a very advantageous thing for his posterity. Souls are separately created, but are defiled by entering corrupt bodies. This transmission of sin, says Watts, is the greatest difficulty in the doctrine. *It would not be just to punish infants eternally.*¶ The infant children of wicked men, he thinks, are annihilated at death.**

* *Doddridge's Lectures*, p. 413 (London ed., 1763).

† *Ibid.*, p. 414.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

§ *Works*, vi., 224, 225.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 235.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 309, 314.

Into this plight were candid and excellent men brought by their federal theology. Such timid theologues were an easy prey to their Arminian assailants. Doubtless it is to Watts and Doddridge that President Edwards refers, towards the end of his treatise on original sin, where he confutes the opinion of "two divines of no inconsiderable note among the Dissenters of England, relating to a *partial imputation* of Adam's sin."

President Edwards fell back on what was substantially the old doctrine of original sin. In reading his discussion we seem to be carried back to Aquinas and Augustine. His original speculations are to support this doctrine, but they do not materially modify it. It is true that he calls Adam our federal head, but the covenant is only "a sovereign, gracious establishment," going beyond mere justice, and promising rewards to Adam and his posterity, in case he should obey, to which neither he nor they could lay claim.* What he attempts to make out is a true and real participation in the first sin. The human species rebelled against God, and that act, as far as the morality of it is concerned, is ours not less than Adam's. There is a consent to it, or a concurrence in it, on our part. The first rising of a sinful inclination *is* this consent and concurrence; and our guilt for this first rising of sinful inclination is identical with our guilt for Adam's sin. There is not a double guilt, as if two things were "*distinctly* imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God." We really constitute with Adam one complex person—one moral whole; as truly so as if we co-existed with him *in time*, and were physically united to him as the members of the body are to the head. "The *first existing* of a corrupt disposition is not to be looked upon as sin *distinct* from their participation of Adam's first sin. It is as it were the *extended pollution* of that sin through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted *union* of the

* Edwards's (Dwight's ed.), ii., 543.

branches with the root; or the *inherence* of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence with the head in that first act." * In saying that this is a *constituted* union, Edwards does not mean that it is artificial, unreal, or merely legal. It depends, to be sure, on the will of God, but not more so than does the accepted fact of personal identity. It is a divine constitution, but it is natural—a constitution of nature. The first depravity of heart and the imputation of Adam's sin, "are both the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order that the evil disposition is *first*, and the charge of guilt *consequent*, as it was in the case of Adam himself." Depravity, as an established principle, unlike the *first rising* of depravity in the soul, "is a *consequence* and *punishment* of the first apostasy thus participated, and brings new guilt." Our share in the first sin is really the same as if we were parts of Adam, "all jointly participating and all concurring, as *one whole*, in the disposition and action of the head." It will be seen that the conception of Edwards is very like that of Aquinas. One original point in Edwards's explication of the subject is the careful distinction between the *first* rising or manifestation of sinful inclination in the soul, and the same as an established principle. Had this distinction been explicitly made by Placæus, and by advocates of mediate imputation generally, their doctrine would not have been mistaken for a mere doctrine of hereditary sin. Edwards presents a philosophical theory and defence of participation. His aim is to show that it is no absurd or impossible thing for "the race of mankind truly to partake of the *sin* of the first apostasy, so that this, in reality and propriety, shall become *their* sin;" "and therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that *ground* God imputes it to them." †

* Ibid., p. 544.

† Ibid., p. 559.

In New England, among the followers of Edwards, only so much of his theory was retained as asserted an infallible connection, in virtue of an established constitution, between Adam's first sin and the existence of a sinful inclination in each of his descendants. This sinful inclination was regarded not as a real participation, but only as a virtual or *constructive* consent to the first sin of Adam. The doctrine of mere inherited depravity on the one hand, and Hopkinsonianism and the new-school theology on the other, were the natural consequence. Imputation of Adam's sin was given up. On the contrary, Calvinists of the Princeton school planted themselves on the federal theory, took up the doctrine of Immediate Imputation, which had brought the English Calvinism of the eighteenth century into such difficulties, and making Turretine their text-book, waged war upon the New England views, not wholly sparing Edwards himself.

When we direct our attention to the Roman Catholic theology we observe that the doctrine of immediate imputation, which Abelard and certain nominalists broached in the middle ages, has found little favor in later times, except among latitudinarians. The orthodox Catholic theology—the representatives of Augustinism—have regarded the whole federal theory with distrust and aversion. It is remarkable that in the Council of Trent the federal theory was brought forward by Catharinus, the opponent of Calvin, and a man who was all his life suspected in his own church of being loose in his theology in relation to the points which separated Augustine from Pelagius. According to Father Paul, Catharinus explained his opinion to be that as “God made a covenant with Abraham and all his posterity, when he made him father of the faithful, so when he gave original righteousness to Adam and to all mankind, he made him seal an obligation in the name of all, to keep it for himself and them, observing the commandments ; which, because he transgressed, he lost, as well for others as for himself, and

incurred the punishments also for them.”* Against this opinion the celebrated champion of orthodoxy, Dominicus Soto, protested.† He distinguished between the actual sin of Adam and the principle or habit “bred in the mind of the actor.” “This habitual quality,” remaining in Adam, “passed into the posterity, and is transfused as proper unto every one.” “He compareth,” says Father Paul, “original sin to crookedness, as it is indeed a spiritual obliquity; for the whole nature of man being in Adam, when he made himself crooked by transgressing the precept, the whole nature of man, and, by consequent, every particular person remained crooked, not by the curvity of Adam, but by his own, by which he is truly crooked and a sinner, until he be straightened by the grace of God.” Afterwards, Father Paul observes that the opinion of Catharinus was best understood, “because it was expressed by a political conceit of a bargain made by one for his posterity, which being transgressed, they are all undoubtedly bound; and many of the fathers did favor that; but perceiving the contradiction of the other divines, they durst not receive it.” In his theological writings, composed after the council, Soto opposed the covenant theory and defended pure Augustinism. Bellarmine declares that the council intended to condemn the doctrine of Pighius and Catharinus, who denied that innate depravity is properly sinful. This great expounder of Catholic theology maintains that the first sin of Adam was generic. “There could not be anything in infants,” he says, “of the nature of sin, unless they were participant in the first sin of Adam.”‡ This sin is imputed to all, who are born of Adam, since all, existing in the loins of Adam, in him and by him sinned, when he sinned.”§

By common consent of Protestants, Jansenius is considered to have been, on the Catholic side in the seventeenth cen-

* We quote from the Old English translation of Father Paul's *History of the Council of Trent*, pp. 175, 177.

† Ibid., p. 176.

‡ Vol. iii., Cont. ii., Lib. v., c. xviii.

§ Ibid., c. xiii.

tury, the most faithful follower of Augustine. He read all the writings of Augustine seventeen times, and his copious work on this father was the fruit of his devoted labors. Now, Jansenius opposes the covenant theory with all his might, as being at war with Augustinian theology. Recent theologians have invented that theory, he says. They could not have excogitated anything more foreign to Augustine's thoughts, more absurd in relation to his system, or more repugnant to his principles.* Augustine held that the greatness of the first sin is the cause of the corruption of nature and of the transmission of corruption; and so that "all things take place by no agreement, but happen from the nature of things, because the children are said to have sinned in the parent and to have been one with him."† "In Augustine's view nothing else is original sin, but concupiscence with guilt." Jansenius declares that nobody ever had so wild a dream as to imagine that this great depravation of human nature comes upon men from some agreement made by God with their parents, or is propagated by the positive law or will of God.‡ Augustine, he says, never resorted to any compacts or positive laws of God for the explication of this subject. It was through the nature of things, in Augustine's view, that the first great sin, together with human nature, pass to the posterity of Adam.§ We could quote from Jansenius pages of argument and warm denunciation directed against the federal theory. It is not merely the idea of imputation without inherent sin—the notion of Pighius and Catharinus—that he opposes, but also the whole conception of a covenant with Adam, entailing a curse on his posterity. The significance and importance of his sentiments on this subject, theological scholars will at once comprehend. He considers the federal hypothesis an innovation, hostile to the spirit of the Augustinian doctrine.

* Jansenius, *Augustinus* (Louvain, 1640), t. ii., p. 208.

† Ibid., p. 211.

‡ Ibid., p. 247.

§ Ibid., p. 246.

Here we pause in this historical investigation. It is clear to us, first, that the prevailing doctrine, down to a comparatively recent period, made the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent depravity, each the inseparable condition of the other, instead of regarding the latter merely as the penal consequence of the former; and, secondly, that real participation in the first sin formed the groundwork of imputation, the covenant hypothesis without participation being a later notion, the offspring of the false and untenable philosophy which supralapsarian theologians vainly endeavored to establish in the Reformed Church.

We subjoin a brief statement of objections to the theory of immediate imputation on the federal basis.

1. The Scriptural argument for this theory will not bear examination. The relation to God under which Adam was placed is never called in the Scriptures a covenant. The advocates of the theory pretend to adduce but one passage where it is thus called—Hosea vi. 7; but this passage is correctly rendered in our version as follows: "For they like men"—not *like Adam*, which is the other rendering—"have transgressed the covenant." The offence of Ephraim and Judah is an example of a common species of depravity. It is not claimed that the teachings of Jesus Christ contain any reference to a covenant with Adam or to a vicarious office such as the doctrine of immediate imputation attributes to him. If this doctrine is one of so vast consequence in the Christian system, it is astonishing that the founder of Christianity should make no mention of it. The circumstance that the same penalties which are threatened to Adam, likewise fall upon his descendants, proves nothing to the purpose. In whatever way they become sinful, these penalties are appropriately inflicted on them. If it is said by Paul (1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 47), that all die "in Adam," this is not saying that their death is the penalty of his sin. They die because they are the children of Adam, but how this takes place, or the causal nexus between the two facts, is not given. The

real stronghold—if it can be called a stronghold—of the imputation theory is Romans v. 12 seq. We have not room to examine this passage in detail. The stress of the argument of the advocates of this theory rests finally on the apostle's statement that "condemnation" comes upon men "by one that sinned" and "by the offence of one," or by one offence. But the apostle's declaration holds good, if the transgression of Adam brought mankind into a state of condemnation, whether this result was through their own depravity or not. The great thought of Paul is that Adam ruined the race, and Christ saved it. Our condemnation is traceable to one, our justification to the other. Intermediate agencies and proximate causes are left out of consideration. The manner in which the advocates of immediate imputation interpret these words of Paul reminds one of Luther's iteration of the *hoc est meum corpus* in his controversy with Zwingle. It is an example of that rather frigid style of exegesis, by which transubstantiation and consubstantiation become dogmas in large portions of the church.

2. The extreme form of the doctrine of imputation, which is in vogue at present, involves its advocates in the inconsistency of supposing that there is a sin for which we are responsible in the full legal sense—as truly so as was its perpetrator—but which does not bring on us, of itself, eternal punishment. Calvin and most of the old theologians were consistent in holding that the penalty could not be inflicted on us for Adam's sin alone, apart from inherent depravity; for they held that imputation is impossible apart from inherent depravity. But the Princeton writers, separating the one from the other and making inherent depravity merely the punishment of sin imputed, still make this depravity the necessary condition of the infliction of eternal death. Why? Did not Adam deserve this penalty for that first act alone? Is not our responsibility for it as great as his? Why would it not be just to inflict eternal death upon us for imputed sin alone? What a strange theory! Here is a sin in which we

had no real part, for which we are not regarded with moral disapprobation, which we are not bound to repent of, and which does not bring on us, as a direct penal consequence, eternal death; and yet it is a sin for which we are legally responsible—as truly so as the individual who committed it!

3. The covenant hypothesis, regarded as a solution of the problem of sin, wears a superficial character. It is one of those artificial solutions of great moral and social problems, which remove difficulties in *too* easy a manner, at the same time that they raise difficulties greater than those which they remove. There is a striking analogy between this hypothesis and the social compact theory of government, which was the product of the same age. A covenant between individuals was declared to be the foundation of civil society, and the obligation of civil obedience was made to rest on this imaginary contract. Certain perplexing questions appeared to be solved by this hypothesis, which was a mere legal fiction, and accordingly its mischievous bearing in other respects was overlooked.

The theoretical defences of the federal hypothesis are weak enough. It is objected to the doctrine that men infallibly become sinners in consequence of Adam's sin, through a sovereign constitution—the idea of New England theology—that this doctrine attributes too much to the *will* of God. We will not here discuss the New England view; but, strange to say, this objection comes from those who found the covenant itself on nothing better. They hold that men are judicially condemned to be sinners, and to endure the penalty of sin; but when we ask for the ground of this condemnation we are referred to the covenant, and when we inquire into the justice of the covenant, we are thrown back on the sovereignty of God. They seek to remove a difficulty by creating another, only one step distant, of a more formidable character. It is better, with Augustine, to leave some questions unanswered than to solve them by inventing

hypotheses which are in open conflict with proper conceptions of the divine justice.

The most plausible defence of the covenant hypothesis is that founded on *scientia media*. God foresaw that the descendants of Adam, if they were to be tried individually, would not do better than he, his inducements to right action being greater than theirs would be ; and, therefore, determined to treat them judicially according to his conduct. The *scientia media*, in such applications of it, is an exploded principle. It might as well be argued that because God foresaw that Adam and his posterity would be sinners, it would be just for him to condemn them all and punish them eternally, without any probation whatsoever.

The analogy of Christ's work is pleaded in support of the theory in question. But Owen, as we have seen, makes the relation of Christ, as the author of benefits to his people, an exception to the ordinary rule of the divine administration, and a case by itself. Not to insist on the propriety of this distinction, it is sufficient to say that the argument from the analogy of Christ's work depends wholly on the idea that distributive justice is satisfied by the atonement, so that the believer, apart from the consideration of the promise to him, could not be justly condemned. To identify the scriptural and orthodox conception of expiation with the last proposition is simply preposterous.

4. The doctrine of immediate imputation, in the form in which it is now held, involves, by necessary inference, the proposition that God is the author of sin. It is held that, on account of Adam's sin, God withdraws from the soul, from the moment of its creation—that is, never imparts to the soul—the grace, without which it cannot but sin. It is thus rendered sinful, prior to moral choice—prior to the knowledge of moral distinctions. It is vain to urge that the act of God is of a negative character. What he does renders the effect inevitable. It is vain to say that the faculties of agency remain. By the supposition, it is just as impossi-

ble, from the moment of creation, to be holy as to see without light or to breathe without air. To suppose a man to be holy is even more absurd, for, on the withdrawal of grace, the powers of the soul necessarily fall into disorder and corruption. We do not see how the conclusion can be avoided that God is the author of sin.

5. The imputation theory makes sin the penalty of sin, in a way which the church has never countenanced. I am condemned to be sinful, as a punishment for the sin of Adam, who is called my representative. I had no real agency, it is asserted, in that sin. But sin is inflicted on me as a penalty for another's act. Now, this theory is totally different from the old view that a wrong-doer fastens on *himself* a habit which becomes too strong for him to cast off; so that his sin becomes his punishment. The theory of immediate imputation makes sin to be inflicted on them who are *not* wrong-doers. They are sinful in pursuance of an ante-natal condemnation—ante-natal, and of an earlier date than their creation. The Augustinian doctrine holds that native depravity is both sin and punishment; but it professes to bring this birth-sin under the great law of habit, to which we have just adverted. We sinned in Adam and brought on ourselves, as individuals, the sinful bondage to evil in which we are born. It is thus widely at variance with the modern theory, according to which we are slaves of sin for an act which we are not to blame for and with which we had nothing to do. The agency of God in relation to the existence of sin is discussed by President Edwards in his treatise on original sin; and he makes the precise distinction which we have made here. The *continuance* of a state of depravity according to a settled course of nature, is one thing; the *origination* of such a state in an individual is quite another thing. This is to charge Adam's sin to his posterity. The statement and admission of this distinction leads Edwards to introduce, at this point in his discussion, the realistic view of our connection with Adam, whereby

his act is made to be ours also, and thus to be a just cause of our inherent depravity from birth.

6. The theory of immediate imputation is incompatible with a right conception of the nature of sin. Princeton essays in support of this theory make much use of President Edwards's proposition that the virtuousness or viciousness of acts of the will or dispositions of the heart lies not in their cause, but their nature. Without assenting to everything that Edwards teaches under this head, we fully accord with his main idea that blame and praise belong to acts and states of the will, and not to anything antecedent, to which they are in some sense due. In the chapter referred to, he is prosecuting his old crusade against the notion of choosing choices. But he guards his own meaning in the following remark: "As the phrase, *being the author*, may be understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of will; but as a person may be said to be the author of the act of will itself, by his being the immediate agent, or the being that *is acting*, or *in exercise* in that act; if the phrase, *being the author*, is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men being [to be] the authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise on account of them." Men are responsible, according to Edwards, for their evil native character, or state of will, because they produced it through the generic act—the act of the race—in Adam. Whether that first sin *was* thus generic, and whether if it were so, it would justify the consequences just stated—whether, in other words, a generic act of this sort may, according to a righteous order, entail guilt on the individual and engender sinful character prior to an act of individual self-determination—we shall not here inquire. But this is manifest, that Edwards, like the Augustinians, supposed that an act of sin in which we truly and really took part is the indispensable condition of native guilt and depravity. This condition the doctrine of immediate imputation on the federal basis sweeps away. We

are made to have a habit of sin from the outset, with no prior act of sin on our part, out of which it grew. This violates the fundamental conception of holy and sinful character, which both the Scriptures and the common-sense of mankind decisively sanction.



A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.*

RECENT ecclesiastical events in New England have called up for public discussion the Christian doctrine of punishment in the future life. The earnest and dispassionate consideration of any of the momentous themes of religion cannot fail to be of wholesome tendency. In the present ferment of theological opinion in all Protestant countries, no traditional belief can escape the ordeal of renewed and searching inquiry. Whatever in the temper of the times may be deserving of censure, there is a vast and increasing number of persons who do really seek the truth with an open mind. It having been thought best to present to the readers of *The New Englander* two essays on the doctrine referred to—written independently of one another, with no polemical intent, and each of them by a theological scholar competent to handle the questions involved, in the light to be drawn from the improved philology of our day—the present writer willingly consents to introduce these learned discussions by preliminary remarks, chiefly historical.

In the ancient period—the patristic period—embracing the first six centuries, the doctrine of endless punishment was the prevalent opinion.† The idea of the ultimate res-

* An Article in *The New Englander* for March, 1878.

† A word may here be said upon Jewish opinion on this subject. The Pharisees in the time of Christ taught the doctrine of endless punishment, as we learn from Josephus, *B. J.*, ii. 8, 14, *Ant.* xviii. 1, 3. In both passages Josephus uses the term *αἰδιος*. See, also, Gfrörer, *Das Jahrhundert d. Heils*, ii. 289, where the Rabbinical teaching is given.

toration of all was entertained by a few eminent church teachers, and the notion of an eventual annihilation of the wicked was occasionally broached. Certain writers are often erroneously cited as favoring the last-mentioned view. The Fathers not unfrequently argue against the belief that the soul is self-existent, and in opposition to such a theory they affirm that the soul, like every other creature of God, is upheld by divine power, and will continue to exist as long as He shall choose to maintain it in being. Remarks of this kind have been construed as indicating that the souls of the wicked will one day cease to be. So Justin Martyr (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, c. 5) is often interpreted; and, at the first blush, this seems to be the natural understanding of his words. But the context of the very passage appears to exclude this construction, which elsewhere would seem to be expressly contradicted (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, c. 130, *Apol.*, i., 28). Irenæus is misinterpreted in a similar way. In one place (*Adv. Haer.*, lib. ii., 34), a casual reader would suppose him to affirm that the existence of wicked souls is terminable. Here again a close scrutiny of the context shows that a distinction is made between bare existence, and "life" in the higher sense, with which "length of days" is made synonymous. This distinction is drawn out in other passages (Lib. v. 4, § 3; 7, § 1; 27, § 2). "Separation from God," he says, "is death," or the loss of that "life and light," that true joy, which depends on communion with God. That Irenæus held to the doctrine of annihilation has also been deduced from a remark made in one of the so-called Pfaffian fragments relative to the ultimate destruction of evil. The author of this fragment evidently had in mind Col. i. 20, 22; and what he meant to say precisely, as far as the destiny of the wicked is concerned, is not fully clear. But the document itself is of more than doubtful genuineness, so

Endless punishment, though the common, was not the universal, belief of the Jews. See the reference to the Talmud, in Schürer, *N. T. Zeitgeschichte*, p. 597.

that no inference respecting the tenets of Irenæus can be built upon it. There are passages in which Irenæus can hardly be otherwise interpreted than as teaching endless conscious punishment (*e. g.*, Lib. iv. 28, § 1; c. 39, § 4; cf. Lib. iii. 23, § 3; iv. 28, § 1). At least every other interpretation seems artificial.

Arnobius (near the beginning of the fourth century), the African rhetorician, advocated the opinion that the soul gains immortality by perseverance in goodness, and that consequently the wicked absolutely go out of being. But he had too many idiosyncrasies of opinion to be of any weight as an authority for ascertaining the beliefs of his contemporaries. Arnobius was in no sense a representative of orthodoxy.

The Alexandrians, Clement and Origen, are the chief dissentients from the ordinary doctrine, in the first three centuries. Clement explicitly affirms his belief that all will finally be restored to holiness. Origen maintains this opinion, and contributed more than any other theologian to give it whatever degree of currency it obtained in the ancient church. With Origen it was an esoteric doctrine, a doctrine which belonged to the believer in the mature stage of Christian character and of discernment, but one which would be abused and be prolific of harm, if it were proclaimed to all.

It is important to observe the connection of this belief of Origen with other parts of his system. He held that the will does not lose its mutable quality, or issue in that permanence of character, which is an essential idea in the Augustinian anthropology. Original sin he explained on the supposition of a pre-existence of souls, a doctrine derived from Platonism, and of a moral fall prior to birth; and though he believed in universal restoration, which would comprehend in its wide sweep fallen angels and even Satan, he thought that there might be a series of falls and recoveries in the æons to come. Punishment, it is also important to remark, he held to be disciplinary in its aim, the reform

of the offender being the prime end in view in the infliction of it.

At this point we may interpose two observations. The first is that the question of the design of punishment in the future life is intimately connected with the problem of its duration. Is punishment ordained chiefly for the recovery of the transgressor? Or is it retrospective, strictly retributive, a recompense, a reaction of offended justice and of the violated moral order? It is true that restoration does not follow, with logical necessity, from the first view, stated above, of the office of punishment in the divine economy; for it may be held that the resistance of free-will will defeat the provision of grace, and prevent chastisement from bringing forth its appropriate fruits, since they do not ensue with any fatalistic certainty. Still, universal restoration is more likely to be adopted in connection with this idea of the reformatory function of penalty. Nor does the doctrine of the retributive, or vindicatory, design of punishment necessarily exclude restoration; since it is conceivable that repentance should take place under the operation of penalties not ordained for the sake of this result. Still, a doctrine of restoration is much more likely to be rejected by those who so interpret the significance of punishment. It is possible, to be sure, to combine the two views of punishment, and to consider it, in its direct or primary design, retroactive, but with a subordinate aim which looks to a beneficent effect upon the character of the sufferer. We do not here discuss the question, but simply point out its cardinal importance. In not a few modern discussions of the Atonement, it has surprised us to find no preliminary consideration of the design of punishment under the divine government.

The second observation suggested by the foregoing statement of Origen's creed is that the question relates to the effect of redemption. What are to be its consequences? What the extent of its actual operation? There is a Universalism—a *Universalismus vulgaris*—which makes little

or nothing of the fact of sin, and founds itself either on a denial of ill-desert, or on a belief in man's power to extricate himself from the control of evil, to shake off the principle of selfishness and ungodliness. Christianity is the redemption of the world by Jesus Christ. Its fundamental postulate is the fact of sin and of condemnation. Deliverance is provided, which is available to all. Now it is conceivable that all should sooner or later lay hold of this help and be saved. If the Bible had so declared, there would have been involved in this declaration no denial or attenuation of the essential elements of the Gospel. It would have been simply the revelation of a fact by which the truths of the Incarnation and Expiation of Christ, and of the work of the Spirit, are nowise affected. We are not aware that John Foster denied any fundamental part of the gospel method of redemption. He probably accepted cordially the Apostles' and the Nicene creeds. He was an evangelical Universalist. Universalism in every form may be an error, and a very mischievous error; or it may not be. But all sorts of Universalism are not to be confounded together.*

When we pass into the second section of the patristic period (from the beginning of the fourth to the end of the sixth century), we find that although the doctrine of endless punishment still prevails, there is more dissent from it.

* A student at Cambridge laid before Robert Hall his perplexities on the subject of eternal punishment. Hall, after stating, in his forcible manner, his reasons for accepting the doctrine, thus concludes: "I would only add that in my humble opinion the doctrine of the eternal duration of future misery, metaphysically considered, is not an essential article of faith, nor is the belief of it ever proposed as a term of salvation; that, if we really flee from the wrath to come, by truly repenting of our sins, and laying hold of the mercy of God through Christ by a lively faith, our salvation is perfectly secure, whichever hypothesis we embrace on this most mysterious subject. The evidence accompanying the popular interpretation is by no means to be compared to that which establishes our common Christianity, and therefore the fate of the Christian religion is not to be considered as implicated in the belief or disbelief of the popular doctrine."—Hall's *Works*, v., 527.

Gregory of Nyssa, one of the most eminent, if not the most eminent, of the ancient Greek theologians, expresses himself distinctly on the side of universal restoration.* Less definitely, Gregory of Nazianzus takes the same view. In the latter part of the fourth century, the two great representatives of the Antioch school of theology, Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia were restorationists. In their theology, the Incarnation was not only for the deliverance of man from sin, but its design and effect were to elevate mankind to a higher stage of being than that on which he stood, or which was possible to him, as a descendant of Adam. Beyond its negative effect, the work of Christ, the second Adam, conferred a positive good by lifting up the race to a higher destination. And this work, Theodore and his followers maintained, would eventually take effect on all. Theodore argues that Christ never would have said "until thou hast paid the uttermost farthing," if it had not been possible for this to be done; nor would he have said that one should be beaten with many stripes, and another with few, if there was to be no end to the infliction when men had suffered a punishment commensurate with their sin.† This argument, it will be perceived, presupposes that a limited punishment is all that justice requires, and that, when this has been endured, the debt is paid.

No doubt this opinion of the Antiochian teachers, which was consonant with that of Origen, though adopted by them independently, had many adherents in the fifth century. But the antagonism to Origen's philosophy and theology, which was excited under the lead of Jerome and others, caused this opinion, together with other peculiarities of the theology of the great Alexandrian, to be at length generally rejected and proscribed as heretical. Augustine strenuously defended the doctrine of endless punishment, although in

* *Orat. Cat.*, 8, 35; also in the treatise *de anima*.

† *Asseman. Bibl. Orient.*, t. iii., p. 323.

his time, and within the circle of his influence, there were "tender-hearted Christians," as he styles them, besides others whom he classifies differently, who declined to accept it.* From the close of the fifth century, the doctrine that those condemned at the last judgment endure endless pain became an undisputed article of belief in the church.

Yet this article of belief was practically modified in a most important degree by the rise and establishment of the doctrine of purgatory. The church from the beginning had believed in an intermediate state. The fathers of the first centuries held that Christ, after his death, descended into Hades. There he prosecuted his work in opposition to Satan. Sometimes it was said that he was victorious there in some undefined conflict with the Devil. This ancient idea is expressed thus in *The Institution of a Christian Man*, which was issued in the early days of the English Reformation, in the reign of Henry VIII.: "Our Saviour Jesus Christ at his entry into hell first conquered and oppressed both the devil and hell, and also death itself."† Without tracing the different modifications of this idea—half-earnest, and half-mythical or symbolic—as it is brought forward in the patristic writers, this, at least, was a clear and accepted tenet, based, as was supposed, on 1 Pet. iv. 5-7 and Eph. iv. 7-11, that in the interval between his crucifixion and resurrection, Jesus preached to a portion of the inhabitants of Hades, or the Underworld, the abode of departed souls. There he delivered the pious dead of the Old Testament, whom he transported to Paradise. This tenet is also set forth in immediate connection with the passage which we have cited from *The Institution of a Christian Man*: "Afterward he spoiled hell, and delivered and brought with him from thence all the souls of those righteous and good men which from the fall of Adam died

* *De Civit. Dei*, lib. xxi. 17-21. Cf. *Encheirid.*, c. 112.

† Quoted in Blunt's *Dict. of Doctr. and Hist. Theol.*, p. 416.

in the fear of God, and in the faith and belief of this our Saviour, which was then to come." Clement of Alexandria, in harmony with his general system, thought that the virtuous heathen shared in the benefit of Christ's preaching in Hades. Paradise, to which the saints of the old covenant were conveyed, was not generally considered by the Fathers to be a subdivision of Hades, but it was held to be an abode of happiness, with respect to the precise location of which opinion was not uniform. Origen placed it in an apartment of heaven—the third heaven. More and more the feeling spread, especially after Origen's time, that Hades, the Underworld, was a gloomy, undesirable region, where there could be nothing but suffering, and where Satan held sway.* Yet it was agreed that the righteous and the wicked do not enter at death into the full fruition of reward or the full measure of suffering. They wait for this until the resurrec-

* *Hades* is the rendering, in the Septuagint, of *Sheol*, the Underworld, the abode of departed souls without reference to distinctions of character or lot. In the New Testament *Hades* occurs only in Matt. xi. 23 (and its parallel, Luke x. 15), Matt. xvi. 18, Luke xvi. 23, Acts ii. 27, 31, Rev. i. 18, vi. 8, xx. 13, 14: since in 1 Cor. xv. 55 and Rev. iii. 7, the correct reading omits the word. In Acts ii. 27, 31, the term appears obviously to retain its old significance. In the book of Revelation it retains its intimate association with "death." In Matt. xi. 23, Luke x. 15, the general idea of destruction comports with the old conception of Hades. The same is true of Matt. xvi. 18: "The gates of Hades shall not prevail against it." In Luke xvi. 23, Dives is in Hades, in torment; Lazarus "afar off," separated from him by a chasm or an abyss, in the bosom of Abraham. Comparing this passage with Acts ii. 27, 31, and with Luke xxiii. 43, we are led to believe that the Evangelist conceived of the place denoted by "the bosom of Abraham" as in Paradise, and Paradise as included within Hades. The heavenly Paradise of which Paul speaks (2 Cor. xii. 4) is differently placed. The perplexity of Augustine in determining the sense of the statement in the Apostles' Creed—"he descended into hell," is partly connected with his inability to think of Hades as comprehending "Paradise" within it. His frank confession of the difficulties that beset his mind on this subject, and especially on the preaching to the spirits in prison (1 Pet. iii. 19), is made at length in one of his Epistles (clxiv., *ad Evodium*).

tion and the last judgment. Some of the Fathers had taught—among them, Clement of Alexandria, and, later, Lactantius, Ambrose, and Jerome—that in the fire of the last day, which consumes the world, the remaining dross of sin will be burnt away from the souls of the redeemed. The same idea, it appears, is found here and there in the Rabbinical teaching, and even, as some think, prior to the time of Christ.* Clement of Alexandria, as might be expected, pronounced this purifying fire to be of an etherial or spiritual nature. It was reserved for Augustine, however, to lay the foundation of the doctrine of purgatory, by suggesting that Christians not fully cleansed at death from the pollution of sin are purified in the intermediate state, through the agency of purgatorial fire. His conjecture was converted by those who came after him into a fixed article of belief. Under the auspices of Gregory I. it established itself in the theology of the Western Church. It connected itself with the doctrine of penance and indulgences, which was rounded out by Alexander of Hales, in the thirteenth century, by the introduction of the notion of a treasury of supererogatory merits. The Eastern Church has never admitted the Latin doctrine of a fiery purgatory. Yet Eastern orthodoxy allows that pains of remorse may exist in the minds of the redeemed after death, and that prayers and offerings in their behalf are beneficial.

Thus the church, throughout the middle ages, or for a thousand years, held to a reformatory punishment, of a limited duration, for the mass of those who were under its tutelage. All were baptized. None were excluded from the sacraments but the contumacious and incorrigible. Hell was reserved for those dying unabsolved, in mortal sin. There was hope for the final salvation of all not obstinate in their rebellion against the church and the law of God. From this hope, however, the heathen and the infidel were

* Gfrörer, *Das Jahrh. d. Heils*, ii., p. 81.

of course cut off. The *Divina Commedia* of Dante, in its three parts, gives to the reader a fair conception of the theology of Aquinas, whom the poet calls his master. Only over the gate of one of the regions which the poet explored was written the inscription :

“Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’ entrate.”

The Reformers attacked the whole doctrine of purgatory. This they did on scriptural grounds, and from the connection in which that doctrine stood with the theory of indulgences, and with the claim of the church and the Pope to a partial control over the lot of those who are enduring purgatorial fire. It was with an assault upon the mediæval conception of indulgences and the correlated tenets, that Luther began his movement. The Augsburg Confession (Art. IX.) makes baptism essential to salvation, and teaches that even unbaptized children are lost. Some of the Calvinistic confessions (as the *Confessio Belgica*, Art. XXXIV.), appear to affirm the same tenet ; though others (as *Conf. Scot. ii.* A. D. 1580), repudiate it. Calvin denies that all unbaptized persons are adjudged to eternal death, and uses language consonant with the view which so many of the old Protestant theologians embraced, that not the privation, but the contempt, of the sacraments brings perdition (*Inst.*, IV., xvi., 26). Many of the Calvinistic confessions (as those of the Westminster Assembly) affirm that “elect” infants are saved, and say nothing, except by implication, respecting those who are not elect. Augustine had taught the final condemnation of non-elect infants, and had retreated from his earlier view that their punishment in the future life is purely negative. He thought, however, that their damnation is of the mildest sort (“levissima,” *Cont. Jul.*, v., 4. Cf. *Ep.* clxxxvi., 29). The schoolmen were generally disposed to embrace Augustine’s prior and more merciful opinion, so that when a distinguished ecclesiastic in the fourteenth century, Gregory of Rimini, revived the later idea

of Augustine, he was designated by the opprobrious title of *tortor infantum*. The schoolmen placed infants in one of the outer zones of hell—the *limbus infantium*—where they are deprived of bliss. Augustine had a greater influence than any other patristic writer in shaping the doctrines of the Reformers on these topics. Zwingle, who brought away from the old church more of the tone of the Renaissance than any other of the Protestant champions, held that not only infants, but the virtuous heathen, also, are partakers of salvation. These ideas were associated with his peculiar tenet respecting original sin, and with other opinions, which, as is well known, led Luther to feel that there was in him a certain Rationalistic vein: “*Ihr habt einen anderen Geist denn Wir.*”

The Protestant theologians carried their opposition to purgatory so far as to obliterate the whole doctrine of the intermediate state. The Westminster Confession (c. xxxii.) declares that “the souls of the righteous,” at death, “are received into the highest heavens,” and “the souls of the wicked are cast into hell;” and adds: “Besides these two places for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none.” In Luther’s Bible, both *Sheol* and *Hades* (even in Acts ii. 31), as well as *Gehenna*, were rendered *Höhle*; in King James’s version, “Hell.” That doctrine was revived, in a form to exclude the notion of purgatory, in particular by certain Anglican divines, as Lightfoot, Burnet, and Pearson, and by Campbell in his *Dissertations on the Four Gospels*.

We have now to glance at those modifications of doctrinal opinion on this subject, which have arisen in more modern times among evangelical theologians who do not accept literally the confessions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

We begin with the Lutheran theologians who are loosely designated as of the Schleiermacherian school—that school to which the revival of a believing and scientific theology,

in opposition to the old-fashioned Rationalism, is chiefly due.

The point to which theologians of this class not unfrequently refer is the prophetic and fragmentary character of the eschatological teaching of the New Testament. Just as the predictions of the Messianic age must of necessity be presented in pictures, and be only partially apprehensible to the church of the Old Testament, so an analogous predictive element enters into the description of the Last Things, which forms a part of the New Testament Revelation. It is only glimpses that are afforded us of an order of things outside of all present experience. Hence the impossibility of that precision of dogmatic statement which is practicable in other parts of the Christian system. This consideration may, to be sure, be used to eviscerate of their proper meaning express declarations of the Saviour and his apostles, or to attenuate the force of the moral truth revealed in them. But such is not the design of the theologians to whom we now refer. They bring forward this suggestion by way of wholesome caution against an over-literal interpretation, or a presumptuous claim to know more than it was the intention of Heaven to reveal.

The principal deviation from the traditional tenets on the subject before us, which is found among the German evangelical theologians, is in the idea of an opportunity of hearing the Gospel, to be granted, beyond the bounds of this life, and prior to the last judgment, to those who have not heard of Christ here, or have imperfectly apprehended his Gospel. The belief is frequently expressed that multitudes who depart from the world without a true knowledge of the way of life, will be enlightened and renewed during this intermediate period. It is maintained that eternal punishment is threatened in the Scriptures to those who have been made acquainted with the Gospel, but have refused to avail themselves of its offers, and that a sound exegesis does not warrant the assumption that anything but the conscious re-

jection of the light and help which the Gospel affords, will be attended with final condemnation. It is true, also, that the problem of the ultimate restoration of all is discussed ; but an affirmative solution is seldom unequivocally expressed. Many, on the other hand, would decide this question in the negative.

It should be stated, also, that this class of theologians, however much they may qualify the old formulas and conceptions of inspiration, stand firmly upon the Protestant principle that the Bible, fairly interpreted, with a comparison of Scripture with Scripture, is the rule of faith.

Schleiermacher (*Christl. Glaube*, ii., 503 seq.) opposes the doctrine of eternal punishment, partly on exegetical grounds : he interprets 1 Cor. xv., 25, 26, as teaching the opposite. He finds psychological difficulties in the supposition of an unending self-reproach through an activity of conscience which yet is attended with no moral improvement. The capacity to conceive of the blessedness of the redeemed, which is the necessary condition of this anguish, involves a remaining capacity to share in the good thus imagined. It is impossible, he argues, to suppose that the saints in heaven can be happy if their fellow-men, for whom, even though their sufferings are deserved, they must feel compassion and sympathy, are in a state of misery from which there is no hope of deliverance. The sorrow of the good would be increased by the consciousness that their own salvation was secured by help accorded, in the course of the divine government, to them, which the lost had not enjoyed. "Therefore we should not hold to such a notion [as to the destiny of men], without decisive testimonies that Jesus has foreseen it, such as we by no means possess.

Neander, in his *Planting and Training of the Church* (Robinson's ed., p. 483 seq.), takes up this question of restoration. He admits the possibility of an increasing illumination of the Apostle Paul's mind in respect to the prospects of the kingdom, analogous to that progressive enlightenment

which Peter experienced on the question of the privileges of the Gentiles. In the later Pauline epistles there is an advance beyond the earlier. "We discern in Paul a progressive knowledge of eschatology generally, as it grew up under the enlightening and guiding influence of the Holy Spirit, when we compare his Epistles to the Thessalonians with his later epistles, the lifting-up of believers to an ever-enduring fellowship with the Lord (1 Thess. iv. 17), with the later developed doctrine of the earth as the seat of the perfected kingdom of God; and 2 Thess. i. 7, 9, with the doctrine of a final restitution announced at a later period." This doctrine Neander is inclined to find in 1 Cor. xv. 27, 28, in connection with Phil. ii. 10, 11, and Coloss. i. 20. He also touches on this topic in his posthumous work on the Epistles to the Corinthians (*Corintherbriefe*, p. 246 seq.), in his comment on 1 Corinthians xv. 22: "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." After noticing the different interpretations given to the passage, he says: "After all, the simplest construction would be to take the second 'all' as equally universal with the first. In that case there would be contained in these words the doctrine of a universal restoration." He then proceeds to answer objections to this interpretation from declarations found elsewhere in the New Testament, and by Paul himself, which are thought to be of a contrary tenor; and concludes thus: "therefore, the *possibility* of such a construction of the passage as we have pointed out, must be maintained." But in a note written later (in 1834), he says: "Paul had in mind only the believers, and ignores those who are lost." That is, he returns to the restricted interpretation of the second "all." In connection with the passage previously quoted from the earlier work, is this note: "The doctrine of such a universal restitution would not stand in contradiction to the doctrine of eternal punishment, as the latter appears in the Gospels; for although those who are hardened in wickedness, left to the consequences of their conduct, their merited fate, have to

expect endless unhappiness, yet a hidden purpose of the divine compassion is not necessarily excluded, by virtue of which, through the wisdom of God revealing itself in the discipline of free agents, they will be led to a free appropriation of redemption" (Robinson's ed., p. 487).

This last thought appears to be involved in the rather obscure discussion by Nitzsch, one of the most eminent of the modern Lutheran theologians and ecclesiastics (*System d. christl. Lehre*, p. 416 seq.). "The Scripture teaches an eternal damnation of individual men, because it is *in hypothesis* necessary. The non-coercive, non-magical, non-mechanical nature of grace leaves room for final resistance to its influence; perseverance in the resistance of unbelief is possible: consequently there must be *de futuro*, and on this supposition, if there is to be a final judgment, eternal damnation." But whether this hypothesis will become thesis, or actuality, is another question. Nitzsch argues against the annihilation doctrine. The Saviour (in Matt. x. 28, Luke xii. 4, 5) does not oppose to the fear of being killed by men, the fear of being killed by God; he does not oppose to the fear of bodily death, the fear of death absolutely. Not to kill (*ἀποκτείνειν*), but "to destroy the soul" (*ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν*), "to cast into hell" (*ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν*), is what God is represented, in contrast with men, as able to do. It is supposable that eternal damnation is a mere hypothesis and universal restoration the fact; or that there is an absolute annihilation; or that the wicked soul is reduced to a ruin—bereft of every good as well as evil activity. In either case it is conceivable that the same apostle who had preached eternal damnation, yet in his *final* eschatology (*äusserste Eschatologie*), in 1 Cor. xv., passes above and beyond this antithesis.

Julius Müller discusses the question before us with his wonted ability, in his unpublished lectures, and in his treatise on *The Doctrine of Sin* (*Lehre v. d. Sünde*, ii., 598 seq.). In this work (vol. i., p. 334 seq.), Müller insists upon the dis-

inction between chastisement and penalty, the former being distinguished by having for its design the amendment of him on whom it is inflicted, and being thus the product of paternal mercy. The idea of punishment, on the contrary, is set forth in such passages as 2 Thess. i. 8, 9, ii. 12, Hebrews x. 29, 30; and most clearly in 1 Cor. xi. 32, where chastisement and penalty are brought into juxtaposition, and explicitly contrasted with one another. Punishment, moreover, is set forth as related to *guilt*, rather than to sin as a principle to be overcome. Müller maintains that no universal restoration can possibly take place prior to the judgment, since in that case there could be no separation and no judgment at all. Hence he concludes that restoration cannot be taught in 1 Cor. xv. 22, nor in Rom. v. 18, 19, since these passages would place it, if they referred to it at all, in this intermediate period. He confutes the argument for universal restoration which is founded on the aim, or proper tendency, of the Gospel and of the divine system of recovery; since the results are made contingent on the free act of the creature. Nor does he regard as conclusive the grounds which are drawn from Christian feeling, which revolts at an unsubdued antagonism to the divine will to be perpetuated forever. He admits the weight of this objection, but does not consider it decisive. The infliction of punishment, where the disobedient creature passively and involuntarily acknowledges the absolute supremacy and majesty of the divine law, secures from discordance the harmony of the divine order. Nor, again, can restoration be infallibly deduced from the divine love, since though justice is a branch of love, yet in love justice and holiness are essential elements. Love, from its very nature, must react against its opposite, and assume the form of holy indignation. Nor can inhumanity be charged on the Creator, if a being endowed with free-will, through his own sin brings on himself endless ruin. The *possibility* of endless punishment must then be conceded. Sin has a tendency to perpetuate itself;

character tends to permanence—evil character, as well as good. What the actual results will be can be learned only from revelation. Müller holds that the divine love will never abandon men until they have become hardened against its influences and efforts. His conclusion is that the text (Matt. xii. 31, 32): “All manner of sin and blasphemy”—that is, every sin, even blasphemy—“shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men . . . neither in this world, neither in the world to come”—is to be taken as a distinct declaration that all sins, except one, will be forgiven either before or after the consummation of the Redeemer’s kingdom; that is, in the present, or the future, æon.

The theory of an eventual extinction of the wicked has few adherents among the eminent German theologians. Rothe is its principal advocate; and in his system it is connected with his peculiar view of the relation of spirit to matter, and of the development and immortality of the soul as contingent on its own holy action.

Rothe’s elaborate discussion of the topic of Future Punishment is found in his posthumous *Dogmatik* (pp. 132–169, 291–336). The most of the Saviour’s utterances on this subject, he asserts, relate to what is to occur prior to the last judgment. At the first glance, Jesus appears to teach the endless punishment of all who enter *Gehenna*. This, however, is not the fact. The word *aionios* (*αἰώνιος*), which occurs in Matt. xxv. 41, 46, is used in the Scriptures in a more lax sense. It signifies, not an indefinitely long time, but the longest time which can belong to an object, in accordance with its nature. There are many examples of this restricted meaning: *e. g.*, Exod. xxi. 6, Deut. xv. 17. In Jude (ver. 6, cf. 2 Pet. ii. 4), a stronger term (*αἰδώς*), is applied to a terminable period. As to the opinion of the Jews, in the time of Christ, respecting the duration of future punishment, they were not agreed on this point; and if they had been, this does not authorize us to conclude that he followed the

popular view. Eternal life and eternal death are spoken of together; but if "eternal" denotes the longest time which the conception, or nature, of an object admits of, that fact presents no difficulty. Of the wicked it is only said, in Matt. xxv. 41, 46, that "during the continuance of their stay in *Gehenna*, their pain will not cease, without any determination of the question whether that stay will, or will not, be endless" (p. 138). If Matt. xxvi. 24, Mark xiv. 21 (cf. Luke xxii. 22) refer to Judas, these expressions are justified on the supposition that Judas was eventually to cease to exist. The statements of Jesus in Matt. v. 26, xii. 32 (cf. Mark iii. 29) oblige us to restrict the sense of *aionios*. The few passages in his teaching, which do not refer to the intermediate state—for to this Rothe applies all those cited above, even Matt. xxv. 41, 46—indicate that the unpardoned will gradually be deprived of sense and being: *e. g.*, Matt. x. 28, Luke xii. 5. This opinion was not, Rothe affirms, unknown to the Jews: it is expressed in the apocryphal 4th Book of Ezra. The terms by which the Apostles denote perdition (ὁ ὄλεθρος αἰώνιος, ἡ ἀπώλεια, ὁ θάνατος, ἡ φθορά) most naturally signify annihilation of soul, as well as of body; especially as Paul (Tit. i. 2, Rom. xvi. 25, Eph. iii. 9) uses *aionios* (αἰώνιος) in the looser sense of the term. Rev. xiv. 11, xx. 10, must be understood in the light of Rev. xx. 14 and xvii. 8. The idea of annihilation is involved in John vi. 39, 40, 44, 54, Matt. x. 28, 30, John iii. 15, 16, x. 28, Luke xvii. 39, ix. 24, 25, Matt. vii. 13, Phil. i. 28, iii. 19, Gal. vi. 8, 1 John iii. 15 (cf. Rev. xx. 4, 5), and 1 John v. 16, 17, Heb. x. 39, vi. 8, x. 27, 2 Pet. ii. 1, 3, ii. 12, 19, Jude 10, 12, 19; cf. 20, 21, etc. Rothe (p. 152) presents a concise statement of the objections which have been brought, on grounds of reason and Christian feeling, to the doctrine of endless punishment, and subjects them to criticism. On the supposition of a final impenitence in the condemned, eternal punishment is fully suited to their guilt. The possibility of final impenitence cannot be denied. The end of God, so far

as the individual is concerned, may be baffled by his own perversity ; though not the comprehensive end of God in creation. Reformation is not the sole—it is not the proper and immediate—design of punishment. This has its end in itself. Punishment need not and ought not to cease for the reason that the recovery of the transgressor is no longer to be hoped for. The pain of the lost may not consist in such reproaches of conscience as might involve an actual or possible repentance, but rather in the incessant experience of the absolute fruitlessness of their rebellion against God, of the hostile relation of the whole created universe to them on account of this rebellion, and of the rage and hatred against God and all his creation, which perpetually blaze up anew within their souls. But other objections to the doctrine of endless suffering Rothe considers valid. The necessary disturbance of the happiness of the redeemed, and the divine plan of the world, with which the endless continuance of sin is held to be incongruous, are among these objections. No conceivable reason can be given why the hopelessly wicked should be kept in being: the notion that their endless suffering is required as a warning is groundless. Final impenitence, on the supposition that the pains of hell are never to cease, would be psychologically inexplicable. Yet in this life, and in the interval prior to the judgment, all the means of grace will have been exhausted upon such as at that time remain impenitent. The only satisfactory solution of the problem is found in the supposition of a gradual wearing out and extinction of their being. This will be the lot of those who persist to the last day in their resistance to the Spirit—of those who are guilty of the unpardonable sin. Rothe lays great stress on the results to be expected from the grace of God, beyond the bounds of this life, in the intermediate state. Among the passages on which he founds this expectation, are included, of course, 1 Peter iii. 19, 20, iv. 6.

With the foregoing notice of the opinions of celebrated

German theologians, we may connect a brief description of the views of a distinguished Danish theologian of the evangelical type, Martensen, as they are expressed in his *Dogmatik* (pp. 534-544). "Shall the development of the world end in a dualism?" Is there an eternal damnation, or a final restoration of all moral beings? The church has never been willing to accept this last hypothesis, both on grounds of Scripture, and from the feeling that the Christian idea of redemption would lose something of its profound earnestness. On the contrary, however, the doctrine of restoration, which has appeared and reappeared at different times in the church, is not without support in the Scriptures, and has sprung up, not always from a lack of earnestness, but from a feeling of humanity, founded in the very nature of Christianity. Here then is an antinomy—a seeming contradiction.

This antinomy is found in the Scriptures. There are passages which, taken in their full weight—"nach ihrem ganzen Gewicht genommen"—most expressly assert eternal damnation. There is "the unquenchable fire," "the worm that never dieth," the "sin unto death," the sin that "shall not be forgiven." On the other hand, there are 1 Cor. xv. 26-28, Eph. i. 10, 1 Cor. xv. 22 (cf. Matt. xix. 26), from which, unless the force of these expressions is curtailed, the notion of a universal restoration cannot be eliminated. That God's Word cannot contradict itself and that this antinomy must admit of some solution, is conceded. But no solution is given. May it not be, asks the author, that the solution is wisely withheld from us as long as we are in this stage of our being?

But the same antinomy, Martensen proceeds to say, emerges in our own reasonings on the subject. From the point of view, which, to be sure, for Christian reflection, is the highest—that of the teleology of divine love, we are led to the doctrine of restoration. The end of God in creation, does not look, as the Pantheist assumes, at the kingdom in general, but at the well-being of each individual. The idea

that the end is reached in the manifestation of punitive justice, does not satisfy the mind ; if there is a will which eternally withstands God, there is a barrier which the divine love never overcomes. The power of love reaches its end, not when beings bow the knee by compulsion—which would only be a revelation of might—but when all bow the knee to Christ with willing consent. On the contrary, the anthropological, psychological, and ethical considerations, the facts of life, lead us to the doctrine of eternal condemnation. Man is free ; he is not compelled to repent ; salvation is not a process of nature ; the hardening of the heart is possible. The time must come when the possibility of conversion is gone ; when “it is too late.” In conversion, not only the abstract power is needful, but also the order of things, the environing circumstances, in which trial and probation have their place. For the condemned, there is no future ; there is only the retrospect of a lost opportunity, a wasted life. There is an inward demand in the soul of the lost for the realization of that which is abstractly possible, while all the conditions of that realization are wanting. This is “the worm that never dieth.” Shakespeare has helped us to imagine that desperate condition, in such a conception as that of Lady Macbeth, wandering about in her sleep, seeking in vain to wash the ineffaceable stain of blood from her hand. Here is no true, no fruitful contrition ; no change of will.

The theological idea leads us to restoration. Hence this doctrine was found mostly in the Greek Church ; the anthropological idea tends to the opposite doctrine, which accordingly was defended by Augustine, and has had fewer to dissend from it in the Western Church.

The theory of annihilation does not solve the antinomy. This theory is not supported by the Scriptures : it leaves the fatherly love of God baffled in its aim and end. The idea that those guilty of the unpardonable sin serve out their time of punishment, and are then delivered, besides the exegetical difficulties which lie against it, gives no rational expla-

nation of the way in which conversion, in such cases, is to be secured. For it is not only a right knowledge of sin that is required, but the beginning of a new life.

The antinomy must, therefore, be left standing. There is a will of God, and in this sense, a design that all should be saved : there is a possibility that such will be the actual fact, but the opposite is also possible (p. 543).

In the annals of English theology, a noted representative of the annihilation doctrine is John Locke. In his *Reasonableness of Christianity*, he shows himself a literalist in his interpretation of the word "death." He understands that Adam was threatened with the literal destruction of soul and body ; that he and his race are saved from this penalty by the work of Christ, and put upon a new probation, under "the law of faith ;" that those who fail to fulfill the conditions on which "life" is offered in the Gospel will undergo the penalty of annihilation, and will forever cease to be.

Of the modern English advocates of the doctrine of the extinction of souls, the most prominent is Archbishop Whately. In his work on *The Future State* (Lect. viii.) he sets forth his opinions. The words translated "destruction," and the word "death," as these terms are applied in the Scriptures to the lot of the finally impenitent, he takes in the most literal meaning. He also maintains the opinion, which was occasionally broached in the middle ages, but was counted heretical, that the souls of men are in an unconscious state during the interval between death and the general resurrection.

In recent times the doctrine of universal restoration has been espoused by a number of theologians, of conspicuous ability, in England. John Foster is one of the most noted of these. His position is, that the endless punishment of men for the sins of this life would be inconsistent with the equity of the divine administration. He assumes that their nature, at the start, is so "fatally corrupt," and their circumstances so unfavorable, that there is no hope for them, save

in an operation of grace *ab extra*, which is arbitrary and discriminative on the part of the sovereign Agent, and independent of the will of man. To the objection that punishment is endless, because there is an endless continuance in sinning, he answers that it is the doom of the condemned which "necessitates a continuance of the criminality," for this is a doom to sin as well as to suffer. "Virtually therefore, the eternal punishment is the punishment of the sins of time." As to the teaching of Scripture, Foster remarks, that the terms "everlasting," "eternal," "forever," original or translated, are often employed in the Bible, as well as other writings, under great and various limitations of import. But "how *could* the doctrine have been more plainly and positively asserted, than it is in the Scripture language?" To this Foster answers, that *we* are able to express it so as to leave no *possibility* of a misunderstanding of our language; and this was equally possible to the biblical writers. The terms they use are designed to magnify, to aggravate, rather than to define the evil threatened. The great difference of *degrees* of future punishment, so plainly stated in the Scriptures, is said to be an argument of some weight against its perpetuity. If a limited *measure* of punishment is consistent with equity, then a limited duration may be; the argument from the alleged *infinite* evil of sin, in one case as much as the other, is set aside.*

Another English theologian, whose writings on this subject have excited much attention, is the late Rev. F. D. Maurice. His opinions are presented in his *Commentary on John's Gospel*, his *Theological Essays*—the last essay in the volume—and in his *Letter to Dr. Jelf*. In this last publication, Mr. Maurice denies that he is a Universalist. Whether suffering will be without end in the future life, is a point on which he professes himself unable to affirm or deny. His position is that of nescience. Nothing, as he thinks, is re-

* *Life and Correspondence of John Foster*, ii., 232 seq.

vealed with regard to the duration of punishment. The word *aionios* (*αἰώνιος*) signifies eternal, and is thought by him to have no reference to time. It is applied in the New Testament to God and to things extra-temporal. It denotes not duration, but a state or quality. "Eternal" death (or punishment) is the opposite of "eternal life," as this is defined by the Apostle John. It is the condition of a soul bereft of the fellowship of God; but on the question how long this state will continue, the word "eternal" sheds no light. "Life eternal" is the knowledge of God, and the quality termed "eternal" is, in its entirety, in that life now, in the case of every one who is possessed of it.

With respect to the English Episcopal Church, since the publication of the *Essays and Reviews*, the civil courts have decided that the Articles do not inculcate the doctrine of endless punishment. In the revision of the Articles under Elizabeth, when the forty-two were reduced to thirty-nine, the forty-second Article, in which eternal punishment had been directly asserted, was among those left out. This was not because the revisers of the Articles disbelieved the doctrine—a doctrine which would seem to be implied in Art. XVII. (Of Predestination and Election)—but it was omitted for other reasons. Inasmuch, however, as this tenet had once been inserted in the Creed, and had been afterwards deliberately omitted, the judicial decision was that clergymen who subscribe to the Articles are not bound to believe and teach it. How extensively it has been abandoned in the Anglican Church, at the present day, it is impossible to judge. A fervid discourse in opposition to it by Canon Farrar has lately been put in print. He describes himself as having no clear and decisive opinion on the question of the duration of future punishment. He cannot accept the Romish doctrine of purgatory, or the "spreading belief in conditional immortality," or the certain belief that all will finally be saved. Yet the final sentences of the sermon appear to be an expression of this last-mentioned belief. Dr.

Farrar holds that *aionios* (*αἰώνιος*) means "age-long," not "everlasting," and in this sense is used in the Bible; that it means, secondly, something extra-temporal; but that it does not contain "the fiction of an endless time." He holds that "Gehenna," as used by Christ, indicates, not final and hopeless, but purifying and corrective punishment, an "intermediate, a metaphorical, and a terminable retribution."

Among the Non-conformists in England, in the evangelical bodies, there are many ministers who no longer believe in the doctrine of endless punishment. A competent witness, Rev. Dr. Allon, in a biographical sketch of Rev. T. Binney, prefixed to a volume of his *Sermons* (London, 1875), says of him, that "he refused the hard and terrible conclusions of Calvinistic predestination." Dr. Allon adds:

"He was one of the earliest of his generation to maintain the broad universal purpose of the divine Father's love, and of the salvation which is proffered through Christ. And, it may be added here, for the same reasons he rejected the dogma of eternal punishment; which seems passing through the same stages of instinctive shrinking from it, traditional affirmation, subtle disintegration, and religious abandonment. While Mr. Binney shrank from propounding any alternative theory of the destiny of the wicked, he distinctly refused to believe in eternal torments. He felt that conclusions from which, not in their sinful and alienated but in their best and holiest feelings, good men instinctively recoiled could not be possible to the holy and loving God. He felt too that it was not possible, as with some mysteries which are simply things unknown, to bow in silence before these conclusions. They involve a necessary appeal to moral judgment and feeling, and if in this appeal, repugnance, and not sympathetic conviction is produced, there must be reason to doubt their correctness.

"His own conclusion, avowed in many conversations on the subject, was, 'It cannot be, that which our best feelings shrink from cannot be possible to God. In some way or other, he will solve the dark problem of evil in harmony with his righteousness and love.' And here he was contented to rest. Mr. Binney propounded no counter theory of universalism, or of repentance beyond the grave; to both he saw, both in the statements of Scripture and in the moral philosophy of things, insuperable objections. He thought that the exégesis of Scriptural representations needed a thorough re-examination; and that a reasonable and rever-

ent interpretation of the strong language of Scripture was possible which would not necessitate the dogma of eternal suffering."

A few ministers of distinction among the English Congregationalists, but only a few, favor the annihilation doctrine.

In the letters of Thomas Erskine, of Linlathen, the author of the noted work on the *Internal Evidence of Revelation*, the doctrine of universal restoration is professed and supported. The main foundation of this belief is made to be the fatherly character of God as revealed in the Bible. A father can never cease from the endeavor to make his child righteous. The Father of the spirits of all flesh will not throw off his care for the souls of his children when they leave this world; the supposition that he will, grows out of false conceptions of his justice and righteousness, which are not separable from his love. No human being, it is held by Mr. Erskine, can be beyond the reach of God's grace and the sanctifying power of his spirit.* The love of God will attain to its end and aim. This he supposes to be definitely taught by the apostle Paul in the 5th and 11th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans.† By these full and explicit declarations of the apostle, the language in Matt. xxv. must be interpreted. "Eternity has nothing to do with duration." "I think eternal means essential in opposition to phenomenal. So eternal life is God's own life; it is essential life; and eternal punishment is the misery belonging to the nature of sin, and not coming from outward causes."‡ "I do not believe that *αἰώνιος*, the Greek word rendered 'eternal' and 'everlasting' by our translators, really has that meaning. I believe that it refers to man's essential or spiritual state, and not to time, either finite or infinite. Eternal life is living in the love of God; eternal death is living in self; so that a man may be in eternal life or in eternal death for ten minutes, as he changes from one state to another."§

* Vol. ii., p. 243.

† P. 239. ‡ P. 135.

§ P. 240.

One of the earliest American works in defence of the theory of restoration was *The Salvation of all Men Examined*, by Dr. Charles Chauncey, which was printed in London in 1784. Dr. Chauncey advocates this theory, but he maintains that, if it be rejected, the alternative doctrine which next to this is best supported, is that of annihilation. The "unpardonable sin" is a sin of which the full penalty is exacted; but this penalty is not everlasting. The reply to Chauncey by Dr. Jonathan Edwards is marked by extraordinary logical acumen, and by no small degree of acuteness in the exegetical part of the discussion. One prominent topic in his book is the true nature or end of punishment in the divine government. Edwards argues that the penalty of sin in the future life is not disciplinary, but vindicative in its intent. If it be of the nature of chastisement, why is it called a "curse?" Dr. Chauncey had asserted that future punishment is graduated according to the varying deserts of offenders. Dr. Edwards charges his opponent with a confusion of ideas. If all the condemned are punished according to the degree of their guilt, what distinction is there between him who suffers for the unpardonable sin, and transgressors generally?

Since the rise of the Universalist denomination in this country, numerous works have appeared on the subject before us; but it is impossible, in this place, to refer to them individually.

We subjoin to the foregoing sketch one or two suggestions, which may afford material for reflection to those who are interested in tracing a theological system to its roots, and in observing the transformations which it may undergo in the lapse of time.

Strict Calvinism was a symmetrical and coherent system. It was constructed from the teleological point of view. The starting-point was God and his eternal purpose. The end was made to be the manifestation of his love and his justice, conceived of as co-ordinate. The salvation of some, and the

condemnation of others, are the means to this end. The motive of redemption is love to the elect, for whom all the arrangements of Providence and grace are ordered. The cap-stone was placed upon the system by the supralapsarians, who followed Calvin's strong language in the *Institutes* (but not elsewhere, especially not in his *Commentaries*), and made the fall and sin of mankind, like creation itself, the object of an efficient decree—means to the one supreme end; for if mercy and righteousness are to be exerted in the salvation and condemnation of sinners, a world of sinners must first exist.

There was rebellion against this system. Not to speak of the different theology of the Lutherans—in the French Calvinistic school of Saumur, wherever Arminianism prevailed, in the modified Calvinism of the New England churches, it was asserted that in “the intention of love,” Christ died for all, that God's love extends over all, in the sense that he desires them to be saved, yearns toward them, and offers them help.

This mode of thought has more affinity to the Greek anthropology than has rigid Calvinism, or its Augustinian prototype. The teleological point of view is less prominent; it stands in the background. The universal love and pity of God, the broad design of the atonement, are the central points.

The more rigid Calvinism often protested against this modification of the system: it considered the whole theodicy imperiled by it: it saw in it a drift and tendency towards other innovations subversive of the system.

For if this is universal, yearning love is at the basis of redemption, will it not be suggested that this love will not fail of its end? Will the heart of God be disappointed of its object? Will the Almighty be baffled by the creaturely will? If Christ died for all, will he be “satisfied” with anything short of the recovery of all?

As a matter of historical fact, belief in restoration and

kindred doctrines are seen to spring up, in different quarters, in the wake of the mitigated form of theology to which we have referred.

Not that such beliefs are logically required. All *a priori* reasoning must be subject to the correction of experience. There is a terrible reign of sin, though all sin is contrary to the will of God; there is a development of sinful character, a hardening of the heart, a persistent resistance—"how often would I . . . but ye would not;" "woe unto thee, Chorazin, woe unto thee, Bethsaida;" there is a stern, tragic side to nature and to human life. We stand within a sphere where results are not worked out by dint of power, but where freedom, under moral law, with all the peril, as well as possibility of good, which freedom involves, is an essential attribute of our being. No speculations on the problem of the theodicy can have the certainty that belongs to the law which is verified by conscience and experience: "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

RATIONALISM.*

AT the threshold of all enlightened investigation of religious truth stands the question, What are the sources of knowledge on the subject? On this first and fundamental question, opinion is divided. We may leave out of the account, for the present, the Eastern Church, which has now for a thousand years exhibited few signs of intellectual life, and these mostly in the shape of occasional outbreaks of polemical fervor against its great rival in the West. Proud of its illustrious teachers of the patristic age—Chrysostom, the Gregories, Basil, Athanasius—and of those ancient councils which are alone regarded as œcumenical, the Greek Church haughtily denies the claim of the Roman bishop to more than a titular and honorary precedence, yet agrees with the Latins in recognizing tradition and church authority. Turning to Western Christendom, we find three parties in reference to the question already stated—the Roman Catholic, the evangelical Protestant, and the Rationalist.

The Roman Catholic and the Protestant have common ground. They both acknowledge a supernatural, divine revelation. They both admit an authoritative teaching, objective, or outside of the individual. They both profess that all this teaching, all of Christian truth that has been revealed from heaven, is to be traced back to Christ and his apostles. It is only since the Reformation, to be sure, that the Roman Catholic Church has thus limited its doctrine of tradition. In the middle ages, tenets were in some instances

* A Lecture in Boston in 1870, forming part of a Course of Lectures by different persons, on "Christianity and Skepticism."

attributed to a post-apostolic revelation. This is done, for example, by Gerson, in the case of the Virgin's Immaculate Conception and the Assumption; and by Occam in respect to the dogma of Transubstantiation. But the prevailing and established theory now is, that the tradition which is the supplement of Scripture includes only apostolic teaching orally transmitted. The church defines the faith; discerns more and more of its meaning, and promulgates what it discerns, but adds nothing to the original deposit. But the Roman Catholic interposes, between the individual and Christ, the church; that is, the visible body organized under the hierarchy of which the Roman bishop is the head. This is the radical, defining characteristic of their system. In keeping with it, the church is held to be at once the infallible custodian and infallible interpreter of both Scripture and tradition—the written and the oral teachings of Christ and the apostles. This last position, together with the theory of the church that underlies it, the evangelical Protestant rejects. He may allow that the oral teaching of the apostles, if we could get at it, would be as authoritative as their writings; but he denies that any safe and sure channel has been provided for its transmission. And, even as to Scripture, he denies that the church in any age is an unerring expounder. Hence all that part of the Roman Catholic creed which he cannot find confirmed in the Scriptures he discards. Tenets, which, if they claim any support from the Bible, rest on alleged obscure intimations of Scripture, are not admitted to be a part of the Christian faith. There is truth in the well-known aphorism, "The Bible, the Bible, is the religion of Protestants!" It is perfectly consistent with this position to hold that the logical implications of the primitive teaching are more and more unfolded to view in the progress of society; that the ethics of the Gospel are developed in new directions and applications; that Christian life is a commentary on Christian truth. We may allow some grains of truth in the mystical and ideal conception

of the church's authority which Möhler and other liberal Catholics have undertaken to propound ; but, when all reasonable concessions have been made, there remains a radical antagonism.

The distinguishing note of rationalism is the rejection of authoritative teaching, the disbelief in supernatural revelation. Whatever special view he may take of the Bible—whether he adopt the low estimate of Thomas Paine, who said that he could write a better book himself ; or the higher estimate of those who pronounce it a lofty product of human genius—the Rationalist denies that the Bible is in any proper sense the rule of faith. The prophets and apostles teach with no authority that does not belong to them in common with all poets and philosophers and preachers. There is nothing properly miraculous either in the origin of their doctrine, or in the evidences that support it. This is the common ground of rationalism in all of its various types. The Atheist, the Pantheist, and the Deist unite in this negation of the supernatural as connected with the origin of Christianity and the Christian system of doctrine.

I am aware, that, in so general a classification, there must be embraced under the term rationalism dissimilar phases of character and opinion. There are Rationalists in fact, but not in spirit. If there is positive and downright infidelity at one extreme, there is an approach to faith at the other. There are men—a numerous class in these days—who can believe only as they can assimilate religious truth ; who seek for it, therefore, with an earnest heart, though under a cloud of doubt. Could they discern the harmony of Christian truth with their intellectual and moral nature, could they set this truth in a close and vital relation to the soul, they would be satisfied. This immediate, living perception is what they most crave. For such, as we may hope to indicate, there is a way out of their present position. Were the principle of division some other than the one we have chosen—which is the position taken with reference to

the sources of knowledge—they might fall into a different category; but, as long as their criterion for judging and ascertaining what is true in religion remains a purely subjective one, they adopt the distinctive rationalistic principle.

Modern scepticism and unbelief, or the whole movement which in its different phases and stages is termed rationalism, is often charged by Roman Catholic theologians upon Protestantism. It is unjustly declared to be the legitimate fruit of the Reformation. The ancient foes of Christianity in the field of thought—Celsus, Lucian, Porphyry, and the rest—were heathen writers, standing outside of the church. In the mediæval age, scepticism came mostly from the Arabic schools in Spain, and was prevented from gaining a foothold through the efforts of Aquinas and other great teachers of the thirteenth century. But before the Reformation, through the disgust that arose against the scholastic theology, and through the influence of classical and literary studies connected with the revival of learning, widespread tendencies to scepticism had become rife in the southern nations of Europe. Neander, in an essay read before the Berlin Academy, quotes a remarkable sentence from a letter of Melancthon, in which the keen-sighted reformer says that far more serious disturbances (*longe graviores tumultus*) would have ensued had not Luther arisen to turn the studies of men in a new direction. The Reformation was a powerful religious movement, which was strong enough to stifle the germs of scepticism far and wide, and which made itself felt with most wholesome results within the Catholic Church itself. The rise of men like Fénelon and the Jansenists must be ascribed to the indirect agency of the Protestant Revolution; but the humanistic spirit, with the sceptical turn that accompanied it among the Latin nations, continued in France. In the seventeenth century, if Luther's Bible was the popular book in Germany, Plutarch's Lives had a like place in France; and the spirit to

which I have referred found expression in the genial scepticism of Montaigne. Without doubt, the decline of religion in the Protestant churches, the incessant controversies among them, and especially the partial sacrifice of the Protestant spirit of liberty in a partisan zeal for creeds, must bear a portion of the responsibility for the infidel reaction that followed. The Protestant scholasticism of the seventeenth century had an effect like that of the Catholic scholasticism of the fourteenth. But the deism of the last century found the most welcome reception in France. Voltaire was not bred a Protestant. Owing to causes, among which the degeneracy of Protestantism as compared with the spirit of piety and freedom that belonged to it at the outset was one, deism obtained a foothold in Germany and England, as well as in the Catholic countries. As Neander truly remarks, the spirit that characterized deism, if logical, and consistent with itself, must lead to the rejection of the supernatural altogether. Pantheism, which identifies God with Nature, is, therefore, the natural successor of deism; although the forms which pantheism took were due to the course of philosophical speculation of which they were the immediate product. At the present time, scepticism and unbelief are far from being confined to Protestant lands. Renan is the name most frequently coupled with that of Strauss. Wherever there is intellectual activity in Catholic countries, scepticism, either hidden or avowed, is prevalent. We have seen lately in Spain how the hatred of the ecclesiastical system of the Roman Catholic Church takes the form of a rejection, and even denunciation, of all revealed religion.

Evangelical Protestantism puts no tyrannical yoke upon reason. It does not concede that any contrariety exists between the Christian faith and reason. When Augustine affirmed that faith precedes knowledge, he meant that Christianity is a practical system, adapted to practical ne-

cessities of the soul, and must, therefore, be applied or experienced before it can be comprehended. It is a case where insight follows upon life; where one must *taste* and see: but that good reasons can be given for the act of Christian consecration in the soul, and good evidence in behalf of the truth that is then received, he, and the schoolmen who followed him in this religious philosophy, fully believed. It was the maxim of Socrates and Plato even, that men must be improved before they can be instructed. Pascal was not a sceptic in his philosophy, as some of his critics have charged: he maintained that faith is reasonable, though not reached by a chain of reasoning; and this because it is an act of the soul, conformed to higher intuitions. Hume, Gibbon, and other free-thinkers of the last century, caricatured the position of Christian theology, when they ironically, with "the grave and temperate irony," which Gibbon says that he learned from *The Provincial Letters*, spoke of the truths of religion as received by faith alone, in the absence of, or in the face of, unanswerable arguments. What, then, in the view of the evangelical Protestant, is the place of reason? First, he allows and claims for the human soul a native recognition, however obscure it may have become through sin, of the verities of natural religion—God, freedom, accountableness, immortality. Secondly, he concedes the necessity of establishing the supernatural origin of the gospel, and of the mission of Christ, by competent evidence. Christ and the apostles, in preaching to Jews, naturally took for granted that groundwork of religious beliefs which was accepted by their hearers. They had only to evince that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah. Yet it is remarkable how frequently in the discourses of Christ—how habitually, it might be said—an appeal is made directly to the moral and spiritual nature. How constant is the recognition of those primary convictions which are inwrought into the soul by its Maker! He rebukes men who can predict the weather from signs in the sky for

not interpreting aright the signs of the times, and for not deducing from phenomena that fell under their own observation the proper inference; and he adds to this censure the memorable words, "Yea, and why, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?" In preaching to the heathen, the apostles argued the case. They set forth the truths of natural religion, which the heathen in part acknowledged; and then they proceeded to establish by testimony the facts of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. It was, throughout, an appeal to the intelligence of their auditors. So it has been since among all considerate defenders of the Christian faith, as the copious library of *Apologies* will bear witness. Thirdly, it is requisite to investigate the question of the authorship of the books which enter into the canon, wherever honest doubts arise on the subject. The *authority* of the church on this point a consistent Protestant cannot admit. The church, as an historical witness, is entitled to speak. The reception, by the early church, of books as apostolic, is certainly a strong, and in many cases a conclusive, argument in favor of so regarding them; but the church, like other witnesses, must submit to be cross-examined. We discard from the Old Testament canon the so-called apocryphal books, because we know from ancient testimony that they formed no part of the Scriptures that were used by Christ and the apostles—no part of the Hebrew canon; and we charge the Church of Rome with being uncritical in incorporating them into the Bible, and pronouncing them, as it does in the Creed of Trent, a part of Holy Scripture. Jerome taught the reformers, on this matter, what Augustine with his defective scholarship did not know. But the Protestant is equally bound not to shrink from the investigation of the New Testament canon whenever he is fairly challenged to this work. Thus in the fourth century, as Eusebius tells us, there were several books in regard to which the church was divided in opinion; some regarding them as apostolic, and others taking

the opposite view. At this time, zeal for uniformity was stronger than zeal for independent study; and the doubtful questions were disposed of without much inquiry. At an earlier day, the state of things was different; for there did not exist in the second century that indifference to the genuineness of books, and ready credulity, which Strauss and many other infidel writers falsely attribute to the early church. But the church of the fourth and fifth centuries, on these particular questions to which I have referred, was rather uncritical. Not that the doubt which Eusebius reports is at all conclusive against the books in question; but it is one sufficient reason, if there were no other, why there should be candid and fearless investigation: and so Luther and the first reformers held. For the settlement of the canon the enlightened Protestant will demand historical testimony, in the shape both of internal evidence and external authentication, of such a nature as to convince the unbiassed judgment. Fourthly, he admits that no amount of evidence can justify belief in propositions that are either self-contradictory, or in conflict with known truth. He admits, that, if such doctrines were to be found in the Bible, it would so far detract from the authority of the book, and might disprove the supernatural origin of the Christian system. But, just here, the evangelical Protestant interposes a protest against the rash, superficial, and sometimes flip-pant assertion, that doctrines are irrational because they are in some respects mysterious, or because they clash with somebody's scheme of philosophy. There has been an infinite amount of confident but shallow denial of Christian doctrine on grounds which a change in the reigning philosophy renders obsolete. Rationalism may often be left to confute itself. For example, the old Kantian Rationalism, which, in common with the Anglo-French Deism that went before, cast out the doctrines, which, like the Trinity, it could not square with its own preconceived ideas, was, for this very reason, treated by Hegel and his associates of the

speculative school with great contempt. The professors who had supposed themselves to have reduced Christianity to a rational system, by eliminating mysteries and trying everything by the touchstone of common-sense, found themselves charged by the more advanced school with a deplorable want of philosophical grasp. Theories of religion and philosophy which are *easy*, which present no hard problems, no unanswered questions, no vistas that the eye cannot explore, find ready credence for a while; but they are short-lived, because flat and insufficient. A "Christianity not mysterious" can take but a feeble hold of the convictions of men. Fifthly, the evangelical Protestant is free in the interpretation of the Bible. He is bound to no view of a passage simply because it is traditional. Whatever light antiquarian and philological study may throw on the pages of the Bible, he is thankfully to accept. The text, the translation, the exegesis, are fixed by no authority which supersedes the exercise of private judgment. Protestantism, on the one hand, vindicates the importance of learning as an aid in the interpretation of the Scriptures; and, on the other hand, asserts for the humblest individual, provided he be endued with an honest heart, the power of arriving at the general sense of the Bible, and of attaining the knowledge that is requisite for the guidance of life and the attainment of salvation.

The true relation of philosophy to faith, of reason to revelation, it is not difficult to define. Philosophy was styled by Anselm the *ancilla*, or handmaid of religion. The office of philosophy was conceived by the schoolmen to be that of elucidating and establishing the contents of faith. The truth which faith lays hold of, reason demonstrates. This did not, of necessity, imply a degradation of philosophy; since the schoolmen, one and all, held that faith has an independent root of its own in our moral and spiritual nature, and is, in the highest sense, reasonable. But the

limited scope allowed to philosophical investigation, without doubt, hampered its development. With Descartes the new era began. It was recognized that philosophy may and must start with the data of consciousness, and erect its own structure with entire independence; taking nothing for granted, and borrowing nothing from other branches of knowledge. And here we come to the precise distinction between philosophy and Christian theology, and, by consequence, to the real relations of reason and faith. Christianity is an historical religion. Unlike the philosopher, the theologian proceeds on the basis of historical facts. These facts—the life, miracles, death, resurrection, of Christ—constitute the starting-point of theology. We know that a sound philosophy must harmonize with them, or find room for them, because we know that they are well attested, and truth is not in conflict with itself. When, therefore, a new scheme of philosophy is broached which is incompatible with the Christian faith, we conclude that it must be to that extent false. Yet an inquisitive Christian mind will not be satisfied until it has detected the particular fallacies and errors which enter into such a system: in other words, it will not be satisfied fully until a theoretical has been added to the practical refutation of it. For example, the German philosophers after Kant, inspired largely by Spinoza, brought forward pantheistic systems claiming to solve all problems, and explain the universe. These systems involve the denial of a supernatural revelation, because they deny the supernatural altogether; and, of course, they rule out the facts of Christianity. This was clearly seen when Strauss applied the Hegelian principles to the discussion of the gospel history, and when Baur did the same with reference to the origin of Christianity and of the New Testament writings. It is plain, that when the facts, the reality of which is thus impugned, are established, the philosophy at variance with them is overthrown; yet the confutation is not radical and complete until the philosopher is met on his

own ground, and convicted of unfounded assumptions or reasonings. Then his edifice is subverted from the foundation. The generality of Christians are not called upon to undertake such a work : it belongs to thinking and educated men. There is many a spectre in regard to which the unlearned Christian has a right to say, when it crosses his path, "Thou art a scholar, Horatio : speak to it !"

If rationalism is taken in the broad sense, in which it is equivalent to disbelief in revelation, it is found in three forms—atheism, pantheism, and deism ; atheism being, for the most part, an explicit or disguised materialism. The critical attacks on the Scriptures, dating from Semler, would form properly a distinct chapter in the history of rationalism ; yet, as they have sprung from a philosophical principle or bias, they might be placed under the head of deism or pantheism. The rationalistic critics of the school of Kant belong under the former head ; those of the school of Hegel, under the latter. It is not my purpose to treat the subject historically, but to characterize briefly types of rationalism which now present themselves to observation.

First, there are those systems which utterly deny or ignore the religious nature of man. The most prominent of them is the so-called positive philosophy, in the form in which it was propounded by its founder. Mr. J. S. Mill maintains that either theism or atheism may be held in consistency with positivist principles. This position, M. Littré, the leading disciple of Comte, earnestly combats. Comte was himself an atheist. This is the proper inference from the doctrines of his system. Religion is declared to be an excrescence upon human nature ; or, rather, it is one of those fancies or delusions which belong to the childhood of the race, and vanish with the development of intelligence. Comte makes the incredible mistake of looking for the prime origin of religion in an effort of the understanding to explain the phenomena of Nature. Religion he makes the

result of the personifying instinct, which at the outset endues all things with personal life. The errors involved in his famous generalization, according to which mankind pass through the successive stages of religion, metaphysics, and positivism, have been frequently exposed. We are concerned at this moment with the stupendous mistake which he commits of ignoring the relation which religion has to conscience and the deepest feelings of the soul. One would think that a simple survey of the operation of religion in the world, the mighty power it has exercised in human society, the wide space it fills in human history, would be sufficient to convince a man that it arises from native, profound, ineradicable sentiments and tendencies of the soul. Even the *evil* that religion, when unenlightened, has caused in the world—the strife and bloodshed and misery—might teach one that the principle or sentiment from the abuse of which all these baleful effects grow is an indestructible element of human nature; otherwise the poet would not have had occasion to write the familiar words—

“*Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*”

Religion is rather to be compared, in the source and extent of its influence, with the social tendency. Some who have called themselves philosophers have said that *society* is artificial; the natural condition of man being that of seclusion and solitude, and social existence being a device to avoid certain inconveniences, and secure certain comforts. This theory, if it ever found serious acceptance, was long ago given up. It is acknowledged that the individual by himself is not complete; that we are naturally, as well as by grace, members one of another. Solitude is, therefore, one of the shortest roads to the mad-house. The marvellous gift of language, the instrument of social intercourse, is the testimony of nature that we exist for this end; for it is hardly probable that this wonderful power was given us

that we might indulge in soliloquies. Place a human being in utter solitude ; suppose him to be ignorant that other beings like himself exist : the sense of loneliness, the vague but intense craving for social converse, the deep yearning of his soul, testify that he is out of his element, that he has lost a part of his being. There is a *nisus*, an unfulfilled exertion, a searching, unresting desire. So it is in respect to religion. The state of a man without religion, without God, is similar. Our belief in God does not appear at first in the form of a deduction, in the form of a proposition, but in the form of trust, reverence, fear, gratitude, supplication—in the form of dependence and obligation ; in the same way that the social instinct makes itself manifest in the child reaching out and groping for another. Psychology is too often defective in failing to state, or even to consider, the propensities of the spiritual nature, on which, after all, human experience and history so much depend. The evidences or arguments for the being of God call out and meet an inward testimony of the soul, of the character which I have indicated. There is an inward *nisus*, as in the eye when in quest of light. There is a gravitating of the soul towards the being who reveals himself in the consciousness and in the law that is written on the heart. Men like Pascal have been called sceptics, only because they found belief, not on external proofs, but on the intuitions of the spirit.

It cannot be denied that those systems which are allied in spirit to positivism—whether their advocates call Comte their master, or, abjuring him, claim to be followers of Hume, or to follow nobody—have strong affinities, not to say a logical relationship, with materialism and atheism. Mr. Herbert Spencer holds to the relativity of knowledge—the sceptical doctrine which comes down from the sophists, that nothing is known as it is in itself ; that is, that nothing is truly known—and from this assumption he deduces the corollary that God is utterly unknown. What he or it is, it is impossible to say. But religion is the commu-

nion of man with a personal being ; and, if God cannot be affirmed to be a person, religion is no more. Mr. Huxley, giving to albumen, the old term for the material substance that enters into living beings, the name of "protoplasm," avows his belief that what we call the soul is the product of a certain disposition of material molecules. But then "matter" itself is said to be only a name for states of consciousness ; and the same is true of "spirit." Matter and spirit are identified in a sort of monism that denies both, or asserts both to be phenomenal. By this unexpected turn, he saves himself from the open assertion of what Sir William Hamilton likes to call the "dirt philosophy"—the philosophy, namely, which teaches that the rational soul is made of dirt, or that both are of one substance. Mr. Huxley professes to build on Hume. He speaks of metaphysics in a tone of supercilious contempt ; yet, like the rest of the extreme empirical school, he is unable to find a basis for induction, or any real validity for the generalizations of his own science. He raises the question, How can we predict the future ? how can we know from our past experience that the next stone we throw into the air will descend to the earth ? Casting away all metaphysical theories, he proceeds to assign two reasons : First, all the stones that have been thrown up have fallen. But the question is, How can we infer from this fact that the same thing will happen ? On what ground can we infer the future from the past ? Plainly, he does not advance an inch in solving the question. His second ground is equally remarkable : we have no reason to the contrary, but every reason to expect that it will fall ; that is to say, we believe that the stone will fall for the reason that there is every reason to expect it will ! In this peculiar style does our great foe of metaphysics handle a philosophical question. And yet, in his own department of investigation, he is an able observer and a learned man. Mr. Mill is not so unwary ; still, in his opposition to an *à priori* and spiritual philosophy, and in his

zeal for the empirical tendency, he barely saves himself from pronouncing the human mind merely a series of sensations; he offers no explanation of the way in which he can know that any other being exists but himself, and can find no theory of induction which does not involve a plain paralogism.

In the field of history, the empirical school has found a representative in Buckle—a writer who has dipped into a multitude of books, but brings to his ambitious enterprise no thoroughness of learning in any single department; who starts with the principle, that every new fact is the necessary product of antecedent facts, and that both Providence and free-will are a delusion, and count for nothing. The machinery of physical laws, either material or intellectual, takes the place of personal agency. History is a drama where the actors are automaton, and through which runs no divine purpose. All that gives interest and pathos to the story of human affairs vanishes at the touch of this pretentious but contracted philosophy. It is pleasant to hear the masters of historical study on the Continent, as De Tocqueville in France and Droysen in Germany, utter their warm protest against the narrow theory of Buckle, to say nothing of the inaccuracies of his narrative. On both these points, the ultimate verdict of all considerate scholars will be the same.

Secondly, there are those—many of whom are not to be reckoned under the class last named—who deny the miracles of Christianity. This unbelief must be traced ultimately to a want of faith in a supernatural order. It springs from a lurking scepticism respecting the primal truths of religion, which may yet be received through the force of a traditional impression. But the disbelief in miracles belongs to many who have not abandoned the belief in a personal God, and have no thought of questioning the truth that man has a rational soul. There is a deistic as well as a pantheistic infidelity. The Epicurean view of the universe, in which the Deity, though admitted to exist, is kept aloof from the

world, and not allowed to concern himself in human affairs, much less to interpose supernaturally, is not wholly banished from the world. The real alternative is atheism or pantheism on the one hand, and Christianity on the other; but this is not at once perceived.

That the apostles testified to the miracles recorded in the New Testament, that they could not be deceived, and were not liars, is a position which all the modern assaults of sceptical criticism have left unshaken. The impregnable character of this position is every day becoming more manifest. It was admitted by Strauss, Baur, and their associates, that the apostles testified to the resurrection of Jesus; but Strauss would fain establish the point, that they did not thus testify to the other miracles described in the Gospels. The early date of the synoptical Gospels absolutely precludes the supposition of Strauss. If the resurrection is counted a myth, no possible explanation of the origin of it can be given, unless, at the same time, it is supposed that the disciples had witnessed such miracles before as would account for their expecting it as a possible and probable event. But, if the prior miracles are credited, there is no longer a motive for seeking to resolve the resurrection into a delusive vision or dream of fancy. Moreover, it is evident that the miracles are so intertwined in the life of Jesus with his words and actions, that no consistent conception of that life, as it went on from day to day, can be formed in case the miracles are excluded. Deny the miracles, and you cannot explain the disciples' belief that Jesus was the Messiah; you cannot explain his own undoubted words in consistency with the hypothesis that he was honest; and you cannot explain the narratives which embody the testimony of eye-witnesses. It is remarkable that the leading advocates of the mythical hypothesis have felt obliged to give up, to a great extent, their favorite theory, and to resort to the hypothesis of a conscious deception by the New Testament authors, whom they unsuccessfully strive to bring down into an age later than the apos-

tolie. Renan, too, is forced to adopt the notion of a pious fraud on the part of the founder of Christianity and his chosen disciples, because he cannot escape from the fact of contemporaneous testimony to the miracles, which yet his narrow philosophy cannot allow. It is very characteristic of the whole method and spirit of Renan, that he should require, as an indispensable condition of faith, the performance of miracles at Paris before a council of savans. The moral relations of a miracle, apart from its character as an act of power, he seems utterly to overlook. He might as reasonably ask, that before believing in the facts recorded by Eusebius of the devoted heroism and endurance of Christian women and children, who, in the Roman persecutions, died for the faith, some persons of like condition should consent to go through the same sufferings before a French commission: not that the evidence by which miracles must be established is the same in kind and degree (this is not the point); but, in both cases, the events are such as occur under the proper moral conditions and surroundings.

It may be said, generally, that, of all the recent writers upon the Gospel history, there is no one who makes greater pretensions to critical impartiality than Renan; and yet there is no one who is more obviously under the sway of subjective standards and prepossessions. One of his principal objections to the discourses of Jesus recorded in John is, that they do not suit his taste; which reminds one of the lines which Goethe puts into the mouth of the old Rationalist Bahrdt—

“Ein Gedanke kommt mir ungefähr—
So red'te Ich wenn Ich Christus wär’.”*

But even Renan involves himself, by his concessions, in a dilemma, where he is forced either to admit the miracle, or

* “Up comes a thought I did not seek—
If I were Christ, thus would I speak.”

to impeach the truthfulness of the founder of Christianity and his chosen disciples.

The whole course of sceptical criticism, if attentively followed, is seen to be leading really to the inevitable conclusion, which will be at length extorted from reluctant minds, that the miraculous events which are set down in the Gospels actually took place.

Thirdly, there are those who admit the historical truth of miracles and the fact of revelation, but deny that the Scriptures are inspired. A distinction is to be made between revelation and inspiration. It is quite possible to hold that Jesus performed miracles, and rose from the dead; to hold that God, who at sundry times and in divers ways spoke unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son; and, at the same time, to disbelieve that supernatural guidance was given to the minds of the sacred writers. They were left, it may be said, to comprehend and interpret the revelation by the unaided light of their own understanding. This is not an infidel position: it admits fully the supernatural origin of the gospel; it allows that the great transactions occurred which constitute the historic basis of revealed religion. God has made himself known to men otherwise than in the stated order of nature; but the view to which I refer leaves us no authorized interpretation of the facts—no surety that the prophets and apostles did not mistake their import: it leaves, in a word, no authoritative teaching. Whatever varying forms the doctrine of inspiration may assume from the hyperorthodox view, that the words are dictated, down through all the grades of opinion, evangelical Protestantism holds and cannot surrender the tenet that the Bible is somehow the rule of faith. There is an objective standard—not one, if you please, that dispenses with the need of study, of comparing Scripture with Scripture, of considering the circumstances of each writer, of having regard to the progressive character of the revelation—but still an objective standard,

exalted above the conjectures and speculations of the individual—a divine testimony—an umpire to end the strife. Inspiration is the means to this end. Christ told his followers that they would, after his death, understand what they could not comprehend before; they would be guided to a true interpretation of what they could not explain in his life and death; they should be led into all truth in regard to him. He directed them, when they should be arraigned before hostile magistrates, not to hunt up arguments and devise rejoinders, but they should have given them what they should say. Intuition, under the illumination of the Spirit, would supersede contrivance. In short, they were to be, and were qualified to be, competent expositors of the Gospel; and their teaching was to have a normal authority; it was to be the supplement and further unfolding of his own divine instruction. Inspiration, therefore, is a truth concerning which the evangelical Protestant cannot be indifferent; it being the source and safeguard of authoritative teaching.

Rationalism, through all of its numerous and conflicting schools, affirms the full competency of the human mind to discover religious truth for itself. Underneath the rationalistic creed there lies this principal assumption. The great fact that is overlooked is the fact of sin, and the influence of sin upon all parts of human nature. The truth that human nature is not in its normal condition, and that sin has darkened the perceptions of the soul, is avowedly or unconsciously set aside. The Pelagian theory lies at the root of rationalism: this lies at the bottom of its denial of the need of external authoritative instruction, of an enlightening and quickening influence upon the mind from without. The consequences that flow respectively from the acknowledgment and the virtual denial of the Christian doctrine of sin can hardly be overstated. This doctrine is the one great postulate of the gospel: "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." It affirms, against Mani-

chæism and dualism in whatever form, that moral evil belongs to the human, creaturely will, and comes not from the Creator; but, with equal earnestness, it asserts the deep and universal dominion of evil among men. There has been a separation of mankind from God. We behold a state of things which compels us either to deny that evil is, and to call evil good, or to assume a mysterious catastrophe, of which revealed religion itself gives, and professes to give, but an imperfect explanation. But, whatever mysteries hang over the origin of sin, two things are certain: one is our personal responsibility for what we are in character—a responsibility to which conscience, the highest witness, clearly testifies; the other is the baleful effect of sin, not only on society, not only on the pursuits and purposes of the individual, but also on the spiritual perceptions. It is a department where the bent of the will affects the perception of the intellect; where mind and heart share a common disaster. How is it possible to look abroad on the world, and see what men are, even when placed under the most favorable conditions; to review the course of history, and notice what men have done—their conduct to one another, their governments, their literature, their amusements, their social customs, their religions even—how is it possible for one to look within himself, and interrogate his own soul, and not acknowledge this great fact of sin—acknowledge that a malady has infected mankind, differing from any other disease only in this, that it emanates from the will, and involves guilt? How is it possible to ignore a fact which all deep-thinking men, heathen or Christian, have united in deploring—a fact which Seneca declares almost in the language of Paul? The human mind, as an organ for the discernment of God and divine things, is not in the condition in which it would be, had sin not perverted its powers. Vague and doubtful apprehensions need to be enlivened and confirmed by the voice of One who speaks as one having authority. It is not truth alone that the human soul

needs, but redemption through One who is himself the truth. But communications of truth respecting God, and our relations to him, will form an essential part of the process which has for its end the restoration of men to communion with God.

The Pelagian view of things appears, at the first glance, to be the easiest. It avoids a number of very difficult questions which theology has not yet succeeded, and perhaps never will succeed, in solving. The trouble is, that it omits to recognize or take into the account vast facts which obtrude themselves upon observation at every turn. How well has it been said that sin is the one mystery that makes every thing else plain! Superficial views on the subject of sin, where the views are not absolutely false and anti-Christian, lie at the foundation of most of the current infidel theories. A truly profound and just view of this subject is the one grand corrective. Every system of pantheism assumes, and must assume, what the healthy moral sense of every man denounces as a falsehood—that the entire course of this world is normal, and conformed to the ideal; that baseness and perfidy, and every form of selfishness, are well, and even divine, in their place. It is no wonder that Spinoza and Hegel betray some uneasiness at what are the necessary ethical implications of their systems. Every system of deism likewise assumes that man is able, without aid from above, to acquaint himself, as fully as he needs, with God, and to deliver himself from the yoke of evil. The Author of revelation says the whole truth in a word: "Thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thy help."

Let full justice be done to the position of the Rationalist: his doctrine, in the most refined form, is that of the supremacy of reason and the moral sense. There is force and plausibility in the statement; but let one consideration be noted. Suppose that I am driven to the admission that reason and the moral sense within me are not quenched, but

perverted and obscured; and suppose that, in Christ, I recognize one in whom, being sinless, reason and the moral sense are clear and perfect, so that his eye sees moral truth with an infallible discernment; suppose that my conviction of his superiority in this respect is deepened with every day's contemplation of his character and teaching, and that, the more I assume the temper of a disciple, the more is my moral sense quickened and clarified through contact with his spirit: why shall I not recognize him as the authority in this province of morals and religion? In this act of trust, do I not establish, rather than subvert, the supremacy of reason and conscience? Be it remembered, also, that this relation to Christ is not one that supplants the exercise of my intelligence and moral sense; but it is one that rectifies, and at the same time constantly develops, elevates, and educates, these powers of the soul. We call him Lord and Master; and so he is: but he does not call us servants, but rather friends; for all things that are made known to him he reveals to us. The relation of dependence is ever turning into that of fellowship and friendship, of sympathy and personal insight.

Let a man discern the surpassing excellence of Christ, and the germ of faith is within him. Remember that there is an order among things to be believed. You are conscious of sin and moral weakness; you have lost that filial relation to God which is the birthright of human nature; but you are struck with the perfect excellence of Christ as he is described in the Gospels. Here is a character that more than fills out your highest conception of nobleness and virtue; here is one whose filial communion with God sin has never broken. This character of Christ is the witness to its own reality. It is no product of imagination: the records that exhibit it could never have been framed by invention. But how about the supernatural facts of the history? They, too, are upheld by the power of this human, and yet superhuman, excellence. You feel that the works of Christ are no more

wonderful than his words and his life, and that he himself is the greatest wonder of all. Who but he can be the Reconciler? Whose hand can I take but his? But he proposes to bring us out of our separation from God, and rescue us from the ruin which sin has brought upon human nature. He is at once the instrument and the first example of redemption; for in his own person, having overcome sin, he overcomes death. He is the power of life to all who come to him, infusing into them his own holiness and peace, reconnecting them with God, saving them from death. It is a legitimate progress, then, from the first living perception of the excellence of Christ to a personal trust in him as the Saviour, and to a discernment, also, of the inner rationality of the method of redemption. Difficulties respecting this or that portion of the Bible may be left to take care of themselves, provided they are not obstacles in the way of a practical acquaintance with Christ. Even the Bible is not to be interposed between the soul and Christ. He was preached and believed in before the New Testament was written, and to those who knew little or nothing of the Old. Salvation is by faith in him. Believing in him, we stand on safe ground, from which all questions, even such as relate to the Scriptures themselves, may be studied. No loyal disciple need fear the displeasure of his Master on account of intellectual difficulties which he is doing his best to solve.

It should not be overlooked that Christianity is more than theory or precept: it is fact; it is a great act of love and sacrifice—an act of God himself. For this reason, it can never be thought out by an *à priori* process, or brought under the category of necessary truth. As sin can never be explained, in the sense of being reduced under the category of cause and effect, like a physical event, for the reason that sin is a free act, so it is with redemption. In its very nature it is historical: hence philosophy can never bring it into a chain of necessary conceptions. Christianity is something which reason does not evolve out of itself, but which

must be received like any other great historical transaction in which free-will plays the essential part.

In dealing with rationalism, let it be observed that it is vain, as well as wrong, to attempt to check the freedom of investigation in any province of knowledge. In regard to the beautiful sciences of nature, the rapid progress of which is a leading characteristic of the present age, this remark is especially pertinent. Let the investigation of second causes in nature be carried as far as possible, and let there be no hindrance put in its way. A jealousy on the part of students and ministers of the gospel with reference to these branches of study is equally unmanly and futile. At the same time, it deserves to be remarked, that, just now, the tendency to speculation is more rife among physical philosophers than among metaphysicians; and theories of nature are brought forward which have a very slender basis of facts to rest upon, and which evince a wide departure from the Baconian method. Those philosophers must not be tenderly sensitive if their theories are subjected to a rigid criticism by theologians, who, to say the least, are, equally with them, trained to habits of logical analysis. We must be excused for not showing the deference to guesses that is properly paid to established truth. Again: it is unjust to charge the clergy and theologians with a standing opposition to new discoveries in physical science. It would be strange if the Christian Church, which has educated the European nations, reduced their languages to writing, founded their schools and universities, saved the ark of learning in the midst of a deluge of barbarism, were to be found uniformly an obstacle in the path of scientific progress. The fact is, that almost all new discoveries which subvert traditional opinions are looked upon at the outset with distrust, and meet with opposition. This opposition is far from being peculiar to theologians, even in the case of physical discovery. Resistance often comes from the men of science themselves. Galileo, the old

example of ecclesiastical intolerance, had his contest to wage with them. There was the scientific professor at Padua, who could not be induced to look through the glass, and see the moons of Jupiter. Why is not more eloquence expended against the narrowness and bigotry of scientific men themselves in respect to new truth in their own department? And, if so much progress is claimed for the physical branches, why may not some progress be permitted from age to age in the understanding of the Bible and of the nature and boundaries of inspiration? Once more it must be said, that the natural and physical sciences, beautiful and useful as they are, often claim, just at present, a higher relative place on the scale of studies than justly belongs to them. The study of matter, even the study of living beings below man, and of his material organism, must ever stand in respect to dignity, as an instrument of culture, second to the studies that relate to the mind. "The proper study of mankind is man." Man, and the products of his activity—language, history, literature, art—are the grandest, the most fructifying studies. The opposite view must be withstood, because it can only prevail in alliance with materialistic tendencies and influences. The study of material nature is lauded as being an observation of the thoughts of God, and an examination of his works, instead of the works of man. But the human mind is the great work of God, being his image. More is to be learned from the mind of Shakespeare, concerning God its Creator, than can be gathered from the astronomic system—infinitely more. We would not disparage physical studies; let them be encouraged, fostered, cultivated, to the utmost: but there are loftier, more inspiring, more edifying branches of study than these. The natural and physical sciences do their best work in the way of mental culture when they are pursued by men who bring to the study of nature an ideal element that flows into the mind from other fountains. Alexander Von Humboldt, though not belonging to the first order of genius, and not to be compared with men like Kep-

ler, Newton, and Leibnitz, is, nevertheless, an example of the warming and widening influence of literary studies upon a devotee of science. He caught something from the genius of his brother, who was probably the abler man of the two.

But rationalism must be met in the field of argument. To this end, apart from the intrinsic interest and value of these studies, the physical sciences must be so far pursued by the student of the gospel as to qualify him to judge of the theories and deductions that bear closely on natural and revealed religion. The two classes of scholars need to know more of one another, and of the wide fields of research in which, respectively, each of them is most at home. Then the naturalist will not ignore the vast range of facts and data that do not lie within his own circle, and a like benefit will accrue to the theologian.

The theologian must not set his face against new truth in his own branch. Revelation is complete, but not our understanding of it. Let us not mistake the outpost for the citadel. Let us not imagine that the Christian faith is imperilled by every proposed modification of received opinions. The effect of historical, philological, and scientific study, is to bring out in bolder relief the human element in the Holy Scriptures. It is more and more felt that "we have this treasure in earthen vessels." If the result is, that traditional formulas are somewhat altered, and new statements must be framed in their place, let it not be supposed that all or that anything truly valuable, is lost. Be it ever remembered that "the letter killeth; the spirit giveth life." Much may be conceded, respecting the Bible, that was once denied; and yet it is left infallible and sufficient as a rule of faith. There is a power in the Bible to quicken the soul; to meet our deepest necessities; to satisfy us when all other sources of wisdom and comfort fail; "to find us," as Coleridge has aptly expressed it: and this power, made manifest in all ages, and among all conditions of men, is the evidence of his divine origin, and a pledge, that, whatever peculiari-

ties incidental to its human origin likewise may come to light, it will never lose its hold upon mankind. A good way to make infidels of sharp-sighted and thoughtful men is to identify the truth of the Gospel with untenable formulas respecting the Scriptures; to make, for example, Christianity stand or fall with the exactness of a genealogical table. Richard Baxter felt this, even in his day. Never was there a louder call for the utmost candor and fairness in dealing with the difficulties and objections of inquiring minds, whose perplexities find little relief in much of the current and traditional teaching. Where there is no settled hostility to the Christian faith, an irenical, conciliatory spirit on the side of its defenders is eminently called for. "Prove all things, hold fast to that which is good," is the motto for the times. It was a Church father—Tertullian, I believe—who said that it was tradition that nailed Christ to the cross.

Nevertheless, the tenor of the foregoing remarks will prevent surprise at the observation, that the most effective antidote to the influence of rationalism is found in direct appeals to the moral and spiritual nature. There is a testimony within, if it can only be called forth. Sometimes the inward witness is awakened by the experiences of life. Robert Hall said that he buried his materialism in the grave of his father. But another providential agent for effecting this result is the prophet's voice. Men are raised up in sceptical times when the higher spiritual nature of men seems dormant, and when the understanding has taken the throne of reason—men whose office it is to appeal with a direct and vivifying power to the intuitive function of the spirit. Among the heathen, this work was done by Socrates, in opposition to the Sophists. He taught men to find within themselves, in their own moral intuitions, a certainty which nothing could shake. In modern times, in Germany, when a barren rationalism had paralyzed faith, it was Schleiermacher who recalled men to religion. The high

privilege was given him to awaken his contemporaries to a sense of the indestructible character and sacred authority of religion. His errors, whatever they may have been, should never prevent us from recognizing the greatness of the service which he rendered. There is no truly earnest preacher, who speaks from a living experience, who is not carrying forward an effective war against rationalism. Robertson of Brighton, referring to the cry of John the Baptist to the Pharisees and Sadducees, "Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" raises the question, how such words could be addressed with any hope to Sadducees, who did not believe in a wrath to come, or in any life hereafter. But, says the preacher, when they heard the prophet say, "Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" they knew that there *was* a wrath to come. There are responsive chords in the soul, which the truth, when simply asserted with the earnestness of a living conviction, sets in vibration. Arguments are sometimes necessary and useful; but they may be superfluous, and even harmful. A striking statement that brings truth in direct contact with the spirit, a declaration that comes from insight and experience, may do what reasoning fails to accomplish. A single utterance, which I call, for the want of an equally expressive term, prophetic, will sometimes dissipate doubt in a moment, and develop a conviction which intellectual inquiry alone might never awaken.

In Germany, it was an orthodox rationalism that paved the way for the heterodox. Theologians took their propositions from the creed, or reasoned them out by processes of logic, but forgot to set them in a living relation to the wants and aspirations of the soul; or they dwelt on the ethical side of the Gospel, to the neglect of the properly religious elements, in which the originality and power of Christianity chiefly reside. Let not the lesson be lost upon us, who are going through an experience not unlike that through which Germany has, in a sense, already passed.

There is one final test to which irreligious as well as religious systems are subject; and that is, their influence on society. The Christian religion is the life-blood of the social body. That gone, decay and moral death inevitably follow. Jesus called his followers "the salt of the earth," "the light of the world." They were the light of the world because he is the light of the world, and their light is kindled from him. Let materialism prevail, and, as surely as effects follow causes, the appetites of sense and earthly passions will gain an undisputed ascendancy, and overturn at last the social fabric. Let a less gross form of rationalism supplant faith in the verities of the Gospel, and a like appalling result will ultimately, though it may be with slower pace, ensue. History unites with reason in teaching, that, when the restraints and incentives that flow from religion are lost, there is no power adequate to control the selfish propensities which clamor for indulgence. If men are made to believe that they are merely animals, they will, in the end, behave like the brutes. If they are persuaded that they are destitute of a free and responsible nature, they will act without a conscience. If they reject the truth of a righteous moral government, they will sin without fear. If the religion of Christ is treated as a human invention, the regenerating power that lies in the Gospel is wanting. By this last stern test, every irreligious and anti-Christian system which is not otherwise overcome must be tried. Supernatural Christianity has been tried as a reformatory agent in millions of individuals, and in society at large. We know what the Gospel can do when it is cordially received. We are not ignorant of what may be expected if atheism, or pantheism, or a Christless deism, should prevail. The fate of the civilized heathen nations of antiquity is instructive: so is the history of modern nations which have given themselves up to infidelity. Apart from argument, there remains, then, the great test of experience, "By their fruits ye shall know them."

THE UNREASONABLENESS OF ATHEISM.*

THE word "fool" commonly means, in the Bible, not a person actually devoid of reason, but one who, having reason, fails, through some wrong quality of character, to use it aright, but proceeds in his thinking or conduct in a way contrary to the dictates of a sound intelligence. There are two sorts of fools; first, natural fools, and secondly, fools from choice—or those who, from haste or conceit, or some evil inclination, occult it may be, are grossly misled in their opinions, or in their practical action. When, for example, we read in the Proverbs that "Judgments are prepared for sinners, and stripes for the back of fools;" and, in another place, "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in a mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him," the allusion is plainly not to men whose native talents are below the average, and whose attainments of knowledge are small. Everything like contempt for inferiors of this class is utterly at variance with the spirit of Christianity. The pride of knowledge, like every other kind of pride, is rebuked in the Bible. But the allusion is to one who, while possessed of the attributes of a rational being, chooses, nevertheless, to adopt principles, or pursue lines of conduct, that are perfectly unreasonable. Even then, to call another "fool" in any bitter temper, to despise or hate him for any cause, is forbidden in the Sermon on the Mount. Yet there is nothing to hinder us from designating folly, not passionately, but in a calm and sober way, by its true name. Not

* A Discourse in the chapel of Yale College (October 22, 1876), on the text: "The fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God.'" Ps. xiv. 1.

to tarry longer upon the explanation of words, I wish to speak of the folly of atheism under two heads; first, the futility of the reasons that lead to it, and secondly, the strength of the evidence for the being of God which it ignores.

Among the sources of atheism, one is the fact that God is imperceptible by the senses. The remark has been attributed to La Place that, searching the heavens, he could not find God with his telescope. It is doubtful whether he ever said it. But whether he did or not, it indicates the spirit that often tacitly underlies theoretical and practical atheism. God, when sought for as a visible object, cannot be found by traversing the sea, or exploring the sky, even if one pursued his journey to the farthest star. But what folly to conclude that God does not exist, because he is not visible! Men—unless you call the body the man—are not visible. The thinking principle, neither in yourself nor in others, have you ever seen. You may say that you are conscious of it in yourself. But how do you know that it exists in another—in the friend, for example, who sits at your side? You cannot see it: all that you behold is certain manifestations, or phenomena—certain visible and tangible signs—which reveal its presence. You may be in daily, intimate converse with another, but his soul ever remains invisible: for

“ We are spirits clad in veils :
Man by man was never seen :
All our deep communing fails
To remove the shadowy screen.” *

Why then disbelieve in God because you cannot see him? If through the look, the tone, the gesture of a man at your side you can infer, or behold with the eye of faith, the invisible mind that resides within, the seat of thought and affection, why not recognize the Supreme Intelligence, of

* From a poem of C. P. Cranch.

whom it is true, as an apostle has said, that "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead?" Even within the sphere of material nature, invisible forces, some of them of vast energy, are admitted to exist. They tell us that matter is composed of atoms: who has seen them? Who has seen the force of gravitation, and can paint a likeness of it? Who has beheld the subtle ether which, it is believed, pervades all space? He who believes in nothing but what he, or somebody else has seen, will have a short creed. Even if he admit the reality of matter and molecular motion, he will have to deny the existence of any such thing as a power of thought or volition—a principle of intelligence—behind the actions and expressions of his fellow-men. He must deny that he is endued with such a power himself. There is no need to go farther. When he has emptied the world of everything but brute matter, which can be weighed and clutched, or brought under the laws of molecular action, he may, perhaps, logically reject God.

A second source of atheism, is the notion that as far as second causes are brought to light, the first cause is excluded, or the notion that second causes are disconnected from God. In the Bible, we read, in a sentence that has hardly a parallel for beauty: "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth." Now suppose the nebular hypothesis, as broached by Herschel and La Place, to be true. Whether it be true or not, I cannot say: the astronomers have not yet made up their minds about it. But suppose it to be true. Then a homogeneous, nebulous matter diffused abroad in space, by a long process of attractions and repulsions, combinations and motions, solidified into the bodies and systems which now form the sidereal world. Does this rule out the sublime declaration of Scripture—"By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them

by the breath of his mouth?" Before attending to this question, let us turn for a moment to another illustration. A person, after a lingering illness, dies. The minister and the physician happen to be together. The minister says: "It has pleased God to terminate the life of our brother." "No," says the doctor, "he died of a fever." "You are wrong," replies the minister, "it is God—it is he that killeth and that maketh alive." "You are wrong," rejoins the other, "I have watched the progress of the fever from the beginning: such a fever seizing upon such a constitution can have no other issue." The one party falls back on religious conviction, and the testimony of the Bible; the other appeals to the obvious connection of antecedent and consequent. Now shall this unseemly wrangle between the minister and the doctor be dignified by the high-sounding name of "a conflict between religion and science?" In such a contest, both are right in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny. Let all the links of secondary causation be exposed as completely as possible, each of them bound to the one before and after it, it is not less true that, when life ends, it is God who brings it to an end. The instrument used does not exclude, it includes his agency. If a bird is shot by a rifle, it is a man still that kills the bird. Many appear to think that God is to be found, if found at all, only at the origin of things—the origin of matter, the origin of life, the origin of different species—at crises, so to speak. But "he maketh his sun to rise"—*daily* maketh his sun to rise—"on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." He is present with his agency in the *course* of nature not less really and efficiently than at the beginnings of nature. He is the primal fountain from which all force emanates. "Not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father." We revert now to the question of the origin of the stellar universe. God is not less its author even if the material of which it is composed were carried through a succession of changes, reaching through a long series of ages.

There is, to be sure, the origination of the material to be accounted for, with all its latent properties and tendencies. But God is presupposed not only at this initial stage, but at every subsequent movement, until the glorious work was consummated. "By the Word of the Lord"—by his will and in pursuance of his plan—"were the heavens made."

Science has for its business the investigation of second causes. Let it have a fair field. I sympathize with the resentment which the students of nature feel when the attempt is made to furnish them with conclusions beforehand. Their peculiar province is to unfold all the links of secondary causation—every *nexus* between antecedent and consequent—which they can ferret out. But the origin of things—I mean, the primary origin—and the end, or design, it belongs to philosophy, in the light of revelation, to define. The man of science may, also, be a philosopher; and he may not be.* The particular fallacy, however, which I would here point out is the false and unauthorized assumption that where secondary causation begins, divine agency ceases, and that as far as secondary causation extends, divine agency is excluded. How much nobler is the conception of the Bible, in the New Testament as well as in the Old! It is God by whom the lilies of the field are clothed with beauty. The fowls of the air—it is your Heavenly Father that feedeth them!

Closely allied to the fallacy just named is the assumption that mechanical causes are incompatible with design. Much

* It is a remark of Archbishop Whately, to be found somewhere in his biography, and a remark characteristic of his sagacity, that science has nothing to do with religion. If I ask a man of science for the origin of an eclipse, it is not for him, that is, not for him in his character as a man of science, to answer that God caused it. This I knew before. His function is to explain the antecedents which constitute the ground on which the event can be predicted. What is true of an eclipse is true of everything else in nature. With respect to the origin of man, it is perfectly legitimate, it is, in fact, the proper function of the scientific man, to find out the mediating process—if there was one—in his creation.

of the atheistic reasoning current at the present day proceeds on this wholly gratuitous assumption, which the analogies of human experience contradict. But to this fallacy I shall soon advert again.

A third particular in which atheism demonstrates its folly is in the assumption that the laws of nature—or the uniformity of nature's laws—excludes God. Must there be then a break—discord where there is order—to prove that God reigns? Is there no God, because there is a reign of law? Imagine that in the room of the universal sway of law, there were a jumble of events, no fixed relation of antecedent and consequent; in a word, chaos. Would there be more or less evidence of a God than there is now? It is because nature is an orderly system, that the universe is intelligible, and science possible. This very aspect of nature shows that the head of the universe is an intelligent being. Miracles would not be credible, if they were, as some suppose them to be, anti-natural. Though not the mere effect of nature, they harmonize with it, as parts of a more comprehensive system.* What a strange idea that for the heavens to declare the glory of God, it is necessary that the planets should leap out of their orbits, instead of keeping their appointed path with unfaltering regularity! We count it the perfection of intelligent control, when the railway train reaches its destination, day after day, at the same appointed moment. "O, no!" cries the Atheist: "let the train, now and then, run off the track into yonder meadow, and I will believe that it does not go of itself, and that an engineer guides it." A government of law is opposed to that of wild chance or mutable caprice.

* Miracles surpass the capacities of nature. But, as Augustine long ago affirmed, the ordinary operations of nature are just as truly from God, as are miraculous phenomena; and those operations would be just as marvellous, were we not familiar with them, as any miracle can be. What marvel greater than every new-born child? But the point made above is that miracles have their law—their *rationale*—as parts of the divine plan.

What should we expect of perfect wisdom, and of perfect goodness too, but a system of nature, a fixed order, on which men can build their plans? Of all the grounds for atheism, the rationality of the universe is the most singular.

Another pretext for atheism is the alleged contrariety of the teaching of the Bible to the discoveries of natural and physical science. An odd conclusion surely, even if such a contradiction were found. For the Bible does not first make known the existence of God. If the Bible were shown to be full of errors, it would not disprove the being of God. His being is assumed in the Bible. It is declared to be manifest in the universe around us, and within us, so that heathenism is without excuse. But there is no discrepancy between the ascertained truth of science, and the essential teaching of the Bible respecting God and his relations to the world. The Bible is our guide in morals and religion. It does not anticipate the discoveries of science, or of art. Paul was a tent-maker. The inspiration that so illuminated his spiritual perception as to render him an authoritative teacher of the Gospel, did not, as far as we know, enable him to make tents any better than other workmen of the same craft. There has been, doubtless, since his time, a progress in this art as in almost every other. These two things are true of the Bible: first, it is written from the religious point of view. That is, God is brought directly before us, in describing the works of Providence, as well as the phenomena of nature—secondary and intermediate causes being, to a large extent, dropped out of sight. The veil that hides him, so to speak, from the dull eyes of men, is torn away, and his agency is brought into the foreground. Secondly, the Bible writers take the science of their time, or the ordinary conceptions of men respecting the material world, and proceed upon that basis, eliminating, however, everything at variance with true religion. They stand substantially on the same plane of physical knowledge as their contemporaries; and from that plane they exhibit the attributes of God as the creator and ruler

of nature. The astronomy of the Bible is that of the ancients. Its authors had no idea of the Copernican system. They simply discard all heathen mythological conceptions, leaving no room for Baal-worship. Their concern was to reveal God as the almighty maker and sustainer of the visible universe; they did not, and they could not, explain the sidereal system.* As for geology, there was none. The Pentateuch records the giving of the law upon Sinai, but does not tell us that the rock is of granite. The journey of the Israelites in the wilderness was not a geological excursion. We know not when, or by whom, the story of the creation was first recorded in the form in which we have it. But that sublime passage of Holy Writ has its parallels in the ancient traditions of other Semitic peoples. In Genesis, we find it cleansed of polytheistic error, and made the vehicle of conveying the loftiest moral and religious truth. Compare it with the cosmogony of Assyria or Babylon, and you will see wherein the proof of its inspiration lies. There may be striking correspondences with modern knowledge, as in the creation of light before the heavenly bodies.† But I should not expect to find in this old panorama of the creation, as it passed before the purified imagination of the primitive Hebrews, any rigid conformity in detail with that vast book which modern science has unrolled. It passed for literal history in by-gone ages; but it must be read now as a poem—a history in the forms of the imagination, as it really was in its primitive inception; yet a poem stamped with the evidences of divine inspiration, containing the essential principles of the Old Testament religion, and em-

* It was a wise as well as witty remark of a celebrated ecclesiastic, supposed to be the Cardinal Baronius, to whom Galileo refers, that the Bible was given to teach us how to go to heaven, not how the heavens go.

† Yet it seems to have been a prevalent conception that light was independent of the heavenly luminaries. It has a dwelling-place (Job xxxviii. 19). Even in the Greek conception, "the rosy-fingered dawn" preceded the chariot of Apollo.

bodily more moral and religious truth than all other books not written in dependence on the Bible. The first utterance—"In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth"—is a truth to which heathen philosophy, on its highest stage, never absolutely attained.* The Bible fares hardly in these days, between an infidel theology, on the one hand, which is blind to the supernatural wisdom that belongs to it, and a rabbinical theology on the other, that makes no room in its formulas for the human element which pervades the book from beginning to end. The Bible is crucified, as it were, between these two theologies. But the Bible, con-

* In the first three chapters of Genesis, we find asserted the truths that the universe owes its being to the creative agency of one personal God—as against dualism, pantheism, and polytheism; that man is like God in his spiritual faculties; that sin is not a physical or metaphysical necessity, but has its origin and seat in the will of the creature; that guilt brings shame and separation from communion with God; that immorality is the natural fruit of impiety. These are truths of vast moment; peculiar, in their pure form, to the religion of the Bible.

Ordinarily we find it to be the method of Providence that sacred history, like other history, should be recorded by "eye-witnesses or well-informed contemporaries." Witness the almost complete silence of the Evangelists upon the first thirty years of the Saviour's life. "Wherefore," said Peter (Acts i. 21, 22), "of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection." The early part of Genesis, the Prolegomena to the Mosaic legislation and to the record of the founding of the Hebrew Commonwealth, precedes contemporary authorship, except so far as earlier documents may be interwoven. It is to be expected that difficulties, and questions for criticism, would arise in extraordinary measure respecting this section of the Bible. Especially is this true of the first ten chapters, which carry us far back into the primeval era, anterior to the beginnings of the Jewish people. But whatever may be here set down to "the human element," the homogeneity of these narratives, as to their moral and religious spirit and content, with the rest of the Scriptures, and thus their elevation above all heathen literature, must not be overlooked. The divine element is not less conspicuous and impressive on the mind of a thoughtful student of the history of religion, than in those portions of the Bible which emanate directly from persons who participated in the events which they record.

taining as it does the word of God, has a perennial life in it. It has shown its power to outlive the changing systems of its human interpreters. There is no inconsistency, then, between the Bible, taken as the teacher of moral and religious truth, and the results of scientific study. There is no room for contradiction, since they move on different planes. Hence atheism founded on this pretext is a folly.

Another ground of atheism is the supposed imperfection in the Creator's work, or government. This, if shown to exist, would not disprove the being of God, though it might affect our estimate of his attributes. If a house is leaky, we do not infer that it was never built, but only that the workmen lacked skill, or were guilty of negligence. It was thought, a century ago, to be a ridiculous boast when Thomas Paine said of the Bible that he could write a better book himself. But we have had to listen, in our time, to criticisms equally daring upon the system of nature, which has been pronounced in various particulars defective. Complaint is, also, made that, in the course of things, righteousness and prosperity are not always united; and, hence, that a perfect moral Ruler, one possessed of infinite goodness and infinite power, cannot be supposed. This last is an old objection. We might stop to ask whence the sceptic derives the faculties by which he undertakes to criticise the natural and moral system, and where he obtained the standard on which his judgments are based? If the universe is so at fault, what assurance has he that his own judging faculty, the author of this unfavorable verdict, is any better constructed? But, passing by this consideration, the whole objection, as Bishop Butler has shown with irresistible force, is an argument from ignorance. It is a rash judgment upon a system not yet completed. I will suppose a man to enter the Cologne Cathedral, one of the grandest monuments of the genius and piety of the middle ages. He paces up and down its long aisles; he follows with his eye the columns, ascending upward, and spreading their branches like a

mighty forest, to uphold the far-off canopy of stone; he pauses at

“The storied windows, richly dight,
Casting a dim, religious light;”

but, just as the grandeur and symmetry of the vast edifice touch his soul with a sensation of awe, his eye falls on portions of the wall left in the rough, on towers abruptly broken off, and cries out, “the artist was, after all, a bungler!” What would you say to such a man? You would say, “O profane babbler, the building is not yet done!” Is there not enough to prove the skill of the architect? You can see to what result the construction tends. Wait till the plan is complete, before you utter your disparagement. So it is with the moral system, and the moral administration of the world. Now we know in part. We see that the direction is right; we can securely wait for the consummation.

Turn now, for a moment, to the positive evidence of God which atheism fails to acknowledge in its real import.

There is, first, the revelation of God in the soul. There is within us a sense of dependence, and a consciousness of a law imposed upon us by the Power on whom we depend—a law moral in its nature, and thus revealing that power as having a preference for right—in other words, as personal and holy. An almost audible voice of God in the soul discloses to us his being, and intimate relation to ourselves.* Connected with this inward experience of dependence and of duty, there is in the depth of the spirit a yearning for

* Suppose the unverified notion of the gradual genesis of the moral faculty—that it is the result of the accretion of hereditary impressions—to be held; still the moral faculty now exists. Moreover, it stands as well, as to its origin, as the intellectual nature; and legitimate deductions from the phenomena of our moral consciousness are equally valid with the science which depends for all of its conclusions on the validity of our intellectual faculty. It is difficult for the most erratic speculation to strike at religion without, at the same time, not only striking at morality, but annihilating itself; for the science that casts discredit on the organ of knowledge commits suicide in the very act.

communion with him in whom we live, and move, and have our being. These inward testimonies of God can never be absolutely silenced. A recent writer has defined God as the power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness. There is a power, then, that gives law to the will without coercing it, cheers with the hope of reward, and menaces with the dread of punishment, and actually secures the reward to the righteous; and yet that power has no *love* of righteousness, and no hatred to iniquity! It is unnatural, it is a perversion of reason to believe this. Behind the mandate of conscience is the preference and will of God. Coleridge is right in saying that it is our duty to believe in God; for this belief is indispensable to the life of conscience. The only correlate for the unquenchable yearning of the human spirit for a higher communion, is the living God, who, though not seen by us, himself "seeth in secret." Faith in God springs up in the soul spontaneously, where the soul is not darkened and perverted. It is strictly natural. Hence religion, in some form, is universal, or as nearly so as are the exercise of a moral sense, and the rest of the higher powers of man. Religion, the belief in God, is like the domestic affections. They may be weakened, they may be corrupted, they may be deadened, and, to all appearance well-nigh extirpated. Nevertheless, they remain, an indestructible part of human nature. A man may argue that these affections—filial, parental, conjugal love—are irrational, the product of fancy, or merely an heir-loom from the past. Pseudo-philosophers have done this. He may profess to emancipate himself from these superstitious feelings. But if he succeed, he will only starve his heart; and, in the end, nature will prove too strong for him.* Religion is not a

* If the attempt were made to bring up a child without the exercise on his part of domestic affection, all the propensities and feelings that relate to the family being, as far as practicable, stifled, the experiment would be analogous to that which John Stuart Mill suffered, as regards religion, at the hands of his father.

doctrine merely ; it is a life, an integral part of the life of the soul ; and without religion, man is a poor deformed creature, more dead than alive. Every organ, deprived of its correlated object, feels after it. There is an effort, a *nîsus*—from which there is no rest. So it is in a man who undertakes to live without God—at least until higher sensibility is paralyzed. In these ways does God give a witness of himself within us, to disregard which is not less irrational than wicked.

Secondly, atheism disregards the revelation of God in the structure of the world, the marks of design that everywhere present themselves to the unbiassed observer. “He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see?” The mind refuses to believe that the author—the cause—of the eye and ear, is itself void of perception. The adaptations of nature exhibit on every hand a contriving mind. The thought of God springs up within us involuntarily, whenever we consider the human frame, or look at any other of the countless examples of design of which the world is full. There is proof of arrangement everywhere. The heart rises in thanks and worship to “Him who alone doeth great wonders ;” “to him that by wisdom made the heavens ;” “that stretched out the earth above the waters ;” “to him that made great lights, the sun to rule by day, the moon and stars to rule by night.” This evidence of God has impressed the greatest minds of the race—men like Socrates and Cicero—and the humblest minds alike. One would think that a man, knowing by consciousness and observation what the characteristic marks and fruits of intelligence are, must have put out his eyes if he fails to discern a plan in the marvellous order of nature. How *can* an invisible, spiritual being reveal himself to other minds, if works appropriate to intelligence do not inspire a conviction of his presence and agency ? *

* The argument from final causes in nature is not weakened by our inability to discern, in many cases, what they are, or by mistakes made in

Nor is the force of this evidence weakened by the doctrine of evolution, unless it is pushed into materialism, in which case it can be overthrown by irrefutable arguments. Suppose it were true that all animals—nay, all living things—could be traced back to a single germ, out of which they are developed in pursuance of certain laws or tendencies. Then they were all contained in that germ. Nothing can be *e*-volved that was not before *in*-volved. What a marvel that gelatin—or protoplasm—or whatever it be called—in which are shut up all the living things that exist? Who laid it in the properties—the tendency to variation, the tendency to permanence, and the rest—by the operation of which this endless variety, and beauty and order emerge? You see that God is required as much as ever. This new doctrine, whether it be an established truth, or an unverified speculation, strikes at religion only when it assumes to deny the existence of mind in the proper sense, and holds that thought

presumptuous endeavors to point them out. The objection of Hume to affirming an analogy between works of nature and works of art, is futile, since in respect to *design*—the feature in both on which the argument turns—the analogy holds. The eye is an instrument employed by a rational being for a purpose; and when we see how it is fitted to this use, we cannot resist the persuasion that it was *intended* for it. The *idea* of the organ we discern, as Whewell well puts it: *we* have in our minds the idea of a final cause, and when we behold the eye, we find our idea exemplified. This idea, then, governed the construction of the eye, be its mechanical causes, the operative agencies that produced it, what they may. Every *part* of an organized being, also, displays design; for there is no better definition of a living thing than that of Kant, that in it every part is both means and end. Some talk of the “unknowable,” but they contradict themselves by admitting in the same breath that the unknowable is manifested as the first cause. They hold that it is only as a cause that we recognize its existence. But this cause is further manifested as intelligent and holy. Nothing can be more sophistical, than the remark of Herbert Spencer, that could the watch, in Paley’s illustration, think, it would judge its Creator to be like itself, a watch. Could the watch think and choose, it would be rational, and would then reason like other rational beings, and conclude that the artificer of such a product as itself must have designed it beforehand—that is to say, must be a mind.

is only a function of the brain, perishing with it. That is to say, there is no free, contriving intelligence in man. What is called that, is only a product of the movement of a blind, unintelligent force. Then, of course, we cannot conclude that there is a free intelligence anywhere. But materialism is not less fatal to morals than religion, for it annihilates responsibility. In truth, it is fatal to the higher life of man. It gives the lie to consciousness which testifies to our freedom, and to our guilt for wrong choices. It destroys the difference between truth and error in mental perception; for both are equally the result of the molecular action of the brain, and equally normal. It provides no norm for distinguishing between the true and the false. It destroys science, for who can say that the molecular movement by which science is thought out, may not at any time change its form, and give rise to conclusions utterly diverse? There is no end to the absurdities of materialism; a doctrine which can be maintained only by a disregard of phenomena, the reality and proper significance of which no reasonable person can call in question. Let scientific exploration be carried to the farthest bound—it will never be able to dispense with God. It is plain that the world is a cosmos—a beautiful order. It came to be such by the operation of forces moving steadily towards this end; for anything like accident, or properly fortuitous events, science can never admit. The world is the necessary outcome of the agencies, be they few or many, near or remote, that gave rise to it. The time occupied in the process is a point irrelevant; were it a billion, or ten billions of years, a moment's thought transports us to the beginning, and the whole problem stares us in the face. There is a plan; rational ends have been reached by adaptations and arrangements; and thus God is revealed.*

* The statements made above are corroborated, it would seem, by remarks of Professor Huxley, who says: "The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are, not necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does

Thirdly, the folly of atheism appears in its failure to discern the revelation of God in the history of mankind. It ignores, also, the God of Providence. The history of mankind is not a chaotic jumble of occurrences, but an orderly sequence where one set of events prepares for another,

he assume primordial molecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are consequences; the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe." Quoted in Jackson's *Philosophy of Natural Theology*, p. 136. On the relation of evolution to theism and teleology, see the excellent remarks of Dr. A. Gray, in his *Darwiniana* (New York, 1876). The only escape from teleology is in the doctrine of an eternal sequence of causes and effects, a notion which, as Dr. Gray says, "no sane man" will permanently hold. Such a notion is equivalent to a denial of all real causation, since the eternal regress can never bring us to the thing sought—a real cause which is not itself an effect. The principle of causation, as a subjective conviction, or demand of the intelligence, involves the belief in the reality of such a first cause.

As to the question of the origin of man, it is evident, in the first place, that we are, on one side of our being, composed of matter. This is an undeniable fact. What is the origin of this material part? It may be supposed that it was created outright, in the organized human form, by a fiat of the Almighty, when the first man was called into being. This is one supposition. Another is that man was made out of the "dust of the earth"—out of pre-existing inorganic matter. This is the mode of conception in the biblical writers. See Gen. iii. 19, Ps. xc. 3, civ. 29, cxlvi. 4, Job x. 9, Eccl. iii. 20. Or, thirdly, it may be supposed that man was made out of previously existing *organized* matter—developed from a lower class of animal beings, either by easy gradations (according to the Darwinian creed), or *per saltum*. If by slow gradations, the proposition amounts to this, that beings intermediate between man and existing or extinct lower animals, once lived on the earth. This remains to be proved, the intermediates not having been found. Neither of these hypotheses necessarily denies the reality of the higher endowments of man. They impinge upon the Christian system only when they are connected with a denial of the distinctive qualities of man as a spiritual being—his free and responsible nature. Precisely how and when he received from the Creator this higher nature—the *quomodo*—is a question, however interesting, of secondary importance. It is only materialism—or, what is theologically equivalent, a monism which identifies soul and body—that cannot cohere with the truths of religion.

and where rational ends are wrought out by means adapted to them. There is a divine plan stamped upon history :

“—thro’ the ages one increasing purpose runs.”

And, irrespective of this plan, records of the past, it has been well said, have little more interest for us than the battles of crows and daws. There is a design connected with history : it is not an aimless course of events—a stream having no issue—a meaningless succession, or cycle of phenomena. Now the atheist shuts his eyes to the evident traces of a providential guidance and control of the world’s affairs. It is chance, he says ; or if there is law, it is law without a law-giver. That moral government which appears in the prosperity accorded to righteousness, and in the penalties that overtake iniquity—that sublime manifestation of justice through all the annals of mankind—declares the presence of a just God. The minds of men, when unperturbed by false speculation, instinctively feel that God reigns, whenever they behold these providential allotments. It is necessary to stifle the voice of nature, and to resort to some far-fetched, unsatisfactory solution of the matter, in order to avoid this impression. In this way, the conscience of mankind convicts atheism of folly.

Fourthly, atheism discerns not the revelation of God in Christ. God is manifest in the flesh. I waive all discussion of the Bible, its authority, and inspiration. The character of Jesus disclosed in the Gospel record could never have been imagined ; it vouches for its own reality, and thus for the history in and through which it is made known to us. In Christ there is a manifestation of God. The power that actuates him is not of the earth and not of man. The righteousness and love of the Father are reflected as in an image. The Father is known through the Son. In his face we behold the Invisible.* His soul is obviously in un-

* This impression was actually made on those most intimately associated with him. See John i. 14, xiv. 9, Matt. xvi. 16.

interrupted communion with the Father. When he quits the world, he says: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Was there no ear to hear that voice? Was it lost in boundless space, obtaining no response? Then, verily,

"The pillared firmament is rottenness,
And earth's base built on stubble."

Then let us draw a pall over life, with its flickering joys, soon to be quenched in eternal night. All that is most elevated, all that is most consoling, all that raises our destiny above that of the brutes that perish, is built on illusion! There is no grand future, no serene hereafter, where the longing soul shall have its profoundest aspirations met in the fellowship of the spiritual world, and in the everlasting dominion of truth and righteousness. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." The senses, at least, do not mock us. The pleasure that they give is real, as far as it goes.

If atheism is a folly, is not sin at the root of it? Not, it may be, a particular sinful practice, or conscious transgression, but a habit of feeling, which is wrong, and which spreads a film over the organ of spiritual perception. Can a man who reflects, as he ought, upon his own being, and deals honestly with himself as accountable and as convicted of unworthiness in his own conscience, rest in atheism? Why is it that to one mind the heavens declare the glory of God, while to another mind their starry surface is a blank page? It is because, in the one case, there is first a recognition of God within the soul; there is a glad acknowledgment of the Father of our spirits, to whom consciousness and conscience alike testify. In the other case, there is darkness within.

And how important it is that all progress in knowledge should bring us closer to God! Alas, that the study of the works of God should ever be prosecuted in such a spirit that he is more and more removed out of sight! Alas, that

the study of history should ever fail to confirm the scholar's faith in the God, of whose Providence history is the record ! Vain, nay, worse than in vain, are all our studies, if they fail to deepen our faith in God. The student's daily prayer should be

—"what in me is dark
Illumine, what is low, raise and support."

Then will knowledge prove, indeed, a blessing.

"Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music as before,
But vaster."

THE APOSTLE PAUL.*

THERE are two very different classes of persons, who, without any abuse of terms, may be called enemies of the Christian faith. In the one there is a latent hostility to principles that still find a secret approval in their own consciences. A more or less conscious opposition of their characters to truth that is known or surmised to exist in the Christian system is at the bottom of their hatred of it. In the other class, however, their enmity may be traced to a wrong bias of will, or perverse tempers of feeling, as the ultimate source, the immediate, conscious ground of it is quite diverse. There is no immoral practice, no unrighteous course of conduct, that shrinks from the rebuke uttered in the Gospel. There is no guilty dread of the light; there is no honest conviction smothered: but they hate Christianity because they misconceive its doctrine, or deem it to be at war with something which they hold as sacred truth. From their education, falling in, perhaps, with their native intellectual tendencies, or from some other influence, they have come to cherish, with their whole soul, beliefs that appear to clash with the Christian system. From their point of view, they cannot do otherwise than misjudge, and, it may be, detest it. Now, as one of this class can be moved to embrace the religion which he has hated, only by being enlightened; so, in case he does embrace it, let the change be never so radical, there will be a certain continuity between his life before and his life after his conversion. His previous position, with whatever moral fault he may

* A Lecture in Boston, in 1871, forming part of a course of Lectures by different persons, on Christianity and Skepticism.

charge himself, he can justly attribute to a misapprehension. His new views are a rectification of the old. Underneath the contrariety, there are some hidden threads of unity. The old conception has proved at least a stepping-stone to the new. Opposite as his new life seems to his former career, there is a logical and moral bond between the two. Paradoxical as it may appear, a thread of consistency passes over from the earlier to the later period of his history.

In this class of antagonists of the Christian faith belonged Saul of Tarsus. He was, in a sense, an intensely religious man before he believed in Jesus of Nazareth. Religion, the relations of man to God, was the ruling, absorbing thought of his mind. It was not science or learning, or any purely mundane interest or occupation, that engaged his attention. It was religion—the relation of the soul to God and the supernatural order. And he was not less sincere in the profession than he was earnest in the practice of his creed. If there were many Pharisees who delighted in the hollow reputation of sanctity—knaves and impostors, all whose thoughts centred in themselves—Paul was at the farthest remove from all such. He was elevated above the influence of a vulgar ambition, and he was an utter stranger to insincerity. There is no hint that he was impeded by any misgivings when he was performing the part of an inquisitor against the disciples of Jesus. The phrase “It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks,” refers to no struggle in his own mind: it simply asserts the futility of the attempt to withstand the progress of the new faith. He had entered on an abortive undertaking; he had plunged into a hopeless enterprise: but he went into it with no divided mind. He verily thought that he ought to extirpate the new sect. He had no stifled misgivings, no scruples of conscience, on the subject. What he did he did ignorantly, in unbelief. He considered it afterwards a sin, but a sin of ignorance, the responsibility for which did not inhere in the act itself immediately, or in the opinion that dictated it.

Moreover, his ideal of character remained, in its general features, the same. Righteousness formed that ideal before he was converted, as well as after. In the earlier period, his idea of righteousness included both personal conformity to the standards of obligation, and that unqualified citizenship in the theocracy which involved a title to all its blessings, and, among them, eternal life. Righteousness, in this inward quality and outward relation, as a determination of the will and a consequent privilege, was to him the sum of all good. But now we come to the contrast. He first thought that the way to attain righteousness, and the only way, was to obey the Mosaic statutes—the moral and ceremonial ordinances at the foundation of the Hebrew theocratic commonwealth. The Mosaic institute, in which ethical and ritual precepts were interwoven, he conceived of as something permanent and eternal. That visible form of society, which had God for its direct author, was to endure as long as the sun and moon. There was no hope for mankind except in the extension of this kingdom. Hence Paul joined the sect whose zeal to bring in the heathen moved them “to compass sea and land to make one proselyte;” the sect at the head of that aggressive Judaism, the progress of which led a Roman philosopher to declare that the conquered had given laws to the conquerors. Hence, too, the cause of the disciples of Jesus appeared to Paul in the light of an impious and treasonable revolt against the divine order. To uphold the theocratic state in full unity and vigor, and to extend the sway of it abroad, was the first duty.

If, now, we look at Paul the apostle, we find him holding a different view of the place and office of the Mosaic system in the divine plan. That system no longer fills his eye to the exclusion of everything else. It is only one link in the chain; one stadium in the series of revelations. He has risen to a more comprehensive view of the divine dispensations, where the function of the Old Testament law-system

is perceived to be subordinate and provisional; as when, from a lofty tower, one sees mountains and plains stretching far away beyond the previous boundaries of his vision. Abraham was before Moses; promise preceded law. The statutory system was an expedient, wholesome and necessary, not without sacred and everlasting elements incorporated with it, yet, as a system, destined to give place to a spiritual kingdom founded on a different principle. This kingdom is spiritual, the head of it being an invisible person to whom we are connected by faith which takes hold of the unseen. It is thus a free and universal religion, in contrast with the external, local, restricted theocracy. The vast revolution of sentiment which Paul's mind underwent might be termed a deeper insight into the philosophy of history. The philosophy of history, the science that aspires to interpret the plan of God in the course of human affairs, has its beginning in the Hebrew prophets. The problem that inspired Augustine to compose *The City of God*, and Edwards *The History of Redemption*; the problem on which modern thinkers of so diverse character—Vico and Hegel, Bossuet and Herder—have labored—first presented itself to the seers of Judæa and Israel. In that old state-system, where the little principality of the Jews was surrounded by the mighty, conquering empires of Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt, what chance had that feeble kingdom against the overwhelming odds? What chance was there, when to the vast preponderance of force on the side of their neighbors there was added the infectious example of their idolatries? Then it was that the prophets, called by the Spirit, sometimes from the sheep-pasture, their souls filled and exalted with the grand idea of an indestructible kingdom of God on earth, pointed to splendid and opulent cities, the London and New York and Paris of that day, and predicted their downfall. They outstripped the sagacity of the profoundest of statesmen. Edmund Burke is admired with reason for anticipating events of the French Revolution; but Burke, in the very work that con-

tained these vaticinations, said also that the military strength of France had culminated, and was no more to be feared. And this prediction was uttered just before the wars of Napoleon. What is there more sublime in literature, when all the circumstances are weighed, than the words of Scripture,—"There shall be a handful of corn in the earth upon the top of the mountains; the fruit thereof shall shake like Lebanon?" If one inquires for their fulfilment, let him behold the Christendom of to-day. The prophets themselves did not divine the full and exact sense of their own predictions. They had glimpses of the felicity of the kingdom in its future developed and mature form. A more spiritual worship was to characterize it; a more unfettered and universal character was to belong to it. Paul, after his conversion, entered into the import of these prophetic pictures, and found them verified and realized in the society that looked to Jesus as its head. The beginnings of this society antedated the law. The germ of it was in the theocracy itself. But the kingdom of believing souls, as it existed before, might exist now, independently of the Mosaic laws and institutions. Regarded as a religious institute, they had fulfilled their end.

But Paul would never have reached this view, his conversion would have remained incomplete, had he not been driven outside of the law-system by the force of some inward experience. This was the painful conviction that he had been mistaken in supposing himself righteous. Instead of having attained that which he sought, he had fallen far short of it. He stood at a hopeless remove from the standard of character which a deeper perception of human obligations revealed to him. With the loss of the sense of inward righteousness, his standing as a member of the divine kingdom was gone too. Instead of being a just or justified member of the theocratical community, he was a condemned person. Precisely how Paul came to discern, in this new light, the deep, spiritual demands of law, we have not the

means of answering. It may be, that, in the crisis of his conversion, teachings of Jesus were brought to his knowledge by some of the disciples who instructed him, and that these gave new life to his conscience. Mr. Matthew Arnold, in recent clever essays upon St. Paul, is correct in asserting that it was not fear that lay at the bottom of his distress. This, at least, was not the chief ingredient of that sharp anguish of spirit which he suffered: it was, rather, the sense of unrighteousness. It was the humiliation, the piercing self-reproach, the burden of a conscious bondage to evil, that afflicted his soul. His self-approbation was undermined. Instead of approving, he must abhor himself. But Mr. Matthew Arnold is wrong in ignoring the element of guilt as related to God, or the objective condemnation, that formed one part of Paul's misery. Paul, with all the depth of his emotional nature, had none of the unhealthy, one-sided subjectiveness that pertains to modern pantheistic tendencies of thought. He was not shut up within the circle of his own sensibilities. He wished not only to be right before himself, but also to stand right before God. Besides the conscious servitude of his will to passion—the "*video proboque meliora, deteriora sequor*," of the heathen poet—there was the objective verdict of the righteous, infallible judge. Where did he get relief? Not from the law, in whose commanding and forbidding there was no force that could overcome the opposing propensities of his nature. The law could condemn and threaten; but it could not create a principle of obedience. There was nothing in bare law to subvert the dominion of sensuality and selfishness. The result was a feeling of wretchedness, of self-despair. Paul turned to Jesus as a helper. Jesus had overcome in the conflict with evil. He had died, but died victorious. The patient, self-denying sufferer was a victor in the struggle. There was a loveliness in Christ that touched the sympathies of Paul, and kindled the desire to walk as he walked; and this desire was a new power in the soul, quite distinct from the influence of

law. But moral admiration, deepening into sympathy, is not the whole of what the apostle meant by faith. There was a love from Jesus to him; there was a compassion of God, underlying the whole mission of Jesus. That love and compassion Paul believed in. The helper whom he received was no distant hero, who exerted power only through an inspiring example; but he was invisibly present, to support, by the mysterious influence of spirit upon spirit, the new life which he had awakened. Hold what particular view one may of the Pauline doctrine as to the significance of the death of Jesus, it is evident that Paul saw in it the means and the assurance of forgiveness. There is a foundation in his teaching for the ordinary Protestant idea of forensic justification. Righteousness had always to him a double aspect: it was both an internal quality and an outward relation. But what the law could not do was accomplished through the personal influence of Christ upon the soul united to him in sympathy and dependence. Nothing in Renan's book upon St. Paul is more groundless than the implication that his personal character was little altered by his becoming a Christian. A new spirit of love took possession of his nature. In the room of the fierce temper of a persecuting zealot, we find a genuine humility, a constant inculcation of kindness and charity. When it is remembered that he was naturally high-spirited, and perhaps irritable, this change is the more touching. "Love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance"—these are the traits on which he dwells. Against these, he says, there is no law. But they are not the fruit of *law*: they are the fruit of the Spirit. They have their springs in the relation of the soul to Christ. In this relation there was a great liberty. In regard to these many virtues and their opposites, the apostle writes, "Ye are not under the law." It is the Christian paradox of a correspondence to the law, but from motives and impulses to the law unknown. It was not the constraint of a statute; but "the love of Christ constraineth us."

Observe, now, the order in which this conversion, in its different parts or constituent elements, took place. It did not begin with new ideas of the spiritual character of the law, and with a sense of sin ; but the historical evidence necessitates the conclusion, that a recognition of the truth of the claims of Jesus was the first step. The apostle himself, in his writings, attributes the change to a sudden revelation. Up to a certain moment, he had thought that he ought to put down the Christians by force. There was no intermediate process of reflection and inquiry between this state of feeling and his acknowledgment of Jesus as the ascended Lord and Messiah. He expressly affirms that this primary conviction was not imparted to him by the other apostles through the exhibition of proofs. How, then, did he obtain it ? It was not by reflecting on the death of Jesus ; for, apart from the consideration that his first belief resulted from no process of examination, the death of Jesus was, to his mind, one of the strongest arguments against the verity of his pretensions. To him, as to other Jews, the cross was a stumbling-block—an insuperable obstacle in the way of faith. It is impossible, then, that he could have believed in Jesus, except through some disclosure of him, real or supposed, as triumphant over death, in a higher and glorified form of existence. Therefore the testimony of Paul on the mode of his conversion, while it accords with the probabilities of the case, tends to corroborate the narrative of Luke respecting the journey to Damascus. It is remarkable, however, and characteristic of Paul, that, besides the vision or revelation that formed the primary source of his belief, he discerns the value of external testimony. The resurrection of Jesus is verified, he affirms, by eye-witnesses, whom he enumerates, presenting the evidence in a circumstantial manner. There was a series of interviews of the risen Jesus : first with Peter ; then with the Twelve ; then with five hundred brethren, of whom the greater part, he says, were then living ; after that with James ; then again

with all the apostles. It was a true and real manifestation of Jesus, in bodily form, to the senses of the disciples. The testimony is such, considering the panic and despair of the witnesses after the crucifixion, and the outward circumstances, as to exclude the idea of an hallucination; but it was a manifestation to the disciples and believers alone. The fact of the resurrection of Jesus was an indispensable condition of the apostle's faith in him.

Here we fall out once more with Mr. Matthew Arnold, who is duly impressed with the truth that Jesus, in the might of his holy love to God and men, died to sin and the world; that this inward death was perfected and shown in his death on the cross, and was the means of a true, spiritual, eternal life, of which all who are united to him in sympathy are enabled to partake. This, without doubt, is a vital part of Paul's religion; but it is not the whole. His faith rested on objective realities. Beyond his own subjective impressions and feelings, there must be the word of God. The resurrection of Jesus proved the acceptance of him as a Redeemer: it was the counterpart, the sign and necessary consequence, of his complete victory over sin. Without that verifying act of God, faith had no objective support, and was vain. The soundness of the apostle's conception of religion, as a relation to God, instead of a mere round of inward experiences, where the subjective feeling goes for every thing, appears very strikingly at this point. The pantheistic drift of much of our modern speculation gets no countenance from him; and yet where shall we find an equal richness and depth of spiritual experience, or so profound a representation of what may be called the subjective side of the Gospel? To die with Christ in his death, to live to Christ, to live because Christ lives in him—these are his familiar thoughts. But as the death of Jesus on the cross fulfilled and expressed his inward dying to the world, so did his resurrection express and demonstrate his life in God.

By the resurrection of Jesus to a spiritual and glorified form of existence, he becomes the head of a kingdom fundamentally different from that of the Jewish dispensation. The kingdom has shuffled off the carnal form which it had previously worn. The former requirements and ceremonies are something quite heterogeneous to its present mode of being. When Paul declares that he does not any longer know Jesus, according to the flesh, as a Jew, the member of a particular nation, with local and national associations upon him, he sets forth in the strongest possible manner, in a manner even startling, his consciousness of the altered character of the kingdom. The throne is not at Jerusalem, but in heaven. The offering is not bulls and goats, but our body and spirit, a reasonable—that is, a spiritual, or inward—service. The temple is not on Mount Zion, but is the soul of the believer. The whole conception turns on the fact of the resurrection and ascension of Jesus.

One might anticipate what attitude a man of Paul's logical intellect and fervid spirit, who held nothing by halves, would assume towards Judaism and Judaizing tendencies in the church. A great amount of ingenuity has been expended of late in an effort to exhibit Paul as at variance with the other apostles on the subject of the admission of Gentiles to the church, and on the whole matter of their relation to the Old Testament ritual. As a means to this end, a deliberate attempt has been made to impeach the veracity of Luke; or, rather, of the author of the book of Acts, whom the negative criticism denies to have been Luke. This last attempt breaks down, not only from the variety and weight of evidence in behalf of the genuineness and historical credibility of the book in question, but also from the failure to establish any contradiction between the general representations of Paul himself in his admitted epistles and the testimony of the Acts. These points are clear from Paul's own statement—that Peter, James, and John required of the Gentiles nothing more than he required; that

they recognized him as an apostle ; that they rejoiced in the conversion of the heathen converts when it was reported to them ; that they approved of the contents of his preaching, and bade him God-speed when he went forth on his errand, they asking and receiving at his hand charities for the poor Christians at Jerusalem from the churches which he planted. At the same time, it was inevitable, and it is perfectly clear, that the original band of apostles, the first disciples of Christ, did not have at the outset that clear perception, and, with the exception of John, probably never had that sharp and vivid perception, of the antithesis of the new system to the old, which had seized on the convictions of Paul. The reason is, that, under the teaching of Jesus, they came out of the old system by a more imperceptible transition. Their religious life was a growth, in which their traditional ideas were gradually corrected and supplanted. They had never entered with so intense earnestness into legal Judaism as Paul had. They had not, like him, to renounce a definite system to which they had committed themselves with all their hearts, and from which they were parted by a sudden access of light. Analogous phenomena occur at the present day among those who enter upon a Christian life. In some cases there is a conscious, abrupt revolution ; in other cases, Christian character springs almost imperceptibly out of Christian training. A diversity in the mode of looking at the Gospel is the natural consequence. The wonder is that the Galilean apostles could so entirely emancipate themselves from habitual, inherited impressions, as to welcome the heathen converts who had not been circumcised, and extend a cordial fellowship to Paul. But he was not only ready to tolerate the Gentiles in the acceptance of the benefits of the Gospel : he would carry these benefits to them. He would enter into the broad field that opened itself far and wide before him.

The effect of such a course must be to excite the malignant hostility of his Jewish countrymen. He must appear

to them in the light of an apostate, and become the object of that vindictive hatred which partisans feel towards a renegade who has deserted his associates and passed over into the camp of the enemy. But the development of the Judaizing principle within the church was destined to be still more mischievous and annoying. Not all of the Pharisees who were converted had Paul's clearness of perception, nor had they tested by so thorough a personal trial the legal method of salvation. Hence they held with stubborn tenacity to the idea that the door into the church was through the Judaic rite of circumcision. To concede this, as Paul saw, was to give up the Gospel as a spiritual and universal religion, to curtail the office of Christ as a Saviour, and to sacrifice the liberty of the heathen convert by subjecting them to a burdensome ritual. To maintain his position on this point was the battle of his life. By his instrumentality, more than by that of any other, Christianity was saved from sinking down into a Jewish sect.

In the encounter with Jews and Judaizers, Paul had an objection to meet, which at first must have perplexed his own mind, and which his opponents would not fail to urge with the utmost emphasis. Were not the Jews the people of God? Were they not a chosen nation? As such, were they not to receive the blessings of salvation? When it was found that comparatively few of the Jews believed in Jesus, and when the number of Gentile converts was rapidly increasing, these questions could not fail to arise. "If you are right," said the unbelieving Jew to Paul, "what becomes of election and the promises?" And the Judaizing believer repeated the inquiry. This brings the apostle to the matter of predestination and election. I do not propose to discuss the interpretation of the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans—the field which has been trodden for so many generations by contending armies of theological combatants—except to say that it was no part of the apostle's idea to offer a metaphysical solution of the old problem of

liberty and necessity, any more than it was his design, in the fifth chapter, to solve the mystery of original sin. All that I propose is to point out the historical occasion of his introducing the subject. The actual rejection of Christ by a great majority of the Jewish people forced him to consider their selection by God, and what the nature of it was. In short, it opened up what we have called the philosophy of history, the character of the Jewish dispensation. There had not been a strict adherance to the hereditary principle on the part of God in constituting the chosen people. The principle of legitimacy, so to speak, had been set aside by his decree. He had not, as a matter of fact, been bound, in the past, by the mere consideration of lineage. Isaac was not the only child of Abraham, and Jacob was an example of a deviation from the natural order of succession; the reason being, in both cases, the divine choice and appointment. Therefore the Jewish theory of hereditary claims and exclusive national rights was a false one, as their own history proved. What should prevent God, then, if he saw fit, from giving the blessing of salvation to the Gentiles? There was no principle of the divine administration that imposed any fetters upon his will in this particular. Hence, if the Jews lost the gift, and the heathen received it, no one had a right to charge the Divine Being with inconsistency, or a disregard of lawful claims. But Paul does not leave the discussion without bringing forward his usual doctrine—that the blessings of grace are transmitted in the line of faith, instead of that of carnal descent. It is not membership in a race, but faith, that puts one in possession of them, as the narrative of Abraham himself proved. The Calvinist will always point to the apostle's language about Pharaoh, and to the illustration of the potter and the clay; the Arminian will appeal to his declaration, that the reason why Israel had not attained to righteousness is because "they sought it not by faith," and that the rejection of Israel is temporary until the Gentiles have been gathered into the church.

Both unite in denying salvation by works or human merit, and in attributing all the praise to God ; and this was the truth which the apostle had most at heart. I have often thought, that, had I the genius of Walter Savage Landor, I would compose an imaginary conversation between John Calvin and John Wesley, two men who were equals in firmness of conviction and energy of will, and with an ardor that impels them to pour out abundant anathemas against the doctrines that offend them. To Wesley, election meant the divine authorship of sin, and insincerity in the invitations of the Gospel ; to Calvin, the denial of election meant salvation by merit, and the insecurity of the trembling and tempted believer. Each fights the inferences that he deduces from the doctrine of the other ; and each denies that the inferences of his opponent are fairly drawn. But how insignificant is the real difference between them when compared with what they hold in common ! It is one consequence of the historical method of exegesis, which, in connection with a more correct philosophy, characterizes the biblical interpretation of the present time, that a new point of view is often gained, from which difficulties are lessened, and the rigid interpretation of the dogmatical school is modified by the infusion of a more genial, penetrative, and catholic spirit. Even Peter did not find the style of Paul very perspicuous. His impetuous mind does not stop to fill out a chain of reasoning, or guard an illustration from a possible misuse. His swift mind leaves gaps for the reader himself to supply. His thoughts, in their hurry, jostle one another ; and parenthesis is thrown within parenthesis to help him in the utterance of them. Before one idea is fully expressed, it is overtaken by another ; as a wave flowing into the shore is chased and overrun by the wave behind it. Hence, of all writers, he requires breadth and insight in the interpreter who would explore his meaning.

The Pauline type of doctrine is frequently brought into comparison with the types of doctrine presented in the Epis-

tle of James and the writings of John. It is more obvious to students of the Bible now than formerly, that the inspiration of the apostles did not operate to supersede, but to intensify, their native faculties of mind. It was dynamic, not mechanical, in its mode of action. The effect of it was organic—to elevate, to guide, to purify the powers of intellect and feeling, but not to supplant them, and not to extinguish their peculiarities, or check their free movement, as by an agency exerted upon them from without. Nor did inspiration interfere with the individuality of religious character that belonged to the apostles. What type their piety assumed varied with their natural traits. They were all dependent on Christ, and moulded by his influence; but, like various musical instruments touched by the same hand—the lute, the organ, and the harp, which give forth various tones and strains of melody—so is the characteristic nature of each of the apostles manifest. The inspiration of the apostles differs from the inspiration that has produced the masterpieces of literature—first, that the former relates to religious and ethical truth; and, secondly, that the products of it are verified to us, and, for this reason, endued with authority. The divine agency here includes a miraculous element, by which the sacred books are set apart from all human productions; even the loftiest efforts of genius, though genius may handle the themes of religion. But the human element, out of which grow the individuality, naturalness, and personal living force of the apostolic writers, is not less evident than the divine element which has imparted to them an inexhaustible, as it is an altogether unique, power. When we compare Paul with James, we perceive that James puts forth no contrary doctrine on the method of salvation. When he declares that faith without works is dead, he shows that he conceives of faith as containing a seed of virtue or holy living, so that good works are not an adjunct of faith, but a necessary fruit. Faith has lost its vitality, it resembles a corpse, when it no longer produces right and benevolent

conduct. This is precisely the conception of Paul. As to his relations to John, it is common to designate the one as the apostle of faith, and the other of love. There are current sayings like that of Schelling, who marks off three periods of the church: the first being the age of Peter, the era of law and ecclesiastical order; the second, the age of Paul, the era when faith is held in highest honor, the age of Protestantism; and the third, the age of John, the coming age of love. Renan thinks to disparage Paul by calling him a Protestant, the forerunner and author of Protestantism. But turn to the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians: "Now abideth faith, hope, love—these three; but the greatest of these is love." Without love, he declares, all gifts are worthless—the gift of tongues; the gift of prophecy—the eloquence of the preacher; the gift of knowledge—all intellectual superiority; the gift of faith, by which miracles were performed; the habit of alms-giving without stint; the martyr-spirit—all are of no account without the love, which includes a gentle, forgiving temper; is the opposite of envy and jealousy, of mistrust, of rudeness and indecorum, of pride and boasting; the love which delights at seeing men good, and deplores their sin; that is patient under the burdens of life; that leaves no room for self-seeking. Love alone is the imperishable virtue: faith will give way to sight, and hope to fruition. "On each side of this chapter," says Dean Stanley, "the tumult of argument and remonstrance still rages; but within it all is calm: the sentences move in almost rhythmical melody; the imagery unfolds itself in almost dramatic propriety; the language arranges itself with almost rhetorical accuracy. We can imagine how the apostle's amanuensis must have paused to look up in his master's face, and seen his countenance lighted up as it had been the face of an angel, as this vision of divine perfection passed before him." Now turn to John; and what do we meet with at the beginning of his Gospel?—"To as many as received him, to them gave he power to be the sons of

God; even to them that believe on his name." Later we read: "This is the work of God, to believe on him whom he hath sent." The love to him who hath first loved us, on which John dwells—what is it but faith? We believe in a love to us that has gone before all love on our side. Responsive love implies faith. Faith, in the doctrine of Paul and John alike, is the connection of the soul with Christ, from which love and all other parts of goodness result. The unity of apostolic doctrine lies in the common view of Christ as the one source of life. He is the vine, sending life and fruitfulness through the branches.

Had Paul been less pure and disinterested in character, he would infallibly have been made the head of a party; but when he heard of the attempt at Corinth to set him in this position, and to organize a sect to be called by his name, he repelled the project with indignation. It was a kind of man-worship, and a dishonor to Christ, from which his whole nature recoiled. 'Who, then,' he said, 'is Paul? Who is Paul? Was Paul crucified for you? Paul and Apollos are but ministers; and shall the servant usurp the place of his Lord?'

In connection with his warm utterances on this subject, he tells us how to look upon uninspired authors of systems of ethics and theology. There is only one foundation; and that is Christ, and his work as a Saviour. Whoever builds on this foundation is a Christian teacher; but he may mingle in his system, in the superstructure which he builds up by the effort of his intellect, wood, hay, and stubble, or elements of doctrine that will not endure the searching test. Building on the true foundation, he is personally saved; but the system that he has created is a human work, is liable to imperfection, and will, at last, be sifted. In this light the great system-makers in the church—as Origen, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Edwards—are to be regarded. Their undertaking is legitimate: they may render a great service in the exposition and defence of truth; but they are not au-

thoritative teachers; and, when an undue deference is paid to them, Christ loses the place that belongs to him. If Paul was offended that his name should be given to a party in the church, is there not, to say the least, an equal objection to the practice of Christians, in later ages, of arraying themselves under the banner of some favorite theologian?

Turning now from the doctrine to glance at the work of the apostle Paul, we find him, by the natural bent of his mind, a missionary. After, as before his conversion, he was a propagandist. A life of contemplative devotion would have been intolerable to him. His favorite metaphor is drawn from the race-course: athletes and soldiers are his types of Christian manliness. There is one popular idea respecting Paul, which, I think, is ill-founded. He is frequently styled a learned man. It is true that he may be called a scholar, so far as the Old Testament Scriptures and the theology and casuistry of the Jewish schools are concerned. As an intellectual man, he is to be rated above most, and probably all, of the apostles, who belonged to what was considered by their countrymen the uneducated class. But there is no sufficient ground for supposing that Paul was a learned man in the sense in which this term is generally applied to him. It is not probable that he had studied the Greek authors. Remember that he was of the stock of Israel, a Hebrew of the Hebrews; born, not of proselytes, but of Hebrew parentage on both sides. It is not improbable that his father or grandfather had been a captive in war, and, being emancipated, had acquired the right of citizenship which descended to Paul. But his father, though living in Tarsus, a cultivated city, was a rigid Jew. Had he found his son reading a pagan writer, it is likely that he would have dealt with him as one of our Puritan ancestors would have treated a child whom he had caught reading the tales of Boccaccio. Transferred at an early age to Jerusalem, he sat at the feet of the Jewish doctor, Gama-

liel. Here the method of instruction was interlocutory ; a stimulating method, which was practised also by the masters of Greek philosophy, and is too little in vogue in our modern schemes of education. Gamaliel is represented in the Jewish tradition as more tolerant in reference to Greek wisdom than most of the rabbis of that day. He gave advice to the Sanhedrim that might indicate that the apostles had made some impression on him of a favorable kind ; but, on the other hand, might imply an expectation on his part that the new sect would soon die a natural death. The president of the Sanhedrim, it is not probable that he had any real inclination towards the Christian doctrine, except as far as it recognized the belief in a resurrection, which the Pharisees also cherished. But, whatever was the temper of the teacher, we know very well what were the sentiments and spirit of the pupil. "After the straitest sect of our religion," he says, "I lived a Pharisee ; . . . concerning zeal, persecuting the church." After his conversion, and his return from Arabia, he spent several years again at Tarsus. Here it is reasonable to suppose that he came in contact with disciples of the Greek philosophy ; in particular, of the Stoic system, of which Tarsus was a flourishing seat. The occasional use of Stoic phraseology and maxims, in a new and higher application, in his writings, is certainly remarkable, and may be owing to opportunities of personal intercourse with Stoic teachers which he then enjoyed. His coincidences, extending even to forms of expression, with Seneca, are much more reasonably ascribed to that sort of acquaintance with Stoic doctrine than to a personal acquaintance of the two men ; a supposition which has little evidence in its favor. But what is the proof that he was possessed of the erudition that is sometimes attributed to him ? A passage that occurs in the poet Aratus, who happens to have been a native of Tarsus, to the effect that we are the offspring of God (Acts xvii. 28) ; and a hexameter line, which occurs in Epimenides, on the bad qualities of the Cretans (Tit. i. 12).

But these sayings, it is likely, were scraps in general circulation, and no more indicate a familiarity with Greek authors than the repetition of the words, "An honest man is the noblest work of God," with the accompanying remark, that it is an utterance of some of the English poets, proves a man to be conversant with English literature. There is no indication in Paul's writings, and no proof from any quarter, that he had read Æschylus or Homer, Plato or Demosthenes, or any other classic writer of heathen antiquity. Had he studied either of these authors, it is hardly possible that distinct traces of this fact should be missing from his writings. The style, as well as the contents, of his letters, would exhibit signs of a culture so diverse from that which the rabbis afforded. The "much learning" which, as Festus thought, had made Paul mad, was converse with Jewish, not Gentile books; and of this matter Festus was a poor judge, learning being a source of insanity to which he had probably taken care not to expose himself. Perhaps the impression to which we refer in respect to Paul's Gentile learning may have sprung from a natural wish of some minds to have one among the apostles who could lay claim to this distinction. It reminds one of the lavish praise that it was once the custom of preachers to bestow on the scientific acquirements of the first man; as when Robert South says that Aristotle was but the rubbish of Adam, and Athens the ruins of Paradise. But Paul is indebted for his eminence to sources of power far higher than literature and science can confer. It was impossible that all vestiges of his rabbinical training should be cast aside; but they serve as a foil to set off more impressively the native vigor of his mind. If he did not devote himself to the study of the heathen authors, he fully comprehended heathenism as a religious phenomenon. The religious aspiration that lies at the root of heathen worship is pointed out in the discourse at Athens. The origin of idolatry is revealed in the opening chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. The responsibility of those who have not

been taught by a written revelation is proved by referring to the testimony of their own consciences and the law written on the heart. How was the declaration of the Saviour, that "salvation is of the Jews," verified afresh when this "Hebrew of the Hebrews" stood on Mars' Hill, and proclaimed to an audience of Athenians Jesus and the resurrection!

Among the qualifications of Paul for his peculiar work as a propagator of the gospel and a founder of churches, the singular blending of enthusiasm with prudence in his nature deserves attention. There was a fire which no difficulties that stood in his path could quench; but along with it there was a moderation, the temperance or sobriety, which kept him back from all extravagance. He unites a zeal, which one might think would brook no restraint, with a wonderful tact and shrewdness. A certain sagacity, or good sense, presides over his conduct. His burning zeal never runs into fanaticism. At the right time, he knows how to consult expediency. When we find these apparently incongruous qualities combined in the champion of any cause, we may look out for great results. These traits mingle in the character of such a statesman as Cromwell, and in the founders of some of the great religious orders in the Catholic Church. The history of Paul contains many examples of the opportune exercise of this prudence and tact. He would not yield an inch to the demand of the Judaizers when the principle was at stake, even though Peter was seduced to give them his tacit support; but he rebuked this leading apostle in pointed terms. Yet he would go very far in making concessions to remove the misunderstanding and prejudice of the Jews, and to pacify Jewish feeling that was offended by his apparently radical proceedings. Before the Sanhedrim he contrived, by avowing himself a believer in one of the doctrines of the Pharisees, to kindle a strife between the two schools of doctors, in the smoke of which he effected his escape. He was not afraid of the face of man: he did not tremble before the furious mob at Jerusalem, and he

stood before Nero without quailing. But he was not the man to throw away his life ; and he did not think it undignified to be let down in a basket from the wall of Damascus. He had no heroic moods that moved him to fling away a reasonable caution. His courtesy to heathen magistrates, even bad men, is in marked contrast with the temper of a fanatic. A refinement and delicacy of sentiment are never wanting. He considers it a superstition to refuse to eat the meat of animals that have been killed at the altars of Jupiter, Diana, or Neptune ; but he would drive nobody into doing what he felt to be wrong, however unfounded his scruples might be. He would not, like a fanatic, insist on the outward act before the conviction was ripe for it. In a kind of chivalry of tenderness, as one has called it, he would himself abstain from eating such meat, if his example was to mislead a weak and superstitious brother into the doing of a right thing against his conscience. The practical wisdom, or sobriety, of Paul, is illustrated on a point where an ignorant criticism has often condemned or sneered at him—in what he says of the dress and deportment of Christian women. He paid a proper respect to the ancient ideas of decorum, not wishing unnecessarily to stir up a prejudice where there was already hostility enough against the infant churches. Paul is censured for the very things that prevented the churches from being broken up by tumults within, and by enmity and suspicion without. He knew just where to draw the line between a Christian independence and a reckless fanaticism. He would do more than excite a commotion : he would organize and build on enduring foundations. I wish that all zealots for social reforms would spend the time which they devote to supercilious criticism upon Paul in the humble study of his life. Let me observe here, that no man has given a higher honor to woman, or set a higher dignity and sacredness upon marriage, than the apostle who makes it the symbol of the union of Christ with his church.

The sympathy of Paul with his fellow-disciples, with his countrymen, and with all men, "Greeks and Barbarians," made self-sacrifice the habit of his life. He clasped the little churches as children in his arms. In his communications to them, he poured out his tender solicitude and more than paternal affection. All that he is, all that he experienced, is for them. Whether he is afflicted or consoled, it is a divine appointment for their benefit. Any form of spiritual good that he may possess is not for himself, but has been given that it might be imparted again to them. A beautiful instance of this identification of himself with his brethren is found in the passage (2 Cor. i. 4) in which he speaks with gratitude of the comfort which he had received from God, "who comforteth us in all our tribulation, *that we may be able to comfort them which are in any trouble by the comfort wherewith we are comforted of God.*" So deep is his sympathy for his kinsmen of the race of Israel, that he would himself willingly be cut off and cursed for their sake! A power in itself, the self-denying love of the apostle called out all his energies, and kept them directed to a single end.

The absorbing religious consecration of Paul is the leading feature in his character. His earnest, strenuous devotion to the word to which he had been called by the Master had no intermission, and knew no rest. It must not be forgotten that we have in the book of Acts a sketch of only a fragment of Paul's missionary career, which covered, in all, a period of thirty years. In the reference that he incidentally makes to the perils, indignities, and hardships to which he had been subject—how he had been scourged and stoned; had fallen among robbers; been exposed to the plots of hostile Jews and treacherous disciples, to hunger and cold; burdened with the care of churches only just converted from paganism—he mentions that thrice he had experienced shipwreck. This was written before the occurrence of the shipwreck on the shore of Malta, which is de-

scribed by Luke. There is a vast, unrecorded history of toil, anxiety, persecution, casualty ; chapters of biography irrecoverably lost, but all the more pathetic for the veil that hangs over them. His life was one long campaign. So he himself felt at the close. He could look back and say that he had fought a good fight. It is interesting to notice that the great idea of righteousness, the one idea that had engaged his thoughts from childhood, was still before his mind : "Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will give me."

I must gather up, in the briefest compass, a few of the lessons for our time, and for all time, which are drawn from the glimpses we have taken of the character and career of the Apostle to the Gentiles.

He is an eloquent witness to the supremacy that belongs to religion, in Christian teaching, as in the lives of men. The inculcation of justice and charity among men is never to be neglected ; but the life of ethics is in religion. The recovery of men to God is the prime end of the Gospel. The preaching of Paul was a beseeching of men, in the name of Christ, to be reconciled to God.

In all Christian ages, Paul is a witness against ritualism —if by ritualism is meant a dependence upon external rites and an earthly priesthood. Imagine a ritualist of this description thanking God that he had baptized only Caius and Crispus and a few other individuals, as Paul says of the church at Corinth, with which he stood in such intimate relations ! At the Reformation, it was the voice of Paul that called men away from human mediators to Christ, and broke up the reign of the mediæval system of religion. As long as the Epistle to the Galatians remains, it will be impossible for Judaizing Christianity permanently to triumph in the church.

How is Christ exalted when we look at the greatness of Paul and the greatness of his influence! Luther said that the spiritual miracles were the greatest. Paul, in all that constitutes the excellence of his character and influence, was, as he himself felt in his inmost soul, only one effect of Christ. The splendor of the planet is not its own, but is derived from the sun round which it revolves. In this dependent relation Paul consciously stood to Christ. When we contemplate such a disciple, are not the power and rank of the Master felt to be altogether unique? Is there not some other, transcendent distinction between Paul and Christ besides that of the degree of moral excellence that belonged to them respectively? The love of Christ to him was the one great consolation and joy, from which no event, and no power, human or superhuman, could separate him. There is something in the bare relation of this disciple to his Lord, apart from all specific declarations, which impresses us with the conviction that Christ, in the apostle's view, was more than a morally perfect man. He stands forth as the divine author of a new spiritual creation.

The best fruit that we can gather from a view of the life of Paul is a rebuke for the languid spirit that belongs to our service of the Master, and a spur to a more unselfish, earnest, courageous performance of whatever work he has given us to do. The most effectual defence of the Christian cause is not reasoning, which ingenious men may contrive to parry, but the irresistible argument of a holy life, before which infidelity stands abashed.

THE FOUR GOSPELS : A REVIEW OF SUPERNATURAL RELIGION.*

THE anonymotus work entitled *Supernatural Religion* is an elaborate attack upon the validity of the evidences and the authenticity of the documents of the Christian religion. The morality of the New Testament is alone possessed of value, in the judgment of the writer ; and this morality is not helped, but weakened, in its influence by the religious doctrine connected with it.† By “morality” he understands love to God and man, although he implies that the personality of God is an anthropomorphic conception.‡ He reserves, however, the full exposition of his theoretical system, which is to supersede revelation, for another work, to be issued hereafter. Nearly one-half of the first volume (pp. 1–214) is taken up with a discussion of the subject of miracles, in which their incredibility is advocated, and a polemical review is presented of the arguments of Newman, Trench, and especially of Mozley. The remainder of the first volume and the whole of the second are devoted to a critical examination of the evidence for the genuineness of the synoptic Gospels and of the Gospel of John. In this, by far the most important, portion of the work, the early ecclesiastical writers are subjected to an extended scrutiny. The author is conversant with the modern critical discussions in Germany. He is very copious in his marginal references to books, even taking pains to point out volume and page of

* From *The Independent*, in November and December, 1874. The title of the work reviewed is : *Supernatural Religion. An Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation.* In two vols. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

† Vol. ii., p. 483.

‡ Vol. i., p. 72.

the well-known manuals on the Introduction to the New Testament, and of other books of a like character, on occasions where there is hardly need of so much particularity. The book is, for substance, a reproduction in English of the theories and arguments of the Tübingen school respecting early Christianity and the gospels. Baur, Hilgenfeld, Volkmar, Zeller, Schwegler, Scholten, and their coadjutors are the names with which his foot-notes are most frequently sprinkled. It is the Tübingen criticism anglicized. The impression which the book makes in England, if we may judge from the tone of the English press, indicates a want of familiarity on the part of the educated class in that country with the course of theological discussion on the continent. Journals like the *Pall Mall Gazette* are quite dazzled at the erudition, as well as skill, of the unknown combatant. In some points this Anglican critic out-herods Herod. For example, in contradiction to most of the scholars of the German sceptical school, he still claims that Marcion's Gospel is the original of Luke's,* and will not admit—what even Hilgenfeld and Strauss concede—that the Clementine Homilies quote from the fourth gospel. Candid and discerning readers of works like Bleek's *Introduction to the New Testament*, Norton's *Genuineness of the Gospels*, and Westcott's *Canon of the New Testament*—we purposely name books which are accessible to English readers—will detect without difficulty the fallacies which swarm in this last attack on the gospels. To sift the work in detail and to expose the mass of sophistry which it contains would require a large space. It is practicable, however, to point out the weakness of some of its main positions.

We begin with the first three Gospels. We shall afterwards take up the Gospel of John. It cannot be denied (and this author does not deny) that in the latter half of the second century the number of Gospels acknowledged in

*[This opinion is retracted in the 7th edition of *Supernatural Religion*.]

the church everywhere—from Antioch and the farthest East to Carthage and the Atlantic shore of Spain—is limited to the four of our canon. Clement, and Irenæus, and Tertullian, the Italic version, and probably the Syriac version, are the chief witnesses. These Gospels the fathers of that time affirm to have been handed down from the apostolic age. This anonymous author fifty times asserts that in the first half of the second century numerous gospels were widely circulated in the church. This statement is utterly unproved and it is untrue. The Gospel of the Hebrews, in its different recensions, was an altered Matthew, and the Gospel of Marcion a mutilated Luke. The one was in use among the Ebionites and the other in the Marcionite sect. Leaving these out of the account, the reiterated statement about the wide circulation and acceptance of other gospels is without foundation. But, if the writer's assertion were true, it would puzzle him to give a satisfactory explanation of the fact that the four—these and no others—are found, in the last quarter of the second century, consentaneously adopted by the churches scattered over the Roman Empire, and adopted without a lip of dissent or contradiction among them.

Very few of the ecclesiastical writers of the *first* half of the second century are extant. The most important of those whose works remain is Justin Martyr. About the genuineness of his two apologies and of the dialogue with Trypho there is no question. It is natural that the author of *Supernatural Religion* should exert himself to the utmost to show that Justin's quotations are not, as they have been generally deemed to be, derived from the gospels of the canon, but from lost works. About forty years ago, Credner, a theologian of Giessen, published his critical works on the New Testament, in which the quotations of Justin were collected and tabulated. The judgment of this scholar was not always equal to his learning. He held that the first three gospels were in the hands of Justin, and he believed in the Johannine authorship of the fourth; but he attributed

exaggerated influence to the Jewish gospels—the “Gospel of the Hebrews,” etc.—and maintained that Justin drew at least the main portion of his passages from them. The Tübingen doctors started with the facts and data of Credner, and, as one might expect, pushed his theory to the extreme of excluding altogether the canonical gospels from the knowledge of Justin. The author of *Supernatural Religion* treads closely in their footsteps. Justin ten times calls the source of his quotations the *Memoirs by the Apostles*, and five times simply *Memoirs*; in one case he speaks of them as composed by “the apostles and their companions,”* and once he explains that they “are called Gospels.”† In the passage where “the apostles and their companions” are mentioned as the authors of the *Memoirs* the connected quotation is found in Luke, a circumstance that would account for the express reference to “companions” in connection with “apostles.” The reason why the gospels are called *Memoirs*, without a mention of the author’s names, is plain. Justin was writing for heathen readers, or for Jews, who knew nothing of the evangelists by name, and would not understand the title “Gospels.” In several places in the “Dialogue with Trypho,” who was acquainted with Christianity, Justin does use “the Gospel” in the singular as a designation for the *Memoirs*. Seeing that later fathers in the same century—as Irenæus and Tertullian—employ this very term as a name for the four gospels collectively, it is natural to suppose that Justin did the same. His Dialogue with Trypho was written about A.D. 160, when Irenæus must have been about thirty years of age. The *Memoirs*, whatever they were, were read along with the prophets, Justin tells us, in the Christian assemblies on the Lord’s Day, in city and country. The author whom we are reviewing repeatedly affirms that Justin did not consider the *Memoirs* inspired or authoritative, that he believed them solely on

* *Dial.*, c. 103.

† *Apol.* i., 66.

account of their accordance with prophecy, and that he was a Judaizer, hostile to Paul—statements contrary to the truth, but not of sufficient relevancy to require here a refutation. In the first place, this author expresses the remarkable opinion that Justin by his *Memoirs* designates a *single* gospel—one work. Then this one book must have had “the apostles and their companions” for its authors! Against this odd supposition, stands not only the natural interpretation of Justin’s language in all of his references to the *Memoirs*, but also his express declaration that they “are called gospels.” But this last clause, without a particle of manuscript evidence, is thrown out of the text and pronounced spurious! That the author is not absolutely alone in this emendation makes it none the less an arbitrary conjecture. When Justin speaks of the *Memoirs* as written by “the apostles and their companions” there is no reason to doubt that he has in mind the works which Tertullian describes in just the same manner. When he refers to a circumstance about Peter as recorded in his *Memoirs* it is right to conclude that the Gospel of Mark which Papias and the ancient church connected with Peter as having been written by his disciple, is the book referred to.* Secondly, the author of *Supernatural Religion* tries to get over the difficulty arising from the liturgical use of the *Memoirs*, by pretending that many other works were read in like manner. A few homiletic writings—as the *Epistle of Clement*, and the *Shepherd of Hermas*—were not unfrequently read in the early churches. But, with the exception of the Gospel of the Hebrews in the Ebionitic communities, there is no proof that other gospels than the four had this public recognition. Justin must have been acquainted with the churches of Italy and Asia. How did the unknown gospel, which corresponded so closely to the canonical narratives, and

* In *Dial.*, c. 106. In the same sentence, Justin refers to Boanerges, as the name given to John and James, a fact mentioned by Mark alone of the Evangelists.

which it is pretended that Justin quotes from, get crowded out of the services on Sunday and get supplanted by others, and all within the space of a few years, since Irenæus must have been a man grown, when Justin wrote his *Dialogue*? Justin himself dwells on the multitude of Christians in his time, who were scattered over the whole world, among all nations, whether nomadic or civilized.* How could the gospels which existed in multiplied copies, and which they read in their public worship, be suddenly dropped, and exchanged for others, and no notice be left of the fact of such a revolution or of the process by which it was effected?

In the very great number of references to the gospel narrative in Justin there is a general and striking coincidence with our evangelists. We shall here speak of the first three gospels, reserving the consideration of John for a later page. We have in Justin no myths respecting Mary and the infancy of Jesus, such as fill the apocryphal narratives. Why attribute his references to any other source than to the gospels of the canon? First, our author brings forward the fact that the quotations are not verbally accurate. But (*a*) this is no peculiarity of Justin. The other fathers, who are known to have received the four alone, quote from memory and exhibit the same sort of inaccuracy. One of the most striking instances of this inexact method of quotation is in the case of Matt. xi. 27 (Luke x. 22), on which our author builds much. But the same deviations from the canonical text are found in Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Irenæus; so that his argument is good for nothing. To paraphrase a passage, instead of giving it *verbatim*; to combine the language of two evangelists upon the same matter; to misrecollect the phraseology of a passage and to quote it more than once in the same inexact form, are so natural, so explicable on known principles of mental action, and so common, even at the present day, that phe-

* *Dial.*, c. 117.

nomena of this sort, occurring at a time when the gospels were comparatively new and were read only in manuscripts, should occasion no surprise. It is true that the author before us stigmatizes this method of accounting for Justin's inaccurate quotations, as "elastic," "convenient," "arbitrary," etc. But such epithets will affect no one who reflects on the subject and who is acquainted with the ordinary practice of the authors of antiquity. (*b*) We find that Justin quotes other writers with quite as much freedom as to the verbal form. He quotes the Septuagint with similar departures from the text. He quotes from Plato, especially in one striking passage where we might look for a literal citation, with a deviation from the original as marked as that of most of his gospel quotations.* Did he read a different Plato, an apocryphal *Timæus*? Is the supposition that he read the *Timæus* that we read, "elastic," "arbitrary," the subterfuge of "Apologists"? He quotes from Isaiah, doubtless by a mistake, a passage not to be found in the prophet.† Does this prove that he had another Isaiah or was unacquainted with the canonical books of the Old Testament? Has the canonical Isaiah supplanted an earlier Isaiah which Justin used? Lastly (*c*), Justin differs from himself. He brings forward in repeated instances passages which he gives in different places in a varying form. In the passage to which we have adverted (Matt. xi. 27) our author finds in Justin's use of the aorist for the present ("knew" for "knoweth") proof of the use of a heretical gospel. But Justin himself cites the passage, giving the verb in the present.‡ This comparison of Justin with himself proves conclusively that he was in the habit of quoting from memory and frequently without taking pains to cite the text *verbatim*. If the position of the author of *Supernatural Religion* is to stand, he must show that Justin's quotations deviate from our gospels in such a way as to ac-

* *Apol.* ii., 10.

† *Dial.*, c. 138.

‡ *Dial.*, c. 100.

cord systematically with the Jewish gospel, to which he attributes them. This, secondly, he attempts to do. Assuming that the Clementine Homilies quote from such a gospel, he would make out a verbal correspondence between certain of Justin's passages and those found in that work. In this effort he follows Credner. The attempt is made with reference only to a very few of the numerous references to the gospel narrative in the Homilies, and the result of the comparison is far from justifying the inference of the author. For example, both Justin and the Homilies ascribe to the Lord the precept, "Let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay." But the canonical epistle of James gives the precept in the same form, and so does Clement of Alexandria, who regarded the four gospels as alone authoritative. The ecclesiastical writers may have taken the form of the precept from James—the form in which it came orally to this Apostle. The instances of verbal coincidence—so far as such exist between Justin's references and those of the Clementines—are quite inadequate to prove a common source distinct from the canonical gospels. When Justin's quotations are compared generally with those of the Homilies, it is found that, so far from tallying with them, they differ in phraseology as widely as do Justin's from the text of our evangelists. The third main argument in *Supernatural Religion*, on the topic before us, is founded on the references in Justin to facts and sayings not contained in our Gospels. These additions are frequently alleged to be numerous and important. This is not true. In the multitude of references to Christ's teaching, there are only two sayings ascribed to him which are extra-canonical. One is the prediction that heresies and divisions would break out; the other is—"In whatsoever things I apprehend you, in these will I judge you." The first of these (resembling the passage in 1 Cor. xi. 18 seq.), is attributed to Jesus by Clement of Alexandria and Lactantius. The second is also in Clement, as well as in later writers. Justin speaks of Jesus as

having been born in a cave—a circumstance referred to also by Origen and in many of the later fathers, and unquestionably an early tradition. But it was in a manger—Justin tells us in the same passage—that Christ was born; the cave contained a manger. Justin says that when Jesus entered the water to be baptized a fire was kindled in the Jordan. The same thing is found in several apocryphal books. In the Gospel of the Hebrews the fire is said to have appeared when he came up from the water. Here we have probably an early tradition, which became incorporated in more than one writer. Justin represents the voice from Heaven at the baptism as saying: “Thou art my Son. This day I have begotten thee.” We learn from Augustine that this reading of the passage was current in his day. It is found in the old Latin version. It occurs in the Cambridge manuscript D. It is met with in Clement of Alexandria, and other later authors. Justin speaks of Jesus as a carpenter, making plows and yokes—a statement introduced into the apocryphal *Gospel of the Infancy* and the *Gospel of Thomas*. Justin says that the people considered his miracles a magic phantasy and called him a magician. This may have been a free paraphrase of the statements in Matthew ix. 34; xii. 24; Mark iii. 22; Luke xi. 15; but it is found in Origen, the *Recognitions* of Pseudo-Clement, and elsewhere. He also says that the ass on which he rode was tied to a vine—a circumstance which probably connected itself early in the tradition with the prophecy in Genesis xlix. 10; with which Justin associates it.* This brief list comprises everything which can fairly be called a supplement to the contents of the four Gospels in the entire mass of Justin’s references; and, as this writer says Justin’s works “teem with these quotations.”† They are here brought together, be it observed, from all his works. In the places where they occur, they would hardly attract an ordinary reader’s attention. It is not impossible that Justin may have been

* *Dial.*, c. 53.

† Vol. i., p. 341.

acquainted with the Gospel of the Hebrews—the Ebionitic Matthew; and that reminiscences of his reading of that book may have mingled themselves with his extracts from the canonical four. Certain sayings of Jesus and circumstances in his life which are not recorded by the Evangelists formed a part of the early tradition. They found their way into books. Whether Justin drew these few things from such books or from an oral source—from traditional report—it is difficult to decide. But there is one point of capital importance: *not one of these extra-canonical statements is referred by him to the Memoirs.* The author of *Supernatural Religion* labors hard to prove the contrary, but he labors in vain. In the account of the baptism of Jesus it is only what our gospels contain that is referred by Justin to the *Memoirs*. To infer that he means to attribute his whole narrative of this event to them is without warrant. If this inference were just, it would only authorize us to conclude that Justin's memory in this instance, as in the case of various references by him to the Old Testament, was imperfect.

That Justin drew the bulk of his references to the gospels from the Matthew, Mark, and Luke of our canon, is one of the best-established results of impartial critical and historical research. That he made use of John's Gospel is, also, capable of satisfactory proof.

If the notions of the author of *Supernatural Religion* as to the source of Justin's quotations were tenable we should have to conclude that there was a gospel preceding the four of the canon, which contained a great part of the contents of all of them; that the four were written on the basis of it, each drawing off a portion of the matter; that this comprehensive gospel was dropped by the churches after the middle of the second century, and the four taken up in the room of it.*

* [The improbabilities (amounting to absurdity) of this theory as to the contents of *The Gospel to the Hebrews*, and its relation to the canonical gospels, are well set forth in *The Lost Gospel and its Contents*, by the Rev. M. F. Sadler, M.A. (London, 1876).]

As we approach the close of the second century we find that the churches everywhere, without conciliar action or the influence of prominent individuals, have settled in common upon the four gospels as possessed of exclusive authority. This very remarkable fact is fully attested, as we have remarked, by the testimony of the fathers, and by the early versions. The author of *Supernatural Religion* repeatedly alludes to the use of other gospels by Clement of Alexandria ; but Clement himself, referring to an alleged conversation of Salome and Jesus, says : “ We have not this saying *in the four gospels which have been handed down to us*, but in that according to the Egyptians.” * He distinguishes the four as authoritative. We must offer a brief comment here upon the way in which the Muratorian Canon is treated in the work which we are criticising. This interesting fragment, as is well known, begins with a broken sentence, which may be naturally interpreted as relating to Mark’s Gospel. The ms. then proceeds to speak of the “ third book of the Gospel according to Luke ” ; then of the Gospel of John, which is called the fourth ; and then of the Acts. That Matthew and Mark preceded this notice of Luke in the ms., no person can reasonably doubt. Yet this author is bold enough to say that there is no evidence of it “ stronger than a mere conjecture.” The ms. says of the *Pastor of Hermas* : “ Hermas, in truth, composed the Pastor *very recently in our times* in the City of Rome, the Bishop Pius, his brother, sitting in the chair of the Church of the City of Rome.” The latest possible date of the episcopate of Pius is 142–157 ; yet our author falls back upon a subterfuge of Volkmar, who suggested that the writer of the canon speaks of the date of Hermas comparatively, in relation to that of the apostolic writings—a suggestion having no support from the language of the document—and forthwith brings down its date “ to a late period of the third century.” He even observes, with

* *Strom.*, iii., 13.

some *naïveté*, that if it can be supposed that the phrase was used thirty or forty years after the time of Pius, "so much license is taken that there is absolutely no reason why a still greater interval may not be allowed." "Very recently," "in our times"—keep us, at least, within the limit of the second century. Be it observed that this same author, who resorts to such flimsy arguments in order to bring the Muratorian ms. down into the third century, nevertheless treats the fact that Matthew and Mark were referred to in it, as "a mere conjecture!"

This author discloses a partisan spirit in what he says of Marcion's Gospel, which, being an altered, mutilated Luke, proves the currency of the canonical third gospel in the first half of the second century. Ritschl and some others of the Tübingen school, contrary to the declaration of the fathers—Irenæus, Tertullian, Epiphanius—and to the well-nigh universal opinion, had defended the proposition that Marcion's Gospel was first and that Luke's grew out of it. This opinion was confuted by Volkmar, of the same school, who was supported by Hilgenfeld and Zeller; and these were joined by Baur and by Ritschl, who retracted their former opinions. The priority of our Luke in general was thus conceded by the sceptical school which had impugned it. The author of *Supernatural Religion* is adventurous enough to take up "the lost cause." He prepares the way by sweeping remarks upon the utterly uncritical habit of the fathers, and the worthlessness of their testimony. Especially does he seek to heap contempt upon Tertullian, the most formidable witness in the case, who, though a vehement controversialist (like Martin Luther), had taken great pains to inform himself about Marcion. Almost the only thing of the nature of serious argument in connection with this indiscriminate and, therefore, unjust diatribe against the fathers, is the attempt to show that Marcion admitted into his Gospel various things inconsistent with his alleged design to exclude what gave sanction to the Old Testament and the Jewish

system. Whoever will carefully consider the omitted passages—as given by De Wette and Bleek—will see that they fully sustain the allegation of the church writers as to the intent of Marcion. That he did not use the pruning-knife with absolute consistency and thoroughness, that in some cases he relied upon strained and perverse interpretations, as a means of getting rid of obnoxious statements, does not militate against the truth of this allegation. In the case of one of Marcion's characteristic alterations, our author defends Marcion's reading, in the face of decisive evidence. The passage is Luke xvi. 17. Marcion rejected all of the apostles but Paul, and, hence, cast away the gospels with which they were connected. But Irenæus and Tertullian both distinctly imply that he was acquainted with the other canonical gospels. Marcion expunged, also, from the Epistles of Paul passages opposed to his own type of doctrine. This is established, although in some cases his variations were doubtless due to diverse readings of the text. The Marcionites, after their master, introduced further alterations into the documents which they received. Besides the peculiarity of Marcion's changes, it is on other grounds irrational to assign the priority to his gospel. Did the church in the middle of the second century take a gospel from the hands of a heretical sect and amplify it? This is one marvelous hypothesis which has not wanted supporters. The absurdity of it the author before us appears to recognize. He broaches the theory that Marcion's Gospel was the original Luke, and had remained in use among the churches of Pontus after it had been supplanted elsewhere by our third gospel. He would have us believe that Marcion's Gospel had been altered and enlarged, and in this new form had been spread abroad; while the first form, the germ of it, still remained among the orthodox Christians of Pontus, where Marcion was brought up. It is fatal to this extraordinary hypothesis that there is not a particle of evidence, from any quarter, that Marcion's Gospel was ever used by

any but Marcionites. There is no proof whatever that Marcion, his opponents, or his followers pretended that his gospel was in use among the orthodox anywhere, either before or after his time. Marcion's Gospel began with the third chapter of our Luke. The prologue of Luke—the first verses—bears every mark of being a part of the original work, and not a forged addition by some later hand. The Gospel has throughout the same uniform characteristics of style and language. It is by one and the same writer.*

The author of *Supernatural Religion* is not less sophisticated in his treatment of the testimony of Papias. He is very free in imputing prejudice and unfairness to Westcott, Tischendorf, and to "Apologists" generally; but he himself furnishes not a few instances of special pleading which are not worthy of a scholar. "It is clear," he says, "that, even if Papias knew any of our gospels, he attached little or no value to them."† As if Papias took pains to give an account of the origin of gospels and of the connection of apostles with them, but attached no value to these works! Papias says that Mark, in writing down Peter's accounts of Christ's deeds and words, did not observe a chronological order. On the ground of the statement, which, at best may have been a merely subjective judgment of Papias—natural, perhaps, in view of the abrupt beginning and abbreviated character of the second Gospel—it is concluded that Papias refers to some other book than our Mark. Neither Irenæus, Eusebius, or any other of the ancient writers, who had the work of Papias in their hands, dreamed of his referring to any other Mark than the canonical Gospel. We are told again, of course, that these authors were uncritical, imbecile: yet they were critical enough to make inquiries on this very subject, and to examine the statements of Papias. These

* [As stated above, the author of *Supernatural Religion*, in his last edition, retracts the opinion that Marcion's Gospel preceded the canonical Luke.]

† Vol. ii., p. 445.

wholesale charges against the fathers are extremely unjust, and are only serviceable to help an advocate bolster up a weak cause. When it serves his turn, this same writer is ready enough to rely on them. Hilgenfeld maintained that our Mark has been manipulated by a devotee of the Petrine interest. The author before us thinks it not Petrine enough to suit the account of Papias. A candid student will find little weight in the arguments of either of these critics on this point. There is nothing in the gospel, and nothing omitted from it, which can lead to the conclusion that a disciple of Peter was not its author. But if *Supernatural Religion* is correct in holding that Papias referred here to the apocryphal book called *The Preaching of Peter*, it is an interesting question how this book became universally supplanted and superseded by our second Gospel, without any notice, too, of the fact, or any traces of a controversy. We are not favored with any solution of this tough problem. "It is not necessary for us to account" for this disappearance of one book, and adoption of another in its room, says our author; and then he pours out his customary assertions about the uncritical character of the fathers. This is simply to throw dust in the eyes of his readers. There are curious inconsistencies in this author's comments upon the reference of Papias to Matthew. He takes the term *Logia* in the restricted sense, to denote "the discourses" of the Lord. Hence he infers that the first Gospel, in its present form, was not known to Papias—a quite illegitimate inference, since Papias, in referring to the translation which every one made as he could from the Aramaic original, speaks in the aorist tense. The implication is, that the necessity for translating no longer existed. The main point of our author's argumentation is that, if there was not a Hebrew (Aramaic) original, we have no testimony to the fact of the existence of a Gospel by Matthew. Various writers—including even Guizot—have asserted that Calvin first published his *Institutes* in French. The fact is that the first publication of

that work was in Latin. Then, by parallel reasoning, as regards the testimony of all these writers, we have no proof at all that Calvin ever wrote or published the *Institutes*. But the author of *Supernatural Religion* appeals to the statement of Pantænus, Irenæus, Eusebius, and the fathers generally, in favor of a Hebrew original of Matthew. Now all of these fathers speak of the *entire* Gospel; so that, by parity of reasoning, again, if their testimony is good for anything, it was the whole Gospel which Papias had. The chronological position of this "ancient man" renders the opposite opinion in the highest degree improbable. The question whether the first Gospel is a translation or not, is decided differently by equally competent critics. Bleek plausibly explains how Papias might have been misled on this point. His testimony in general would not be invalidated by such an error. The author of *Supernatural Religion* contends with much positiveness that if the first Gospel is a translation of a lost original, it is destitute of authority. But here, as so often elsewhere, he falls into fallacious, extravagant assertions.

We have not the space even to sum up the evidence for the antiquity of the first three Gospels. The unanimous, undisputed acceptance of them by the churches of the last half of the second century, their coincidence with known fact in a thousand archæological particulars, their eschatological passages (Matt. xxiv., xxv., etc.), their sobriety of tone, in which they are in marked contrast with apocryphal Gospels, are among the principal proofs of their early composition. Referring to a strange expression about the millenium, attributed, on the ground of tradition, by Papias to Jesus, the work before us says that, if "it be not of a very elevated character, it is quite in the spirit of that age." This author would not deny that it is utterly foreign to the spirit of the canonical Gospels. It illustrates what sort of stuff they would have contained had they been composed at the period where he would place them. We may say one

word here upon the genuineness of the Gospel of Luke. The book of Acts refers back to the third Gospel. Both profess to be by the same author. They are homogeneous in style. Both books were written throughout by the same pen. Tradition from the beginning ascribed them to Luke. At the part of the narrative in the Acts where Paul leaves Troas (xvi. 11) the writer first uses the first person plural—"we." This disappears after Paul leaves Philippi and until his return. Then the same form of expression reappears (xxi. 1-18; xxvii. 1; xxviii. 17). It is implied, of course, that the writer became a companion of Paul. Since the *Acts* is not a conglomerate, is not a piece of patchwork, but is composed and wrought by a single author, it follows that, if this author was not an actual participant in the events at the points referred to, we must attribute to him a knavish device—a trick, too, of a sort unexampled in apocryphal literature. Suppose these two books to have been written by Luke, to whom the unanimous tradition of the ancient churches ascribed them, and the peculiarities to which we have adverted, as well as their whole structure and complexion, meet with a perfectly natural explanation. But, if the genuineness of Luke is established, doubt respecting the antiquity of Matthew and Mark must disappear.

The patristic evidence for the Gospels is, to use an old simile, like a bundle of fagots. There are single sticks in the bundle which it is almost impossible to break. Of many of these rods, however, it is true that each can be separately broken; yet, when combined, they are irrefragable. There are leading proofs, and there are corroborative proofs. The art of the controversialist, which the author of *Supernatural Religion* finely exemplifies, is to isolate each of the numerous items of evidence and then attack it by itself. Thus, in the case of the *Fourth Gospel*, there are passages in Ignatius, in the Epistle to Diognetus, and in other documents, which, taken in connection with the general stream of

evidence, go to prove the Johannine authorship; though, considered by themselves, they are not conclusive. The writer's arguments against the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel are few of them new, and they have been more than once confuted. His attempt to show that Papias was not acquainted with the Fourth Gospel, on account of the silence of Eusebius on this point, is utterly futile, as any one can see who will observe the limit which Eusebius proposes to observe, and actually did observe, in his references to quotations made by the earlier writers from New Testament books. References to "acknowledged," or undisputed books, among which he reckons John's Gospel, he did not profess to notice.* The efforts to show that Justin Martyr was not acquainted with this gospel is one of the points that merit attention. This author maintains that Justin drew his conceptions of the Logos mainly from Philo. But Justin, although he may have been acquainted with Philo's writings, does not mention him, even in the dialogue with the Jew, where the authority of the Alexandrian might have helped him in his argument. But there is this grand peculiarity of Justin and the Christian writers, that they dwell upon the incarnation. It is the *incarnate* Logos in whom they are chiefly interested. But the incarnation of the Logos is something utterly foreign to Alexandrian Judaism. The Logos is scarcely personal in Philo; of the incarnation of the Logos in a man, the life and soul of the doctrine alike in John and in Justin, the Alexandrian speculatist knows nothing. The substance of the Christian conception of Christ was the direct effect of the impression which he made upon the apostles and of his testimony respecting himself. The Logos terminology was no part of his own teaching; it was the vehicle through which John expressed his idea of Christ, thereby rectifying all other notions of "the Word." Again, it is in the highest degree improbable that Justin should say as much as he

* Eusebius, *H. E.*, iii., 3.

does of Christ as the Word unless he depended for this doctrine on some authoritative gospel. A single allusion of doubtful meaning to Christ as the Word, in the Apocalypse, is utterly insufficient to account for the phenomena which Justin's writings present. When we find him, then, in connection with remarks on the Logos, distinctly referring to the *Memoirs*,* who can honestly doubt that it is John's Gospel which is the source of his doctrine? The terms in which he describes the incarnation differ in form, rather than substance, from those of John; and our author's argument in this matter is a very frail one. When we come to single passages, that on regeneration baffles every attempt to connect it with any other source than the Fourth Gospel.† Both of the verbal deviations in Justin from the text of the Gospel are found in the same passage as quoted by Irenæus and by Eusebius, and both of them are easily explained. The substitution of "Kingdom of Heaven" for "Kingdom of God" is an inaccuracy of frequent occurrence in citing this passage. In this way, as Prof. Abbot has pointed out, Jeremy Taylor quotes the passage.‡ The differences in the passage as quoted in the *Clementine Homilies* and by Justin are as marked as are the points of resemblance. Moreover, Hilgenfeld and Volkmar concede that the author of the *Clementines* quotes from John. The endeavor of *Supernatural Religion* to show the contrary—even in reference to the story of the man born blind§—is a desperate attempt to disprove what is patent to every unbiased scholar. There is no known source to which the account of this miracle can be referred, except the Fourth Gospel. When the concluding portion of the *Homilies* was issued by Dressel, containing unmistakable references to John's Gospel, the whole enterprise of tracing Justin's quotation on the new birth to a lost gospel suffered

* *Dial.*, c. 105.

† *Apol.* i., 61.

‡ See Am. ed. of Smith's *Bible Dict.*, Art. *John, Gospel of*.

§ *Hom.* xix., 22.

shipwreck. In his desire to weaken the force of the proof derived from the *Clementine Homilies*, the author would make the date of the work as late as possible. But the later he makes it, the more improbable is his hypothesis that these passages, which are in the characteristic style of John, are quotations from some other book.

We must pass over the writer's effort to show that Valentinus, Marcion, and other teachers, heretical and orthodox, were not acquainted with the Fourth Gospel. He is obliged, in respect to Marcion and Valentine, for example, to contradict, by an arbitrary dictum, the explicit assertions of the ecclesiastical writers who were in a position to know the truth. All the evidence, external and internal, goes to show that the Fourth Gospel preceded the Valentinian heresy. If it be supposed, as this writer would have us think, that the Fourth Gospel was used not by Valentinus and Basilides themselves, but by their disciples and followers—by "the school" of Valentinus and by "the school" of Basilides—what is the result? Why, we are driven to the conclusion that in the very heat and ferment of the great Gnostic controversy, this new Gospel appeared, was accepted by both antagonistic parties as an authority, was referred to by each and interpreted by each in his own manner—all uniting in ascribing it to John! Is any marvel that is narrated in the Gospel itself greater than such a fact would be? A new Gospel, distinguished from the gospels already in use by striking peculiarities, pronouncing upon doctrinal points of the highest interest and moment to the two contending parties, is composed by some unknown writer, but is accepted at once, without hesitation, and without suspicion, by both!

We wish especially to call the attention of our readers to this writer's disposition of the testimony of Irenæus. This testimony is of so convincing a character that the only possible mode of turning the edge of it is by an assault upon the intelligence of the witness. Accordingly, Irenæus is pronounced so wholly uncritical as to be absolutely unworthy

of confidence. That this father sometimes errs we admit. An example, and the most striking example, is his idea respecting the long ministry of Jesus, which he accepted from others, of course without a critical attention to the data afforded by the Gospels. He is sometimes fanciful in his reasoning, as are Augustine and most of the patristic writers. Nevertheless, he was a man of more than ordinary talents; practical, sober in his judgments, and conscientious. That he was careless as to accepting spurious documents is a false accusation. It is one of his own charges against the Gnostics that they alter the gospels, and frame new gospels for themselves. In short, he is an unexceptionable witness on the question before us. Now, Irenæus, in his youth, knew Polycarp, a pupil of John. He remembered how Polycarp discoursed of the Apostle John. He had also known other presbyters in Asia Minor who had been acquainted with the same apostle. Irenæus gives the most decisive testimony to the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel. So established is he in his faith in the four as the only authentic gospels that he appeals, in a fanciful way, to cosmical and other analogies to show that there *must* be four and only four. Strange to say, this conceit is referred to by sceptical writers, including the author before us, to discredit Irenæus's testimony. If Irenæus had been first led to believe in the four by the fact of there being four winds, and four quarters of the globe, there might be some force in the objection. But everybody who reads him knows that the ground of his faith in the Four Gospels is the testimony of the churches and of "the elders." To this he explicitly refers his readers; and these fanciful analogies indicate not at all the source, but only the strength and settled character of his reliance upon the Four Gospels of the Canon as the sole authentic sources of knowledge respecting Jesus. The chronological position of Irenæus, whose active life covered the last forty years of the second century, his intimate acquaintance with the churches in the East, as well as in the West, and his separation by

only a single link from the Apostle John himself, give to his testimony an irresistible weight.

There are several references in the writings of Irenæus to his acquaintance with Polycarp. From the most copious of these, his letter to Florinus, who had joined the Valentini-ans, we copy this extract :

“ Those opinions, Florinus, that I may speak in mild terms, are not of sound doctrine ; those opinions are not in agreement with the church, and involve those who adopt them in the deepest impiety ; those opinions not even the heretics outside of the church have ever ventured to broach ; those opinions the elders who were before us, who were the pupils of the apostles, did not deliver to you. For, while I was still a boy, I saw you in Lower Asia, with Polycarp, when you were in a brilliant position in the royal palace and strove to approve yourself to him. For I recall better what occurred at that time than I do recent events, since what we learned in childhood being united to the soul as it grows up, becomes incorporated with it, so that I can even describe the place in which the blessed Polycarp used to sit and discourse, his goings out, too, and comings in, the manner of his life and the form of his body, and his discourses which he used to deliver to the people, and how he spoke of his familiar intercourse with John and with the rest of those who had heard the Lord, and how he would call to mind their words. And whatever things he had heard from them respecting the Lord, both as to his miracles and his teaching, just as Polycarp had received it from the eye-witnesses of the Word of Life, he recounted it agreeably to the Scriptures. These things, through the mercy of God which was upon me, I diligently heard and treasured them up, not on paper, but in my heart, and I am continually, by the grace of God, revolving these things in my mind ; and I can bear witness before God that, if that blessed and apostolic elder had ever heard any such thing, he would have cried out and stopped his ears, saying, as he was wont to say : ‘ Good God ! unto what times hast thou reserved me that I should endure these things ? ’ And he would have fled from the very place where, whether sitting or standing, he had heard such words.”*

This extract will enable the reader to judge of the tone and spirit of Irenæus, and to decide whether it is probable that a gospel having all the peculiarities of the fourth, and differing, as that does, from the synoptics, could have been

* Irenæus (ed. Stieren) i., 822 seq.

invented, and silently palmed off on the churches throughout the Roman empire, during the period when Polycarp was in active life and either shortly before or shortly after the personal intercourse of Irenæus with him. The truth is, that the recent adversaries of the genuineness of this gospel have done no sort of justice to the external evidence in its favor.

The examination of the internal evidence respecting the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, in the book before us, presents few points that are fresh. We must content ourselves with noticing one of these. Says this writer : * “ The author [of the Fourth Gospel] shows in a marked way that he is not a Jew, by making Caiaphas and the chief priests and Pharisees speak of the Jewish nation, and the people not as ὁ λαός, like the Synoptics and other New Testament writings; but as τὸ ἔθνος, the term always employed by the Jews to designate the Gentiles.” Now John uses the word *ethnos* in only two passages—in xi. 48–52 and in xviii. 35. In the last case it is uttered by Pilate; “Thine own *nation* and the chief priests,” etc. In Pilate’s mouth, surely, this word might naturally be expected. In the other passage (John xi. 50) Caiaphas uses both terms—that one man should die for the people (*laos*), and not that the whole nation (*ethnos*) should perish.” The latter term denotes the Jewish people more in a political relation; the former, in a theocratic character. In any event, it would be natural for John to use the term *ethnos*, writing, as he was, for Gentiles, at a distance from Judea. But in Luke’s Gospel it is twice used by Jews of themselves—cc. vii. 5, xxiii. 2; and in the Acts in cc., xxiv. 17, xxvi. 4, xxvii. 19; also in Rom. x. 19. The statement of *Supernatural Religion*, which we have quoted here, is far from being a solitary example of inexact assertion and weak reasoning to be met with in this portion of the book.

* Vol. ii., 410.

This author brings forward no definite theory of his own in relation to the motives and design of the writer—whoever he was—of the Fourth Gospel. Here is a history of Jesus written from beginning to end by one man who earnestly believes that Jesus is the Messiah, and written in order that others might partake of his faith. According to the Tübingen doctors, he composed a fictitious biography of the Master, whom he loved and adored. Why did he do this? In answer to this question we are told that all his interest was in the metaphysical, pre-existent Logos; that the history of Jesus had for him personally no importance. It is the manufactured investiture of an idea. Except on this remarkable hypothesis, the Tübingen theory about the Fourth Gospel is not even intelligible, much less plausible. If it be true, then, that the faith of the author of the Gospel was “a historical faith”—that is to say, if his faith centered in the *incarnate* Jesus—living, teaching, working miracles, dying and rising from the dead—the whole foundation of the skeptical cause falls away. But who that reads the Fourth Gospel can doubt for a moment that the religious life of the author drew its origin and its daily breath from the *historical* manifestation of Christ? The opposite view can be maintained only by the most arbitrary and artificial exegesis. This fatal weakness of the negative theory has been often pointed out. Quite lately this has been done, with signal clearness, by Beyschlag.* This article demolishes the position of Baur, by showing that the author of the Fourth Gospel was no such transcendental dreamer as the negative school is obliged to assume him to be. He believed in the divine character and mission of Jesus, and in the fourth gospel he sets forth the historical facts on which his belief was founded.

Before the author of *Supernatural Religion* makes his literary onset upon Revelation, he undertakes to prove the

* In the *Studien u. Kritiken*, Oct., 1874.

inherent incredibility of all miracles, and in particular of those which the Gospels describe. His principal points may be conveniently reviewed under five heads :

I. He contends that a supernatural occurrence is incapable of being proved. He goes so far as to say of the supposed case of Paley, that the testimony of twelve observing, sober, disinterested witnesses, of tried veracity, to an event requiring supernatural agency ought to be disbelieved. He reviews and undertakes to expound the reasoning of Hume. Mr. J. S. Mill, among others, has clearly shown that Hume's argument has no weight in disproving a miracle, provided there be a Supreme Being who is able and willing to bring such an event to pass. In other words, the real battle with unbelief is on the principles of natural theology. Is there a God and is Revelation antecedently probable? If so, Hume's argument is stripped of its force; it has no pertinency. Mill also points out the obvious fact that the miracle is no violation of the axiom that the same causes produce the same effects, since the intervention of a new cause is presupposed. To these considerations, so lucidly set forth by one of the chiefs of the empirical school, the book before us offers no adequate reply. All that the author says about "a complete induction" as ruling out miracles, is fully answered in the remarks of Mill to which we have just referred. Whether miracles have occurred is a question of evidence. To elevate practically the presumption adverse to their occurrence, derived from the observed uniformity of Nature, to a level with mathematical axioms, is an extravagance which hardly merits a serious refutation.

But these truths of natural religion—such as the being of a personal God—are, says the author, "a mere assumption." As far as the argument for miracles is concerned, that is granted by the "Apologists," for whom this author is so fond of expressing his contempt. You cannot prove the fact of a miracle to a dogmatic atheist. The Gospels inform us that Christ did not expect persons of this class to assent

to his affirmations respecting himself. What "Apologists" claim is that the existence and character of God and the need of a revelation are assumed on good and sufficient grounds.

II. This author maintains that supernatural events, on the supposition that they should occur, may be referable to evil beings, as well as to God; and that, hence, they have no evidential value. Let it be granted that, as far as mere power is concerned, superhuman evil beings are capable of producing events which surpass the power of men and of natural causes. This objection Christ met by saying that "a house divided against itself cannot stand." Beelzebub does not work against his own cause. He does not do deeds of benevolence which are adapted to win men to the love and worship of God and to the practice of righteousness. We go behind the supernatural occurrence, and determine in particular its origin by moral considerations. Why is not this criterion adequate?

III. Our author strives again to destroy the evidential value of miracles by the consideration that their credibility as divine works is contingent on the character of the doctrine which they profess to verify. The fact we admit; the inference we deny. The doctrine proves the miracle and the miracle proves the doctrine. That is, they lend to each other a mutual corroboration. If the doctrine were immoral or otherwise unworthy, it would discredit the miracle. If, on the contrary, the doctrine seems noble and beneficent and worthy to have God for its source, this lends probability to the miracle, which, in turn, affixes a seal of verity and divinity to the doctrine which accompanies it. The purity and elevation of the doctrine are not only a prerequisite; they also give to the miracle a measure of positive credibility. The author of the work before us argues that, since the contents of Revelation are above reason, they cannot be judged to be credible beforehand; and that the presumption against the recurrence of the miracles adduced in support of

them cannot, therefore, be set aside. The supernatural he would gladly convert into the anti-natural. He takes as the synonym of "doctrine" theological propositions upon the Trinity, the Incarnation, etc. As if the whole teaching of Jesus upon man—his soul, his duties, his relations to God, his sin—and upon the principles of God's government, and as if the personal characteristics of Jesus himself—his wisdom, his self-sacrifice, his stainless purity and rectitude—were not elements in that internal evidence which renders miracles antecedently credible, as the natural and expected accompaniments of this unrivalled moral and spiritual excellence. This author first reduces Christianity and Christ to a few metaphysical conceptions, which, however well warranted, are far from being a fair or complete statement of the Gospel; and then he proceeds to infer that they are not sufficiently clear and credible in themselves to lend an anterior probability to the assertion that miracles attend the promulgation of them. He cannot be ignorant that intelligent "Apologists" have always laid stress on the perfection of the Gospel as a means of deliverance from sin, and as a disclosure of the character of God; on the unparalleled greatness and excellence of Jesus and the peculiarity of his aims. The true relation of the internal to the external argument can be made plain. Let us suppose ourselves to have been among the hearers and attendants of Jesus. We first listen to his teaching. We behold an instance of healing performed by him. It seems altogether miraculous. But we may, perhaps, question the accuracy of our observation; or, admitting the phenomenon, we may doubt as to the agency by which it is made to occur—whether it be, indeed, the act of God, or an effect wrought by some inferior, possibly evil, instrumentality. But the more we see of Jesus the more irresistible becomes the impression of His moral and spiritual integrity and elevation. He speaks as never man spake. Witnessing, further, His wonderful works, we no longer doubt either their reality or the means by which they are wrought.

Coming thus to believe in the works, they cast back a new character of impressiveness upon his teaching, the divine source of which is now demonstrated by these exhibitions of power and love. We were not personally witnesses of the miraculous works, or hearers of the teaching of Christ; but, by means of the testimony of the apostles, we can place ourselves back among those who were, and can see with their eyes and hear with their ears, and can partake of the impression which the whole manifestation of Jesus made upon their minds. It does not follow from the circumstance that Christianity is revealed and presents a mysterious side, that it has no points of contact with man's intelligence and moral nature. Rather is it the "bread of life." It corresponds to an inward hunger. It meets profound and more or less conscious necessities of the soul. It is medicine to the sick. In a word, it is redemption. Our author's argument depends for its plausibility on an extreme and irrational supernaturalism, which ignores the affinity of Christianity to human nature, and the intrinsic rationality of the Gospel, notwithstanding the mysterious aspects and partially insoluble problems which a divine revelation might be expected to offer.

IV. A prominent topic in *Supernatural Religion* is the credulity of the Jews at the time of the appearance of Christ. The book speaks of the "dense ignorance and superstition" of the Jews at that date. The idea is that, in such an atmosphere, a belief in all sorts of miracles might easily arise and spread. When we look for the proofs of this sweeping statement respecting the countrymen and contemporaries of Josephus, we are furnished with an assemblage of notions drawn partly from the book of Enoch and other apocryphal writings, but mainly from the Talmud, which is assumed to reflect the prevalent ideas of the Jews at the beginning of the Christian Era. Without debating this last point, we observe that it is Jewish notions about angels and demons on which our author almost exclusively

dwells. But he breaks the force of his own argument by insisting himself on the long continuance of what he regards as superstitious beliefs on this subject. Demoniacal agency, sorcery, and witchcraft, he tells us, have been almost universally believed in, down to a recent date. The times of King James I. seem, in his judgment, to have shared in the credulity of the times of Herod. When he leaves this particular topic of demoniac agency, and looks about for proofs of the excessive credulity which he attributes to the Jews in the time of Christ, he is obliged to cite such examples as the familiar passage in Josephus on the portents observed in connection with the downfall of the Temple. Of the insufficiency of such proofs to establish his main thesis no well-informed student of history needs to be assured. Such portents, in times of high-wrought public excitement, even in modern times, have been often imagined to occur. There are certain facts which prove conclusively the erroneous and misleading conception of the state of the Jewish mind which this author seems to entertain. The geographical position of the Jews; their intercourse with the Greek world, as indicated in the circumstance that they were bilingual; the fixed legal character of their theology and worship; the existence of the party of Sadducees, a party marked by a tone of skepticism; the fact that no miracles are ascribed to John the Baptist and none to Jesus before his public life began; the numerous expressions in the gospels which signify the amazement which the miracles of Christ excited—these are among the circumstances which disprove the position of the author of this work. How could events of a class which everybody easily credited, and believed to be common, excite astonishment and fear, and be spoken of as events the like of which had never been heard of?

V. We are told by the author of *Supernatural Religion*, that if we believe the gospel miracles we must likewise accept the later ecclesiastical miracles; that both classes rest upon equal evidence; that there has been a continuous

stream of miraculous pretension down to the present time; and that to draw a line at any given point, after which we withhold our credence, is an arbitrary proceeding.

The view which an enlightened Protestant takes of miracles is this: that they were requisite elements in that creative, providential epoch when Christ and Christianity were introduced and entered into the historic life of humanity. At the same time, we are not obliged to affirm that miracles, at a given instant, abruptly and altogether ceased. Instances of manifest supernatural power exerted, in answer to prayer, in the healing of physical disorders, may have occurred after the death of the apostles, and even in later ages. Such events would not prove the infallibility of those through whose instrumentality they were wrought; nor would they invalidate the force of the gospel miracles as attestations of authoritative teaching. In the case of the latter, they were avowedly presented as credentials of a divine commission to teach. This was one of their direct and declared functions. But of the alleged post-apostolic miracles in the patristic age we remark, first, that they most frequently lack the proofs that would be requisite to establish even extraordinary natural events. For example, the author of this work appeals to the stories told of Gregory Thaumaturgus by his biographer, Gregory of Nyssa, and by St. Basil. But both of these lived a century after the person to whom these narratives relate. As to St. Basil, our author can hardly be serious in recommending his testimony on the ground that his "grandmother, St. Macrina, was brought up at Neo-Cæsarea by the immediate followers of the saint." In many other cases the evidence, when it is sifted, turns out to be not more satisfactory. We remark, secondly, that the alleged post-apostolic miracles are conceded to be in contrast with those of the Gospels in respect to "dignity and beauty." This author tries to account for the fact by saying that the latter were associated with "our sublimest teacher." But the explanation is not very

clear, and the striking fact remains that the miracles of the apocryphal gospels, which are connected with Christ, have a grotesque and offensive character, in marked contrast with the narratives of the evangelists. These last narratives comport with the whole tone of the teaching ascribed to Christ; they harmonize with it in their spirit, they fit into it also, and are presupposed by it in ways which no counterfeiter would be expert enough to contrive. We remark, thirdly, that the post-apostolic and especially the mediæval legends of miracles are explicable from the effect of Christianity itself, with its authentic miracles, upon the imagination and feelings of men of undisciplined minds, who were deeply impressed and kindled into a flame of emotional life by the Gospel. The gospel miracles, on the other hand, were not wrought in behalf of an accepted faith; they created a new faith. It is not true, as the author says, that no individuals in the mediæval age ascribed to themselves miraculous powers. For example, Augustin, the missionary to the Anglo-Saxons, and St. Bernard supposed themselves to perform miraculous works of healing. But, generally speaking, it is true that it was not the missionaries and preachers themselves, but others about them or after them, who attributed to them these marvels.

Now the Old Testament religion stood in no such relation to Jesus and his contemporaries as did the Gospel to the mediæval peoples, and in a less degree to the Christians of the third and fourth centuries. Neander, in his *Life of Christ*, has a brief but profound and important passage on this distinction. Christ and the apostles introduced a movement which is aboriginal and creative, notwithstanding its organic relation to the Old Testament religion. It is pretty generally felt that Strauss's theory was a plausible, but superficial, hypothesis. Judaism was languishing and dying. The age of miracles was in the far-off past. Men were fully sensible of the contrast between that distant period, the era of Moses and of the prophets, and the stagnant and

petrified period in which they themselves were living. There were no miracle-workers, unless exorcists are to be counted as such. Moreover, it is inconceivable that Jesus could have believed himself to be the Messiah, or in that character could have attached his followers to his person, had he not wrought miracles.

The main question is whether the Gospels give a substantially correct representation of the life of Jesus—of what he said and what he did. If the writer of *Supernatural Religion* had succeeded in his literary attack—we hold that he has added another to the long list of failures—but had he succeeded, he would have simply shown that these particular books, in their present form, represent merely the belief of the church in the second century. But how the church arose, what Christianity was—that tremendous movement which went forth with a silent, conquering power, in the face of obloquy, torture, death, on its mission to subdue the world—of these questions we are furnished with no solution. It is as certain as any historical fact can be—the Epistles of Paul, by themselves, establish it—that the apostles, the immediate followers and chosen companions of Jesus, testified to the miracles, including the crowning miracle of his resurrection.

The capital defect of this book, and of many other books of the same kind, is that they utterly lack a deep, broad, comprehensive understanding of Christianity, and a philosophical appreciation of its historical relation to the times previous and to the times subsequent to its appearance in the world. If here is not a new spiritual creation, if Christ is not “the second Adam,” a new head of humanity, the Redeemer, all this discussion about miracles might as well be dropped. Writers, who start with the fixed idea, whether consciously or unconsciously cherished, that the Christian religion is an example of the thousand and one impostures which have arisen and passed away in each generation; writers who are thus ignorant of Christianity as a system

of moral and religious truth, and as a vast, transforming movement in the course of human history, are shut up by their own narrow perceptions to a false conclusion. One who mistakes a pyramid upon the Nile for a cob-house will hardly arrive at a correct theory respecting its origin.

THE END.

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
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